Japanese Zero vs Spitfire vs FW 190

Schweik said:

So it sounds like he says the Spitfires were having serious overheating problems

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Yup, it wasn't just a problem in hot climes, the overheating issue was a problem in Britain as well while waiting to taxy. This from the Spitfire Mk.I and II Pilot's Notes:

"Warming up should not be unduly prolonged, as the temperature rises quickly and some margin must be kept in hand for taxying. If it is 130 degrees before the aeroplane taxies out it will become excessive if there is any distance to taxy downwind. The engine should not idle for any length of time in a light wind, and the aircraft should always face into wind."

There are warnings about never exceeding radiator and oil temps as well as keeping the radiator flap open on the ground. It was a well known issue of the Spit.

I should clarify this, while the aircraft could overheat if not acted on, it was maintained under control in normal use because of reductions in waiting time on the ground, rather than it being a serious problem. Pilots had to be aware that if they took too long to taxy they could overheat the engine.

jaydawg73 said:

Interesting response to a positive post I wrote. Perhaps you are somebody who just chooses to pick points from someone's post that you do not like and comment on those as opposed to reading and taking in the whole post and evaluating it for how it was intended. But I shall leave you with that thought and will not be responding to anymore of your posts. Thank you for your points of view.

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Well how about debating this instead of acting like a butt-hurt child? There are some of us on this forum who have worked around this equipment, operated and flown same, so unless you're in a position to discuss this based on first hand knowledge, actual experience, or show references to back your statements, I suggest a comfy armchair.

Schweik said:

On 16 June 1942 another raid came in with 27 x Japanese bombers (apparently mostly G4M) and 27 x A6M. 8th and 9th FS of 49th FG (with apparently two flights of 4 planes each) engaged the enemy. 1 P-40 from 8th FS piloted by Chester Namola was shot down (possibly went into a spin after being hit). Another P-40 burned out it's engine in a frantic dive to get away from Zeros, the pilot ditched in the water and was rescued by the Royal Navy the next day. A third P-40 piloted by Bruce Harris also dove away, but recovered, went into a zoom climb, caught up with the Japanese formation and attacked, firing until his guns jammed, but ran out of fuel heading back to base. He crash landed and his aircraft caught on fire and burned. He too was later rescued by an RAAF Wiwrraway after a harrowing ordeal. 9th FS did better and claimed 3 x A6M and 2 x G4M, while one P-40 was hit by return fire from a G4M and landed dead-stick. His aircraft was recovered the next day. Another made a belly landing on an artillery range. From the context it sounds like 9th FS was already at altitude when the raid came in, while 8th FS was climbing up. The site didn't indicate what Japanese losses actually were, but the US lost 3 planes, plus 2 badly damaged, with 1 pilot killed and one evacuated back home, claiming 3 fighters and 2 bombers.

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According to "The Empire Strikes South" and "Eagles over Darwin" the Japanese suffered no losses on this raid.

Acheron said:

Two thoughts:
1 While a bomber is more expensive than a fighter, downing enemy fighters instead moves you closer to air superiority, achieve that you will destroy a heck lot of enemy bombers.
2 AFAIK, during the BoB, most British fighters could deal with German fighters and bombers. During the Battle of Germany, this was somewhat less the case. A fighter optimized to go after a heavy four-engine bomber needed quite heavy armament and ideally extra armor, which however significantly reduced performance against fighters. By contrast, the lighter German bombers were not as tough a nut to crack.

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My thoughts are you are completely miss understanding the Battle of Britain, For Dowding the most important thing above all else was that the RAF fighter command had to continue to exist. The LW could trade at losses of 2 to 1 in fighters and still wipe out the RAF fighter command completely.



1 Dowding had to maintain air superiority over the UK. As far as air attack that meant preventing attacks all around the south coast of England and the eastern coast of England and Scotland as far as Scapa Flow in the Orkney isles north of Scotland itself. The only important thing was stopping the LW bombers.
This was done very quickly with raids from Norway, the Me110 Dackelbauch was batted out of the game and with it most raids from Norway ceased because they suffered too many losses. Raids by Ju 87 on the south coast of England were stopped, they suffered high losses because they were very difficult to escort and protect. There were then many raids on airfield and industrial targets, almost all were met and countered, no airfield or RADAR station was put out of commission for a serious length of time. But with these raids the LW suffered heavy losses of bombers. Not only shot down but also badly damaged and damaged on landing, plus many crew who returned were injured. By mid September when the LW switched to mass raids on London, this was a strategic decision, but also the only strategy left. So many bomber squadrons had been reduced to 3 or 4 operational planes with crews that the only thing to do with what was left was to give a simple form up point and a simple target. Even so, the escorts of German bombers outnumbered the whole of the RAF fighter command's operational fighters, let alone those who were able to be brought to the fight, only approximately half of RAF fighters were available to defend London, but still the escorts were not able to prevent unsustainable losses of bombers.

