Ju-87 Stuka vulnerability to fighter attack

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Wasn't there a Dogfight show where a SBD took on some A6Ms and won?
 
Wasn't there a Dogfight show where a SBD took on some A6Ms and won?

VS-5 SBD's acting as anti-torpedo plane screen attacked by Zuikaku's Zero sdn, at Coral Sea. The SBD's claimed 4 Zeroes for 4 losses, but the Zui Zeroes didn't actually suffer any losses. And that's not new info at all (see pg 250 of Lundstrom "The First Team" published 1984). But that's TV for you.

Joe
 

Actually, the 30 % penetrating figure is a sort of an indication how information gets distorted when referenced from another source; the thing you noted about the firing trials of 109F appears in the Wright Field evaluation report of the 109F, but that one is just a compilation of British reports; there seem to be a case of 'lost in translation - the original reports state that the rounds (30%) which were fired and passed through the fuel tank above the fuel line would penetrate the pilot`s back armor, but those that go below it would not.
 
Hi Kurfürst,

>the thing you noted about the firing trials of 109F appears in the Wright Field evaluation report of the 109F, but that one is just a compilation of British reports; there seem to be a case of 'lost in translation - the original reports state that the rounds (30%) which were fired and passed through the fuel tank above the fuel line would penetrate the pilot`s back armor, but those that go below it would not.

You're right, I used the Wright Field report - thanks for straightening that out!

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
Hi Joeb,

Noting that you came, saw, and evaded the question, I'm going to ask again:

But you do seem to be making fairly strong judgements based on analysis of one factor that happens to lend itself to quantitative analysis, firepower

Joe, would you please show me the sentence which I typed in this thread which you think contains my fairly strong judgement?

I'm not amused by the careless way in which you distort my statements, and this is your chance to correct a misunderstanding. (If it is one.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
1. I don't know what question you claim I'm evading, unless something I missed among long posts by several people.
2. It wasn't one single sentence but ongoing theme that the SBD faced a weaker attacker in the Zero, than Ju-87 in Western fighters say early/mid Spit's for example. Was that not your contention? But your main repeated piece of evidence was their higher firepower. True higher (though not really twice and four times for Spit V's and cannon Hurricanes as you maintained) but that's just one factor. In many other cases Zero units devastated Allied non-fighters; it's not clear at all to me that 1941-42 Zero units overall qualitatively represented a significantly more permissive opponent to divebombers than the British fighter units of the same period. They had plenty of 'parties' and other successes against Allied non-fighters in 1941-42, including a/c better armed than any divebomber. Again, I think the SBD's reputation is partly due to the fact that *quantitatively* it didn't face intense Japanese fighter opposition all that often; although there are cases like the Santa Cruz one just discussed where it's reasonable to doubt Ju-87's (any model) could have survived in pairs against 1942 several plane CAP sections of Japanese carriers as SBD's did.
3. There's no such intention, but I haven't said anything in this debate that would offend any reasonable person. I suggest just sticking to defending your positions on the topic, not accusing people of 'distorting'.

Joe
 
[edit] Poland
On 1 September 1939 the Wehrmacht invaded Poland triggering World War Two. At exactly 04.26 hours a Kette of Ju 87s of 3./StG 1 lead by Staffelkapitän Oberleutnant Bruno Dilly carried out the first bombing attack of the war. The aim was to destroy the charges wired to the bridges over the Vistula. The mission failed and the Poles destroyed the bridge before the Germans could reach it.

It was a Ju 87 that achieved the first air victory during World War II on 1 September 1939, when Kettenführer Leutnant Frank Neubert of I./StG 2 'Immelmann' shot down a Polish PZL P.11c fighter aircraft piloted by Captain Mieczysław Medwecki, who was killed in the engagement[2].

On one occasion six Polish divisions trapped by encircling German forces were forced to surrender after a relentless four day assault by StG 51, StG 76 and StG 77. Employed in this assault were the 50 kg fragmentation bombs which caused appalling damage to enemy ground troops. Demoralized, the Poles surrendered. The Stukas also participated in the Battle of Bzura which resulted in the breaking of Polish ability to resist effectively. The Stukageschwaders alone dropped 388 tonnes of bombs during this battle[3].

Once again enemy air opposition was light, the Stukawaffe lost just 31 machines during the campaign[4].


[edit] Norway
Operation Weserübung began on 9 April 1940 with the invasions of Norway and Denmark, Denmark capitulated within the day whilst Norway continued to resist with British and French help.

The campaign was not the classic Blitzkrieg of fast moving armoured divisions supported by air-power as the mountainous terrain ruled out close Panzer/Stuka cooperation. Instead the Germans relied on Fallschirmjäger (paratroops), airborne troops transported by Junkers Ju 52s and specialised mountain (ski troops). The strategic nature of the operation made the Stuka essential. The Ju 87s were given the role of ground attack and anti-shipping missions. The Stuka was to prove the most effective weapon in the Luftwaffe's armoury carrying out the latter.

