Kamikaze: Ever had a chance of success?

tyrodtom said:

But the bombs mattered to the emporer, so much so that he even mentioned them in his surrender address to his people.
The order of decussion proves nothing, sometimes it's last but not least.

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I agree that it mattered to the emperor. He also mentioned them during his final verdict asked by the War Cabinet. It seems he was more aware of what was going on, than the generals. I guess that's what happens when you let the military run a country.
However, it also shows the lack of courage the emperor had. He kept his little divine mouth shut, when he was already convinced the war was lost.

One simply cannot understand WW2 Japan from a Western POV. For instance, when the emperor had decided to surrender, the ministers and generals started to weep uncontrollably, hysterically. Grown men, leaders of armies and fleets, weeping like little children over words of an emperor, who was in some weird way prohibited in speaking in the first place.

Things were not what they seem and the Japanese surrender was not because of the A-bombs. No meeting was assembled after the drop of the first bomb. They only assembled after the news arrived of the Russian invasion. At most, the bombs accelerated the surrender.


Kris

gjs238 said:

Perhaps the Soviets finished them.

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"And mark you! Japan sued for peace before the atomic bomb hit Hiroshima and before Russia entered the Pacific War." - Rear Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN.

Hiroshima and Manchuria happened almost concurrently. But Japan's armies and air forces at that time were actually larger than they were in 1941. The prospect of opposing the Russians wasn't what made that nation, with its military strength still for the most part intact, quit so quickly and decisively. They were facing, not just defeat, but total extinction. That's what those atomic bombs got across to them, and in no uncertain terms.

The second atomic bomb, and Russia's entry into the war was on the same day. The 9 th of Aug.
The meeting between the emperor and cabinet was late that night going into the next morning.

Hiroshima bombed Aug 6, Russia declared war Aug 8. Russia invaded Mancuhko early morning Aug 9, later that same morning Nagasaki was nuked.

Indeed, Tyrodtom.

And VBF-13, you are right, that they were facing complete destruction. But this was already going on before the A-bombs. Firestorms had turned its largest cities and industries into ashes.

Many of the generals/admirals stated that it was better to die to the last man. If Japan was to be taken over by the enemy, it could just as well stop existing.

What you guys should also realize is that Japan considered its territories in Manchukuo and Formosa as part of the Japanese empire. An attack on these territories was almost an attack on the home country. Until the end, the Japanese had hoped to keep these territories if they surrendered to the Americans. In the end, they were not allowed to. Only their wish to see the monarchy is place, was met.

The existence of the emperor was a symbol of the Japanese identity. If the emperor would remain, Japan would live on.

Like I said, it's not our Western way of thinking at work here.
Kris

I'm not so sure it's that the eastern way of thinking is so different, but I think people who have been in absolute power for so long don't realize how powerless they'll become when they lose. They can have a totally unrealistic view of their worth to their enemy.
Take for example how some in the Nazi hierarchy thought they could negotiate a separate peace with the western allies, then combine forces with them against the Soviets.

Joes wiki link is worth reading. Relevantly it says


"The combined shock of these events caused Emperor Hirohito to intervene and order the Big Six to accept the terms for ending the war that the Allies had set down in the Potsdam Declaration. After several more days of behind-the-scenes negotiations and a failed coup d'état, Emperor Hirohito gave a recorded radio address across the Empire on August 15. In the radio address, called the Gyokuon-hōsō ("Jewel Voice Broadcast"), he announced the surrender of Japan to the Allies"...

Saying the bombs had no effect is not valid, but then trying to discount the Soviet invasion is also clearly at odds with known facts. Its true that the Japanese were seeking a way out of the war from at least June 1944, but the unconditional surrender terms and the refusal by the allies to give any concessions regarding the empereor were major sticking points for the Japanese, and until the Soviets attacked, Japan was showing absolutely no signs of accepting them. They seemed prepred to committing national sengoku rather than risk having the emperor mistreated. The "big six" were dead locked, and remained so until after the invasion of Manchuria. It was the invasion, not the bomb that caused them to seek the emperors guidance, something that had not occurred since the Meiji Restoration. So, as far as the "big six" were concerned, it was not the bomb that loomed large for them. However for the emperor, we dont actually know what pushed him to instruct the war cabinet to accept Potsdam and surrender unconditionally.... Given that some members of the big six were appalled by the losses being suffered, and the emperor was clearly favouring the peace initiatives, one can only surmise that he too was influenced by the effect of the bomb(s). He never made it clear, however, in the post war period what caused him to intervene in the way that he did. He just did.....

