Kamikaze: Ever had a chance of success?

[tyrodtom]

All aircraft go thru handling changes at different speeds, you can't simulate it with ground training, or a gentle flight in a glider.
Just from my limited flight experience, some aircraft require a lot of trim changes with different speeds. and i'm just talking about regular flying. I don't know if I could keep up with the trim changes on a Cessna 172, if I put one in a suicide dive. I remember one time I complained to the instructor about how busy I was changing elevator trim, so he let me with fly it for awhile without trim changes, it began to require a lot of muscle to fly with just some minor airspeed changes, I never complained again.
That is IMO one of the problems encounted by the Okha pilots, they had glider training, but none of them had even flown the aircraft at the speeds they attained in that finale dive.
And then there's the problem of what is called getting behind the aircraft, where things happen faster than you accustomed to reacting to.

Training pilots in gliders that maybe could approach 200mph, and then expecting them to be able to sucessfully dive them on a target at speeds approaching 500mph was madness.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

All aircraft go thru handling changes at different speeds, you can't simulate it with ground training, or a gentle flight in a glider.
Just from my limited flight experience, some aircraft require a lot of trim changes with different speeds. and i'm just talking about regular flying. I don't know if I could keep up with the trim changes on a Cessna 172, if I put one in a suicide dive. I remember one time I complained to the instructor about how busy I was changing elevator trim, so he let me with fly it for awhile without trim changes, it began to require a lot of muscle to fly with just some minor airspeed changes, I never complained again.
That is IMO one of the problems encounted by the Okha pilots, they had glider training, but none of them had even flown the aircraft at the speeds they attained in that finale dive.
And then there's the problem of what is called getting behind the aircraft, where things happen faster than you accustomed to reacting to.

Training pilots in gliders that maybe could approach 200mph, and then expecting them to be able to sucessfully dive them on a target at speeds approaching 500mph was madness.

Some good points there - in general the Okha would probably had a tendency to pitch up when the rockets were fired. I do know that the aircraft was flight tested before it was used operationally but I've seen little information on its flying characteristics. Training in gliders was probably the best approach given the circumstances, especially if some of the test flight experiences was incorporated into the training syllabus.

 

[Civettone]

I think you are exaggerating. They only needed to know two settings: max cruise speed and dive speed. All the pilots needed to do was to steer it to the target. I respect the skills a pilot needs, but this is not what the drivers of the Ohka (not Okha) or Natter needed.


Kris

 

[tyrodtom]

I think you are exaggerating. They only needed to know two settings: max cruise speed and dive speed. All the pilots needed to do was to steer it to the target. I respect the skills a pilot needs, but this is not what the drivers of the Ohka (not Okha) or Natter needed.


Kris

I don't think you know what you're talking about.
Even a Cessna 172 can get build up control forces hard to over come, with the small speed ranges it can cover.

And then there's the even bigger problem of operating in a speed range you're not experienced with, everything happens faster, much faster. Like learning to drive in a Jetta diesel, and then immediately expected to be able to handle a 5 sec. A/A fueler in the quarter.

I'm not a experienced pilot, just low time, but I can understand some of the difficulties of jumping to a much faster aircraft, and the increased problems of just controlling the aircraft in simple manuvers can be much different.

Bou I am a fairly experienced in car racing, and very acquanted in people having trouble when mover up to faster cars, from what they were formally experieced with.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I think you are exaggerating. They only needed to know two settings: max cruise speed and dive speed. All the pilots needed to do was to steer it to the target. I respect the skills a pilot needs, but this is not what the drivers of the Ohka (not Okha) or Natter needed.


Kris

Exaggerating? How do explain a max cruise speed then you have no control of thrust? Its not quite as simple as "steering it to a target." When you're flying an aircraft at high speeds it's not always a gentle ride and even the most minor control deflections could send you in various directions very quickly. Trim is really important to maintain pitch attitude and unless you've been there, you can't understand. BTW my statements are just considering perfect conditions, throw in winds, turbulent air and someone shooting at you and you have other limiting aspects to look at. If it was a matter of just "steer it to the target" Kamikaze training would have been one hour.

 

[Civettone]

Ohka pilots had a training of 30 hours. Don't know if that includes ground training or not.


Kris

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Ohka pilots had a training of 30 hours. Don't know if that includes ground training or not.


