Kamikaze: Ever had a chance of success?

[VBF-13]

Getting back to the Bakas, it might be interesting to note, those were actually conceived of just days before the Marianas. In fact, they were designed, for the most part, then, too. The Japanese knew, they lose those islands, which constituted their perimeter defense, they may as well hang it up, and go home. That's why they sent that massive fleet consisting of nine carriers and some 500 planes from Tawi Tawi after us to help oppose the landings at Saipan. The ensuing slaughter and turning back of that fleet only served to confirm the desperate position they were in and basically sold the Baka concept to Fukadome, although it was still kept very secret. Only after the Philippines were lost and the Japanese had evacuated that Kamikaze program and those records to Formosa did they have the Bakas ready for the inaugural whirl. The Kamikaze program preceded the Baka program as the latter not only had to be built, but the tactics and manner of deployment had still to be worked out. When the Bakas were conceived, there was heavy fighting at Saipan, both on the ground, and in the air from the Japanese bases at Rota and Guam, but those weren't enough to hold. We could have chased after that fleet and finished it off with our F6Fs but Spruance was more concerned with making sure we had those islands secured, and that's why we let it off. The Baka program still needed work, and the Kamikaze program was an easy deployment, and that's why they went with the Kamikaze program, first. That was in October 1944, out of small bases in the Philippines, for the purpose of opposing the Philippine landings. Those were basically small units, consisting of just a few planes, with spotter escorts to record the latitude and longitude of the hits, and report those back.

 

[parsifal]

The Kamikaze program preceded the Baka program as the latter not only had to be built, but the tactics and manner of deployment had still to be worked out

.


Bakas were a part of the Special Air corps inventory. Suggesting it was something different is misleading

We could have chased after that fleet and finished it off with our F6Fs but Spruance was more concerned with making sure we had those islands secured, and that's why we let it off.

There are three pieces of misinformation here. Firstly, that the F6Fs had the ability to sink japanese carriers. they never did. They could carry bombs out to a range of about 180 miles but lacked the firepower and the accuracy to ever sink any major warship of the IJN. Secondly, Spruance operational orders were to protect the beachhead, and he was rightly concerned that being drawn off by 1st mobile fleet might expose the beachhead to some outflanking move. Thirdly, Sprunace calculated that by the time he had caught them again, he may well be subject to massive attacks (2-3000 a/c) from air units based in the Home Islands. Japan even at that stage had significant forces retained for homed defence.

Catching and destroying the Japanese fleet at phil sea is one of those popular urban myths put out by post war armchair strat5egists whi really dont know what they are talking about.....

The Baka program still needed work, and the Kamikaze program was an easy deployment, and that's why they went with the Kamikaze program, first.

Bakas were a part of the Kamikaze effort, not separate to it. Its logical that it followed the initial employment of the tactic, not preceded it.

That was in October 1944, out of small bases in the Philippines, for the purpose of opposing the Philippine landings. Those were basically small units, consisting of just a few planes, with spotter escorts to record the latitude and longitude of the hits, and report those back.

What??????. The Phillipines and Formosa had been comprehensively worked over by the fast carriers prior to Leyte. The Kamikazes were controlled from Formosa initially, but had to operate from small dispersed fields because they were the only ones left in operation after halseys cariers had rooted out most of the Japanese air strength in the TO. Japan by October 1944 was staring defeat squarely in the face and needed a miracle to stem the tide. Some of the fanatics believed that making a supreme self sacrifice might deliver that miracle and save the empire. It was a complete pipe dream....

 

[VBF-13]

What??????. The Phillipines and Formosa had been comprehensively worked over by the fast carriers prior to Leyte. The Kamikazes were controlled from Formosa initially, but had to operate from small dispersed fields because they were the only ones left in operation after halseys cariers had rooted out most of the Japanese air strength in the TO. Japan by October 1944 was staring defeat squarely in the face and needed a miracle to stem the tide. Some of the fanatics believed that making a supreme self sacrifice might deliver that miracle and save the empire. It was a complete pipe dream....

