Kongo and Haruna

[parsifal]

The Mediterranean campaign in this period is indeed interesting, but the gambit of directly comparing nominal Italo-German air strengths in that campaign to project results in Pacific War 'what ifs' is fatallly flawed. And you, being a good student of the Pacific War, already undercut this idea yourself in your previous post by correctly pointing out the non-comparability of typical Italo-German v Japanese air unit anti-ship capability in this period. As Vincenzo also suggested, the numbers also don't look exactly right either, but that's secondary. The Italo-German forces were more numerous, but a relatively small proportion were skilled anti-ship units. The bombers missed a lot even in cases where not directly interfered with by British a/c from the carriers or Malta.

My point was that in fact in the Med the allies were outnumbered in the air 8:1, whereas in this scenario, they would at maximum be outnumbered 3.5:1. I acknowledged the superior skills of the japanese aviators in anti-shipping operations, but is that enough to make a shortfall of 5-700 a/c. Incidentally, I think i know why the figures appear high...they are looking at two operations, one in the eastern basin the other in the western basin. There are two operations described, hence i think the sources are quoting the airforces based in Sicily, southern italy and Crete and available for operations.

One case where the there can be no doubt about the proficiency of the crews were the attacks by FKX on Illustrious Jan 41. There were 248 a/c directly attached to the Korps, plus approximately another 60 RA a/c in support. These a/c were tasked specifiically to sink the carrier. Despit those numbers, and repeated attacks on the damaged ship, they failed to do that. the biggest single attack was by 48 a/c from memory, and well within fighter range, just 60 miles off the Italian Coast. Despite misdireecting their CAP, and taking 7 bombn hits, 3 of them in excess if 1000 lbs, they failed to sink the carrier.

Even though the japanese were far more likley to put a larger proportion of their forces corectly over the target, they would still be hard pressed to get more than 50% there at any given time. They would suffer similar problemes in concentration of effort just like everyones land based air had when it came to carrier operations. Finding the target is at least half the battle.

The other major problem is the non-comparability of the missions and geographical set up. The success of carrier escorted convoys for *part* of those journeys to Malta importantly depended on the carriers staying far enough from the Axis air bases for the short legged Axis fighter escorts, the German 109's especially, to have minimal if any persistence over the convoy. German Med theater Bf109 units in this period did not fail to noticeably affect any of those attacks because they lost fierce battles with FAA fighters. There were hardly any engagements between the 109's and the FAA a/c, and only a handful between other Axis fighters and the FAA fighters. The 109's were too far from their bases to be effective.

There are enough exceptions to this broad statement to bury it. I would agree that in the majority of instances carriers attempted to stay out of range of the SE fighters, but the geography of the med is such that there were also many occasions when the FAA did have to fight or deal with Me 109s. The problem was not that the 109s could not often be at the scene.....they often were....the problem was that a carrier battle required a certain amount of loiter time....aircraft just hanging around as the attack was deployed and executed. 109s did not have the endurance to deal with that. 110s did however, although they tended to be used as bomb trucks most of the time.

And, the convoys had to carry on without carrier cover after the carriers turned back. This worked out ultimately satisfactorily in the Pedestal case: merchant ship losses after the carrier turn back were heavy but ultimately not heavy enough to starve out Malta; although they would have been if the success of Harpoon (for the Axis anti-merchant ship effort) had been repeated.

The merchant ships were never left without cover of some description The carriers were pulled back after the Sardinian narrows had been negotiated, as the convoy pressed on to be within Beafighter rangeand then Spitfire range later in the morning

But in any case a single carrier supporting a pair of capital ships seeking to intercept enemy invasion shipping is a quite different scenario. The capital ships have to close to essentially zero range; practically speaking the carrier has to come almost all the way with them. I can see why a carrier would be highly welcomed by the Force Z commander if determined to attempt this mission at all cost, but I don't see how that carrier or the capital ships could ultimately survive such a mission against the Japanese forces arrayed against them

.

This statement is, with respect, rubbish. Lets look at the historical situation just to show how wide of the mark it is...Scouts for Force Z came within 5 miles of the invasion convoy (with the battleships some 26 miles) behind them before Phillips decided to abandon the operation. He made his decision because it was evident that the landings had already occurred, and he could not identify the force that was defending the transports. At that time, the Japanese BBs were not directly attached to the invasion force and were standing off by at least a days sailing. The direct escort consisted of 1 Ca 2 CLs and 6 or 8 DDs. If the carrier had been attached, he would have received pertinent up to date information on the enemy forces and their dispositions. He would have realized that a milk run awaited Fze Z if he had committedf them. He could have used the 24 strike aircraft (night capabale as the strikes against bismarck had shown). PoW and Repulse could have gone in, sank the escort and convoy7 and be heading home for tea with the carrier never seriously troubled by any of this. british TF were rpeatedly used in this way in 1940-41 in the med, without the slightest effect on either the TF ofr the Carrier groups, only when tied to a low moving convoy on a predictable path was there ever even the slightest trouble for the FAA.

