davebender
1st Lieutenant
HMS Indomitable didn't carry enough fighter aircraft to protect itself. It would be just another target and most likely the first ship sunk by IJN airpower based in South Vietnam.
Kongo and Haruna
- Thread starter renrich
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delcyros
Tech Sergeant
As far as KONGO vs REPULSE/PoW is concerned, one has to keep in mind the abilities of both sides.
The japanese emphasized night battle doctrines and long range combat. The RN emphasized decisive ranges and daylight battles initially.
There is nothing on a KONGO which could prevent the 15inchers from reaching the vitals. Similarely, there is little on REPULSE to lend some sort of protection against 14inchers at most ranges and possible combat target angles.
PoW is the only (very...) well armoured ship here. Then there is little the 14 inchers could hope to achieve on KONGO´s armour, at least at the desired medium ranges. It has nothing to do with good armour on KONGO´s part but poor AP-shell performance on the british 14in APC. This was a negative surprise to the RN, not a nice story to be exact. In armour penetration trials, they found out that the 14in APC, which was a more or less scaled down 15in APC behaved poorly and shattered at velocities higher than 1500 to 1600fps rather than penetrate intactly. Thus, while a KONGO is indeed insufficiently protected against a modern, delay pattern APC, the defect in british 14in APC renders a high portion of hits as non-delay burst at all ranges closer than 20,000 yard while at larger ranges, barbettes and belt offer quite substantial resistence. Note that the 15in APC of REPULSE is not subject to this defect.
There is some evidence to suggest that this is what actually happened with BISMARCK. Very few penetrations (all identified as RODNEY´s 16in) and lots of shatter marks from 14in on main AND upper side armour belt. Such a hit can still hurt, take equipment out of action, silence turrets but it may not be as decisive as intended.
For further reading, compare the article "The End of an Era" in the Naval Review, 1960 - Vol 4. -Or, alternatively, SUPP 6-144 A.P.P. Committee Special from 31st of march 1943, the primary source for poor shatter velocity charackteristics of the newly introduced 14in APC.
The story is not pretty, being essentially a reprise of the navy's unhappy WW1 experience with inadequate AP projectiles.
That beeing said, british APC had exceptionally good service reliability and -unless shattered- burst even after beeing deflected by armour (no other AP fuse could achieve this!). Japanese AP, however, were fitted with break-away type seperated AP-caps as well as with an ultra-long delay action pattern, which allowed the shell to travel a certain distance under water and strike the ship where no armour is (up to 200 yard short for the 14in).
Thus, overs are overs for both AP but shorts can outturn as underwater hits for the japanese, which is a considerable danger for a large ship.
The japanese emphasized night battle doctrines and long range combat. The RN emphasized decisive ranges and daylight battles initially.
There is nothing on a KONGO which could prevent the 15inchers from reaching the vitals. Similarely, there is little on REPULSE to lend some sort of protection against 14inchers at most ranges and possible combat target angles.
PoW is the only (very...) well armoured ship here. Then there is little the 14 inchers could hope to achieve on KONGO´s armour, at least at the desired medium ranges. It has nothing to do with good armour on KONGO´s part but poor AP-shell performance on the british 14in APC. This was a negative surprise to the RN, not a nice story to be exact. In armour penetration trials, they found out that the 14in APC, which was a more or less scaled down 15in APC behaved poorly and shattered at velocities higher than 1500 to 1600fps rather than penetrate intactly. Thus, while a KONGO is indeed insufficiently protected against a modern, delay pattern APC, the defect in british 14in APC renders a high portion of hits as non-delay burst at all ranges closer than 20,000 yard while at larger ranges, barbettes and belt offer quite substantial resistence. Note that the 15in APC of REPULSE is not subject to this defect.
There is some evidence to suggest that this is what actually happened with BISMARCK. Very few penetrations (all identified as RODNEY´s 16in) and lots of shatter marks from 14in on main AND upper side armour belt. Such a hit can still hurt, take equipment out of action, silence turrets but it may not be as decisive as intended.
For further reading, compare the article "The End of an Era" in the Naval Review, 1960 - Vol 4. -Or, alternatively, SUPP 6-144 A.P.P. Committee Special from 31st of march 1943, the primary source for poor shatter velocity charackteristics of the newly introduced 14in APC.