You're more mixed-up than anybody. I'll just address this part. Get your facts straight. The Kamikaze program was conceived at Mabalacat Airfield, which formed a part of the Clark Base complex, which was some 50 miles NW of Manila, on or about 19 October 1944, with fewer than 100 planes operational, out of the 201st Air Group, just as we were at the mouth of the Leyte Gulf. When that bunch was all but finished the records and the program were forthwith removed to Formosa under two separate covers in two separate flights to make sure they could restart-up the program from there with whatever assets they could command, which is exactly what they then did. That's from Rikihei Inoguchi and Tadashi Nakajima, who were there from the inception of the program to the end, look those gentlemen up. The Japanese had the Bakas designed, as I said, well-before that, but couldn't deploy them until after the Formosa program was operational, because of the different logistics involved. Do yourself a favor and pick up of a copy of The Divine Wind, read it, then tell me where anything I said herein is inconsistent with those first-hand narratives.

 

[cherry blossom]

The answer to the initial question is almost certainly not. We can produce a best case for the Special Attack Units and I have also been thinking about the decisive Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944.

First we assume that the original proposal by Ensign Ohta Mitsuro in 1943 is immediately accepted and design started. How much time does that gain?

According to "Kamikaze: Japanese Special Attack Weapons 1944-45" by Steven Zaloga, work started at Kugisho on 16th August 1944. However, preliminary plans had been drawn up by Professor Ogawa Taichiro and his coworkers at The Imperial University of Tokyo over the previous few months. Exactly when they started isn't obvious. "Japanese Special Attack Aircraft and Flying Bombs" by Ryusuke Ishiguro Tadeusz Januszewski mentions that Captain Tadanao Mitsugi had carried an analysis of Ohta original idea before the IJN gave permission for the work at Tokyo but even that seems to date to "mid 1944".

We know that the first Ohkas were being sent to the Philippines in December 1944 but never got there IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY MYSTERIES. Thus if we assume a start approximately 8 months earlier, we could have deployment for May-June 1944 in time for the Battle of the Marianas.

Secondly, we assume that liquid fuel rockets are available. The obvious way to achieve that is for German designs together with manufacturing details to arrive in Japan by early 1944. Unfortunately, I do not know which German design would be chosen or what performance was possible. The HWK 109-507 of the Hs 293 seems too heavy and has relatively low power for only a short time. The Schmidding 109-513 Schmidding 109-513 Motor was better but a system for relighting would need to be added. The best performance would be achieved by accepting the risks of the hypergolic HWK 109-509. According to Wikipedia Walter HWK 109-509 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, this is the lightest and most powerful, weighing only 100 kg and in the case of the A-1 variant "The thrust here was adjustable between 100 kp (1 kN) and 1600 kp (15.7 kN (3,500 lbf))". This is more than twice the power of all three solid fuel rockets of the Ohka, which was much smaller even than the Me 163 Komet. The problem is trying to work out how long the rocket could give the thrust needed to keep the Ohka in the air and moving fast enough to be hard to intercept. Me-163 Komet has "Operational time at full thrust 4 min 11 seconds . However, the Komet carried only enough fuel for 7 ½ minutes of powered flight." The Komet carried quite a lot of fuel as there was roughly two tons difference between empty and loaded weights. If we halve the warhead weight of the Ohka from 1,200 kg to 600 kg, we might free up enough weight to have a half scale HWK 109-509 and still get either 4 minutes of full power or perhaps 10 minutes of variable power, keeping the Okha at 350-360 knots which would be hard to intercept. That gives a range of about 70 miles, which would probably generally allow release before interception (hopefully you will all check my guesses ).

Perhaps 100 of these Ohka and their G4M carriers will be positioned on Guam and perhaps more than half of them will survive the first day of attacks, perhaps in specially constructed partially underground hangars. Before dawn on the 13th June, the G4Ms will take off and fly initially north in a curve to approach from between Guam and Saipan, rising up to release the Okhas when reconnaissance aircraft report the position of the American aircraft carriers. The US fleet had 15 fast carriers in the area, so it would be fairly astonishing if about 50 Ohka hit all of them. It does seem likely that a few of the Essex Class will be out of action after such an attack. However, enough will probably survive to win the battle.

 

[VBF-13]

That's consistent with the narratives in The Divine Wind.

Guys, Ohka means "cherry blossom." So don't argue with cherry blossom on this.

