Japanese logistics, purchase programs and war booty, reality and alternatives 1936-44 (2 Viewers)

[tomo pauk]

Similar to the German thread, with Japanese both starting and finishing one year later.

Granted, Japanese will have far less to capture in the sense of the finished products. They can make a better use of the stuff developed by Germany than it was historically the case, though. Japan still embarks on the conquest as per historically (ie. China, SE Asia, attack on PH and Philippines etc, but no attack on Soviet Union bar the historical clashes before 1942), and they actually get to capture the oil fields (contrary to what Germans did). They still need a lot more of fuel stuff than what they have had available, while the Japanese industry is not as well developed as German industry, and was a fraction of what the USA had - no great discoveries there.

Imperial Japanese are still what they are - cruel masters of the captured areas - to their detriment. Perhaps some toning down of the hostile stance was possible, but not by a great deal.

To start the ball rolling: a more substantial cooperation with Germany once the Anti-Comitern pact is signed in late 1936.

 

[Zmauky]

To begin with - cooperation between the army and the navy without duplicating development, the same calibers of weapons and so on.
For example, Daimler sold an aircraft engine license to the Army (Kawasaki) and the Navy (Aichi)!
Japan is the only nation whose military had aircraft carriers and whose navy had ground forces (and I don't mean the SNLF as marines).
We can say that Germany lost the race in the development of the atomic bomb because they had 5 ? independent and non-cooperating teams, but Japan had two parallel military forces that (mostly) did not cooperate.

 

[tomo pauk]

To begin with - cooperation between the army and the navy without duplicating development, the same calibers of weapons and so on.

Yes, a modicum of the cooperation will be needed. Not easily achieved, but every bit helps.

Air defenses:
- buy the licence for the 40mm Bofors (for both Army and Navy needs), don't bother with the 25mm AA gun from France
- the Japanese 20mm AA guns are just fine, Navy should have these in production for their needs
- seems like the 100 and 120-127mm guns were the best what Japan had wrt. the heavy AA guns, but these are unlikely to be manufactured en masse as needed, so something else is also needed, preferably the German 8.8cm, or even the Bofors 75mm AA gun that Japanese actually copied, if too late
- increased and early cooperation with Germany should've introduced the Japanese with the advantages of the gun-laying radar

Granted, having workable radars is an force-multiplier on it's own and for anyone using it, at least before the jamming is introduced.

 

[tomo pauk]

The suggestions about making the German fuel situation are also applicable for the Japanese. They (Japanese) were trying even more exotic fuel sources, like the oil from pine roots etc.
They were not lucky enough with finding the oil in Manchuria, where in 1959 the Chinese found a lot, and also missed the Liaohe oil field. Getting lucky in either of the two changes a lot of the dynamics of the Pacific war.


Japanese tanks used the air-cooled diesels, so they were probably getting as good mileage for their tanks as possible. Not that their tanks could've not used some upgrades, mind you.