The story is not pretty, being essentially a reprise of the navy's unhappy WW1 experience with inadequate AP projectiles.
That beeing said, british APC had exceptionally good service reliability and -unless shattered- burst even after beeing deflected by armour (no other AP fuse could achieve this!). Japanese AP, however, were fitted with break-away type seperated AP-caps as well as with an ultra-long delay action pattern, which allowed the shell to travel a certain distance under water and strike the ship where no armour is (up to 200 yard short for the 14in).
Thus, overs are overs for both AP but shorts can outturn as underwater hits for the japanese, which is a considerable danger for a large ship.
- Thread starter
- #23
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Many thanks for you perspective on this matter,del. It seems to me that the tipping point in this imaginary engagement might be the IJN DDs and those torps. At this stage of the war, I doubt that the British just like the USN were aware of the Japanese doctrine with those torps. At Java Sea, the allies suffered from those weapons and one would think that, night or day, they could be a real factor.
Gee, that's a bold, if sweeping statement if ever there was one! How many aircraft does a carrier need to protect itself then? Indom could accommodate 48 aircraft. Of these, about half were fighters; Grumman Martletts and Sea Hurricanes in 1941. Against Mitsi G3Ms and G4Ms, they would have performed well, I'd imagine, contrary to your pretty baseless claim.
Hello
in Apr 42, nearest date to Dec 41 I could easily find, Indo carried 12 Fulmars and 9 Sea Hurricanes (+24 Albacores), not good enough against Zeros but capable to catch Nells and Bettys and achieve at least some chaos amongst the torpedo bombers and before that to make life difficult to snoopers.
Juha
in Apr 42, nearest date to Dec 41 I could easily find, Indo carried 12 Fulmars and 9 Sea Hurricanes (+24 Albacores), not good enough against Zeros but capable to catch Nells and Bettys and achieve at least some chaos amongst the torpedo bombers and before that to make life difficult to snoopers.
Juha
davebender
1st Lieutenant
IJN 22nd Naval Air Flotilla. Saigon, Indochina.
22nd Naval Air Flotilla, 11th Air Fleet, Imperial Japanese Navy, 7.12.1941
96 x G3M2.
36 x G4M1.
25 x A6M2.
21 CV based fighter aircraft cannot stop an attacking force of this size. RN CAP may shoot down some bombers but most will get through and the British CV will be the primary target.
22nd Naval Air Flotilla, 11th Air Fleet, Imperial Japanese Navy, 7.12.1941
96 x G3M2.
36 x G4M1.
25 x A6M2.
21 CV based fighter aircraft cannot stop an attacking force of this size. RN CAP may shoot down some bombers but most will get through and the British CV will be the primary target.
parsifal
Colonel
I agree you have an intersting what if, but it is far from clear as to the outcome. Firstly not all of those 132 were available. Some were not airworthy, others were needed for search operations. historically the Japanese managed to hit Force Z with just over 60 strike aircraft, and a further 22 or so held back in a second wave if needed (they werent). The Zeroes of the "Yawata" Wing were not available as escort, they were assigned to fly cover to the invasion convoy and managed to average about 9 fighters over the invasion force for the period needed to coss the gulf of thailand.
Compared to the german and italian attacks onto the med convoys, the numbers available to the japanese were very meagre. "pedestal" was attacked by forces in excess of 590 a/c. The defenders numbered less than 70. Thats an attacker to defender ratio of more than 8:1. pedestal suffered the loss of 9 merchant ships, 1 carrier (not sunk by air attack) 2 cruisers and a destroyer, not all of them to air attack. in this scenario, the japanese would in total outnumber the allied defenders by about 3.5:1. The differece is in the training....the japanese were expert antishipping crews, by 1942, the germans and italians were not so well trained in this field. It would really get down to how well the CAP was managed i would suggest
The other thing that is glaringly obvious about the Fce Z scenario that has been suppressed from the start, is the marked superiority the japanese would enjoy. I should really check, but from memory they could call on 4 heavy cruisers and four light cuisers and about 24 fleet destroyers. by comparison the british, if they had decided to group their light forces at Singapore, (which they didnt) they could have had 2 or 3 light cruisers of WWI vintage and either 4 or 6 old destroyers . The japanese force included either one or two of their torpedo cruisers....cruisers devoid of gun armamanet and carring a broadside of over 40 Long Lance Torpedoes. In my opion the POW and REPULSE were ships able to deal with the IJN ships in a day engagement. As the bismark found in her final fight, and Scharnhorst as well....penetrations of the citadel counted for little. Ships could, and were, easily disabled by multiple nonlethal hits. These sorts of hits generally would either dpwngrade, or curtail the operations of either the comms, the propulsioon, the steering, the rangefinding, the guns or some other system, or combination of the above, leaving such ships crippled and vulnerable. in the case of the bismarck, her main guns were pretty much knocked out in less than an hour, which attasts to the effectiveness of british shells in my book. There is some doubt about what happened to Scharnhorst to cause her to lose speed, but once sje did, she was pummelled very quickly by DOY 14 batteries.