Kris

Then to put it in perspective, it takes 40 hours to get a PPL, not including ground training.

 

[VBF-13]

Training pilots in gliders that maybe could approach 200mph, and then expecting them to be able to sucessfully dive them on a target at speeds approaching 500mph was madness.

But that's what this was. Look up "Baka." This was fanaticism that rationally-followed from their indoctrination, namely, to die for the Emperor and their cause. These guys knew they were beat, right down to the boots on the ground. That's why the atomic bombs were necessary. Kris is right. They drop the guy into the narrow cockpit through the bomb bay and he points the thing to the target and they hope for the best. What do you think this was, flying school? Quite the contrary, it was a desperate attempt at holding out to the last man. The bigger problem with these was the Bettys needed heavy fighter escort just to get into range to make the release as they were very slow and handicapped carrying these 1800 kgs of explosives. Bottom line? This wasn't any strategy to win any war. It was a strategy to show uncompromising resolve, right to the bitter end. In fact I'll go as far as to say it didn't even matter if they hit their targets. Maybe they'll get a concession out of it, who knows? If one needs a larger strategy, that was probably it.

 

[tyrodtom]

But that's what this was. Look up "Baka." This was fanaticism that rationally-followed from their indoctrination, namely, to die for the Emperor and their cause. These guys knew they were beat, right down to the boots on the ground. That's why the atomic bombs were necessary. Kris is right. They drop the guy into the narrow cockpit through the bomb bay and he points the thing to the target and they hope for the best. What do you think this was, flying school? Quite the contrary, it was a desperate attempt at holding out to the last man. The bigger problem with these was the Bettys needed heavy fighter escort just to get into range to make the release as they were very slow and handicapped carrying these 1800 kgs of explosives. Bottom line? This wasn't any strategy to win any war. It was a strategy to show uncompromising resolve, right to the bitter end. In fact I'll go as far as to say it didn't even matter if they hit their targets. Maybe they'll get a concession out of it, who knows? If one needs a larger strategy, that was probably it.

I know they hoped that their resolve would result in a more favorable surrender terms, but the results were two nuclear bombs.
Showing resolve, but no results convinces your enemy you're so far from reality he's not going to be able to have any realistic chance of reaching any agreement with you.

 

[VBF-13]

As a matter of fact, Tom, that's exactly what it did. It only made the case for the bombs that much better.

 

[parsifal]

All natinalities at one time or another, employed suicide attacks. It was prevalent in the Pacific, where the battles were particularly vicious and had didtinct racial overtones that exist to this day. Allied nations tend to play down the role of suicide attacks that were made by their personnel as suicide was a characterisitc frowned upon even in the service of ones country. In Japan it was revered, but never specifically asked for until Leyte. By then nearly every strike was a suicide mission anyway, so it made sense to try and expend the pilot and aircraft in a direct attack.

Kamikazes were still an adaptation of the basic japanese naval strategy which extended all the way back to Tsushima and beyond. destroy the enemy fleet by a decisive naval engagement, using small, light expendable forces to attrition the enemy strength before the decisive battle. It was a strategy and a dictum that pervaded every japanese naval operation and technology that they pursued except their battleships. The Zero was seen and designed in this light. Their submarine strategy was designed for fleet co-operation (and failed miserably at it), Japanese cruisers and destroyers were designed primarily as support elements of the battle line at the expense of all other capabilities.

By 1945, Japan no longer possessed a fleet capable of challengng the Americans. Moreover, they knew they needed to make peace, but like the germans, had hoped for the grand alliance to break up under the strain of the war. After this, the Japanese simply were looking for a face saving peace and somehow avoid the worst elements of the Potsdam declaration. In the final months of the war they were looking for two main concessions....that the Home islands not be occupied and that the position of the emperor be respected. They managed to obtain one of those concessions....the position of the emperor was respected (though that undertaking was only ever given verbally, but it was more than any of the other Axis...except Siam,...ever got in their surrender terms). Whether the Kamikazes had anything to do with achiving that concession I am doubtful, but then, who knows....

Kamikazes sunk 47 ships and damaged 288 (at least). Not often acknowledged is that a significant number of those 288 never put to sea again. Undoubtedly many didnt because peace broke out, but several, including one of the two Essex class damaged, were simply no longer seaworthy. British carriers were very stoutly built, but those hit by kamikazes were not able to be fully repaired even in the post war peacetime conditions

Could the Kamikazes have made a difference. I doubt it, but they could have increased losses if adopted earlier.

