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I disagree.
- FEAF was not outnumbered.
- FEAF had plenty of airfields for aircraft dispersal and more could have been built during the four months available. Grass runways don't take long to establish.
- Four months is plenty of time to establish airfield defenses and put secure communications systems in place.
- FEAF had 7 radar sets. That's plenty for Luzon if properly employed.
- Properly flown P-40s and A-20s were as good or better then Japanese aircraft during December 1941. You've got four months for additional pilot training.
- If P-40s lack oxygen, .50cal ammo or anything else it's because FEAF didn't make it a priority. 4 months is plenty of time to ship this material from San Francisco.
- By 1940 the Philippine Army Air Corps had about 100 pilots and 500 ground crew trained to USAAC standards. With modern aircraft the six PAAC squadrons could be a significant factor for defense of their homeland.
IMO the key is to replace Brereton with someone more competent and do it early. The new FEAF commander should be in the Philippines by mid August 1941. The FEAF commander must have the nuts to do the right things rather then becoming a yes man for Big Mac.
Come on Dave, we've all played this game before. No mater what anyone post, you're gonna rip into it.
The Phillippines of the 40's wouldn't have had many usable open areas you could use for airfields. It was either jungle ( big trees) or cultivated land ( very wet rice paddies) Either would take a lot of equipment, and in the rice paddies a lot of fill, to bring even up to 40s standards for aircraft use. PSP and gravel was used for such later in WW2, don't think it was very availiable in 41.
But I guess i've got to agree with you, most of the problem were lack of training for too much of the forces involved, and a command that spent too much time with their heads up their lower intestines.
There was also a production line at Douglas- El Segundo. The US was NOT awash in A-20s as these were, as previously stated, mostly contracted for aircraft that were being delivered as fast as possible and NOT planes built on speculation sitting around on lots waiting for buyers like a big car lot. The best that might be done would be to defer deliveries on currant production for more aircraft to be delivered later.
A couple of points I'd like to make.
1. Clark's runways were sod. Nichols' were paved.
Thanks for confirmation.
2. The no oxygen story is a myth. Read the pilots accounts of practice intercepts of B-17s at 20,000 feet in Bartsch's
"Doomed..."
My bad, as described in Edmunds history of the campaign, the O2 production capability existed but was insufficient to supply the operational needs of all the figter squadrons. Most of what was available was used by the Navy for its own needs. That's what motivated ordering an O2 plant during the summer of 1941.
3. What good would P-36Cs have been? They'd be no more effective than the P-35As.
P-36Cs or preferrably A's as there were a lot more of them, had a higher operational ceiling than the P-40E which proved to be ineffective against high altitude raids in the Java campaign according to Bartch "Every Day a Nightmare" P-36 also had a higher ceiling than the P-35 which itself was apparently higher than P-40E. Also, P-36s (as Hawk 75s) appear to have given a reasonably good account of themselves in a variety of theaters (Finn, French and I believe DEI, although I haven't yet read Shore's account of the Java campaign.) where as I mentioned before the P-40E appears to have struck out as an effective interceptor.
4. You can have all the airfields you want but they're useless without modern AA protection for low, medium and high
altitudes and a decent warning system.
Good point
5. FEAF was indeed outnumbered, especially if you only count first line aircraft which eliminates all the observation
aircraft, the B-18s, P-35AS and A-27s. The JNAF was able to hit Clark with over 50 bombers, besides what they used at
Iba on Dec. 8th. The famous quote made by a pilot at Clark just before the bombs fell "because we don't have that many"
rings true.
Also the supply of bombs for USAAF offensive ops in the pacific theater appears to have been somewhat limited based on subsequent accounts.
6. In retrospect, if anyone should have be replaced prior to Dec. 8th it was Major Grover, the CO of the 24th PG. He
screwed up big time and was never taken to task.
From Bartsch? Don't know the story. Please describe.