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- Thread starter
- #29
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Don't count on the fighters from Indomitable ( if she was present) to down any Japanese recon planes. That task was a little like a crap shoot. The US carriers had superior VFs aboard and even when radar detected a Japanese snooper they often could not make contact with that snooper. If they did, however, they usually shot it down.
Even a relatively small fighter force makes it much more difficult for shadowing recon a/c, as shown by many episodes in WWII with even smaller fighter forces (for example, the ersatz merchant ship carriers the Brits used to disrupt German shadowing of Atlantic convoys). However such small fighter forces and the radar/fighter direction capabilities of late 1941 (even British, which were the best developed as of then) would hardly render such a force immune to detection and shadowing. Radar detection of single a/c was (still is in certain circumstances) a statistical probability of a certain magnitude, not a certainty, and weather with any cloud can afford even radar-detected shadowers plenty of cover. This was also repeatedly demonstrated.
So a British force including a single carrier with 20 or so Fulmar/Hurricane types would be in a significantly better position to harass Japanese air recon efforts. But, IMO the ultimate outcome would still probably add a carrier loss to the historic loss of two capital ships. Some of the posts above posit these two points as if contradictory or mutually exclusive, but they aren't. As it was the British force was easily dispatched without ever posing a real threat to any Japanese force. It's a long way from that outcome to actually achieving a success, including literally so in physical distance. I don't see the British force surviving in the end against the forces the Japanese had in the area.
As far as a straight up capital ship engagement, outright British success depends on the Japanese fighting on terms favorable to the British. And again it's hard to see that happening.
-a night engagement is probably not favorable to the British (not as certain as IJN's advantage over USN at the time, but probably still the case, RN units participated in the generally unsuccessful night actions v IJN in DEI without obviously distinguishing themselves from the Dutch or US units)
-a day action would tend to be favorable to the two British big gun ships, but would also blow up any idea of preventing good intelligence by the Japanese about the exact whereabouts of the British ships to launch a concentrated air attack with escort (the likely battle area well within Zero range if the location of the target ships was well known at launch).
-either a day or night action would likely be closer to the Japanese air bases than the actual air attack on Force Z.
-many capital ship engagements in the 20th century were not decisive; especially when one side was at a disadvantage in combat power but advantage in formation speed (as the Japanese ships would be in this case). It's always possible the British ships could score a lucky devastating hit on one of the Japanese ships (in which case the other would probably withdraw) or the Japanese score a similar hit on Repulse (mainly, less likely v PoW), but it's at least likely IMO one or the other side or both would disengage without a decisive outcome...to the capital ship contest, still leaving the major British ships including the carrier likely to fall prey to air attack, or perhaps surface torpedo attack, or slowed by one and finished off by the other (or by subs, also in the area).
Joe
So a British force including a single carrier with 20 or so Fulmar/Hurricane types would be in a significantly better position to harass Japanese air recon efforts. But, IMO the ultimate outcome would still probably add a carrier loss to the historic loss of two capital ships. Some of the posts above posit these two points as if contradictory or mutually exclusive, but they aren't. As it was the British force was easily dispatched without ever posing a real threat to any Japanese force. It's a long way from that outcome to actually achieving a success, including literally so in physical distance. I don't see the British force surviving in the end against the forces the Japanese had in the area.
