Japanese perspective

[GrauGeist]

Wrong. San Diego was the home port. It moved to Pearl May 1940 as a forward position.

Against the wishes of the Navy.

Do not think for a moment that Pearl, Wheeler, Hickham and other installations sat vacant prior to that date.

And while you're at it, tell me where was the U.S. Asiatic fleet based...

The Japanese leadership saw the U.S. as a potential threat to their expansion and drew up plans to neutralize it. As the U.S. started to withdraw trade of raw materials and oil in 1940 and 1941, they were drawn to the conclusion that the U.S. would be a potential adversary and felt that the neutralist American public would not have a stomac for war. Based on that assumption, the Japanese leadership wrongly beleived that a successful attack, or series of successful attacks, on American interests would force the U.S. to the bargaining table.

There were several among the Japanese leadership who disagreed, including Admiral Yamamoto, who even expressed that attacking the United States at Pearl may hold a victory, but would invite disaster for the Empire in the long run.

 

[buffnut453]

With the exception of the sizeable submarine force, the Asiatic Fleet was little more than a speck in terms of combat capability compared to the forces at Pearl Harbor. Also, although the facilities you mentioned were not sitting empty, it's equally true that they underwent considerable reinforcement by more capable/modern aircraft from late 1940 onwards. Those actions were perceived in Tokyo as an increase in threat to Japan's interests.

 

[tyrodtom]

Those B-17 and B-24 were a flying fortress which Japanese fighters did not know how to attack.
Even after captured some B-17s in the Philippines and Indonesia, Japanese experts were unable to understand its design conception soon well, especially the Norden bomb sight and the turbo charger.

Army fighter pilots anyway studied tactics flying together with them and taught the navy Zero pilots how to make effective Approaching Attack.

A book says like above

Maybe the army pilots should have asked for some advice from Saburo Sakia, he led the group of Zeros that shot down the first B-17 lost in air combat in the Pacific, just 3 days into the war. That was the B-17 piloted by Colin Kelly.

 

[VBF-13]

Sorry, VBF-13, if I may have put you in any anger or annoyance.

I am not necessarily standing on the Japanese nationalists' side and the Chinese communists' side either but their arguments are not only in parallel but harsher day by day. This is my anxiety. Books, evidences, testimonies and opinions about the issue made public in the both sides after the war ended are much different with exaggeration with political intention and emotion like the John Rabe for example but I thought fresh reports introduced soon after the incident happened in Dec 1937 could be telling us "What actually happened" very closely to the fact.

I know LIFE reporters were clearly standing on the Chinese side but see the article I have introduced in above. Doesn't it look quite fair for both sides? I have posted wishing such a 'fact' as this to be a common perspective among Japan, China and the old Allies.

I'm sorry, I think we're misunderstanding our replies. In this question I was seeking to take a dispassionate look into the Allied provocations, if any, to the Japanese aggression on December 7th, 1941. Something caused that. Something ignited it. Something touched it off. That's what I was looking to explore. Your earlier reply seemingly pinned that Japanese aggression on the longstanding, deep-seated differences between China and Japan, which, in effect, would make that Japanese aggression on December 7th, 1941 inevitable, unstoppable. It was in the cards. The die was cast. Those longstanding, deep-seated differences were there. They weren't going away. They were, at bottom, the reason for the Japanese aggression on December 7th, 1941. No amount of Allied diplomacy or negotiation could have changed that. That aggression was a part of that plot. It fit right into those Japanese imperatives in relationship to China. To stop it, those longstanding, deep-seated differences had to be resolved, and they couldn't be, there was no chance. They were, for the most part, irreconcilable.

I hope that's better. I hope you understand, I'm not pointing the finger at anybody, or judging anybody, here. Quite the contrary, I'm trying to make sense of what you said your understanding was for that Japanese aggression. You pointed to the troubles with China to explain that aggression away. I can't say that's wrong. In fact, quite frankly, it makes a lot of sense to me.