 

[RCAFson]

Kamikazes sunk 47 ships and damaged 288 (at least). Not often acknowledged is that a significant number of those 288 never put to sea again. Undoubtedly many didnt because peace broke out, but several, including one of the two Essex class damaged, were simply no longer seaworthy. British carriers were very stoutly built, but those hit by kamikazes were not able to be fully repaired even in the post war peacetime conditions

Could the Kamikazes have made a difference. I doubt it, but they could have increased losses if adopted earlier.

AFAIK, all RN carriers returned to service after being hit by kamikazes. After the war the UK was bankrupt and the RN couldn't possibly support all the carriers in service and those under construction, so some had to be decommissioned and scrapped.

 

[parsifal]

Its a complex question regarding the Brit carriers. Mostly I agree with you, but the armoured box conept did have some down sides, long term, that made them highly susceptible to long term damage. Nav weapons 9 i acknowledge its inherent anti British bias) has an article dealing with this, that suggests the armoured carriers were a long term design failure, and certainly postwar british carrier design did not repeat the process

Were Armored Flight Decks on British Carriers Worthwhile?

 

[VBF-13]

FWIW you hit any carrier with just so much as a 500-pound bomb about 1/3 in from the bow and you immediately cripple it as that's its central elevator shaft and most vulnerable spot. On other ships you want to go for the base of the bridge.

 

[RCAFson]

Its a complex question regarding the Brit carriers. Mostly I agree with you, but the armoured box conept did have some down sides, long term, that made them highly susceptible to long term damage. Nav weapons 9 i acknowledge its inherent anti British bias) has an article dealing with this, that suggests the armoured carriers were a long term design failure, and certainly postwar british carrier design did not repeat the process

Were Armored Flight Decks on British Carriers Worthwhile?

Here's a quote from the above article:

in fact, the British designs failed. Off Okinawa, the resistance of the British carriers seemed impressive but in reality the damage they took was severe. Having the hangar inside the hull girder made the hull structure weak and the ships were deformed by comparatively minor damage. Note how quickly nearly all the armored carriers were scrapped postwar - surveys showed they had irreparable hull damage. In contrast, the Essex's, which suffered much more severe damage, lasted for decades.

The severe damage suffered by the British armored carriers is documented by their post-war surveys. These surveys were carried out to determine the suitability of the ships for modernization.

Of the British armored carriers, Formidable and Illustrious were write-offs due to war damage. By the end of the war, Illustrious was in very poor condition; her centerline shaft was history due to structural deformation and her machinery was shot. Formidable had raped herself when a Firefly (sic – aircraft that caused the damage was actually a Corsair) rolled off a lift and raked the hangar with 20 mm gunfire. This started a very bad fire which was contained within the hangar and acted like a furnace. The heat deformed the hull and that was it.

Indomitable was actually used in the post-war fleet and was modernized (lightly). In 1951 she had a gasoline explosion in her hangar deck. This was actually quite minor (an Essex would have shrugged it off) but the fact it was contained and was within the hull girder caused severe damage. She was patched with concrete for the Coronation Review, then scrapped...


We also have to be very careful when looking at apparent ship histories in the 1945 - 1955 period. There is a lot of statistical deceit used here (Eric Grove in "Vanguard to Trident" makes an eye-opening read). Ships that were apparently in good condition and in service were actually laid up or otherwise non-operational. Illustrious is a good example. Her Ship's Cover is quite clear that she had never recovered from the damage she'd taken in WW2 and was limited to around 22 knots for all practical purposes. That's why she was used for experimental purposes - she wasn't much use for anything else. Indomitable is another example of statistical deceit. After her 1950 gasoline explosion (shortly after she finished her refit), she was completely useless and had to be towed to Spithead for the Coronation Review. As soon as that was over, she went to the breakers.