As far as a straight up capital ship engagement, outright British success depends on the Japanese fighting on terms favorable to the British. And again it's hard to see that happening.
-a night engagement is probably not favorable to the British (not as certain as IJN's advantage over USN at the time, but probably still the case, RN units participated in the generally unsuccessful night actions v IJN in DEI without obviously distinguishing themselves from the Dutch or US units)
-a day action would tend to be favorable to the two British big gun ships, but would also blow up any idea of preventing good intelligence by the Japanese about the exact whereabouts of the British ships to launch a concentrated air attack with escort (the likely battle area well within Zero range if the location of the target ships was well known at launch).
-either a day or night action would likely be closer to the Japanese air bases than the actual air attack on Force Z.
-many capital ship engagements in the 20th century were not decisive; especially when one side was at a disadvantage in combat power but advantage in formation speed (as the Japanese ships would be in this case). It's always possible the British ships could score a lucky devastating hit on one of the Japanese ships (in which case the other would probably withdraw) or the Japanese score a similar hit on Repulse (mainly, less likely v PoW), but it's at least likely IMO one or the other side or both would disengage without a decisive outcome...to the capital ship contest, still leaving the major British ships including the carrier likely to fall prey to air attack, or perhaps surface torpedo attack, or slowed by one and finished off by the other (or by subs, also in the area).
Joe
parsifal
Colonel
I thought it might be useful to look at the force compositions for the respective sides in the pedstal Operation. It shows very cloearly just how difficult it could be for land based air groups to mount effective attacks against TGs provided with even minimal aircover. The advantage of the CAG is always that it is easier to concentrate and regroup the defenders than it is for the attacker operating at long range. Thats as true today as it was in 1941.
Sources: Fioravanzo, La Marina Italiana Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, vol. 5, pp.
410–13;
Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys, pp. 129–31; "Operation Pedestal,"
Supplement to the London Gazette, p. 450-6.
"THE ALLIED FORCES
OPERATION PEDESTAL
FORCE F
Convoy WS.5.21S
13 freighters (Empire Hope, Dorset, Wairangi, Rochester Castle, Waimarana,
Brisbane Star, Port Chalmers, Almeria Lykes, Santa Elisa, Clan Ferguson, Glenorchy,
Melbourne Star, Deucalion)
1 oiler (Ohio)
Additional escorts from Britain to Gibraltar: 5 destroyers (Keppel, Malcom,
Amazon, Venomous, Wolverine)
FORCE Z
2 battleships (Nelson, Rodney)
3 aircraft carriers (Victorious, Eagle, Indomitable)
72 fighters, 38 torpedo bombers3 light cruisers (Charybdis, Phoebe, Sirius)
15 destroyers (19th Destroyer Flotilla) (Laforey, Lightning, Lookout, Quentin,
Eskimo, Tartar, Wilton, Westcott, Wrestler, Somali, Wishart, Zetland, Ithuriel,
Antelope, Vansittart)
FORCE X
4 light cruisers (10th Cruiser Flotilla) (Nigeria, Kenya, Manchester, Cairo)
11 destroyers (6th Destroyer Flotilla) (Ashanti, Intrepid, Icarus, Foresight, Fury,
Derwent, Bramham, Bicester, Ledbury, Pathfinder, Penn)
1 ocean tug (Jaunty)
FORCE Y
2 freighters (Troilus, Orari)
2 destroyers (Matchless, Badsworth)
FORCE R
3 fleet oil tankers (Brown, Ranger, Dingledale)
4 corvettes (Jonquil, Spirea, Geranium, Coltsfoot)
1 tug (Salvonia)
Malta Escort Force (17th Minesweeping Flotilla)
4 minesweepers (Speedy, Hythe, Hebe, Rye)
7 motor launches (121, 126, 134, 135, 168, 459, 469)
Submarine Group (10th Submarine Flotilla)
2 submarines off Milazzo and Palermo (P.211, P.42)
6 submarines between Malta and Tunisia (P.44, P.222, P.31, P.34, P.46,
Utmost)
OPERATION BELLOWS
1 aircraft carrier (Furious)
RESERVE ESCORT GROUP
8 destroyers (Keppel, Westcott, Venomous, Malcolm, Wolverine, Amazon,
Wrestler, Vidette)
OPERATION M.G. 3
Port Said
Convoy M.W.12 (3 merchant vessels)
Escort (2 cruisers, 10 destroyers)
Haifa
1 merchant vessel
2 cruisers
3 destroyers
SERVICEABLE LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT ON MALTA
9 fighter squadrons
3 torpedo-bomber squadrons
4 bomber squadrons
2 air recce squadrons
38 Spitfire fighters from Furious
(Note these forces were unavailable for most of the battle)
The Allied sector of the main effort in Operation PEDESTAL was the western
Mediterranean, while the easternMediterranean was the sector of secondary effort.