Duane
I generally agree with those points, would note:A couple of points I'd like to make.
1. Clark's runways were sod. Nichols' were paved.
2. The no oxygen story is a myth. Read the pilots accounts of practice intercepts of B-17s at 20,000 feet in Bartsch's
"Doomed..."
3. What good would P-36Cs have been? They'd be no more effective than the P-35As.
4. You can have all the airfields you want but they're useless without modern AA protection for low, medium and high
altitudes and a decent warning system.
5. FEAF was indeed outnumbered, especially if you only count first line aircraft which eliminates all the observation
aircraft, the B-18s, P-35AS and A-27s.
6. In retrospect, if anyone should have be replaced prior to Dec. 8th it was Major Grover, the CO of the 24th PG. He
screwed up big time and was never taken to task.
I generally agree with those points, would note:
3. I agree P-36 v P-35 wouldn't have been a huge difference but some measureable difference in favor of the P-36.
see above:
4. Yes and also stuff like dispersal, camouflage (including dummies), revetments etc. After the initial JNAF attacks through Dec 10, both JNAF and JAAF continued attacking the US fields on Luzon for up to a few weeks before physically capturing them, claimed in their reports many more US a/c destroyed on the ground, but actually destroyed *zero* additional a/c. Relatively quickly implemented measures by the USAAC to better hide and protect the remaining a/c reduced ground losses to nothing. The larger initial force might still have suffered some ground losses, but could suffered a lot fewer with comprehensive airfield defense measures especially passive ones. And while AA, radar and integrated warning and control were not what they should have been a/o Dec 8, passive airfield defense was almost zero, with the important exception that 1/2 the B-17's were dispersed to Del Monte on Mindanao (a field the Japanees didn't even know of until weeks later, and they couldn't reach from Formosa anyway) and so escaped destruction. But IMO passive airfield defense was the most glaring deficiency of all, and would have required much less knowledge of the future to remedy, as opposed to some of the other suggestions.
Good points
5. The respective orders of battle of bombers and fighters (not including recon, flying boat, utility, observation etc on either side) were as follows:
JNAF 21st and 23rd Air Flotilla's on Formosa: 90 Type 0 Fighters, 24 Type 96 Fighters, 81 Type 1 Land Attack, 36 Type 96 Land Attack. All but the Type 96 Fighters could reach central Luzon from Formosa; the Type 96's were used for local defense and saw no action. Also Ryujo's small air group of Type 96 Fighters and Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes was only used briefly v Davao and encountered no FEAF a/c.
JAAF 5th Air Division on Formosa: 72 Type 97 Fighters, 18 Type 97 Heavy Bombers, 27 Type 99 Twin Engine Light Bombers, 27 Type 97 Light Bombers. The fighters couldn't reach, and bombers had limited capability v central Luzon from Formosa; the bombers were initially used in unescorted strikes v northern Luzon until they and the fighters leapfrogged to fields in N Luzon around a week after the campaign started, and FEAF was already crippled.
FEAF: 54 P-40E's, 18 P-40B's, 18 P-35A's, 35 B-17C/D's (all refitted to 'D' standard)
See Below
So the FEAF was outnumbered overall, but in the key area of fully modern fighters able to operate immediately over central Luzon the Zero and P-40 forces were fairly close in size. The FEAF lost that near parity with the heavy losses of P-40's, especially on the ground, in the initial raids. After that, no plausible number of B-17's, or A-20's for that matter, were going to accomplish much v the largely intact Zero force, and as it was even the remaining P-35/40 force was mainly used for recon and limited strike, generally avoiding the JAAF Type 97 Fighter force once it was established on Luzon. Interestingly though, after early January 1942 all but one company of Type 97 Fighters was withdrawn, and the Zeroes were also gone, so the P-35/40 remnant became again close, perhaps even slightly superior, in number to the Japanese fighter force facing it.
See Below
Joe
Did those P-40's survive undamaged, or with different degrees of damage?