The Stukageschwaders were now equipped with the new Ju 87R Richard, which differed from the Berta as the 50 kg bomb racks had been replaced by external fuel tanks increasing range.

The first Stukas took off at 10.59 hours from occupied airfields to destroy Oscarsborg Fortress. The Stukas of I.StG 1, failed to silence its batteries contributing to the loss of the heavy cruiser Blücher and causing the disruption of the amphibious landings in Oslo through Oslofjord.

The Stukas however had numerous successes against Allied Naval vessels. HMS Bittern was sunk on 30 April. The French super-destroyer Bison was sunk along with HMS Afridi by Stukageschwader 1 on 3 May 1940.


[edit] France and the Low Countries
The Stukawaffe had learned some lessons from the Polish and Norwegian campaigns. The failures of Oberleutnant Bruno Dilly in Poland and the Stukas of I.StG 1 to silence the Oscarborg fort ensured even more attention was paid to pin-point bombing during the Phoney War period. This was to pay off in the Western campaign.

When Fall Gelb began on 10 May 1940 the Stuka helped swiftly neutralise the fortress of Eben Emael. The HQ of the Commander responsible for ordering the destruction of the bridges along the Albert Canal was stationed in the village of Lanaeken (14km to the north). However the Stuka demonstrated its accuracy when the small building was destroyed after receiving four direct hits. As a result only one of the three bridges was destroyed allowing the German Army to rapidly advance.

The Stukageschwader were also instrumental in achieving the breakthrough at Sedan. The Stukawaffe flew 300 sorties against French positions, with Stukageschwader 77 alone flying 201 individual missions[5].

The Luftwaffe also benefited from excellent ground-to-air communications throughout the campaign. Radio equipped forward liaison officers could call upon the Stukas and direct them to attack enemy positions along the Axis of advance. In some cases the Stukas responded to requests in 10-20 minutes. Oberstleutnant Hans Seidemann (Richthofen's Chief of Staff) said that "never again was such a smoothly functioning system for discussing and planning joint operations achieved"[6].

During the Battle of Dunkirk 89 merchantmen (of 126,518 grt) were lost, and the Royal Navy lost 29 of its 40 destroyers sunk or seriously damaged, mostly at the hands of the Ju 87s[7]. Enemy airpower was ineffective and disorganised, as a result the Stukas losses were mainly due to ground fire. Some 120 machines, one-third of the Stuka force was destroyed or damaged to all causes[8].


[edit] Battle of Britain
The Battle of Britain proved for the first time that the Junkers Ju 87 was vulnerable in hostile skies against well organised and determined fighter opposition.

Steady losses had occurred throughout their participation in the battle. On 18 August, a day known as the 'hardest day' as both sides suffered heavy losses, the Stuka was withdrawn after losing 16 of its number and numerous others damaged[9]. The myth of the Stuka was shattered.
[edit] North Africa and the Mediterranean
In response to the Italian defeats in Greece and North Africa the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht ordered the deployment of some German forces to these theatres. Amongst the Luftwaffe contingent deployed was the Gescwadersatb StG3 which touched down in Sicily in December 1940. In the next few days two Gruppen - some 80 Stukas were deployed under X.Fliegerkorps. The first task of the Korps was to attack British shipping passing between Sicily and Africa. The Ju 87s first made their presence by subjecting the British aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious to heavy attack. The crews were confident that they could sink it given the flight deck spanned approximately 7,000 square metres.

On 10 January 1941 the Stuka crews were told four direct hits with 500 kg bombs would be enough to sink the carrier. The Ju 87s delivered six and three damaging near-misses[10]. But the ships engines remained untouched and it made for the dubious sanctury of Malta.

Many ex- Luftwaffe Ju 87s were handed over to their Italian ally, the Regia Aeronautica and re-named the Picchiatelli. Some of the Picchiatelli saw action in the opening phase of the Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940. The number was ineffective and the Italian forces were quickly pushed back. By early 1941 the Greeks had pushed into Italian occupied Albania. Once again Hitler decided to send military aid to his Allies.

In March the pro-German Yugoslav government was toppled. A furious Hitler ordered the attack to be expanded to include Yugoslavia. Operation Marita commenced on 7 April. The Stuka once again spearheaded the air assault with a frontline strength of 300 machines. Yugoslav resistance in the air was minimal. As a result the Stukas fearsome reputation returned. Operating unmolested the Stukawaffe took a heavy toll of ground forces. The light losses incurred were a result of ground fire. The effectiveness of the dive-bombers helped bring about Yugoslav capitulation in just ten days.