 

[GrauGeist]

With the exception of the sizeable submarine force, the Asiatic Fleet was little more than a speck in terms of combat capability compared to the forces at Pearl Harbor. Also, although the facilities you mentioned were not sitting empty, it's equally true that they underwent considerable reinforcement by more capable/modern aircraft from late 1940 onwards. Those actions were perceived in Tokyo as an increase in threat to Japan's interests.

With over 20 years of expansion and occupation in neighboring countries in the Western Pacific and Eastern Asia, at what point do you suggest the Japanese realized that the United States presence in the region was a threat to their goals?

Granted, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet was not impressive as many fleets go, it was still a long-established military force on Japan's doorstep.

 

[buffnut453]

It was one factor among many but let's start with Asiatic Fleet specifically. On 22 Jul 41, the new port facility at Mariveles was completed, providing modern berthing for more vessels. In Oct 41 the existing, but largely elderly, fleet of 13 submarines was effectively doubled with the arrival of SubDiv15 and SubDiv16. That's clearly an expansion of offensive rather than defensive forces, as is the arrival of B-17s in increasing numbers during the latter half of 1941. Then there's the rapid expansion in fighter aircraft defences and the considerably qualitative improvement from P-26s to P-40s. Taken from the Japanese perspective, this all adds up to a major rearmament effort and it's happening right in what Japan considered to be her "back yard"...and was seen as a knife pointed at the throat of Japan's economic lifelines from China and the wider Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The US had been competing with Japan for 60+ years in the Pacific rim but it the increase in tensions during 1940 and 1941 prompted a major US reinforcement of the Philippines which appeared to Japan like a huge increase in threat posture.

 

[GrauGeist]

The US had been competing with Japan for 60+ years in the Pacific rim

Along with other many other Western nations

increase in tensions during 1940 and 1941 prompted a major US reinforcement of the Philippines

And why do you suppose the U.S. was enhancing their numbers in the region?

The aggressive Japanese expansion in the region had many nations on edge

 

[buffnut453]

Entirely agree but we're supposed to be discussing the Japanese perspective...and that's all I'm trying to articulate here. What certain Japanese viewed as their destiny, other nations saw as blatant and illegal expansionism. What British and American leaders viewed as considered measures to "encourage" Japan towards tangible, meaningful reductions in military expansionism were interpreted by some Japanese as attempts to choke their nation.

 

[GrauGeist]

Also bear in mind that Japan was a historic friend and ally of the U.S. and when the U.S. started to draw-down it's material support, the Japanese took that as an insult.

 

[davebender]

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/australia/oceania_pol01.jpg
Formosa and Japanese occupied SE China can be reached by heavy bombers based on Luzon. Japanese naval base at Palau can be reached by heavy bombers operating from the new B-17 base on Mindanao.

Given the amount of military cooperation between 1941 Britain and USA Japan had to assume Philippine based heavy bombers could stage through British airfields in Hong Kong, Malaya etc.

 

[VBF-13]

Entirely agree but we're supposed to be discussing the Japanese perspective.

Yes, Buff, that's it, what the Japanese were seeing as the provocations, the precipitating causes, for their aggression. I want to see that perspective.

 

[fubar57]

Entirely agree but we're supposed to be discussing the Japanese perspective...

Was wondering when someone was gonna mention this.

Geo

 

[Messy1]

I also believe the US was responsible for showing Japan how to expand their empire using force if necessary. While trying to open trade routes with Japan against their will in the mid 1800's, we threatened military action if they did not concede to our trade treaties, we sailed ships into their harbor and threatened bombardment. We showed Japan how to use force to accomplish their goals. I believe these actions also contributed to Japan modernizing their military, making it strong enough so they could not be bullied by western nations. They adopted our own tactics in some ways.
Also do not forget the Washington Naval Treaty after WWI. Japan took it as a mjor insult, limiting the size of their WWI allies ships and navies, even when they fought alongside Great Britain and the US.