 

[Civettone]

Secondly, we assume that liquid fuel rockets are available. The obvious way to achieve that is for German designs together with manufacturing details to arrive in Japan by early 1944. Unfortunately, I do not know which German design would be chosen or what performance was possible. The HWK 109-507 of the Hs 293 seems too heavy and has relatively low power for only a short time. The Schmidding 109-513 Schmidding 109-513 Motor was better but a system for relighting would need to be added. The best performance would be achieved by accepting the risks of the hypergolic HWK 109-509. According to Wikipedia Walter HWK 109-509 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, this is the lightest and most powerful, weighing only 100 kg and in the case of the A-1 variant "The thrust here was adjustable between 100 kp (1 kN) and 1600 kp (15.7 kN (3,500 lbf))". This is more than twice the power of all three solid fuel rockets of the Ohka, which was much smaller even than the Me 163 Komet. The problem is trying to work out how long the rocket could give the thrust needed to keep the Ohka in the air and moving fast enough to be hard to intercept. Me-163 Komet has "Operational time at full thrust 4 min 11 seconds .

Just skip the rocket engines and go for the pulsejet engine of the V 1 flying bomb. The Kawanishi Baika was derived from it. The Fi 103R had the same weight as the Ohka, so expect similar performances but with a range of at least 150 miles!
I don't know if anyone knows the CAS radius for US carriers but geometrics of a circle indicate that it would be close to impossible to intercept these aircraft.

Kris

 

[parsifal]

You're more mixed-up than anybody. I'll just address this part. Get your facts straight. The Kamikaze program was conceived at Mabalacat Airfield, which formed a part of the Clark Base complex, which was some 50 miles NW of Manila, on or about 19 October 1944, with fewer than 100 planes operational, out of the 201st Air Group, just as we were at the mouth of the Leyte Gulf.

Disagree, and further, would suggest you are misquoting the Japanese sources you mention. Suicide attacks had been used unnofficially by all nationalities from the beginning of the war, but in particualr the japanese. The first recorded or known use of deliberate suicide attacks occurred during Santa Cruz, in October 1942, thereafter ther were increasingly frequesnt instances of their usage.

In the fall of 1943, the AAF began to form its first "Special Attack Units" in New Guinea. In the fall of 1943 and for about a month at the beginning of 1944, Lt. Col. Koji Tanaka, a staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters, surveyed the situation in New Guinea. In an effort to stop the constant raids, some Japanese army pilots had resorted to crashing their planes into American B-17s and B-24s. The use of these special attack methods by the army began in 1943 and lasted into the spring of 1944. They included deliberate suicide attacks against airborne, land based and sea based targets, including a successful attack on DD 394

Tanaka returned to Japan and reported his findings to the highest echelon of the Army and recommended that the use of special attack operations be considered. Philosophical disagreements sprang up among the top army officers. The discussion centered on whether or not special attack tactics and squadrons should be under a mandate from the Imperial Army or whether they should be strictly volunteer. Both the Inspector General of Aviation, Gen. Korechika Anami and his deputy chief, Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, felt that they should be strictly voluntary. After conversations with Maj. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, the Chief of the First Bureau, General Staff Headquarters, it was decided not to order army pilots to engage in special attack training. Shortly thereafter, in July 1944, the army "Aviation Inspector-General sent a letter to all flight school superintendents requesting a list of special attack volunteers be submitted. (A similar letter was sent from the War Minister to all air group commanders.)" Within a short period of time the army had selected fifty volunteers. Bomber pilots trained at Hamamatsu and Hokoda Army Flight Schools and the fighter pilots at Hitachi and Akeno Army Flight Schools. The following month, another sixty volunteers were accepted for special attack training and the program began to grow. By fall of 1944, the army pilots were still undergoing training, but the navy had also been considering special attacks. The program was initiated by the navy using regular pilots who were asked to volunteer.


Japanese sources frequently credit RAdm. Masafumi Arima as the inspiration for the beginning of the suicide attacks at the Philippines. Arima commanded the 26th Air Flotilla which was based at Manila. On 15 October 1944, he decided to lead a strike against American carriers near Luzon, an unusual undertaking for an officer of his high rank. Japanese reports claim that Arima crashed his Zero into the carrier Franklin CV 13, but this is unlikely. Neither Franklin nor the other carriers in the American force were hit by kamikazes that day.


