Hello,
Many historians point out a drastic material inferiority of the IJA as being responsible for their defeat in such battle, and the reason they didn't joined with Hitler in 1941.
While the Japanese "defects" are certainly very good history lessons, my impression is that the historians are too much hard with the Japanese.
For example, let's look at same data of the Soviet offensive:
Zhukov assembled a powerful armored force of three tank brigades (the 4th, 6th and 11th), and two mechanized brigades (the 7th and 8th, which were armored car units with attached infantry support). This force was allocated to the Soviet left and right wings. The entire Soviet force consisted of three rifle divisions, two tank divisions and two more tank brigades (in all, some 498 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks[20]), two motorized infantry divisions, and over 550 fighters and bombers.[21] The Mongolians committed two cavalry divisions.[22][23][24]
By contrast, at the point of attack the Kwantung Army had only Lieutenant General Michitarō Komatsubara's 23rd Infantry Division, which with attached forces was equivalent to two light infantry divisions. Its headquarters had been at Hailar, over 150 km from the site of the fighting. Japanese intelligence had also failed to detect the scale of the Soviet buildup or the scope of the imminent offensive.
Battles of Khalkhin Gol - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
As we can see, the Japanese were not only vastly outnumbered, but they also simply didn't detected the Soviet offensive to act accordingly. The IJA Intelligence certainly must be criticized for this, but in no way the Army, there's simply no sense!
Also, while the Japanese casualities were very high (in Alvin Coox Nomonhan book, there's a mention from about 20,000 casualities from the IJA archives), the Soviet casualities are quiet similar. Which is quiet impressive, given that most Japanese casualities were inflicted in an offensive were they simply didn't have idea that would happen. One can think how much more difficulties the Soviets would face if the Japanese were aware and with "crack" troops in the area, including the IJNAF.
Another point I would like to make is about the IJA tactics. The IJA infantry tactics were intended for flank the enemy in a favourable terrain, and this terrain was in Eastern Manchuria, were one year earlier General Kotoku Sato managed to achive it's objective against vast Russian numerical (and total aerial, no IJA aircraft involved) in the Battle of Lake Khasan. He was only drived back because the guys in Tokyo didn't wanted to risk an escalation of the conflict.
I cannot denied the IJA serious problems like in the artillery and many other areas. But even in such areas, caution is needed, because the Red Army didn't had a spetacular performance in Finland either, and it was capable of absorve lessons, specially when the Barbarossa started.
There are many other points I missed. However, my basic intention is argument that Nomonhan was not really the "test battefield" for the IJA against the Soviets that many historians claim.
Many historians point out a drastic material inferiority of the IJA as being responsible for their defeat in such battle, and the reason they didn't joined with Hitler in 1941.
While the Japanese "defects" are certainly very good history lessons, my impression is that the historians are too much hard with the Japanese.
For example, let's look at same data of the Soviet offensive:
Zhukov assembled a powerful armored force of three tank brigades (the 4th, 6th and 11th), and two mechanized brigades (the 7th and 8th, which were armored car units with attached infantry support). This force was allocated to the Soviet left and right wings. The entire Soviet force consisted of three rifle divisions, two tank divisions and two more tank brigades (in all, some 498 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks[20]), two motorized infantry divisions, and over 550 fighters and bombers.[21] The Mongolians committed two cavalry divisions.[22][23][24]
By contrast, at the point of attack the Kwantung Army had only Lieutenant General Michitarō Komatsubara's 23rd Infantry Division, which with attached forces was equivalent to two light infantry divisions. Its headquarters had been at Hailar, over 150 km from the site of the fighting. Japanese intelligence had also failed to detect the scale of the Soviet buildup or the scope of the imminent offensive.
Battles of Khalkhin Gol - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
As we can see, the Japanese were not only vastly outnumbered, but they also simply didn't detected the Soviet offensive to act accordingly. The IJA Intelligence certainly must be criticized for this, but in no way the Army, there's simply no sense!
Also, while the Japanese casualities were very high (in Alvin Coox Nomonhan book, there's a mention from about 20,000 casualities from the IJA archives), the Soviet casualities are quiet similar. Which is quiet impressive, given that most Japanese casualities were inflicted in an offensive were they simply didn't have idea that would happen. One can think how much more difficulties the Soviets would face if the Japanese were aware and with "crack" troops in the area, including the IJNAF.
Another point I would like to make is about the IJA tactics. The IJA infantry tactics were intended for flank the enemy in a favourable terrain, and this terrain was in Eastern Manchuria, were one year earlier General Kotoku Sato managed to achive it's objective against vast Russian numerical (and total aerial, no IJA aircraft involved) in the Battle of Lake Khasan. He was only drived back because the guys in Tokyo didn't wanted to risk an escalation of the conflict.
I cannot denied the IJA serious problems like in the artillery and many other areas. But even in such areas, caution is needed, because the Red Army didn't had a spetacular performance in Finland either, and it was capable of absorve lessons, specially when the Barbarossa started.
There are many other points I missed. However, my basic intention is argument that Nomonhan was not really the "test battefield" for the IJA against the Soviets that many historians claim.
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