We can also look at JNAF v RN surface units situations in the early Pac War fighting and see that the JNAF is likely to score hits at a much higher rate than Italo-German attackers usually did. If we bring the LW and RA to the Pacific, or equip the JNAF with only very short range, though otherwise formidable, single engine fighters (Bf109F's), or if we change to the scenario to partial cover for an Allied convoy, then run in alone or with air support from Malaya...all those scenarios might have varied and interesting outcomes. But the scenario at hand, add a single typical FAA CAG to Force Z attempting to destroy Japanese invasion shipping, and further assume as the thread does that a pair of (old) fast Japanese BB's and DD/CL screen would engage, then IMO the outcome isn't subject to a lot of doubt as far as British losses, assuming the British commander is intent on pressing home his attack: the British would lose the carrier *and* the two big gun ships

.

I disagree completely. And there is no evidence to support any of the claims you are making here. The limited numbers of Zeroes available....just 25 precluded any heavy escort for their bombers. These zeroes in any event were tasked to fly continuous cover for the convoy. so, the japanese strike aircraft...a/c with a top speed (unloaded) of just 230 knots, are going to be shot out of the sky with ease. if Zeroes are available, the equation does change, that i will grant you, but that is not what is being claimed by you, or anyone else.....the claim is that with the tools at hand the japanese would defeat the carrier. They could not.

Moreover, you are claiming that that the IJN, with no heavy ships (remember the two BBs and most of the escort were not in direct contact with the convoy as they had detacjhed after the landings) and just a force of three cruisers and 8 DDs at most, could defeat 2 battleships and 24 strike aircraft. I doubt it.

Although, the scenario would present more difficulty for the Japanese, probably result in heavier JNAF a/c losses, and possibly warship losses, though it's doubtful that would justify a British carrier loss, since no Japanese carrier would be at risk.

You have presented no evidence that I find reasonable to support the claim that the carrier was likley to be lost, just opinion. The fact that that opinion is running counter to nearly every experience the RN had in the central basin before that doesnt seem to worry you. Sorry, but I cannot accept your hypothesis on this occasion. if the carrier had been present, and fully worked up, it would have been a bloodbath against the japanese IMO.

 

[Vincenzo]

I have quoted from two good sources, you have how many??? You need to quote your sources to challenge these numbers

a this point i think that your sources are not so good.

i only checked on ww2.dk what Stuka units were in medit

i've checked because clearly 328 dive bombers it's a very high number,
because 5 italian squadrons with 328 planes it's so strange also for 5 italian stormi* this was a too high number, i've checked for 287th, 146th, 170th, 144th, 197th and this had not o limitate positive check, a few are sea recce squadriglie (recce squadriglia had, on paper, 7 planes so around half squadron)

*stormo (pl stormi) is larger tactical unit of RA


p.s.
just for add data on 1st august the LW had less of 94 Ju 88A-4 in Sicily (less because the III/77 was partly in Greece) source my sum on data of ww2.dk

 

[parsifal]

a this point i think that your sources are not so good.

i only checked on ww2.dk what Stuka units were in medit

i've checked because clearly 328 dive bombers it's a very high number,
because 5 italian squadrons with 328 planes it's so strange also for 5 italian stormi* this was a too high number, i've checked for 287th, 146th, 170th, 144th, 197th and this had not o limitate positive check, a few are sea recce squadriglie (recce squadriglia had, on paper, 7 planes so around half squadron)

*stormo (pl stormi) is larger tactical unit of RA


p.s.
just for add data on 1st august the LW had less of 94 Ju 88A-4 in Sicily (less because the III/77 was partly in Greece) source my sum on data of ww2.dk

so, you are going to try to argue that some unnamed source material that you have is superior to firstly what can be reasonably argued as an italian source passable as an official naval history. fioraranzo is pretty universally accepted as your country's official history of your country's war at sea, is he not? And you arre saying that 'official history is wrong. Further the london gazatte, whilst not the "official history is the nearest i can find to a primary source of the force committments and estimated enemy force dispositions. Admittedly I found these references to the official histories, indeed the summary itself in Admiral messervis's account of the war in the med 1940-3.

