Japanese Zero vs Spitfire vs FW 190

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

The effect of being cold increases with time, for a high altitude interceptor inadequate heating is inconvenient and uncomfortable, for long range missions it can be fatal, especially since UK missions in February meant the pilot was probably very cold before he even took off.
 
Ageed. A point I have made in the past and tend to ignore when applied to me is that the people making the decisions where under tremendous pressure to make the decisions very quickly with an overriding need to get aircraft into combat yesterday if not sooner. When bomber crews are dying at an unsustainable rate the comfort of a fighter pilot becomes pretty much irrelevant.
 
I grew up in a part of the world that can see temperature as low as minus 40 so I am fully aware of how difficult it can be to function in cold weather and the serious issues that can result from prolonged exposure.
Having spent time trying to keep warm in a Volkswagen beetle with the same style of exhaust manifold heater as the P-38 I feel empathy for the pilots.
 
I agree I was just referring to the part in your post, not your words but a linked quote that contained "Although designed as a high altitude interceptor".
 
Agree on both fronts - over the years many people have tried to demonize (for a better choice of words) Lockheed for deficiencies found on the P-38, and there were many on the early production models. As stated many times previously, no one expected more than 75 P-38s to ever be constructed and the aircraft was operated in a variety roles it was never intended, again one of them being a long range escort. Most of the bashing was the result of the memo written by Col Rau, 3 June1944. I bolded and colored key points;

20th Fighter Group Headquarters APO 637 U.S. Army(E-2)
3 June 1944
Subject: P-38 Airplane in Combat.
To: Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command, APO 637, U.S. Army.

1. The following observations are being put in writing by the undersigned at the request of the Commanding General, VIII FC. They are intended purely as constructive criticism and are not intended in anyway to "low rate" our present equipment.

2. After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred hours on combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands now, is too complicated for the 'average' pilot. I want to put strong emphasis on the word 'average', taking full consideration just how little combat training our pilots have before going on as operational status.

3. As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-fivehours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising along with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavyload). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced",what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several thingswrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure.

4. In my limited experience with a P-38 group, we have lost as least four (4) pilots, who when bounced, took no immediate evasive action. Thelogical assumption is that they were so busy in the cockpit, trying to get organized that they were shot down before they could get going.

5. The question that arises is, what are you going to do about it? It is standard procedure for the group leader to call, five minutes before R/Vand tell all the pilots to "prepare for trouble". This is the signal for everyone to get into auto rich, turn drop tank switches on, gun heaters on, combat and sight switches on and to increase RPM and manifold pressure to maximum cruise. This procedure, however, does not help the pilot who is bounced on the way in and who is trying to conserve his gasoline and equipment for the escort job ahead.

6. What is the answer to these difficulties? During the past several weeks we have been visited at this station time and time again by Lockheed representatives, Allison representatives and high ranking Army personnel connected with these two companies. They all ask about our troubles and then proceed to tell us about the marvelous mechanisms that they have devised to overcome these troubles that the Air Force has turned down as "unnecessary". Chief among these is a unit power control, incorporating an automatic manifold pressure regulator, which will control power, RPM and mixture by use of a single lever. It is obvious that there is a crying need for a device like that in combat.

7. It is easy to understand why test pilots, who have never been in combat, cannot readily appreciate what each split second means when a "bounce" occurs. Every last motion when you get bounced is just another nail in your coffin. Any device which would eliminate any of the enumerated above, are obviously very necessary to make the P-38 a really effective combat airplane.

8. It is also felt that that much could done to simplify the gas switching system in this airplane. The switches {valve selector handles} are
all in awkward positions and extremely hard to turn. The toggle switches for outboard tanks are almost impossible to operate with gloves on.

9. My personal feeling about this airplane is that it is a fine piece of equipment, and if properly handled, takes a back seat for nothing that the enemy can produce. But it does need simplifying to bring it within the capabilities of the 'average' pilot. I believe that pilots like Colonel Ben Kelsey and Colonel Cass Hough are among the finest pilots in the world today. But I also believe that it is difficult for men like them to place their thinking and ability on the level of a youngster with a bare 25 hours in the airplane, going into his first combat. That is the sort of thinking that will have to be done, in my opinion, to make the P-38 a first-class all around fighting airplane.

HAROLD J. RAU
Colonel, Air Corps, Commanding.


