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In the big picture I would actually agree with varsity's 'final limiting statement'. This is an airplane discussion board, and I'm a WWII airplane fan too, but you have to look at the basic seapower situation to evaluate the big picture of first PI campaign. As long as the US Pacific Fleet was crippled, or anyway wasn't going to sortie quickly and in strength to relieve the PI, the US position in PI was hopeless. Eventually the US force there would run out of fuel and munitions (although if it could hold large physical areas of the PI it could feed itself, unlike the actual situation where the main force was backed into Bataan then largely starved into defeat).I think you have correctly summarized the causal history, but in doing so also oversimplified a very complex situation, any element of which might be worthy of discussion. It's hard to argue with your last sentence but I don't think we (at least I don't) learn much by accepting it as a final, limiting statement.
Given all the cited problems encountered during the 1941 PI campaign were some factors more damaging than others? Was defeat simply the result of a poorly defined FEAF aircraft fleet requirements/capabilities?
1. The Lingayen landing was the third on Luzon. The FEAF put its maximum (then remaining) effort on the smaller landing at Aparri in northern Luzon Dec 10, then had very little left for the landings at Legaspi in southern Luzon Dec 12, or the bigger landing at Lingayen Gulf the 22nd. This same pattern must be assumed IMO to have a remotely realistic scenario. So, even if the A-24's score significant success against the Aparri landings (covered by relatively limited numbers of Army Type 97's and Navy 0's) the Japanese can adjust to that by keeping the bulk of Tainan/3rd AG's deployed v PI which they didn't in actual history...because it was apparent the FEAF was neutralized.1. I didn't get that (about a Lingayen Gulf surprise attack), but maybe I missed something. It seems to me a reasonable argument supposes the historical battle must procede from the December 8 attack, but contested with the FEAF forces defined by the thread participant with plausibly camoflaged fields to make the force more resistent to attrition.
2. According to Bartsch, the A-24 group that arrived in the PI (sans aircraft) was comprised of well trained and I infer, high time pilots. They weren't the rookies that comprised the bulk of the pilots in some of the Pursuit squadrons. And yes, I wouldn't expect them to hide but rather to engage at the first hint of an invading force where ever it occurred. There were many more airfields in the PI than I previously realized (Bartsch again) and I believe resisting each landing could have been a possibility if the A-24 force or some other with antishipping attack capability, had been in place.
3. I think this might be diminishing the quality of the P-40E a little too much. My main concern with respect to the P-40 is its unsuitability as a high altitude interceptor. Encountering zeros while escorting A-24's at probably 15-20,000 feet is a different matter and may play more to the (few) strengths of the P-40E, (armor, its diving ability and its heavy armament) That seemed to work during the Java campaign although it doesn't seem to have been a game changer. It does seem to have allowed the P-40Es to survive Zero encounters and score some (very) limited success there.
you have to look at the basic seapower situation to evaluate the big picture of first PI campaign. As long as the US Pacific Fleet was crippled, or anyway wasn't going to sortie quickly and in strength to relieve the PI, the US position in PI was hopeless. Eventually the US force there would run out of fuel and munitions (although if it could hold large physical areas of the PI it could feed itself, unlike the actual situation where the main force was backed into Bataan then largely starved into defeat).
The FEAF could conceivably have inflicted more serious losses on the Japanese invasion convoys at Aparri (N Luzon) Legaspi (S Luzon) and eventually the larger Lingayen Gulf landings (though never would have allowed the first two only to 'spring a trap' on the third: totally unrealistic). But in fact the Japanese were not that critically short of merchant type shipping at that stage of the war, and captured a good deal as they advanced. So FEAF delaying Japanese plans by causing heavier shipping losses and/or forcing JNAF units to dwell on Luzon longer is plausible. But FEAF 'defeating' the Japanese seizure of PI: not plausible. Only the main force of the USN could have done that by being ready to, then successfully executing, a decisive fleet action to relieve the PI. And that just wasn't going to happen after the PH attack; it's an interesting 'what if' whether the USN could have pulled it off *without* there having been a PH attack.