This decision was predetermined because the convoy started its voyage in
Gibraltar and headed towardMalta. The sectors of effort dictate where the principal
forces and their supporting forces should be concentrated or employed in a
major naval operation. In a defensive major naval operation as was Operation
PEDESTAL, the main Allied forces were those that defended the convoy, Force X.
Force Z, submarines, and land-based aircraft were supporting forces.
VEGO 125
THE AXIS FORCES
ITALIAN MAJOR SURFACE FORCES
3rd Naval Division (Messina)
3 heavy cruisers (Gorizia, Bolzano, Trieste)
7 destroyers (Aviere, Geniere, Camicia Nera, Legionario, Ascari, Corsaro,
Grecale)
7th Naval Division (Cagliari)
3 light cruisers (Eugenio di Savoia, Raimondo Montecuccoli, Muzio
Attendolo)
4 destroyers (Maestrale, Gioberti, Oriani, Fuciliere)
1 destroyer for mining the Sicilian Narrows (Malocello)
8th Naval Division (Navarino)
3 light cruisers (Duca degli Abruzzi, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Emanuele Filiberto
Duca d'Aosta)
5 destroyers
SUBMARINES
18 Italian submarines (Bronzo, Ascianghi, Alagi, Dessié, Avorio, Dandolo,
Emo, Cobalto, Otaria, Axum, Asteria, Brin, Wolframio, Granito, Dagabur,
Giada, Uarsciek, Vellela)
2 German U-boats (U-73, U-333)
LIGHT FORCES
2nd MS Squadron (MS 16, 22, 23, 25, 26, 31)
15th MAS Squadron (MAS 549, 543, 548, 563)
18th MAS Squadron (MAS 556, 553, 533, 562, 560)
20th MAS Squadron (MAS 557, 554, 564, 552)
German S-boats (S30, S59, S58, S36)
Total: 9 cruisers, 17 destroyers, 20 submarines, 10 MS, 13 MAS
LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT (SICILY/SARDINIA)
Italian 287th, 146th, 170th, 144th, 197th air squadrons
328 aircraft (90 torpedo bombers, 62 bombers, 25 dive-bombers, 151
fighters)
German II Air Corps
456 aircraft (328 dive bombers, 32 bombers, 96 fighters)
Total: 784 aircraft (328 Italian, 456 German)"
Sources: Fioravanzo, La Marina Italiana Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, vol. 5, pp.
410–13;
Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys, pp. 129–31; "Operation Pedestal,"
Supplement to the London Gazette, p. 450-6.