So in effect you are rubbishing three sources....two more or less official gistories from two countries, and a third independant author well respected by both sides. all i can say is you really must habe some fantastic sources to be a brave as that. You seem to be relying on identified squadrons of the RA, but there is every possibility that not all the squadrons wre identified, ut the toatal numbers.

Incidentally Roskill identifies 590 a/c ranged against the pedestal convoy, that is half the operations quoted. He doesnt give information on the forces ranhed against the convoy coming from the west, but by calculation if roskill is correct, then there were 194 facing the westen group.

Anyway, you seem to be saying;

ignore the (more or less) official history of the italian navy
ignore the nearest that i can find to primary material on allied reports of their own forces committed and their own estimates of enemy strength
ignore what is widely considered the "official" historian of the RN during the war

believe you, with an improperly referenced source and imprecise figures, and a blanket claim that it is just all wrong.

You will excuse me if i dont follow your advice and dont give a lot a credence to your claims

 

[Vincenzo]

ww2.dk is very good page the sources are indicated and are primary luftwaffe sources.

i've not the vol V of italian official WW II navy history so i can check it but if it's write that that 5 "squadrons" (it's write in italian so i'm sure that not use the word squadrons) had 328 planes it's in wrong. so i gentle ask you to recheck the book and report that it's write in it.

i'm ignoreing nothing are you ignoring the luftwaffe reports on her own unit
and well knewn that estimated of enemy strenght are useless if we have the right side report on the strenght

 

[parsifal]

This is another source for you to consider
Lt Col Eddie Bauer - The History Of WWII Jaspari Polaris Monaco 1984
Lt Col Eddie Bauer is a swiss historian. not a fantastic source, but he is considered thorough and unbiased

In Chapter 34 of his book he makes the following observation

"it was difficult to keep such a large operation as the pedestal convoy a secret,and the italian secret serviceused paid informers in the bay of Algeciras to give ample early warning of the the convoy. German B-Dienst wservices had also given warning of the operation some days previously. This allowed the germans to prepre down to the smallest details and concentrate a maximum of force to counter the allied movement. Recognizing that the re-supply of Malta represented a direct threat to the control of the central basin, Kesselring Admiral Ricardi of Supamarina and the Commando Supremo command issued instructions accordingly. This shows a close level of co-operation now existed between Supermarina under adm riccardi, Superareo(Gen Rino Corso Fougier and the german commands under feldmarshal Kedsselring and Admiral Weichold. (Supermarina) reported that it could not use its four battleships so great had the fuel crisi become. in a memot to OKW kesselring reported August 10 on the following force availability

1.16 Italian and 5 German submarines which had the task of attacking the enemy between the straits of algiers and the Sicilian Narrows.
2. A total of 784 aircraft from both FKX and the RA (447 bombers, 90 torpedo aircraft, 247 fighters and fighter bombers)
3.18 MTBs which had been ordered to concentrate around Cape Bon and the island of Pantelleria
4. 6 cruisers and 11 destroyers which in conjunction with the the land based air units would finish off the convoy."

Bauers account then gives a pretty good summary of what happened. Eagle was sunk by U-73 1209 on the 11th August, south of Majorca. RN DDs a few hours later attacked and sank the italian submarine Dagabur as she attempted to torpedo the Furious.

There were some vlr attacks at 2000 on the 11th by Ju88s . These attacks were inneffective

"At 0800 on the 12th the convoy was 120 sw of Cape Spartivento, and came under the first air attacks at about that time. Bauer states "throughout August 12, the CAP of the three carriers repulsed successive attacks that amounted to more than 200 aircraft. 28 were shot down and scores forced to turn back before pressing home their attacks . The successes of the Axis attackers were extremely meagre, the CAP not deviating from its primary purpose....to break up and disrupt the axis attackers, and not be drawn away from the defence of the fleet. Axis success was extremely meagre - one cargo vessel damaged by a bomb lagged behind and was finished off during the night by an MAS boat. Hits were scored by Ju87s on the flight deck of the Indomitable , however it was possible to transfer the planes of this carrier to the Victorious. Destroyer Foresight was hit by a torpedo and was scuttled. The eastwards movement of the convoy continued, with four more airstrikes between 1600 and 1900. At 1908 some 65 miles NNW of Bizerte, Syftret detached the main force from the convoy and turned west".