2 British fighters and German fighters could deal with bombers, if they had the time and were left alone. The British attempted to bring cannon into the fight in 1940. The LW increased the armament on their interceptors partly because of American bombers defensive armour and defensive firepower but mailny because the presence of escorts gave them very little time to hit the target. Both sides discovered after the war how many planes they didnt shoot down but riddled with bullets made it to somewhere but neither the plane or many of the crews flew again.

Wildcat said:

According to "The Empire Strikes South" and "Eagles over Darwin" the Japanese suffered no losses on this raid.

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Cool, thanks for turning me on to those books they both look great!

So while it seems that some aircraft did not do so well in torrid tropical conditions of excessive heat and moisture, was the reverse also true? How many aircraft didn't do well in cooler conditions of Northern Europe? I know the early P-38 had problems with the (lack of) heaters. Did the A6M have any problems operating in Alaska?

Conversely, did Fw 190s have any problems in North Africa? I know they did pretty well in combat down there when they were deployed (I think JG 2)

Schweik said:

So while it seems that some aircraft did not do so well in torrid tropical conditions of excessive heat and moisture, was the reverse also true? How many aircraft didn't do well in cooler conditions of Northern Europe? I know the early P-38 had problems with the (lack of) heaters. Did the A6M have any problems operating in Alaska?

Conversely, did Fw 190s have any problems in North Africa? I know they did pretty well in combat down there when they were deployed (I think JG 2)

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The only negative thing I ever heard about the Zero with regards to maintenance was that part interchangeability was poor as well as the spare part supply chain, but I think this was common across the board for most Japanese aircraft. I don't have a reference for that but I know it's been mentioned several times

The comparative reliability of the A6M and Ki-43 were probably a lot of why they remained in use for so long. An aircraft with 150% of the capability but 30% of the availability is just not as good. If you are the unit commander you aren't going to want the latter.

Schweik said:

The comparative reliability of the A6M and Ki-43 were probably a lot of why they remained in use for so long. An aircraft with 150% of the capability but 30% of the availability is just not as good. If you are the unit commander you aren't going to want the latter.

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Seems reasonable. A serviceable Ki-43-II is more valuable than a Ki-84 grounded with a sheared gear leg and smoking engine.

Exactly. This is in fact why the unit from the above mentioned Darwin defense, 49th FG, which was (I think) the first unit to get P-38s in the PTO, (and the original unit of McGuire and Bong) was still very slowly and painfully transitioning to P-38s as late as 1944. I think they had one of three squadron, plus another spin-off squadron, flying P-38s by then. A lot of the war in the South Pacific was being fought with 1941-42 vintage aircraft on both sides until what was probably after the tipping point.

Schweik said:

Exactly. This is in fact why the unit from the above mentioned Darwin defense, 49th FG, which was (I think) the first unit to get P-38s in the PTO, (and the original unit of McGuire and Bong) was still very slowly and painfully transitioning to P-38s as late as 1944. I think they had one of three squadron, plus another spin-off squadron, flying P-38s by then. A lot of the war in the South Pacific was being fought with 1941-42 vintage aircraft on both sides until what was probably after the tipping point.

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The 39th, 9th and eventually the 80th were the tipping point and it started in December 42'. These units gained aerial superiority over New Guinea when they started operating P-38s. I think you'll find that transition happened a lot quicker than 1944 although V fighter command was never able to get their hands on enough P-38s and for a spell, the 348th had P-47s (Neil Kearby's unit). From what I can see the 13th AF was fully engaged by October, 43.

FLYBOYJ said:

The 39th, 9th and eventually the 80th were the tipping point and it started in December 42'. These units gained aerial superiority over New Guinea when they started operating P-38s. I think you'll find that transition happened a lot quicker than 1944 although V fighter command was never able to get their hands on enough P-38s and for a spell, the 348th had P-47s (Neil Kearby's unit)

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The 9th FS was the first unit of the 49th FG which was flying P-38s. The other two fighter squadrons (7th and 8th) were still flying P-40s well into 1944. Bong and McGuire flew for the 9th FS (and also breifly for the 39th FS, an operational training / transition unit). Ninth fighter squadron was also flying P-47s for a while in early 1944.