"THE ALLIED FORCES
OPERATION PEDESTAL
FORCE F
Convoy WS.5.21S
13 freighters (Empire Hope, Dorset, Wairangi, Rochester Castle, Waimarana,
Brisbane Star, Port Chalmers, Almeria Lykes, Santa Elisa, Clan Ferguson, Glenorchy,
Melbourne Star, Deucalion)
1 oiler (Ohio)
Additional escorts from Britain to Gibraltar: 5 destroyers (Keppel, Malcom,
Amazon, Venomous, Wolverine)
FORCE Z
2 battleships (Nelson, Rodney)
3 aircraft carriers (Victorious, Eagle, Indomitable)
72 fighters, 38 torpedo bombers3 light cruisers (Charybdis, Phoebe, Sirius)
15 destroyers (19th Destroyer Flotilla) (Laforey, Lightning, Lookout, Quentin,
Eskimo, Tartar, Wilton, Westcott, Wrestler, Somali, Wishart, Zetland, Ithuriel,
Antelope, Vansittart)
FORCE X
4 light cruisers (10th Cruiser Flotilla) (Nigeria, Kenya, Manchester, Cairo)
11 destroyers (6th Destroyer Flotilla) (Ashanti, Intrepid, Icarus, Foresight, Fury,
Derwent, Bramham, Bicester, Ledbury, Pathfinder, Penn)
1 ocean tug (Jaunty)
FORCE Y
2 freighters (Troilus, Orari)
2 destroyers (Matchless, Badsworth)
FORCE R
3 fleet oil tankers (Brown, Ranger, Dingledale)
4 corvettes (Jonquil, Spirea, Geranium, Coltsfoot)
1 tug (Salvonia)
Malta Escort Force (17th Minesweeping Flotilla)
4 minesweepers (Speedy, Hythe, Hebe, Rye)
7 motor launches (121, 126, 134, 135, 168, 459, 469)
Submarine Group (10th Submarine Flotilla)
2 submarines off Milazzo and Palermo (P.211, P.42)
6 submarines between Malta and Tunisia (P.44, P.222, P.31, P.34, P.46,
Utmost)
OPERATION BELLOWS
1 aircraft carrier (Furious)
RESERVE ESCORT GROUP
8 destroyers (Keppel, Westcott, Venomous, Malcolm, Wolverine, Amazon,
Wrestler, Vidette)
OPERATION M.G. 3
Port Said
Convoy M.W.12 (3 merchant vessels)
Escort (2 cruisers, 10 destroyers)
Haifa
1 merchant vessel
2 cruisers
3 destroyers
SERVICEABLE LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT ON MALTA
9 fighter squadrons
3 torpedo-bomber squadrons
4 bomber squadrons
2 air recce squadrons
38 Spitfire fighters from Furious
(Note these forces were unavailable for most of the battle)
The Allied sector of the main effort in Operation PEDESTAL was the western
Mediterranean, while the easternMediterranean was the sector of secondary effort.
This decision was predetermined because the convoy started its voyage in
Gibraltar and headed towardMalta. The sectors of effort dictate where the principal
forces and their supporting forces should be concentrated or employed in a
major naval operation. In a defensive major naval operation as was Operation
PEDESTAL, the main Allied forces were those that defended the convoy, Force X.
Force Z, submarines, and land-based aircraft were supporting forces.
VEGO 125
THE AXIS FORCES
ITALIAN MAJOR SURFACE FORCES
3rd Naval Division (Messina)
3 heavy cruisers (Gorizia, Bolzano, Trieste)
7 destroyers (Aviere, Geniere, Camicia Nera, Legionario, Ascari, Corsaro,
Grecale)
7th Naval Division (Cagliari)
3 light cruisers (Eugenio di Savoia, Raimondo Montecuccoli, Muzio
Attendolo)
4 destroyers (Maestrale, Gioberti, Oriani, Fuciliere)
1 destroyer for mining the Sicilian Narrows (Malocello)
8th Naval Division (Navarino)
3 light cruisers (Duca degli Abruzzi, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Emanuele Filiberto
Duca d'Aosta)
5 destroyers
SUBMARINES
18 Italian submarines (Bronzo, Ascianghi, Alagi, Dessié, Avorio, Dandolo,
Emo, Cobalto, Otaria, Axum, Asteria, Brin, Wolframio, Granito, Dagabur,
Giada, Uarsciek, Vellela)
2 German U-boats (U-73, U-333)
LIGHT FORCES
2nd MS Squadron (MS 16, 22, 23, 25, 26, 31)
15th MAS Squadron (MAS 549, 543, 548, 563)
18th MAS Squadron (MAS 556, 553, 533, 562, 560)
20th MAS Squadron (MAS 557, 554, 564, 552)
German S-boats (S30, S59, S58, S36)
Total: 9 cruisers, 17 destroyers, 20 submarines, 10 MS, 13 MAS
LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT (SICILY/SARDINIA)
Italian 287th, 146th, 170th, 144th, 197th air squadrons
328 aircraft (90 torpedo bombers, 62 bombers, 25 dive-bombers, 151
fighters)
German II Air Corps
456 aircraft (328 dive bombers, 32 bombers, 96 fighters)
Total: 784 aircraft (328 Italian, 456 German)"
i've many doubt on this data,
example there was one alone Stuka Geschwader in Medit the 3rd and this sure can not had 328 dive bombers (actually 1st august had 67, 1st september had 100) and almost one gruppe was too east based for this operation.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
Not all of the RN CV based aircraft will be available either. In addition to normal maintenance issues there will be CV landing accidents and perhaps combat damage inflicted by IJN seaplane tail gunners.