The main force increased speed and had cleared the sardinian narrows by morning. they were not again troubeled by the Axis air units. However during the night, Axis submarines and MTBs were very effective. RM submarines Axum and dessie hit and sank the AA cruiser Cairo (a major loss at that point)and also hiting tanker Ohio. Cruiser Nigeria was also hit, whilst two cargo vessels were hit by night air attack (which were sunk after 2200 by italian naval forces). In addition, RM sub Alagi damaged the cruiser Kenya and sank another merchant ship. MAS Boats sank a further 4 cargo ships and the cruiser Manchester".

However during that fateful night the convoy moved from a point west of the skerki bank to a point 60 miles south of Pantelleria and about 80 miles from Malta ....well within fighte range (now reinforced by the Spifires flown off from Furious the previous day). A fierce battle was now raging in the axis high command....what to do with the available fighters. Should they be used to provide aircover to the cruisers so as to finish off the convoy with naval power, or should they be used to provide escort to the strike aircraft? The axis high command decided to put their faith in the air force and allocated their fighters to escort duties. The commanders could not agree, the final decision was made by Mussolini himself.

It was a bad decision. The next day beginning at 8am and continuing all day, the axis delivered multiple attacks on the convoy. They were largely unsuccessful. The newly arrived Spitfires and the beafighters on Malta prevented all further losses bar one. worse, the italian cruiser force itself was attacked on its way home by RN submarine Unbroken, the cruisers Bolzano and Atendolo were both hit and so badly damaged they never returned to service.

This was a hard fought action by both sides, with heavy losses, but the effectiveness of the British carriers to protect a convoy should be amply clear. And a convoy is a preedicatable, slow moving target.

Against a fast moving target like Fce Z, the Japanese would have their intell quality downgraded, and be penalised as to the numbers of aircraft they could bring to bear. if 60 or so Sea Huricanes and Fulmars (and a few Martlets) (60, because some of the CAP was lost when Eagle went down), could destroy 28 aircraft and turn back over 100 (some escorted and most strike aircraft with better performance and much better protection than the Nells), then it is not unreasonable to extrapolate the 24 fighters of the Indomitable to be able to shoot down about 15-20 of the 22 flotilla and see off about 30 or so. We cannot assume that 22flotilla will have as many aircraft held back for airstrikes as they did....the british aircover will force them to pour more resources into searches. lets say that an additional 20 aircraft are needed for searching because of that fighter presence. That reduces the strike potential of 22 flotilla from the historical 86 a/c that they had, down to about 66. We know that PoW and Repulses AA batteries managed to stop roughly 15 aircraft from getting through. You can double that with the more modern and effective flak suite of the carier added. That means that roughly 55 aircraft will be shot down or stopped by the CAP, and 30 aircraft shot down or stopped by the AA effects. thats a total of 85 kills/aborts from a strike force not likley to exceed 65 a/c. On balance the IJN should not get through. Im the first to admit, anythings possible, but that little red herring cuts both ways. We are looking at the balance of probabilities, and on the balance of probabilities, based on the RNs contemporary performances, the Indomitable should help to win the battle.

 

[Vincenzo]

just for info
all luftwaffe combat unit (not recce unit included) in mediterranean (also too far from pedestal operation), data from ww2.dk
strenght at 1st august

67 Ju 87
144 Ju 88A
22 He 111H
9 Do 17Z
30 Ju 88C
40 Bf 110C-F
127 Bf 109*

total 439

this give me clear the situation
your sources give the force of the luftwaffe in mediterranean not that alone enough near to Half August Battle (the italian name of the battle battaglia di mezzo agosto)

* w/o Geschwader HQ fighters, they are 5 so 132 109 and total 444

p.s. the recce unit had around 85 planes, this are to check for staffeln so it's possible i miss a few

 

[parsifal]

just for info
all luftwaffe combat unit (not recce unit included) in mediterranean (also too far from pedestal operation), data from ww.dk
strenght at 1st august

67 Ju 87
144 Ju 88A
22 He 111H
9 Do 17Z
30 Ju 88C
40 Bf 110C-F
127 Bf 109*

total 439

this give me clear the situation
your sources give the force of the luftwaffe in mediterranean not that alone enough near to Half August Battle (the italian name of the battle battaglia di mezzo agosto)

* w/o Geschwader HQ fighters, they are 5 so 132 109 and total 444

....which is different to the numbers quoted by my three sources as well as Kesselrings repoprt to his bosses in what substantial way???