In trying to understand japanese intransigence, one has to remember the very nature of Japanese politics.....I call it "assassination politics". If the Kwantung Army (the real power brokers in japan) did not like what a politician was doing or saying, they would rub him out without a moments hesitation. Even after the emperors intervention on August 8/9, there were grave fears of a coup de tat that would see the emperor killed or detained. thats exactly what was attempted by Anami and his associates but thankfully it failed

There is a slightly Machiavellian interpretation of Japan's decision to surrender. "Eurasian Eclipse: Japan's End Game in World War II", Yukiko Koshiro, The American Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 2 (April 2004) (pp. 417-444) has:

A two-front war against both the United States and the Soviet Union was looking like an impossible scenario; the Soviet attack alone would be the end of Japan's war in Asia and the Pacific. However, Japan's surrender tactic was now to have the United States and the Soviet Union compete against each other in their planning for the future of East Asia. Thus Japan's plan for surrender and beyond, both politically and militarily in the Eurasian context, was made assuming a Soviet attack beginning in Manchuria and assessing its impact on the United States. In fact, by mid-April 1945, when the Imperial Headquarters acknowledged the rapid reinforcement of Soviet forces in the Far East, the Army War Operations Plans Division made no recommendations for preparations for counterattack. Instead, it made the following observation: the key to accomplishing the goal of the Greater East Asian War was to predict precisely when the Soviet attack would occur and to complete by then a quick and proper response and measure concerning it. The "quick and proper response and measure" seems, in this context, to mean Japan's surrender. But nowhere in the observation did it hint that Japan should do so before the Soviet attack.

Civettone said:

Indeed, Tyrodtom.

And VBF-13, you are right, that they were facing complete destruction. But this was already going on before the A-bombs. Firestorms had turned its largest cities and industries into ashes.

Many of the generals/admirals stated that it was better to die to the last man. If Japan was to be taken over by the enemy, it could just as well stop existing.

What you guys should also realize is that Japan considered its territories in Manchukuo and Formosa as part of the Japanese empire. An attack on these territories was almost an attack on the home country. Until the end, the Japanese had hoped to keep these territories if they surrendered to the Americans. In the end, they were not allowed to. Only their wish to see the monarchy is place, was met.

The existence of the emperor was a symbol of the Japanese identity. If the emperor would remain, Japan would live on.

Like I said, it's not our Western way of thinking at work here.
Kris

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Kris, I'm buying a lot of that. As Tom pointed out, though, the second atomic bomb and Manchuria were almost simultaneous. I'm loosening up, though. At any rate, I didn't mean to imply Russia wasn't a consideration. I just still think Nagasaki was the straw that broke the camel's back; the procuring cause; the main event.

As a slight digression, do you know what Stalin wanted? This is just my personal view. He wanted his boys on the USS Missouri (that is to say, in a manner of speaking). He wanted a piece of Tokyo just as he ultimately got that piece of Berlin. That greedy bastard.

Just proceeding from my slight digression, from Japan's point of view, knowing they were licked, the ultimate question was who they wanted to unconditionally surrender to. Russia's late entry into that War at that point was almost insulting, too, after all that fighting we did, there.

VBF-13 said:

Kris, I'm buying a lot of that. As Tom pointed out, though, the second atomic bomb and Manchuria were almost simultaneous. I'm loosening up, though. At any rate, I didn't mean to imply Russia wasn't a consideration. I just still think Nagasaki was the straw that broke the camel's back; the procuring cause; the main event.

As a slight digression, do you know what Stalin wanted? This is just my personal view. He wanted his boys on the USS Missouri (that is to say, in a manner of speaking). He wanted a piece of Tokyo just as he ultimately got that piece of Berlin. That greedy bastard.