Now here's the truth:

Formidable steamed for another 100,000 miles in the post war period before being laid up pending a complete reconstruction (as per Victorious):

P o s t W a r N o t e s
HMS FORMIDABLE did not take part in surrender ceremonial in Japan. The ship was deployed to carry repatriated Japanese prisoners of war to Sydney and returning troops from the Far East. During this duty she carried nearly 14,000 passengers and steamed over 100,000 miles. Returning to UK in February 1946 the ship was Paid-off on 26th July that year. In 1947 she was reduced to Reserve without preservation or maintenance for 4 years. The resulting deterioration of the hull prevented the planned modernisation and HMS FORMIDABLE was placed on the Disposal List in 1950. Sold to BISCO for demolition by TW Ward the ship arrived in tow at the breaker's yard in Inverkeithing on 12th May 1953.
HMS Formidable, British fleet aircraft carrier, WW2

Illustrious:

HMS ILLUSTRIOUS remained under refit after VJ Day in order to up-date her equipment fit and did not resume service until June 1946. The ship was then used for deck-landing trials until reduce to Reserve status in 1947. Recommissioned in 1948 the ship had refitted for further trials and training duties during which she carried troops to Cyprus in 1951 and attended the Coronation Review at Spithead in June 1953 but never deployed with the operational Fleet. Placed in Reserve and laid up in the Gareloch this ship went on the Disposal List during 1956 and sold to BISCO for breaking-up at Faslane where she arrived in tow on 3rd November for demolition.
HMS Illustrious, British fleet carrier, WW2
After the war, she was given the role of a training and trials ship, and she continued to be plagued by vibration problems which were partially cured by new propeller designs. In 1946, she had a new five-bladed propeller fitted to the centre shaft.[5] She was refitted and modernised from January to August 1948, and made 29 knots (54 km/h; 33 mph) on trials with 110,600 shp at 227.5 rpm. In 1950, on full power trials, she made 29.2 knots (54.1 km/h; 33.6 mph) with 111,480 shp at 225.1 rpm.[5] In 1953 she took part in the Fleet Review to celebrate the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II.[11] She was decommissioned at the end of 1954, sold on 3 November 1956, and finally, after a successful career, scrapped at Faslane.
HMS Illustrious (87) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

So in no way shape or form was Illustrious a "write off".

Indomitable

HMS INDOMITABLE was deployed with the BPF in the Far East until 12th November 1945 and returned to the United Kingdom on 12th December. The ship was reduced to Reserve in 1946. Between 1948 and 1950 she was extensively refitted and modernised including replacement of bow and stem structure as well as installation of British radars. On completion she re-commissioned and was deployed as Flagship of the Home Fleet. In 1954 she was again put in Reserve and then placed on the Disposal List. On 30th September 1955 this ship arrived at Faslane to be broken-up.
http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-04CV-Indomitable.htm:

The Indomitable returned to the UK in November 1945. The following year she carried the Great Britain national rugby league team to Australia on their first post-war tour, earning the team the nickname, 'The Indomitables'. In 1947, she was placed in reserve, and then given a refit that took three years, from 1947 to 1950. Late in her refit her boilers were discovered to have only 10 years of life, and the engine spaces had to be torn apart and rebuilt to replace the boilers. Upon the completion of her refit she returned to operational duty with the Home Fleet in far cooler climates than her wartime operations. On 3 February 1953, she was badly damaged by an internal fire and explosion; the damage was later covered in concrete, and was never repaired. In the same year she sailed to take part in the Fleet Review to celebrate the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II.[6] She then did deck landings in the channel, with experimental landing lights replacing the batman. She returned to the reserve fleet. In October 1953 she was placed in unmaintained reserve. She was sold for scrap in 1955.
HMS Indomitable (92) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

So Indomitable was heavily modernized including brand new boilers (which would have required the complete dismantling of her upper decks.

Here's another quote which indicates that Formidable was slated for modernization:

There seems to have been general agreement that the first ship to be modernized should be an Illustrious. Formidable was laid up and required a long refit in any case, so she was provisionally selected for modernization. Illustrious was a deck landing training and trials carrier, and could not be spared, particularly as she was needed to test the new generation of naval aircraft. This left HMS Victorious as the only other candidate. In early 1951 the other two ships of the programme were HMS Implacable, followed by HMS Indefatigable, for modernisation, respectively, 1953–55 (to relieve HMS Eagle so that she could refit in 1956 with steam catapults) and 1954–57. HMS Indomitable was scheduled for a more limited modernisation (1957) as the future deck landing training ship. At this time Eagle was scheduled for completion in August 1951 and Ark Royal in 1954, so that the full programme would provide the Royal Navy with five fleet carriers plus a semi-modernised deck landing training ship.
Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, p305

However, the RN did commission the two Audacious class CVs above in the 1950s (both with 4in armoured flight decks) but they also scrapped 2 others on the slipway. The RN eventually commissioned 4 Centaur class CVs but scrapped 4 others on the slipway. Something like 16 other Light Fleet Carriers were also eventually completed so there's just no way that the RN could have afforded to modernize and operate all 6 of the Illustrious and Implacable class armoured flight deck carriers.