P-38 detractors have taken bits and pieces of this memo to bash the P-38 and Allison over the years, but if you read into it Rau identifies the root of the problem in the first paragraph. Now IMO, he was overcritical about the cockpit configuration, compare the P-38 cockpit to other twin engine fighters (DH Mosquito, Beaufighter, Me110) of the period and I don't think you'll see much difference. The P-38 had to fulfill roles that wasn't identified when it was being developed and although difficulties were encountered, got the job done.
 
The Army didn't want to take the performance hit a gasoline fueled cockpit heater would cause.

American Stewart-Warner South Wind car heater from the 1930s.


After the British got out of their contract for Aircobras by specifying such a heater the Army didn't want to see the P-38s performance ruined by such a device.

(Sarcasm)
BTW Old VW Beetles and Corvairs could be equipped with such heaters as options.
 
The infamous Webasto auxiliary heater that Canadian spec Beetles often came with didn't truely solve the problem.
 
The coldest I have ever been was in the back seat of a Morris Minor riding through Amarillo Texas in December. There wasn't enough water in the little four cylinder for the coffee can size heater up front to notice.
 
A couple of questions to show my ignorance.

1). What is a "Combat Switch"?

2). Did the P-38 ever get the "marvelous mechanism" known as a "unit power control, incorporating an automatic manifold pressure regulator etc."?

3). Were the valve selector handles changed for easier use?

Thanks in advance.
 
A couple of questions to show my ignorance.

1). What is a "Combat Switch"?
That's been asked several times and I really don't have an answer, it's not found in the basic flight manual in any cockpit nomenclature (at least in the copy I have). I believe it might have something to do with arming the guns or turning on the gunsight.
2). Did the P-38 ever get the "marvelous mechanism" known as a "unit power control, incorporating an automatic manifold pressure regulator etc."?
As far as I know, "no."
3). Were the valve selector handles changed for easier use?
They were - I believe the original selector had a raised portion that was twisted into position, the later selector had a handle.
Thanks in advance.
 
Thanks FB, too bad about number 2, sounds like it would have been quite the boon in combat.
 
Yes, because the airplane is a born Dogfighter. Same scenario WWI aircraft found themselves in.
The Zero, while having excellent climbing ability, wasn't such a good diver, as the plane was built too lightly (to put it in a very general sense), thus it wasn't a good plane for "Boom and Zoom" tactics, which is a WWII scenario.
That's what I meant when I posted that statement.
 
Every plane design involves the art of intelligent compromise. Japan needed a plane with a 600 mile combat radius, one that could operate from aircraft carriers, including small ones. The plane had to be able to take on the best planes operated by potential adversaries, and it had to make due with a 950-1050 horsepower engine and be affordable to the Japanese government and be producable by Japanese industry. The Zero fulfilled these requirements, but more to the point, in the 5 months from December 1941 through May 1942, the Zero drove all opposition from the sky, enabling the country to accomplish most of its territorial goals by May 1942. During this period, and even through the battles of Coral Sea and Midway, losses of the A6M in the air were manageable even though the plane did not have armor or protected fuel tanks. To that end, those features were not essential to the aircraft accomplishing its mission. In the Guadalcanal campaign, despite the Zero generally flying 600 miles from Rabaul, the Zero fought the F4F to a statistical draw (according to Lundstrum), and the Wildcat was a much more expensive aircraft than the A6M. The problem with the Zero was that it wasn't replaced in 1943 when the Allies replaced their 1941 fighters.
 
The problem with the Zero was that it wasn't replaced in 1943 when the Allies replaced their 1941 fighters.
Yes, interesting comment.
I have to wonder if the Japanese Military felt that the Zero needed to be replaced?
I think we replaced our "early war" fighters with more advanced models because we felt they needed to be replaced.
See what I'm getting at?
 
Even in peacetime, aircraft were evolving.
Wartime just accelerates that process.

The A6M was in the process of replacing the A5M and the KI-43 was in the process of replacing the KI-27, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

At this same point in time, the USN's F4F was replacing the F2A and the USAAC's P-40 as replacing the P-36.

Once war broke out (in the pacific), the US accelerated it's development of other types that were already in the works: P-38, P-39, etc.

The Japanese seemed to be a bit slower in this respect.
 

Users who are viewing this thread