parsifal
Colonel
Correct,however the carrier like nearly every carrier operation of this kind could count on a higher servicieability rate than land based air, and also had the priceless advantage of being able to concentrate at any given point. this is what gave the british their victory with pedestal and allowed the USN with just two carriers to hit at Rabaul in 1943.
Fulmars and Sea Hurricanes suffered the lowest non-combat loss rate of any british type. at the end of Pedestal, ther had been just three such losses over a five day period.
Against the tail gunners of the LW and RA seaplanes, fulmars suffered very few losses. In the six months from september to march 1941, they suffered something like 10 losses to axis bombers (of all types), out of either 40 or 60 a/c deployed (i cant remember the exact numbers, but it was in that area) whilst shooting down more than 100 of these aircraft. Why would they all of a sudden suffer heavier losses agaist the japanese. Fighters were needed to hurt the CAP, and fighters were unavailable to the 22 AF
davebender
1st Lieutenant
I served on the U.S.S. America for 2 1/2 years. We lost no aircraft to enemy action. However we lost an A-6 to a catapult accident, an F-14 to a landing accident and had a second F-14 slide off the deck when the ship took an unexpectedly large roll. We lost a pair of A-7s to aerial collision. Several aircraft were made temporarily unservicable when a hanger deck sprinkler system malfunctioned and sprayed them with fire fighting foam.
CVs are the most dangerous airfield in the world. Any CV that remains at sea awhile will have aircraft casualties. That's before we consider damaged aircraft that made it back to the CV and are unservicable for a couple days while being repaired.
CVs are the most dangerous airfield in the world. Any CV that remains at sea awhile will have aircraft casualties. That's before we consider damaged aircraft that made it back to the CV and are unservicable for a couple days while being repaired.
parsifal
Colonel
I served on the melbourne for three years . There were no losses of any kind on the Melbourne for a three year continuous period, but admittedly we lost two aircraft in three months in the final months of 1981 just after that. And melbourne steamed more miles and flew more sorties per aircraft than any other carrier in the world....
Look also at the RN operations in the south atlantic during the falklands, under combat conditions. how many harriers were lost whilst the ship was on combat patrol.
Im not disputing that noncombat losses on a carrier can be high, but british carriers were operated more safely than any US carrier. maybe that explains why no US carriers have ever operated above the arctic circle...it takes a lot of careful deck management to do it. i can say that from experience. And the losses for Illustrious Ark Royal are what they are, and they are low.
It generally does not take a few days to get aircraft that have been damaged airborne again....usually overnight sometimes even just a few hours. In wartime, on a carrier, safety standards are often ignored to get the CAP back up again. Sometimes that goes wrong as it did for the japanese at Midway. but its a risk all CAGs will take
a lot of who har is made about the high accident rate of the sefire, by way of comment. true enough in 1943, when operating from escort carriers under extreme conditions (conditions too still to get enough air under the wings). peopple then conveniently ignore the operations of the Seafires in 1945, when operating under better conditions on fleet cariers....the safest record of any type in any navy in that period, on a per sortie basis. seafires in those final months were flying 6-8 sorties per day and had low loss rates
And, for this scenario, we are not talking a long period...perhaps 2-3 days. For comparison, during korea Sydney lost 11 a/c over a 4 month period, 5 over the side in a typhoon 3 on combat operations and 3 to landing or non operational causes.
if the brits lost 2 aircraft over that 3 days hypothetical they would be doing badly
parsifal
Colonel
I have quoted from two good sources, you have how many??? You need to quote your sources to challenge these numbers
The Mediterranean campaign in this period is indeed interesting, but the gambit of directly comparing nominal Italo-German air strengths in that campaign to project results in Pacific War 'what ifs' is fatallly flawed. And you, being a good student of the Pacific War, already undercut this idea yourself in your previous post by correctly pointing out the non-comparability of typical Italo-German v Japanese air unit anti-ship capability in this period. As Vincenzo also suggested, the numbers also don't look exactly right either, but that's secondary. The Italo-German forces were more numerous, but a relatively small proportion were skilled anti-ship units. The bombers missed a lot even in cases where not directly interfered with by British a/c from the carriers or Malta.