The official (American version) of the beginning of the Japanese Navy's kamikaze units came on 19 October 1944 when VAdm. Takijiro Onishi (who was headquartered at Formosa) toured the base of the 201st Air Group at Mabalacat, Philippines. His command at that time had already suffered heavy losses from repeated strikes undertaken in prepration for the main operation ( source Rielly, Robin L. Kamikaze attacks of World War II : a complete history of Japanese suicide strikes on American ships, by aircraft and other means)Onishi had just been appointed commander of the First Air Fleet with his operational orders including the formation of "special attack units" similar to the above described army units already in training. AFAIK, the Navy was also training units along the same lines. The Navy General Staff had recognized that Japan's position in the war was tenuous. Onishi, in accordance with his orders suggested to the air group's leaders that suicide crashes were their only chance to defeat the enemy. Within the hour the determination had been made to use this extreme attack method and twenty-seven members of the 201st volunteered for the mission. These men were not poorly trained beginners but were ranked among the best pilots in the air group. Lt. Yukio Seki, a graduate of the Naval Academy, was selected as their leader.


So, saying the initiatve for the kamikazes came from an obscure small unit in the Phillipines is completely misleading and frankly, untrue.

 

[tyrodtom]

If you drop the Ohka 150, 70 or whatever miles from their targets, how are they going to find their targets?
You surely don't expect to just point them in the general direction of where you hope the fleet to be, and let them go ?

The long range sounds nice, but if it's inexperinced pilots envolved, that just gives them more ocean to get lost in.

 

[Civettone]

I thought about that too. But then again, how do those Betty bombers find them? All they can do is fly high, follow the designated course and hope that the intel was correct. Also, adding an experienced but now suicide pilot seems essential...


Kris

 

[tyrodtom]

The Betty bombers had fairly experinced pilots and way more than adaquet range.
When you're flying along at 20,000-25,000 feet, with several eyes aboard, you've got a lot of abilty to search for targets. But they had to get within visual range of the target to release the Ohka. Without radar on the Bettys, that's the only way possible.
That's why so many Bettys got shot down before they got the chance to release the Ohka.
If the dropping aircraft didn't have radar, the added range Ohka wouldn't help at all. It would just mean you'd lose fewer dropping aircraft.

 

[Civettone]

No, I think you are mistaken. The reason why the Betties had to get so close was because the range of the Ohka was only 35 km.

I don't think it is relevant if the Betty crews have more eyes or if they are more experienced. Without radar, all they could do, is follow a set course and look out for large fleets. A large swarm of Baikas or Ohkas would be just as capable of visually detecting a US Task Force.


Kris

 

[tyrodtom]

No, I think you are mistaken. The reason why the Betties had to get so close was because the range of the Ohka was only 35 km.

I don't think it is relevant if the Betty crews have more eyes or if they are more experienced. Without radar, all they could do, is follow a set course and look out for large fleets. A large swarm of Baikas or Ohkas would be just as capable of visually detecting a US Task Force.


Kris

You've evidently never had to do a visual search from the air. Very small specks, that a untrained eye wouldn't even stop to focus on can turn out to be a target, or just dirt on the windshield. The more eyes you have, the more time each has to focus on a sector long enough to see something.
One man would be just flying along head in and out of the cockpit, having to concentrate on flying and searching, and being a newby to flying, flying might take quite a bit of his concentration.

 

[tyrodtom]

How far is the horizon on a clear day at 20,000-25,000 feet ?

You've got some fairly experienced pilots on this forum, i'm not one of them. But I can imagine myself as a newby pilot though, brecause i'm not far above that level right now.
I can imagine me at the 50 hour level of experince flying around trying to find something, maybe with a pair of binoculars, i'd soon merge with the ground.
I'm very experienced with search from the air over ground from the Army aviation, plus have helped the CAP in some downed aircraft searches, it's not something you do with inexperinced pilots, unless you want to add to the aircraft downed.

 

[VBF-13]

Disagree, and further, would suggest you are misquoting the Japanese sources you mention. Suicide attacks had been used unnofficially by all nationalities from the beginning of the war, but in particualr the japanese. The first recorded or known use of deliberate suicide attacks occurred during Santa Cruz, in October 1942, thereafter ther were increasingly frequesnt instances of their usage.