My list says:

Italian 287th, 146th, 170th, 144th, 197th air squadrons
328 aircraft (90 torpedo bombers, 62 bombers, 25 dive-bombers, 151
fighters)
German II Air Corps
456 aircraft (328 dive bombers, 32 bombers, 96 fighters)
Total: 784 aircraft (328 Italian, 456 German)"


Your saying 444 not including recons. I dont know about "everything in the med" but I doubt it since air units not subordinated to Commando Supremo or Kesselring continued to operate elsewhere under other commands. I would say your "everything in the med" is actually "everything under Kesselrings command" and by extension, under the control of CS.

Why the small difference between Kesselrings numbers and your website source (why I am bothering to debunk yet another website is a mystery even to me....)? I would say almost certainly because Kesselring did include recons. I know that at least 9 German flying boats were under II Air Korps command, not sure about FKX.

Rememeber also that the axis made the defeat of this convvoy an absolute priority. They didnt view it as a minor or peripheral issue. They poured as much material as they could possibly spare into stopping this convoy....

Another source (which I cannot recall) put the total numbers of aircraft at about 1200 for the entire meditterranean front as at June 1942. I doubt very much that they (the Germans) lost 800 aircraft in two months in this TO.

I am still underwhelmed by the quality of the information you are presenting. Why dont you properly reference it so i can have a look for myself. Who knows, maybe you might have something worth looking at....

 

[Vincenzo]

you have presented that force how that used in operation pedestal "useful to look at the force compositions for the respective sides in the pedstal Operation" not as the force present in mediterranean elsewhere in the fact when you presented allied air force you writed only the Malta units.
i've writed all times that the source is the web page ww2.dk if you want not write is not my fault

 

[parsifal]

Vincenzo
I do apologise for getting a little hot under the collar. your a fine researcher, and a good friend, ....so we have a somewhat different understanding about the numbers. big deal. People can judge for themselves.

What can we agree on then.....well, I'll put it to you this way. would you agree that the the CAP was heavily outnumbered, and that despite this the attacking land based air units were unable to sink any carriers, despite they being the focus of many attacks. The attacking aircraft could not much hurt the convoy either. most of the damage to the convoy was done by submarines, surface ships of the RM and submarines. I count 1 ship sunk outright and several shared kills, and most of these were achieved after Force H had left the battle.

How would you feel about that position?

 

[Vincenzo]

as your post the allied had 72 carrier fighters and 9 fighters squadrons on Malta
the LW had in Sicily a Ju 87 Gruppe, 2 Bf 109 Gruppen, part of 1 Ju 88C Gruppe (night fighters), 5 Ju 88A Gruppen (1 partly also in Crete)
this were as numbers around same of the only allied fighters. there was also the RA your posted there were 328 italian planes if this are all in sicily or sardinia and the battle was in the range of axis fighters sure there is a numerical advantage on air forces available for the axis but they are flying on 2 different HQ german and italian speakers 2 different language and for the italian take off from 2 different island hundred miles far so the situation was not so bad (comparate to situation with one HQ, 1 language, take off from all the same area) for the allies. if the operation were farther of axis fighter range, or also farther of most of axis fighters range, the advantage is all in the allied side.

 

[parsifal]

I think we have a number of differeing sources.

In summary I have the following sources

Messervis:

Says that on the eve of the operation there were a total of 784 a/c available to the axis forces. He says that he has used the Italian "official" history and the London Gazette to put that list together.

Bauer

Says also that on the eve of the operation there were 784 a/c available and further says that most of the advantages were with the Axis. they had advanced warning what was coming, at the start a single unified command system (Kesselring was answerable to Commando Supremo though he still also answered to OKW. OKW did not interfere with the battle)

Bauer says he is quoting from Kesselrings own report to his superiors

Roskill

says that 590 a/c were deployed in Sicily and Sardinia to attack the convoy. He does not give details on dispositions or types and does not appear to include the reserves held in italy.

Some additional sources to consider

Ellis
says that in June the Italians had 748 in Italy and the Med, plus an additional 248 a/c deployed in North Africa. By the end of the year this figure was 515 in Italy/Med (of which 376 were in Northern and central italy) and 283 in NA.

In June the Germans are listed as having 357 a/c in Italy and the Med (LF II, which by the time of Pedestal had absorbed FliegerKorps X). However LF II did not take FliegerKorps VIII with it when it deployed to the med (meaning Italy and the central basin) in December 1941. This unit operated on the Eastern Front as a separate independant command, playing critical roles there ). There were in June 1942 183 a/c operating in North Africa under the command of FliegerFuhrer Afrika. Additionally there was yet another command in the eastern meditterranean, covering the Balkans (excluding Rumania), and the Aegean Islands, including Crete. This command was designated LuftwaffeKommando Sud, and had under its command in June 186 a/c, most of them in Crete and Greece.