The other major problem is the non-comparability of the missions and geographical set up. The success of carrier escorted convoys for *part* of those journeys to Malta importantly depended on the carriers staying far enough from the Axis air bases for the short legged Axis fighter escorts, the German 109's especially, to have minimal if any persistence over the convoy. German Med theater Bf109 units in this period did not fail to noticeably affect any of those attacks because they lost fierce battles with FAA fighters. There were hardly any engagements between the 109's and the FAA a/c, and only a handful between other Axis fighters and the FAA fighters. The 109's were too far from their bases to be effective. And, the convoys had to carry on without carrier cover after the carriers turned back. This worked out ultimately satisfactorily in the Pedestal case: merchant ship losses after the carrier turn back were heavy but ultimately not heavy enough to starve out Malta; although they would have been if the success of Harpoon (for the Axis anti-merchant ship effort) had been repeated.
But in any case a single carrier supporting a pair of capital ships seeking to intercept enemy invasion shipping is a quite different scenario. The capital ships have to close to essentially zero range; practically speaking the carrier has to come almost all the way with them. I can see why a carrier would be highly welcomed by the Force Z commander if determined to attempt this mission at all cost, but I don't see how that carrier or the capital ships could ultimately survive such a mission against the Japanese forces arrayed against them.
We can also look at JNAF v RN surface units situations in the early Pac War fighting and see that the JNAF is likely to score hits at a much higher rate than Italo-German attackers usually did. If we bring the LW and RA to the Pacific, or equip the JNAF with only very short range, though otherwise formidable, single engine fighters (Bf109F's), or if we change to the scenario to partial cover for an Allied convoy, then run in alone or with air support from Malaya...all those scenarios might have varied and interesting outcomes. But the scenario at hand, add a single typical FAA CAG to Force Z attempting to destroy Japanese invasion shipping, and further assume as the thread does that a pair of (old) fast Japanese BB's and DD/CL screen would engage, then IMO the outcome isn't subject to a lot of doubt as far as British losses, assuming the British commander is intent on pressing home his attack: the British would lose the carrier *and* the two big gun ships. Although, the scenario would present more difficulty for the Japanese, probably result in heavier JNAF a/c losses, and possibly warship losses, though it's doubtful that would justify a British carrier loss, since no Japanese carrier would be at risk.
Joe
Though I again I don't think the exact number is the central point, but rather capability and operational context, the order of battle you presented is detailed for naval forces, not so for air forces. Shores in "Malta the Spitfire Year" p.653-55 gives a detailed OOB of air units, and 328 is much too high for German bombers. Also I think you and Vincenzo are speaking somewhat at cross purposes about 'divebombers' v Ju-87's. There was according to Shores only one German Stuka gruppe, I/Stg3 w/ 26 Ju-87D's, involved in the Pedestal action, though there were 144 Ju-88A's in various units; however those units didn't all always act as divebombers. II Fliegerkorps had a total of 255 operational a/c on Sicily according to Shores.
The Italian forces in range on Sardinia and Sicily were larger, approx 304, but that again included short ranged fighters defending various bases and which weren't involved in missions v the convoy, dedicated (and vulnerable) recon types, and level bombers which basically didn't hit ships. There were 44 S.79sil (ie torpedo version) on Sardinia 20 more S.79/84 sil on Sicily and 14 Ju-87B on Silicy. That was the heart of the Italian strike capability as far as a/c capable of sinking ships with any probability, but the record of the Italian Ju-87 units wasn't so impressive; the S.79sil units OTOH were a real menace to Allied ships, but still probably not fully comparable to JNAF torpedo units. It wasn't a bed of roses for the Pedestal carriers, but they faced a less numerically formidable air force than is implied by the sources you read, and again the quality as well as the difference in overall context of the Pedestal action and what if action around Malaya is very important. Also AFAIK 1 carrier to add to Force Z was mentioned, not 3.
Joe
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