There was almost certainly a lot more realism present among the troops stuck in the PI in 1941 than there may be in this thread (With no insult intended to anyone posting here!), but I suggest that some of that came as a result of the rapid and utter collapse of the primary (and ineffectual) deterents: The USN's Asiatic sub fleet and FEAF.If you read personal recollections of many PI veterans, it was common knowledge among them that relief from the US by sea was their only real hope. And their morale was sustained by the belief that it would still happen, however impossible we know that was with hindsight.
Joe
1. The Lingayen landing was the third on Luzon. The FEAF put its maximum (then remaining) effort on the smaller landing at Aparri in northern Luzon Dec 10, … very little left for the landings at Legaspi in southern Luzon Dec 12, or the bigger landing at Lingayen Gulf the 22nd. … the Japanese can adjust … by keeping the bulk of Tainan/3rd AG's deployed v PI which they didn't ... because it was apparent the FEAF was neutralized.
2. But lack of individual pilot total hours wasn't most of the problem with USAAC units in this period. It was stuff like the historical problem with A-24 deployment: didn't have their planes, or, hadn't trained intensively in *those* types, which might prove to have bugs, as the recently received P-40E's did (gun chargers, rendering the armament useless in some early combat sorties).
IMO it's totally unrealistic to compare such units to USN VS/VB squadrons of summer 1942, which had been cohesive units flying the same a/c in pretty intensive training for months before the war, then stepped up after Dec '41, and also those units had shakedown combats in the carriers raids v Japanese islands in early 1942. In fact it encapsulates the whole issue IMO, as I stated it earlier: if you assume unit effectiveness of USAAF units typical of late 42-early 43 (the USN had a headstart on them in readiness, since they weren't expanding hand over fist in 1940-41 like the Air Corps was), many things are possible. But the Army air units of late '41 just didn't have those capabilities. Individually competent pilots, yes, but high level of combat effectiveness as units: they proved repeatedly that they did not.
With respect to kill ratios determined from IJN Zero vs. USAAF P-40 combat for all encounters occurring during the DEI campaign. That appears to follow Bartsch, but I choose (perhaps arbitrarily) to consider only the results of combat encounters that occurred between USAAF pilots who launched with the sole intent of engaging any enemy A/C. That produces a somewhat different result than the one you cite. Based on Bartsch's account, I do not include any victories or losses during the debacle over Darwin where even the so-called top-cover P-40s were orbiting oblivious to the A6M threat. I do include every encounter from February 1 through March 1, 1942 that occurred between Japanese A/C and the pilots of the USAAF composite 17th Provisional Pursuit Squadron based at Ngoro field. The tally for that period as presented by Bartsch appears to be: 9 USA victories vs. 12 losses. Not counted are the Nell destroyed on 2/5, Buel's fatal 2/15 Mavis intercept or the Val destroyed on 2/19, over Darwin.3. The kill ratio of P-40 units in the DEI campaign v Zeroes was considerable *worse* than that in the limited number of actual P-40/Zero combats in the PI, around 1:7 v perhaps 1:3+ (actual causes of Zero losses in the early raids, AA, P-40 or other, are hard to determine even with detailed Japanese records, most of the a/c lost were only known not to have returned). And in the brief sampling of P-40/A-24 teaming in the defense of Java, the A-24's did sink one Japanese transport w/o being intercepted on one mission, but a P-40 escort force was largely wiped out defending them on the other mission. Another book by Bartsch covering this period is "Every Day a Nightmare" but the basics are in "Bloody Shambles". Also in a slightly different context against mostly land targets, USAAF A-24's supported by RAAF Kittyhawks/USAAF P-39's in New Guinea in spring/summer 1942 proved at high risk to Zeroes. The USAAF swore off the plane after an A-24 force with P-39 escort was virtually wiped out, in July 1942.
Joe
While I agree that FEAF (like AHQFE in Singapore) should have done more to ensure the guns worked and that sufficient ammo was available to get pilots to a high degree of gunnery proficiency, the problems of .50 cal failures were far more widespread than just FEAF. Pretty much every fighter equipped with .50 cals had major gun reliability issues in the period thru the end of 1942 including the F4F, Buffalo, P-40 and early P-51 variants.
The Buffalos in Singapore also suffered from solenoid problems. There wasn't just one problem, though. Each installation had its peculiarities (eg ammunition feed trays etc).
Think that Chennault never encountered Zeroes, let alone before 1942?