The Stukas also took a peripheral part in Operation Punishment - Hitler's retribution bombing of Belgrade. The dive-bombers were to attack airfields and known anti-aircraft gun positions whilst the level bombers struck civilian targets. Belgrade was badly damaged, and a reported 15,000 people were killed or injured.

In Greece, despite British aid, little air opposition was encountered. The Stukas were able to roam the skies and attack targets unmolested. As the Allies withdrew and resistance collapsed the Allies began evacuating to Crete. The Stukas proved effective in inflicting severe casualties to Allied shipping. On 22 April the 1,389 ton destroyers Psara and Ydra were sunk. In the next two days the Greek Naval base at Piraeus suffered the loss of 23 vessels to Stuka attack[11].

As the Battle of Crete drew to a close the Allies began yet another withdrawal. The Stuka and their crews once again proved exceptional against enemy warships. On 21 May HMS Juno was sunk, on the 22 May the battleship HMS Warspite, and the cruiser HMS Gloucester were damaged . The Ju 87s also crippled HMS Fiji that morning, (she was later finished off by Bf 109 fighter bombers) whilst destroying HMS Greyhound with a single hit. On 23 May the Royal Navy also lost HMS Kashmir, HMS Kelly sunk followed by HMS Hereward on the 26 May. HMS Orion and HMS Dido were also severely damaged[12].

However despite initial successes, the Stuka remained vulnerable. Perhaps the prime example of the type's vulnerability to fighters, even at this stage in the war, was the shooting down of five Stukas in the space of a few minutes, by the Australian ace Clive Caldwell in a P-40 Tomahawk, on December 5, 1941, over Libya.

The Stukageschwaders faithfully supported Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommels Deutsches Afrika Korps in its two year campaign in North Africa, helping it achieve considerable success. However as the tide turned and Allied airpower grew in the Autumn of 1942, the Ju 87 became little more than cannon fodder. The old frailties emerged and losses were heavy. The entry of the Americans into North Africa during Operation Torch made the situation far worse. The Stuka became obsolete in what was now a fighter-bomber's war. The Bf 109 and Fw 190 could at least choose to fight on equal terms after dropping their ordnance whereas the Stuka enjoyed no such option. An example of the Junkers vulnerability was demonstrated on 11 November 1942 when 15 Ju 87Ds (Doras) were all shot down by USAF P-40Fs in minutes[13].

By 1943, the Allies enjoyed total air superiority in North Africa. The Ju 87s ventured out in Kette strength only, often jettisoning their bombs at the first sight of enemy aircraft and making "a run for home".
 
The P-47 had 9.5mm or 3/8" hardened armor plate behind and in front of the pilot.

Design Analysis of the P-47 Thunderbolt

The same is indicated in Technical Order and other spec docs.

Jank - You are absolutely correct but I believe the change was made in the P-47D-1 forward, along with the increased armored glass?

I haven't yet found any intial production fighter that started with anything greater than 1/4 inch plate?
 

Joe - this would be one of several 'unequivocal' positions that is hard to prove that caught my eye... particularly since the RAF fighters pronounced as 'better armored and heavier firepowered' were trounced by the same fighter dismissed below?

As I see it, the one thing that we can say for certain is that the SBD-3 tended to face unarmoured, unprotected, low-firepower fighters while the contemporary Ju 87D met well-armoured and protected fighters of generally superior firepower and speed.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
Hi Joeb,

>I suggest just sticking to defending your positions on the topic, not accusing people of 'distorting'.

Yes, I'm accusing you of distorting my words. It might be entirely unintentional on your part, but it has to stop anyway.

You claim I passed "fairly strong judgements" on the SBD vs. Stuka case in this thread, and I want to see where you got that from, with direct, verifiable quotes from my own posts.

If on re-reading my posts, you'd like to correct your claim, that would be perfectly acceptable of course.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 

How bout this one?

As I see it, the one thing that we can say for certain is that the SBD-3 tended to face unarmoured, unprotected, low-firepower fighters while the contemporary Ju 87D met well-armoured and protected fighters of generally superior firepower and speed.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 

Myth. And it was shattered far too many times.

The Stukas were neither withdrawn, neither there were 'steady losses'. The loss rate was quite acceptable, and they had major successes during the Battle.
 
Drgondog's post is one good example. It seemed to me a fairly strong statement, which you then elaborated on with analysis of things like firepower, etc , but without enough IMO consideration to the high overall actual combat effectiveness of JNAF fighter units in 1941-42, against Allied fighters and non-fighters alike, which seriously undercuts the general implication of your statement. If you disagree that that was a 'strong statement' or in any other way, that's your opinion.

So please, I have no intention to annoy you (or anybody else), but it's not going to get you anywhere to tell me 'what must stop' and so forth. All my posts have been well within any reasonable ROE on any forum. If you're upset about them that's unfortunate, but your problem.