In the fall of 1943, the AAF began to form its first "Special Attack Units" in New Guinea. In the fall of 1943 and for about a month at the beginning of 1944, Lt. Col. Koji Tanaka, a staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters, surveyed the situation in New Guinea. In an effort to stop the constant raids, some Japanese army pilots had resorted to crashing their planes into American B-17s and B-24s. The use of these special attack methods by the army began in 1943 and lasted into the spring of 1944. They included deliberate suicide attacks against airborne, land based and sea based targets, including a successful attack on DD 394

Tanaka returned to Japan and reported his findings to the highest echelon of the Army and recommended that the use of special attack operations be considered. Philosophical disagreements sprang up among the top army officers. The discussion centered on whether or not special attack tactics and squadrons should be under a mandate from the Imperial Army or whether they should be strictly volunteer. Both the Inspector General of Aviation, Gen. Korechika Anami and his deputy chief, Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, felt that they should be strictly voluntary. After conversations with Maj. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, the Chief of the First Bureau, General Staff Headquarters, it was decided not to order army pilots to engage in special attack training. Shortly thereafter, in July 1944, the army "Aviation Inspector-General sent a letter to all flight school superintendents requesting a list of special attack volunteers be submitted. (A similar letter was sent from the War Minister to all air group commanders.)" Within a short period of time the army had selected fifty volunteers. Bomber pilots trained at Hamamatsu and Hokoda Army Flight Schools and the fighter pilots at Hitachi and Akeno Army Flight Schools. The following month, another sixty volunteers were accepted for special attack training and the program began to grow. By fall of 1944, the army pilots were still undergoing training, but the navy had also been considering special attacks. The program was initiated by the navy using regular pilots who were asked to volunteer.

Japanese sources frequently credit RAdm. Masafumi Arima as the inspiration for the beginning of the suicide attacks at the Philippines. Arima commanded the 26th Air Flotilla which was based at Manila. On 15 October 1944, he decided to lead a strike against American carriers near Luzon, an unusual undertaking for an officer of his high rank. Japanese reports claim that Arima crashed his Zero into the carrier Franklin CV 13, but this is unlikely. Neither Franklin nor the other carriers in the American force were hit by kamikazes that day.

The official (American version) of the beginning of the Japanese Navy's kamikaze units came on 19 October 1944 when VAdm. Takijiro Onishi (who was headquartered at Formosa) toured the base of the 201st Air Group at Mabalacat, Philippines. His command at that time had already suffered heavy losses from repeated strikes undertaken in prepration for the main operation ( source Rielly, Robin L. Kamikaze attacks of World War II : a complete history of Japanese suicide strikes on American ships, by aircraft and other means)Onishi had just been appointed commander of the First Air Fleet with his operational orders including the formation of "special attack units" similar to the above described army units already in training. AFAIK, the Navy was also training units along the same lines. The Navy General Staff had recognized that Japan's position in the war was tenuous. Onishi, in accordance with his orders suggested to the air group's leaders that suicide crashes were their only chance to defeat the enemy. Within the hour the determination had been made to use this extreme attack method and twenty-seven members of the 201st volunteered for the mission. These men were not poorly trained beginners but were ranked among the best pilots in the air group. Lt. Yukio Seki, a graduate of the Naval Academy, was selected as their leader.

So, saying the initiatve for the kamikazes came from an obscure small unit in the Phillipines is completely misleading and frankly, untrue.

Excuse me for drawing attention to your inability to be responsive but since when did I mention "Special Attack Units" and for that matter since when are those even but tangentially-related to the discussion? The Kamikaze concept was rationalized in Mabalacat off the practice of suicide-crashing into bombers, I had already pointed that out, go back and refresh your recollection on it. You're hardly being full of news, there. Thank you for pointing out Ohnishi's role, that's good information. However, it's only supplemental to what I said. I left his role out, you put it in. It was integral, I agree. But let's not go non-responsive and scatter-brained, which is precisely what you're doing. Get The Divine Wind and learn what the facts were relating to the Kamikaze program from those first-hand narratives. They'll tell you all about Ohnishi, in detail, and beyond. I'm talking specifically about the Kamikaze concept and the development of that specific program. Focus before you criticize. That's all you have to do. That, for a change, would be refreshing. Hell, it would be welcomed.