If you add up the numbers you will arrive at 706 combat aircraft (ie excluding transports) across the whole TO in June

There was an additional command that I have not fully researched. General Students FliegerKorps XI was the German tranport command, operating independantly to the abovementioned commands. I am not entirely sure of numbers, but it was about 490 from memory. Not all of these were in the med, but a substantial number were . .


In prepration of the convoy operation in mid August, the Germans appear to have reinfoorced the Med command , not only from the other two med commands, but also from outside the TO. By the middle of August, there were 940 a/c under LFII command, 375 under FlgrFuhrer Afika. There were 194 a/c in the Balans command. That gives a total of LW 1509 a/c in the TO overall excluding their transport commands.

To cross check these numbers, I also had a look at the quarterly returns for the LW, to see if such numbers were at least plausible. In total (excluding transports and trainers) the LW had a total strength of 3860 frontline A/C in June. 706 a/c I know from other sources, that roughly 20% of the LW strength was being poured in the MTO by June. 20% of 3860 is roughly 780 a/c. so these numbers are entirely consistent with each other.

Next I checked with Dunnigans and Bergs "Campaign For North Africa". A simulation used at Sandhurst and here in Australia at our RMC. It has over 30 square fet of maps, requires a minimum of 32 personnel to run, 8500 pieces uses the German Kriegspiel system, and takes a minimum of two year to work through. Call it a game if you like, but be aware that Dunnigan now works directly for the pentagon as a military adviser. he has over thirty books to his name, and is a specialist on the MTO. Bergs CV is equally impressive. And their work is in print, not just online sources, so i would hold their credentials and accuracy up to any one volume or online source any day.

Without repeating myself, CNA almost exactly replicates the above figures. There is some variation for the forces under LuftwaffeKommando Sud, giving them just 90a/c, but I suspect this is because they only inldude the a/c on Crete and disregard the other deployments

I cannot explain why your figures are different to mine, but they are fundamentally so. I get back to Kesselrings report to OKW. Why would he say that he had deployed 784 a/c to counter the convoy unless he had done so. These are primary records, that cant be easily written off or ignored.

As far as the convoy having all the advantages....hardly. They had advantages, I will grant you that, but on the basis of the above numbers, they certainly did not have any numerical advantage. What did happen was that the axis had great difficulty in concentrating their forces, which gave the RN the opportunity to defeat each strike individually. This would be no different to the situation in Malaya. The Japanese did not attack as a single group, they attacked in separate strikes, each broken up into waves, with each wave coming in at intervals of about 20-40 mins apart. Forced on them by the dispersal of their airfields, though admittedly also designed to try and dissipate the CAP. Against carrier borne CAP that would be very hard to achieve for strikes coming in from several hundred miles distant

 

[Vincenzo]

LW unit in Sicily (strenght 1st august) (ommited HQ they had no more of 3 planes) I/KG54 (25-88 ), II/KG77 (16-88 ), 606 KGr (14-88 ), 806 KGr (15-88 ), III/KG77 (20-88 but with a detachment in Crete), I/NJ2 (30-88, scattered in all Mediterranean), II/JG53 (24-109), I/JG77 (17-109), I/STG3 (10-87), I/LG1 (24-88 ), II/LG1 (25-88 ) i've missed LG unit in my post n° 50th
LW in North Africa III/ZG26 (40-110, 1-109 but with detachment in Crete), 10/ZG26 (9-17), I/JG27 (24-109), II/JG27 (24-109), III/JG27 (24-109, with a detachment in Crete), 10/JG27 (6-109), 10/JG53 (7-109), II/STG3 (29-87), III/STG3 (28-87)
LW in Crete&Greece II/KG100 (22-111) plus the detachment previous indicate


the LG gruppen are commonly based in Crete was moved in Sicily for the operation, the I/STG3 was commonly based in NA was moved in Sicily, idk if for the operation or for reequip in august came in the unit many 87D that overred the older 87R

 

[parsifal]

Thanks Vincenzo, very useful post, I should say. however I do have some problems with the information just the same. The information is not referenced, so it cannot be verified one way or another. The Geographical limits on the deployments dont cover the entire commands, so dont give a full picture. LF2 for example was not limited to just Sicily, though your report does limit itself. LF-2s commamnd area was not restricted to just Sicily. The report is dated 1 August , which, allowing for the time needed to collate that information, probably means that it is actually a snapshot from a few days before that date. Moreover, LF-2 did not get knowledge of the convoy until some time aft4er that, after which they initiated their reinforcement plan. Kesselrings memo is dated 10 August. There will almost certainly be a massive movement and concentration of force in the intervening period, for both the RA and LF-2.