The post war history of the Illustrious class makes it clear that none were write-offs and and IMHO the navweaps article is so flawed and filled with errors of fact and omission as to be a disgrace.

 

[RCAFson]

Another bald faced lie from the navweaps article:

Originally, the Midway's were to have had a heavy (8 inch) deck gun battery. Eventually, this was discarded and the weight saved was used to provide two inches of flight deck armor. This was in addition to the 3.5 inches of hangar deck armor sported by the Essex's. The suggestion that they are a response to the UK armored carrier designs is largely a myth - the discussions that lead to the Midway's actually predate the Illustrious class

and the truth as revealed in a USN damage report (USS Franklin):

As a result of study of damage sustained by various British carriers prior to our entry into the war, two important departures from traditional U.S. Navy carrier design were incorporated in the CVB Class, then still under development. HMS ILLUSTRIOUS in an action off Malta on 1 January 1941 was hit by several bombs, three of which detonated in the hangar space. Large fires swept fore and aft among parked planes thereby demonstrating the desirability of attempting to confine the limits of such explosions and fires by structural sectionalization of the hangar space. On the CVB Class the hangar was therefore divided into five compartments separated by 40 and 50-pound STS division bulkheads extending from the hangar deck to the flight deck, each fitted with a large door suitable for handling aircraft. It is hoped that this sectionalization, in conjunction with sprinkler and fog foam systems, will effectively prevent fires from spreading throughout the hangar spaces, as occurred on FRANKLIN on 30 October and 19 March. The damage experiences of several British carriers, which unlike our own were fitted with armoured flight decks, demonstrated the effectiveness of such armour in shielding hangar spaces from GP bombs and vital spaces below the hangar deck from SAP bombs. Accordingly, the CVB Class was designed with an armoured flight deck consisting of 3-1/2-inch STS from frames 46 to 175 with a hangar deck consisting of two courses of 40-pound STS between frames 36 and 192.
Researcher@Large - War Damage Report #56 - CV-13 Franklin

Additionally the Essex class had a 2.5in not 3.5in armoured hangar deck.

 

[parsifal]

Thats a good answer that i like a lot. I would dearly like to debunk the Navweapons claims on this, and i do acknowledge the quotes that you have. However one or two details do need to be pulled up on. 100, 000 miles is really small change for carrier steaming. HMAS Melbourne, for example decommissioned on 30 June 1982, having spent 62,036 hours underway and having steamed 868,893 nautical miles. Thats about 9 times the mileage of the much bigger

also the 16 Light fleet carriers were closed hangars, but not armoured boxes , in fact they were designed specifically as a response to the perceived failures of the Illustrious class, namely the susceptibility to internal explosions that the armoured box conferred on them. HMAS Melbourne, was one of those 16 carriers, and was designed for the the decking to blow upwards and outwards to try and protect the lower decks and also lower the CG so as to maximise carrying capacity on the smallest possible tonnage. At 14000 tons, with a capacity of 32 (wartime complement) a/c, the Majestics were very good value, for what they were, but not comparable to a full on true fleet carrier. The question begs....why despite this obvious infereiority, did the British prefer to scrap tyheir high value CVs for less capable CVLs?

I do have a question as well.....were any of the big fleet carriers used in Korea. if not, why not??? Why was it cheaper for a cash strapped Britiain to build new carriers postwar rather than refurbish the existing fleet carriers, which were all pretty new ships. In the case of the Indomitables, the answer was the low hangar heights of the double hangar system, but this is not true for the Illustrious class. Why was the RN keen to build the Light Fleets and not convert the Illustrious (except the Victorious) to angled deck, jet capable carriers. the RN seemed to prefer conversion of the Light Fleets (which desp[ite their excelent design as value for money were in no way comparable in theory to the Illustrious Class.