Joe
 
Hi Joeb,

>Drgondog's post is one good example.

Quoting myself:

"As I see it, the one thing that we can say for certain is that the SBD-3 tended to face unarmoured, unprotected, low-firepower fighters while the contemporary Ju 87D met well-armoured and protected fighters of generally superior firepower and speed."

I asked for a "fairly strong judgement" (your own words!) on the SBD vs. Stuka case, and that quote is not a judgement - it's a simple, verifiable statement of fact. "Judgement" is a verdict, "statement" is evidence.

>It seemed to me a fairly strong statement ...

That is a very good example for why I am positively unhappy with your posts. You orginally wrote "judgements", I asked for "judgements" - three times over! -, and here you go talking about "statements" as if I had asked for just that. (I had not.)

I guess you'll agree that "judgement" is a significantly different concept from "statement"?

Now notice that while posting, you were obviously genuinely convinced that you had portrayed my position correctly. However, in fact you were assuming that I was talking about a significantly different concept.

If you accept that you have seriously misrepresented my position in this case without even noticing, I figure you might see my suggestion that this has happened before with other eyes now.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
Not exactly on topic, but see Stukas slamming British armor in North Africa; experts only. Quite an adrenaline rush with the utterly furious siren...(by the way, sounds like F1 racing).

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jA09htDvr9s

Also i find those stories of allied soldiers saying that after a while that infernal noise "had no effect on them" very very hard to believe.
 

Hello!

Havn't had a chance to read it yet, but it sounds interesting.

They wouldn't have hit other types any more accurately either And more seriously, since there were no comparable types around, we can't really use this for a comparison.

True, but that was my point In the beginning it was stated that the Stuka faced greater adversity in the form of cannon armed, armored planes but as I saw it, it wasn't as black and white as that. Also, the "Parties" began even in the days of rifle only armed fighters.



I've read the Dunn article. It is very interesting and makes a good case though in retrospect, I don't consider it to be an open and shut refuting of prior sources. It also only deals with the Ki-43-I. When mentioning the Oscars in the examples i've cited here and in prior threads I am referring to the Ki-43-II.


Trust me....i'm a bad pilot. I did do better with .50cal armed fighters. Even managed one classic boom and zoom attack on a G3M once. ONCE.

Yes, the Japanese 20's don't compare ballistically to the Western versions but in RL they could still get the job done and at times did. My point was that they cannot simply be dismissed and the early (orig) crop of Japanese fighter pilots were able to put them on target very well, including hard deflection shots. I think it bears merit to also mention that if the Japanese had cannon ammo that didn't top the list, they also faced extremely rugged opposition as well. Planes like the P-40 and F4F won't win alot of awards here from what i've read in terms of preformance but the latter plane in particular could take loads of punishment including cannon hits.


It depends. In the case of armor glass its a bit of hit or miss from the descriptions i've read. Sometimes it would stop/deflect a 7.7mm slug...other times no. I would also factor in that a Spit or Hurr has an increased vulnerability to the engine/radiator being liquid cooled vs. a radial. 01 flyers in Burma made specific mention of aiming for a Hurr's radiator in order to make up for their lack of firepower. Given the results there, it worked very well.


Well I'd say thats almost an Apples and Oranges comparison. Over Germany, the Luft would mass a large wedge of airpower and then attack at a moment of their choosing en-mass (and usually after the escorts had left the scene) Under such circumstances the only viable tactic is to use the box formations. Not enough by itself but still the best tactic. The engagements Shores was commenting on tended to be smaller with less time for defensive patrols and scrambles to react. A better comparison is with USN dive bombers facing enemy attack. Once the SBD's reacted by closing ranks and concentrating their rear guns, the A6M's had a harder time of it. Shores was suggesting that the Stuka's might have done better as well had they done the same but it appears they did the opposite, often breaking up into smaller groups increasing Stuka vulnerability and making the job of the escorts that much harder. This would be a factor in support of posters like Kurfurst who feel the Stuka simply suffers from bad PR in terms of it's vuln.

>I agree the SBD faced a less lethal environment though I look at it more from the # of sorties/# of fighters PoV.

Hm, I fear I have not fully understood that line of thinking. What are these numbers for both?

For the SBD, it's primary opposition was naval, and there were only four carrier clashes where enemy fighter opposition was occured in all of 1942. Lunga saw SBD's basing there but they operated primarily at night vs naval targets, no or little fighter opposition. By day the Zeros were busy trying to keep the Wildcats off the G4M's backs. Due to distance involved they're arrival could be accurately predicted in most cases. In constrast the Stuka, being used as a primary land based support plane flew less intermitedly, and faced larger total numbers of enemy air squadrons (though that didn't always auto translate into actual attacks by enemy fighters being very large in nature)


No argument from me. 8)
 
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