Lastly,, there were quite massive differences in the strength of individual formations. Fiebigs FiegerKorps VIII was at one point in the east Front several orders of magnitude stronger than LF-=4. By rights it should have been a far smaller command. Thats a mark of the flexibility of the german system, and the depth of talent that existed in its command echelons

 

[Vincenzo]

the source it's same, ww2.dk i thinked at this point this was clear
there are not other unit in italy with exception of replacement staffeln in north italy and this is not a combat unit. tell the me what you want as territorial limit i've checked all mediterranean area. the report is not dated 1st august they are the Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen that give monthly situation, (aircraft strenght start to month, changes in the month, strenght end the month). (example I/STG3 10 Ju 87R, - 8 87R to others units, +26 87D new, final 2 87R and 26 87D).

 

[starling]

Hey guys,forgive me for jumping in here,and I may have missed the data,but during the Pedestal'timeframe',did the R.A.F.bomber units(Wellington,Beaufort and beaufighters?),not attack the axis airfields on Sicily etc.? Are there any accurate figures on the axis losses that were sustained,if any.?Starling.

 

[parsifal]

the source it's same, ww2.dk i thinked at this point this was clear
there are not other unit in italy with exception of replacement staffeln in north italy and this is not a combat unit. tell the me what you want as territorial limit i've checked all mediterranean area. the report is not dated 1st august they are the Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen that give monthly situation, (aircraft strenght start to month, changes in the month, strenght end the month). (example I/STG3 10 Ju 87R, - 8 87R to others units, +26 87D new, final 2 87R and 26 87D).

Thankyou for clarifying your source. This is one source, with impressive references, I will grant you, however it is still at odds with Kesselrings report, and with four contrary sources that each refer back to primary material. And, with the greatest reespect, it is not a verifiable source

This source look as if it is a good one, but from the quick look I have made of it, it is typicial of internet based sources. Whilst impressively referenced (which is a vast improvement on most web based sources) there is no evidence of any independant verification of the sites accuracy, no critique or review done by independant authorities. When faced with an apparent conflict in the information, the reliability of that information ha to be looked at, and when you look at this material, it looks good, but it is not independantly verified. That weighs very heavily against it. . There is no way of relying or verifying what statements are made within its pages. they could be saying ANYTHING, and there is no easy way of cross checking any of the material.

You need to cross reference this one source with an alternative to verify your claims, as I have done. I have taken four completely different hiostorical accounts and cross referenced them. They each confirm the strengths that were available , thereby buttressing each other and making the argument stronger. I have four sources, all in print and therby benefitting from the advantage of having an independant editor in each case, and in the case of Dunnigans and Bergs running the gauntlet of being independantly critiqued on many occasions. These sources all say the same thing, the Axis had 784 aircraft concentrated in the central basin for the purpose of attacking the convoy. They also say that ther were other air units in the TO not committed to the battle. They all link back to primary sources, and in particular make reference to Kesselrings report.

We do not have that level of scrutiny for your website. It looks like a very good site, and they do cite very good records. But there is no editor, no independant review, no peer review of this material. Though unlikley, they could be missing things, or saying anything and there is no real way of making sure the material is correct or not. For that reason alone, it makes the claims you are making unreliable. You need to verify your material as I have done, or refer to the original sources.

i have provided four referenced sources that can be verified and traced back to their original sources. The original sources are primary datra, most importantly Kesselrings own report to OKW which you are just refusing to acknowledge even exists. You need to look at this document and find out why it, as a primary source document, is so different to the website material that you are relying on You cannot, with respect say that these were the only units in all of italy, on the basis of the one source that you are relying on.

you are not going to like this criticism, I know, but I am applying standard research standards to this debate, and this material you are relying on does NOT measure up however cool or sexy it may look.

 

[parsifal]

To be fair however, Roskill does put the number of aircraft involved at 590. Alfred Price says that there were 660 a/c, whilst Correlli Barnett puts it at the same number. The German Historian Jurgen Rohwer puts the figure at 620 a/c. Norman Polmar in his book "Aircraft Carriers" (written in collaboration with Minoru Genda, Eric Brown and Robert Langdon), puts the figure at 650a/c. Peter Shackland and Anthony Hand in their joint Work "Malta Conoys " puts the number at just over 660 a/c as well;.

I have a few more sources that may be worth digging up from the basement .