All three squadrons of the 49th FG were 'elite' units and did very well. Aside from Bong, McGuire, and Gerald Johnson, who were outliers, the 9th FS had about the same rate of success.
The 9th FS had 15 Aces (including Bong, McGuire and Johnson and one more double ace), the 8th FS had 14 Aces (including 3 double aces), and the 7th FS had 8 aces including one double-ace.

Robert DeHaven (14 victories) who flew with the 7th Fighter Squadron and scored about half of his victories in the P-40 and half in the P-38, noted that the main difference was really the range, the P-38 could be used on the offensive at further distances beyond Southern New Guinea. The P-38 had the potential to be a game changer but it was not around in enough numbers to really make the difference, and not enough pilots had the skills to deal with all of the challenges of flying it, at least until after that tipping point. A lot of the heavy lifting (and eventual combat success) in New Guinea specifically and South Pacific more generally was with P-40s, Wildcats, and P-39s.

80th FS was originally flying P-39s (P-400s) and then went back to P-40s, converting to P-38s in March 43.

I think the F4U Corsairs were making a difference fairly early as well (I think VMF 124 was first, early in 43) though in similarly small numbers to the P-38s.

The Hellcats were not around until fall of 1943. The P-47s were around by early 44 though I'm not sure how much difference they made, P-51s did make a difference but I think they were also arriving in 44.

Schweik said:

The P-38 had the potential to be a game changer but it was not around in enough numbers to really make the difference, and not enough pilots had the skills to deal with all of the challenges of flying it, at least until after that tipping point. A lot of the heavy lifting (and eventual combat success) in New Guinea specifically and South Pacific more generally was with P-40s, Wildcats, and P-39s.

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I don't know about that - if you review the history and V and XIII fighter command (and the P-38 squadrons under them), it seems by early/ mid 43, their operations expanded because they had a fighter that was capable of long range sweeps and escorts, well documented in the book "Peter Three Eight." Additionally you had many aces emerging from these units. I don't know if you can say they were "elite, " just had some great pilots assigned to them. Don't forget the 433rd and the 475th (McGuire's squadron) Now with that said, nothing is taken away from the P-39s and P-40s still being operated in theater. Now you mention Wildcats - Guadalcanal?

yes Guadalcanal and the Navy units

Schweik said:

yes Guadalcanal and the Navy units

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Well when the P-38 arrived in theater V Fighter command went from about a 1 to 1.5/ 1 to 2 kill/ loss ratio to well over 4 to 1, depending who you talk to. I think overall in the PTO the P-38 "claimed" a 17 to 1 kill ratio. Without the P-38 the V and 13th AF would not have been able to advance out of New Guinea in the same amount of time as they did. You said it yourself, "the P-38 could be used on the offensive at further distances beyond Southern New Guinea." As far as not enough pilots or aircraft, that could have been said just about anywhere in the PTO, but I think it's obvious results were apparent. The P-38 enabled 5th AF medium bombers to attack targets with escorts and finally without the P-38 the Yamamoto mission would have never happened. If that didn't make a difference, I don't know what else will!

Given the small numbers of P-38s (especially before 1943), their fairly low serviceability especially early on, and the fact that the other units were racking up victories at the same rate more or less (especially if you exclude Bong and McGuire) - plus the inevitable overclaiming - I think the changes may have had less to do specifically with the P-38s and more to do with more gradual improvements in training, logistics, and the more gradual improvement of the existing aircraft. In the 49th G, the loss rates per combat sortie of the 7th and 8th FS went way down from the catastrophic levels of the spring and early summer, more or less the same as they did for the 9th. Part of this was better equipment.

By late 1942 for example 7th and 8th FS were receiving P-40Ks which had improved ammunition storage (therefore much less jamming problems) and 400+ additional horsepower at lower altitude (making the escape maneuver + zoom climb a much more sure thing). The surviving pilots had learned many hard lessons, they had established tactics and procedures to deal with the Japanese fighters, I think they had mosquito nets, and (I think) DDT and quinine, and the replacement pilots coming in were fare better trained. All of those things individually are minor but put together add up to a lot.

And you had Corsairs in the Islands and Spitfires in Darwin in early 1943 and later East Indies, not sure when they got the Spitfire VIIIs but those were a major improvement - and Beaufighters (in the New Guinea area starting in mid-1942), and much more heavily armed Allied bombers like the B-25s and B-24s coming in more and more.

Finally, perhaps the most telling factor is that by the end of 1942, the Japanese units were starting to really feel the effects of attrition, and had lost a lot of their most experienced aircrews like at Midway and in the steady fighting around New Guinea.