 

[RCAFson]

Thats a good answer that i like a lot. I would dearly like to debunk the Navweapons claims on this, and i do acknowledge the quotes that you have. However one or two details do need to be pulled up on. 100, 000 miles is really small change for carrier steaming. HMAS Melbourne, for example decommissioned on 30 June 1982, having spent 62,036 hours underway and having steamed 868,893 nautical miles. Thats about 9 times the mileage of the much bigger

also the 16 Light fleet carriers were closed hangars, but not armoured boxes , in fact they were designed specifically as a response to the perceived failures of the Illustrious class, namely the susceptibility to internal explosions that the armoured box conferred on them. HMAS Melbourne, was one of those 16 carriers, and was designed for the the decking to blow upwards and outwards to try and protect the lower decks and also lower the CG so as to maximise carrying capacity on the smallest possible tonnage. At 14000 tons, with a capacity of 32 (wartime complement) a/c, the Majestics were very good value, for what they were, but not comparable to a full on true fleet carrier. The question begs....why despite this obvious infereiority, did the British prefer to scrap tyheir high value CVs for less capable CVLs?

I do have a question as well.....were any of the big fleet carriers used in Korea. if not, why not??? Why was it cheaper for a cash strapped Britiain to build new carriers postwar rather than refurbish the existing fleet carriers, which were all pretty new ships. In the case of the Indomitables, the answer was the low hangar heights of the double hangar system, but this is not true for the Illustrious class. Why was the RN keen to build the Light Fleets and not convert the Illustrious (except the Victorious) to angled deck, jet capable carriers. the RN seemed to prefer conversion of the Light Fleets (which desp[ite their excelent design as value for money were in no way comparable in theory to the Illustrious Class.

Formidable steamed over 100,000 miles in the 6 months from the end of the war against Japan until her return to UK. IOW, she was almost continuously underway from Aug 45 to Feb 46 when the Navweaps article claims she was a write off from the end of the war. Formidable probably steamed nearly as many miles during WW2 as Melborne did during her whole career.

The Audacious class CVs had armoured flight decks and armoured boxes as per the Illustrious class. The Centaur class had armoured flight decks but the other light fleet carriers were too small to have any armour at all. The RN scrapped their fleet CVs (except Victorious) because they had the nearly identically sized Centaur class coming into service along with the much larger Audacious class and there simply wasn't enough money or manpower in the RN to operate all these carriers - and so the older carriers were run for another 5-10 years or so after the war and then scrapped as the CVs laid down during the last years of WW2 were slowly completed and brought into service.

I don't know why the RN used the light fleet carriers in the Korean war rather than their armoured fleet carriers, but I presume that it was simply because they were cheaper to operate and because the UK was nearly bankrupt at the time and the RN didn't have the budget to man all their ships. Indomitable, Illustrious, Implacable and Indefatigable were all capable of operating the FAA aircraft that were actually used during the Korean war, but they also required about the twice the crew size and twice the fuel:

HMS IMPLACABLE landed her air crews and aircraft in Australia and was converted to accommodate passengers. She was then deployed for repatriation of British POW and embarked 2,127 at Manila to take passage to Canada arriving at Esquimalt on 11 October 1945. In January 1946 she visited Melbourne with HMS INDEFATIGABLE and sailed for UK in May, arriving in June that year. The ship was placed in Reserve and refitted before joining the Home Fleet as Flagship in 1949. Due to manning problems during 1950 many Home Fleet ships had to be withdrawn from service and HMS IMPLACABLE was deployed in the Training Squadron and continued service in the training role until 1954 when placed in Reserve. Placed on the Disposal List she was sold for breaking-up at Inverkeithing, Rosyth arriving at the breaker's yard on 3rd November 1955.
HMS Implacable, British fleet aircraft carrier, WW2

 

[fastmongrel]

Operating costs, I believe the Light Fleets were around 1/2 the cost per aircraft to operate as a Large Fleet. In a country where rationing was still in place and for some foodstuffs was actually less generous than wartime rationing costs were very important. Its the same reason why the RN sent nothing bigger than a Light cruiser to Korea or any RAF squadrons.

 

[parsifal]

Formidable steamed over 100,000 miles in the 6 months from the end of the war against Japan until her return to UK. IOW, she was almost continuously underway from Aug 45 to Feb 46 when the Navweaps article claims she was a write off from the end of the war. Formidable probably steamed nearly as many miles during WW2 as Melborne did during her whole career.

No. Melbournes Steaming distances remains an unbroken record by any carrier of any Navy. She was a hard worked carrier