So there seems to be some dispute on the numbers, hovering between as low as 590a/c through to 784 from the sources I have dug up so far. Barnetts does say that the last 70 a/c (ju88s and He111s) flew into Sardinia on the 11th, ...just before the battle proper began

 

[Vincenzo]

if the italian number 328 is good and this is possible there were in 1940 around 300 combat planes in Sicilia&Sardegna, around 200 lw planes the 1st august maybe some more (teens) in right days just add recce planes and easy get number like 590 planes

 

[barney]

If Indom was there at the time that the Repulse and Prince were attacked, it would have added another element to the mix, particularly if the Japanese battleships were present (according to my copy of Siegfried Breyer's book Battleships and battlecruisers 1905 - 1970; "The fitting of torpedo bulges reduced their speed and from 1930 onwards they are therefore classified as senkan = battleships" - pedant ).

I've been away from home and computers for a few days and I see this discussion has become quite advanced in my absence. However, I'd like to go back and write a few words about the importance of the classification of these ships.

You are correct in writing that Siegfried Breyer reports that the Kongo Class battle cruisers, after conversion were listed as battleships and after new engines were installed, as fast battleships. These were 30 knot ships. The 30 knot speed should be the giveaway here. If these ships had been armored to the standard of WWII era battleships they couldn't have had that speed. As it was, their vertical armor has been described as "Incredibly thin".

So, why is this important? I suggest that the turning point in the Pacific was not Coral Sea or Midway but the loss of two of these vessels on successive nights near Savo Island. After that the Japanese Army began withdrawing from Guadalcanal and the Japanese Navy didn't come out to fight again until Leyte Gulf.

Also, if these ships were battle cruisers, the battle of Friday the 13th, where an American cruiser flotilla left Hiei circling at 5 knots to be finished off the following day and the decisiveness of the Washington Kirishima engagement are both better explained. Finally, history books tell us that battleship to battleship engagements occurred twice in the Pacific during WWII. I suggest the correct answer is once.

 

[parsifal]

These were 30 knot ships. The 30 knot speed should be the giveaway here. If these ships had been armored to the standard of WWII era battleships they couldn't have had that speed.

They were re-engined and rearmoured between the wars. Whilst I agree that they were not on a par with a South Dakota class, they were better protected than the heavier WWI era ships that were their contemporaries. Not in overall armour thickness, but certainly in the amount of armour as a precentage of total displacement, and also from the more modern bulges and subdivision of these ships. They were pre-WWI era battlecruisers, in which armour was spread allover the ship like margarine. As a result their armour was insufficient against 16", but they could concevably stop a 14" of lower power.

These ships are similar to the Italian cavour class in that they were almost completely gutted in their rebuild. Are the cavour class a Battlecruiser as well?

As it was, their vertical armor has been described as "Incredibly thin".

Yes, they were, if they are judged by the standards of ships built 25 years their junior

So, why is this important? I suggest that the turning point in the Pacific was not Coral Sea or Midway but the loss of two of these vessels on successive nights near Savo Island. After that the Japanese Army began withdrawing from Guadalcanal and the Japanese Navy didn't come out to fight again until Leyte Gulf.

This is factually incorrect. The Japanese fought at Phillipine Sea in THE major battle that defeated the japanese. they fought repeated cruiser actions in the Solomns and in the far north, winning more than they lost. The defeat of yammamotos aerial offensive in April 1943, and the decimation of the carrier air groups that such a defeat brought along with the unrelenting pressure being put on the japanese were far more important. The death of Yammamot , an inherently aggressive commander, brought with it a switch to a more defensive stance by the japanese, as they looked to fight their decisive battle in the central pacific. they believed the decisive location for that were either the marshalls or the marianas.

Also, if these ships were battle cruisers, the battle of Friday the 13th, where an American cruiser flotilla left Hiei circling at 5 knots to be finished off the following day and the decisiveness of the Washington Kirishima engagement are both better explained.

In the case of the two battleship actions, on both occasions, the Japanese were hampered by the shell loadout they were using. On both occasions they were loaded out with HE shels, which severely downgraded the effectiveness of their guns, at least initially. On both occasions they were not expecting the opposition they received,. In the second battle, despite being outnumbered, and outgunned, and at a tactical disadvantage, Kirishima still came close to sinking the sth Dakota, who suffered repeated failures. Washington was very fortunate, her radar allowed her to close to point blank range, and pump a full broadside into the japanese ship from point blank range. Even a bismarck or a new Jersey would not have withstood that sort of pounding.