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Somewhat strangely, since the USN quoted a/c speeds in kts, all official USN data for their a/c ranges in WWII era are in statute, ie land, miles. Even when authors quote US WWII naval a/c ranges in nautical miles, they are often mistakenly assuming the official ranges are nm, rather than correctly converting the official land mile ranges.The A-24s should provide a potent offensive punch at virtually any point on Luzon flying from either Clark or Nichols. I believe the 1,000 pound bomb radius was about 225 miles and 500# pound range used for CV searches was closer to 300 miles. I can't recall whether these ranges are in nm or sm.
... Found the SBD range reference.... I am assuming, based on published numbers (Lundstrom Fletcher book) 175 and 225 nm that max combat radius was 200 and 260 sm with the 1942 CV battles providing the basis for the estimate.
Where are you getting these numbers? The IJA assigned a low priority to the Philippine operation. IJA 14th Army that invaded during December 1941 was in fact just a weak infantry corps.On December 22nd, 1941, the Japanese approached Lingayen Gulf with 76 transports carrying 80,000 IJA soldiers
That's plausible as it's only one more Ki-27 then was assigned to 14th Army on Dec 8, 1941. Apparently they received 1 more replacement then what was lost in combat. Those were the only aircraft assigned directly to 14th Army during December 1941.According to Shores there were about 37+ Ki-27s operating out of small airstrips at Appari and Vigan in Northern Luzon after the 11th.
But your basic scenario is a hodge podge of unrealistic what if assumption (that the FEAF would hide its strength until the Lingayen Gulf landings) put together with the actual lesser Japanese air strength by that time because *they knew the FEAF had been largely neutralized*.1. That's plausible as it's only one more Ki-27 then was assigned to 14th Army on Dec 8, 1941. Apparently they received 1 more replacement then what was lost in combat. Those were the only aircraft assigned directly to 14th Army during December 1941.
2. During March 1942 the IJN assigned a 23rd Air Flotilla detachment to Luzon.
.....18 dive bombers. Probably Vals.
.....9 fighters. Probably Zeros.
Aircraft from CVL Ryujo were used only to cover amphibious landings. As of 20 December 1941 IJN Ryujo airwing consisted of 12 fighter aircraft and 16 torpedo bombers. That single fighter squadron isn't going to stop or even seriously hinder a mass attack escorted by a couple squadrons of P-40 fighter aircraft.
OK. I won't take a back seat to anyone on this thread when it comes to a knowledge of the ACTUAL history of what went down with the FEAF in the PI in '41-42. But these what'ifa, would'a, could'a, should'a scenarios are being taken to the extreme. History is what is.
It seems to me IMHP that this thread has become a competition about who knows the most about troop strength , how many A/C were on hand and the performance of a number of aircraft that were never slated to go to the PI
in Operation Plum or any other effort to reinforce the PI prior to Dec. 8th.
It was a combination of limited resources, human error and bad luck that contributed to what happened in the PI on Dec. 8th. BUT, the bottom line is that the PI were lost regardless of what the FEAF could have done before or after the the initial attack.
Duane
I'm quoting details of Japanese strength and deployments in the campaign including info directly from the records of Japanese air units involved, and you're asking me if I've ever looked into the subject, really?Have you looked at Japanese resources vs operation plans for December 1941? Japan had essentially no reserves at all. A serious defeat anywhere would have been catastrophic.
I'm quoting details of Japanese strength and deployments in the campaign from Japanese language sources about the campaign, and you're asking me if I've ever looked into the subject, really?Have you looked at Japanese resources vs operation plans for December 1941? Japan had essentially no reserves at all. A serious defeat anywhere would have been catastrophic.
But your basic scenario is a hodge podge of unrealistic what if assumption (that the FEAF would hide its strength until the Lingayen Gulf landings put together with the actual lesser Japanese air strength by that time because *they knew the FEAF had been largely neutralized*.
Even assuming (unrealistically IMO) that the FEAF could have had any number of *properly trained and ready* A-24 units, they would have been used to counter the landings in Northern Luzon Dec 10, just as the B-17 force was, and the suriviving fighters too. I doubt a realistic size and capability A-24/P-40 force would have inflicted devastating damage on even that smaller Northern Luzon force.
But again, the thing that's hardest to plausibly 'what if' your way around is the manifest inability of USAAF P-40 units to meet Zeroes on anything like even terms in Dec 41-Mar 42, at least. A-24's covered by P-40's have the P-40's stripped away by Zeroes, then eventually fall prey to Zeroes. And a sudden springing of a huge trap at Lingayen, after allowing the Japanese to land unopposed in north Luzon (and Legaspi in the south), is totally unrealistic.
As far as historical order of battle items:
1. Both 24th and 50th Flying Regiments were on Luzon at the time of the Lingayen landings. Japanese Monograph No.11 states that 20 and 24 Type 97's from the two regiments provided air cover to the approaching convoy Dec 21. As of early January the total strength of the two regiments is given in Sensi Sosho 34 as 73 with 50 a/c serviceable. Meanwhile from Dec 8 to Jan 7, 4 and 12 Type 97's of the two regiments were 'damaged', though the cause of only a few of those loss/damage cases is known (1 burned on ground by Buzz Wagner Dec 12, 2 disappeared in weather over Lingayen Dec 22, one lost in accident Dec 27). The complete records of those units didn't survive, unlike relevant JNAF records which did.
2. The JNAF bombing component brought back to Luzon in March consisted of 18 Type 1 Rikko of the Takao Air Group, which bombed Corregidor in support of JAAF 'heavy' (ie Type 97, 'Sally') bomber units. They flew their first mission March 24 and their last April 17; two Type 1's were downed by AA fire from Corregidor over that period (source is Takao group's original combat reports, it's not mentioned in "Shambles"). A Tainan AG Zero detachment accompanied them but the few remaining FEAF a/c were avoiding contact.
The JNAF deployment to Luzon more relevant to this discussion was the detachment of the Tainan AG sent to Legaspi in southern Luzon from Dec 14, initially 9 a/c later reinforced. They remained until early January, and besides one air combat with FEAF (they lost a Zero to a P-35A Dec 23 per their and FEAF's records, misreported in 'Shambles' as possible Phil AF P-26 victory Dec 24) also strafed Del Monte, and virtually wiped out the USN floatplane detachment at Bataan, increasing the American impression of a strong Japanese fighter force throughout the PI, despite their small number.
Anyway again, these Japanese strengths were based on needs. If the FEAF fighter force had survived longer in greater number, it could have slowed other Japanese operations by requiring more fighter strength, especially JNAF, to be kept against Luzon. But that's what the Japanese would have done. And a grand surprise trap Dec 22 by a previously undetected FEAF force is just pure fantasy, not how military organizations or operations work in real life.
Joe