 

[VBF-13]

If you drop the Ohka 150, 70 or whatever miles from their targets, how are they going to find their targets?
You surely don't expect to just point them in the general direction of where you hope the fleet to be, and let them go ?

The long range sounds nice, but if it's inexperinced pilots envolved, that just gives them more ocean to get lost in.

From 6000 meters altitude the Bakas had a range of some 30,000 meters and were released at around 20,000 meters to go plummeting toward their targets. Again, Tom, the big deal was, protecting those twin-engined bombers. It took a lot of fighter-escort for that as they were slow and very vulnerable carrying that 1800 kilograms of explosives beneath them.

 

[Jenisch]

If I were the Japanese, I would try to import some Ar-234s to do reccon flights. I'm trying to be smart here, but actually they certainly must have thought of this at the time, and certainly it was not done because impossibility to bring things from Germany.

 

[parsifal]

Excuse me for drawing attention to your inability to be responsive but since when did I mention "Special Attack Units" and for that matter since when are those even but tangentially-related to the discussion?

Special Attack units ARE Kamikazes. Kamikaze is not even a word in Japanese. "Special Attack Units" is the best English translation for what we term "Kamikazes. They are, however, the same thing

The Kamikaze concept was rationalized in Mabalacat off the practice of suicide-crashing into bombers, I had already pointed that out, go back and refresh your recollection on it.

Koji Tanakas recommendations, and the activities of the AAF unit in PNG was not just limited to attacks on Allied Bombers. it included organised and deliberate attacks of air, sea and ground targets.

You're hardly being full of news, there. Thank you for pointing out Ohnishi's role, that's good information. However, it's only supplemental to what I said.

No its completely different to what you said. You claimed that the initiative for the kamikazes stemmed from a local source, in the phillipines. In fact it was an operational order handed to onishi, who was based in Formosa. His orders came directly from IGHQ, and the navy and army were both busy training attack units in Japan. You also claimed or inferred that there were no real attacks on Onishis command prior to Leyte...that the US forces had not entered the battle zone until just before the battle (a few days being the inference). In fact Onishis command had been subjected to repeated attacks since at least the 12 october that had completely wrecked all the major airfields, destroyed well over 800 aircraft, and left him with no choice but to skulk around remaining airfields and implement the new policy. Thats why he was in the Phillipines when he was.

I left his role out, you put it in. It was integral, I agree.

It wasnt "integral", it was critical. Kamikazes would not have developed in the historical way thet they did without his involvement, and beyond that the decisions made by IGHQ. The role of the 201st was simply to provide the "voluteers", but apart from that they were following orders, nothing more. Thats completely at odds with what you claimed. you claim they dreamed suicide attacks up and were the driving initiative behind it.

But let's not go non-responsive and scatter-brained, which is precisely what you're doing.

No, I am pulling you up on spurious claim after spurious claim. You claimed the genesis of Kamikazes was a localised phenomena, emananting from the Phillipines. You claimed that Kamikazes were a direct result of the defeat at Phil Sea, when clearly the Japanese were taking steps to form suicide units well before that. You also attempted to claim the Baka preceded the development of kamikazes in concept, and finally you made spurious claims about what the Hellcat as an aircraft could do. Oh, and you also made claims that Spruance "missed an opportunity" to destroy the 1st mob Flt when no such opportunity ever existed without him directly disobeying orders (now, that IS getting OT, but its still worth correcting your claims as the need arises).

Get The Divine Wind and learn what the facts were relating to the Kamikaze program from those first-hand narratives. They'll tell you all about Ohnishi, in detail, and beyond.

Ive already read the book, and many others on this subject, which is one reason why I know when you are taking people out of context, or misqupoting them, or simply telling enormous porkies (which is most of the time sad to say)....

I'm talking specifically about the Kamikaze concept and the development of that specific program.

So am i, and its development was a process that began at least from 1942 for the japanese.....in fact the whole concept self sacrifice, in the sense of the Kamikaze mindset goes all the way back to the Bushido.

Focus before you criticize. That's all you have to do. That, for a change, would be refreshing. Hell, it would be welcomed

.

I am focussed. Focussed on getting the truth out, despite the best efforts of special intersat groups to suppress and promote their version of history. And if you want to avoid my criticism, stop making outlandish claims and spurious remarks

And we are both talking about Kamikazes here...