 

[The Basket]

Signing the Tripartite Pact with Germany in Sept 1940 was a clear indication of future intent.

 

[buffnut453]

And Britain withdrawing from its treaties with Japan...again, trying to put the Japanese perspective.

 

[The Basket]

Anyhoo back to Pearl Harbour. Basing the Pacific Fleet there is a clear game changer as it is a message to the Japanese. The actual battleships are secondary. Red rag to a bull.

The tripartate pact clearly indicate that Japan saw the western powers as future enemies.

Can a Western person see things from a Japanese Perspective? Not really. I have owned 4 Japanese motorcycles though! So that must make me an expert! Only a Japanese national can really tell you.

 

[GrauGeist]

Obviously the thread is from the "Japanese Perspective"...

The point I was trying to make, was whether or not the Pacific fleet was moved to Pearl, there was going to be a showdown between the U.S. and the Empire of Japan. The Japanese had considered west coast targets and if the fleet were not in Pearl Harbor, then the confrontation would have most likely been on continental U.S. soil. Either way, it was going to happen.

There was a huge rift between the two that was getting wider and wider as the Empire's intentions came into conflict with the American's interests. Placing embargoes and halting raw material shipments to Japan was pretty much the last straw as far as the Japanese were concerned.

Moving the Pacific Fleet to Pearl didn't expedite Japan's intentions, it just made their first move easier.

 

[parsifal]

japans war with China and the West was a war about trade. Basically the japanese wanted most favoured nation status, something the Chinese had given to the wetern european nations under the uneaqual treaties of the 1800s, but not to them. they resented that. And the japanese policy toward China was diametrically opposite to the US Open Door policy toward China.

Japan observed the deeply racist and white supremacist policies of the west in the Far East and determined that they had to lead asia out of its bondage. They viewed the colonial expansions as a deep affront to emerging Asian identity.

Unfortunately at the same time as japan was emerghing from her isolation , she also adopted some rather nasty traaits that was to seal the collision with the west. Japans samurai codes and military traditions lent themselves well to the rise of ultra nationalism in Japan, and from that extreme militarism. The result was that when Japan did actually start on its 20th century expansion, it soon came up against Asian and western resistence

Nanking was a massacre, lets not beat around the bush, for which there are few excuses. it is a stain on japanese honour Im afraid, particulalry since the commander, a relative of the emperor no less, continued to issue orders to continue the slaughter, long after it was obvious that no legitimate military targets remained in the city

 

[VBF-13]

Japan observed the deeply racist and white supremacist policies of the west in the Far East and determined that they had to lead asia out of its bondage. They viewed the colonial expansions as a deep affront to emerging Asian identity.

How much did they care about "Asian identity" when they slaughtered all those Chinese in Nanking? No, I'm sorry, it's not that easy. "Japanese identity," now we're talking. And I'm seeing, now, they were unprovoked. They had a plan and military they thought was tough as a nickel steak. I could get it all off an episode of "Victory at Sea." They were going ahead with their plan to conquer that region, and that was that, nothing, no amount of negotiation, was stopping it.

 

[Shinpachi]

I think this thread title had better be changed to 'American Perspective' but complying with it with my great respects to you VBF-13, a genuine Japanese perspective was, unlike you imagine with my apology, the Pacific Ocean was not their back yard but sacred front yard.

When armed Americans one day suddenly came in there paying no respects and even killed a number of Filipinos in front of them, no natural threats like the typhoons or earthquakes were bigger than that for the Japanese. They had no choice but expanding their armaments further to confront like "Come on guy. Draw your gun".

That's it and no way but I don't think the PH attack would have come earlier than the Dec 7 as I know Japanese leaders hesitated another war in Asia until the last moment in the end of October, 1941. You could see there are same dilemma in China and North Korea today.