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Uncle Joe did get part of the Kuril Islands Kuril Islands dispute - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

WWII era Kamikaze appear normal compared to these lunatics.
Counter-Terrorism: Butt Bombs A Bust

For over a decade now Western terrorism experts (and script writers) have predicted that Islamic terrorists would hide bombs inside their bodies in order to avoid detection before the bombers got to their targets (usually high-value individuals). The simplest method to carry a bomb internally is to insert a small (500 gr/a pound of explosives) package up the rectum.

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davebender said:

WWII era Kamikaze appear normal compared to these lunatics.
Counter-Terrorism: Butt Bombs A Bust

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My point in #107 was that according to Yukiko Koshiro some Japanese leaders were not only rational but almost prescient. They calculated that waiting for a Soviet attack and then surrendering would lead to Soviet – American conflict over Korea and China which they believed was the best chance for Japan to regain its independence.

Of course finding evidence that some officers thought that way in early 1945 does not prove that they were influential, still less that they were controlling Japanese policy .

Returning after the digression into the politics of the Japanese Surrender to the original question and particularly whether the Battle of the Philippines Sea could have been affected, it does seem clear that a far sighted IJN officer should have been worried by the difficulty that a Kamikaze pilot with only limited training might have in finding an American aircraft carrier. He might have also been concerned by the difference in the handling of an Ohka under power compared with the glider version used in training.

I don't think that it would have been wise to have included use of the T-Stoff and C-Stoff powered flight in the training syllabus because of the hazard. However, perhaps it might have been possible to have added the RATO rockets actually used historically to a glider to give a student some idea of the characteristics of an Ohka at 350-380 knots. The Japanese probably had enough RATO rockets as they used those on carriers in 1944 (none of the Japanese carriers in WW2 had catapults – Kaga had tested a bad design pre-WW2). I don't know if it would have been necessary to develop a method of jettisoning the RATO rockets as well as the water warhead before landing the glider.

The problem of finding an aircraft carrier might be soluble by turning the Ohka into an anti-radiation missile with sophisticated terminal guidance. The German night fighters in 1944 were homing on bomber emissions using Naxos against the centimetric radar of H2S and also used the RAF IFF if it was switched on. We might imagine that plans for Naxos had arrived at the same time as planes for the liquid fuelled rocket motors. However, while radar emissions might find a USN ship, finding a carrier might require more discrimination.

The unique signal of the USN carriers was their verbal fighter direction system, about which I know very little (help!). Thus I have no idea how easy it would be to use this for homing, although it would seem that a simultaneous conventional attack should get the USN talking. The signals could be picked up at a fair range. There is an account of pilots over Guam being called back to defend their carriers by the code signal "Hey Rube" when Ozawa's strike was detected. It would be necessary to identify frequencies and I assume that the system involved some frequency hoping. A few G4Ms flying with the Ohka carriers could possibly carry equipment to analyse the signals and inform the Ohka pilots of settings if early investigations during the attacks on the Marshalls and Truk had identified how the American system worked (perhaps aided by examination of aircraft shot down over Truk). The RAF could break into the German fighter direction system and give false instructions HyperWar: Royal Air Force 1939-1945: Volume III: The Fight is Won [Chapter 12] and RAF West Malling which implies that finding the frequencies for that system was possible.

cherry blossom said:

Returning after the digression into the politics of the Japanese Surrender to the original question and particularly whether the Battle of the Philippines Sea could have been affected, it does seem clear that a far sighted IJN officer should have been worried by the difficulty that a Kamikaze pilot with only limited training might have in finding an American aircraft carrier. He might have also been concerned by the difference in the handling of an Ohka under power compared with the glider version used in training.

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The Kamikazes were led to their targets by escorts, who also did the progress-reporting.

VBFs comments are correct. The japanese needed to locate and fix the position of the 5th fleet before they could hit them. It was one of the stnad out successes for the japanese during the battle. they retained this recon advantage to the end of the war. USN was located by long range land based seaplanes almost as they left their anchorages. They retained good surveillance of the USN until the last days, when the USN finally closed up this source of vital information for the Japanese. That helps to explain (but not fully so) why one of Ozawas strike almost completely missed their targets.