I think it's an overly simplistic story to credit it all to the P-38s, personally. I think the P-38 and especially that handful of pilots who really learned how to make the most out of it, were a major part, but not the whole thing or even necessarily the decisive factor. I know that was the post-war narrative though.

The biggest difference the P-38 did make was as you said, the longer range escort ability, though Japanese fighters weren't super effective against B-25s and B-24s even unescorted

Schweik said:

Given the small numbers of P-38s (especially before 1943), their fairly low serviceability especially early on, and the fact that the other units were racking up victories at the same rate more or less (especially if you exclude Bong and McGuire) - plus the inevitable overclaiming - I think the changes may have had less to do specifically with the P-38s and more to do with more gradual improvements in training, logistics, and the more gradual improvement of the existing aircraft. In the 49th G, the loss rates per combat sortie of the 7th and 8th FS went way down from the catastrophic levels of the spring and early summer, more or less the same as they did for the 9th. Part of this was better equipment.

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How can you exclude Bong and Maguire, during that period? Why don't you disregard other participants as well? McGuire didn't even arrive until March 1943. They were not even the higher scoring aces at the time, you had others contributing like Tom Lynch, Danny Roberts, Robert Vaught, Stan Sparks and even George Welch, and I'm talking from late 1942 into the summer of 1943.

Over claiming it's a given regardless, but I do agree with you on better training and logistics support

Schweik said:

By late 1942 for example 7th and 8th FS were receiving P-40Ks which had improved ammunition storage (therefore much less jamming problems) and 400+ additional horsepower at lower altitude (making the escape maneuver + zoom climb a much more sure thing). The surviving pilots had learned many hard lessons, they had established tactics and procedures to deal with the Japanese fighters, I think they had mosquito nets, and (I think) DDT and quinine, and the replacement pilots coming in were fare better trained. All of those things individually are minor but put together add up to a lot.

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Agree, but even with the improved P-40 K, they were not going to drive the Japanese out of the New Guinea skies. I'm not addressing the Australian effort here, I'm just talking about the Fifth and 13th Air Force.

Schweik said:

Finally, perhaps the most telling factor is that by the end of 1942, the Japanese units were starting to really feel the effects of attrition, and had lost a lot of their most experienced aircrews like at Midway and in the steady fighting around New Guinea.

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Agree

Schweik said:

I think it's an overly simplistic story to credit it all to the P-38s, personally. I think the P-38 and especially that handful of pilots who really learned how to make the most out of it, were a major part, but not the whole thing or even necessarily the decisive factor. I know that was the post-war narrative though.

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You keep saying "handful of pilots" small numbers and serviceability issues - exactly when? The first major P-38 combat sorties were flown in late 1942. By mid-1943 how many squadrons do think were operational in the SWP?

No, I'm not giving all the credit to the P-38 and I recognize the units flying them were not the only game in town, my point is it DID make a difference - a BIG DIFFERENCE.

FLYBOYJ said:

How can you exclude Bong and Maguire, during that period? Why don't you disregard other participants as well? McGuire didn't even arrive until March 1943. They were not even the higher scoring aces at the time, you had others contributing like Tom Lynch, Danny Roberts, Robert Vaught, Stan Sparks and even George Welch, and I'm talking from late 1942 into the summer of 1943.

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I'm just saying Bong and Maguire were outliers, they (and arguably) Gerald Johnson were the guys who really learned to make the P-38 sing, and live up to it's true potential even while it still had so many teething problems. The other P-38 pilots did well but so did the P-40 pilots in 49th FG.

FLYBOYJ said:

Over claiming it's a given regardless, but I do agree with you on better training and logistics support


Agree, but even with the improved P-40 K, they were not going to drive the Japanese out of the New Guinea skies. I'm not addressing the Australian effort here, I'm just talking about the Fifth and 13th Air Force.

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Well I'd say the Aussies and N-Zeds were also a critical factor. They were comparable to the 49th in impact.

FLYBOYJ said:

Agree

No, I'm not giving all the credit to the P-38, my point is it DID make a difference - a BIG DIFFERENCE.

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Yeah we aren't that far apart, I'm just squeezing in a little more nuance here. People tend to forget that the aircraft which were being used in early 1942 did get improved, as did tactics and conditions etc.. 49th FG got the P-40K and later N, and also even got some P-40Fs (they were the only unit in the PTO to get any). I think even the P-39s in Theater improved, the early ones were P-39D and those P-400s that they couldn't hook up oxygen for, later they got at least slightly more capable models.

It would be really interesting to see some kind of estimate of how many fighter pilots (and trained bomber crews) the IJA and IJN had from early 1942 to the end of the year, and through 1943