 

[Coyote]

Special Attack units ARE Kamikazes. Kamikaze is not even a word in Japanese. "Special Attack Units" is the best English translation for what we term "Kamikazes. They are, however, the same thing

So what does 神風 mean????
This is the first time in 40+ years I have ever read that Kamikaze is not a Japanese word. I guess I'm gonna have to write all the authors from the hundreds of books I've read and tell them to come up with another Japanese term for Divine Wind...............I'll be right back...............

 

[VBF-13]

So what does 神風 mean????
This is the first time in 40+ years I have ever read that Kamikaze is not a Japanese word. I guess I'm gonna have to write all the authors from the hundreds of books I've read and tell them to come up with another Japanese term for Divine Wind...............I'll be right back...............

Coyote, the special unit born at Mabalacat was given the name, Shimpu (Shimpu is just another way of reading the characters for "Kamikaze").

Let me add just a quick footnote that might be helpful in understanding the wider picture. When Vice Admiral Ohnishi came to Mabalacat from Tokyo on 17 October 1944 to assume command of the First Air Fleet the Japanese had already had a plan in the works, called Sho, which had been completed in July 1944. That plan had basically set out, whichever area was invaded next by the enemy shall be declared the "theater of decisive battle," and all available forces shall be rushed to there to oppose the said invasion. That plan was activated at 1701 on 18 October 1944 with the first intimation of the American invasion at Leyte, and the Philippines was declared that decisive battle area. That's, also, the how, when and where of the Kamikaze Special Attack Corps, in a nut.

 

[VBF-13]

Special Attack units ARE Kamikazes. Kamikaze is not even a word in Japanese. "Special Attack Units" is the best English translation for what we term "Kamikazes. They are, however, the same thing

Koji Tanakas recommendations, and the activities of the AAF unit in PNG was not just limited to attacks on Allied Bombers. it included organised and deliberate attacks of air, sea and ground targets.

No its completely different to what you said. You claimed that the initiative for the kamikazes stemmed from a local source, in the phillipines. In fact it was an operational order handed to onishi, who was based in Formosa. His orders came directly from IGHQ, and the navy and army were both busy training attack units in Japan. You also claimed or inferred that there were no real attacks on Onishis command prior to Leyte...that the US forces had not entered the battle zone until just before the battle (a few days being the inference). In fact Onishis command had been subjected to repeated attacks since at least the 12 october that had completely wrecked all the major airfields, destroyed well over 800 aircraft, and left him with no choice but to skulk around remaining airfields and implement the new policy. Thats why he was in the Phillipines when he was.

It wasnt "integral", it was critical. Kamikazes would not have developed in the historical way thet they did without his involvement, and beyond that the decisions made by IGHQ. The role of the 201st was simply to provide the "voluteers", but apart from that they were following orders, nothing more. Thats completely at odds with what you claimed. you claim they dreamed suicide attacks up and were the driving initiative behind it.

No, I am pulling you up on spurious claim after spurious claim. You claimed the genesis of Kamikazes was a localised phenomena, emananting from the Phillipines. You claimed that Kamikazes were a direct result of the defeat at Phil Sea, when clearly the Japanese were taking steps to form suicide units well before that. You also attempted to claim the Baka preceded the development of kamikazes in concept, and finally you made spurious claims about what the Hellcat as an aircraft could do. Oh, and you also made claims that Spruance "missed an opportunity" to destroy the 1st mob Flt when no such opportunity ever existed without him directly disobeying orders (now, that IS getting OT, but its still worth correcting your claims as the need arises).

Ive already read the book, and many others on this subject, which is one reason why I know when you are taking people out of context, or misqupoting them, or simply telling enormous porkies (which is most of the time sad to say)....

So am i, and its development was a process that began at least from 1942 for the japanese.....in fact the whole concept self sacrifice, in the sense of the Kamikaze mindset goes all the way back to the Bushido.

I am focussed. Focussed on getting the truth out, despite the best efforts of special intersat groups to suppress and promote their version of history. And if you want to avoid my criticism, stop making outlandish claims and spurious remarks

And we are both talking about Kamikazes here...

I give up. Whatever you want to say, we leave it at that.