The Japanese really sucked at inter-command co-operation. The LBA elements of the plan were supposed to keep the 1st mob fleet of accurate updates on their progress...the idea being they would attrition the USN to even up the odds. They gave completely spurious and innaccurate reports of sinking US carriers and huge unsubstantiated US aircraft losses, when in reality the USN was absolutely working them over and wiping the floor with them for very few losses

Japanese fighter direction was really a matter of guesswork by the ground based commander...most of the airborne deployments were left up to the discretion of the airborne leaders in tactical command. Good flexibility but limited capability is the way i would describe Japanese fighter direction.

The unique signal of the USN carriers was their verbal fighter direction system, about which I know very little (help!).

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In 1942 the USN fighter direction was poor, overcentraliused and lacking discipline by the pilots. two critical elements thwat the USN just didnt get to grips with until later. But still markedly better than the Japanese. By 1944, fighter direction techniques were much perfected, with far better radio discipline and better central control exercised by the FCs. It was this excellent C&C that was the single most important element to victory at Phil Sea and elsewhere....being in the right place at the right time at the right height and in the right numbers was a critical element to USN success. The pilots did play a role in achieving that advantage incidentally By 1945 it was the second most effective navy at fighter control techniques second only to the BPF. The British were, and remained, the masters of the trade until the advent of high tech AEW and AWACs aircraft. There was only a slight advantage by 1945, but a clear one. in our view, the USN jockey still retained an element of ill discipline. which tended to cost them despite the massive numbers they could bring to bear by that stage.

I might be a little biased on this last subject, but its a genuine opinion, backed up by some good stats. .

Apparently the term 'kamikaze' was known in the West before the war.

A Mitsubishi Ki-15 flew from Japan to Europe with the word kamikaze written on the fuselage. Written in Western letters, so either this is the source of the misuse of kamikaze for suicide planes, or means that the word was already known in the Western world.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamikaze_%281937_aircraft%29
Kris

"Kamikaze" is a modification of two japanese words....from Japanese, "kami" divine + "kaze" wind, referring to the winds that, according to Japanese tradition, destroyed a Mongol invasion fleet in 1281. Kamikaze as a name has been used quitre regularly by the Japanese, for example they named a class of Destroyers "Kamikaze" class DDs. in Japoanese vernacular, the term has more to infer divine providence or miraculous good luck or good fortune, so the phrase was used quite a bit in prewar Japan.

But the Japanese whilst making references to the "divine winds" of 1281 when they formally initiated suicide atacks, never formally referred to the term as a description of their special attack units. That was a name given to them by the west.

Even this explanation belies the extent of bastardization that has occurred . Before 1940, many Japanese texts refer to this word as equivalent to kami ( y ) god (earlier *kamui ) + kaze wind (earlier *kanzai). As should be apparent, the word was mangled and misused by the Allies....a clear indication of near total ignorance of the Japanese motivations.

My point is merely that I believe the word kamikaze was known in the West prior to WW2. This record-setting Ki-15 is either a result of the Western knowledge of this word, or it contributed to it.

In other words, I do not believe it is a coincidence that the Japanese used exactly this word for their first and only aircraft trip to Europe.

Kris

Yeah, okay I understand, and fair enough. But the japanese never referred officially to their Special Attack Corps as "kamikazes". They were popularised in the west by that name, and it may even have been used in their local popular press. But I am yet to find any evidence of that. If you want to be a bit pedantic , it should really should be shown as two separate words ie Kami Kaze and not the bastardised westernised version of 'kamikaze", since in japanese language the term is a combination of two words. of course, in the post war, it probably crept into even Japanese language as a new word, because of the gradual westernization of the country and the popularization of the supreme saacrifices made by these men.

I dont think we as observers have the moral right to show such disrespect .......they were our mortal enemeies, but they fought more bravely that just about any other group of warriors in human history....

It is written as one word on that plane of theirs


Kris