Lancaster as an escorted, daylight bomber ala B-17/24?

[Greyman]

Everyone is saying the Halifax is crap. When I ask why I get crickets. When I suggest the inferiority of the Hercules (high drag, poor altitude performance) I hear crickets. and folks attack me for no quoting a mainstream internet source. I'm not writing academic papers.

Why did the Halifax have inferior performance.

Depends on the mark number, but;

• 'Aerodynamic vices' that
  - effected manoeuvrability and made violent evasive action risky
  - only allowed small gap between maximum cruising speed and stall speed at operational heights
• Poorly designed engine intakes
• Faulty automatic mixture control (I've only seen one reference to this)
• Inadequate exhaust flame damping

There were many others but I think those were the main ones.

 

[JDCAVE]

Everyone is saying the Halifax is crap. When I ask why I get crickets. When I suggest the inferiority of the Hercules (high drag, poor altitude performance) I hear crickets. and folks attack me for no quoting a mainstream internet source. I'm not writing academic papers.

Why did the Halifax have inferior performance.

No crickets here. I apologize for the long-winded reply, but as always the devil is in the details and the chronology.

Halifax vs Lancaster

Randall Wakelam, The Science of Bombing, summarizes the research done by ORS (Operational Research Section) on the issues with the Halifax Bomber. The summary of this research is also available in a extant document by Basil Dickens, the lead scientist of ORS "Operational Research in Bomber Command."

The study is complicated and responses evolved over time. ORS offers the following:

• When the force was a mixed group of aircraft types, the Lancaster had a lower loss rate than the Stirling and Halifaxes.
• When the Lancaster was operating on its own, the raid was often to a more difficult target and the loss-rate increased by 50%. This was considered in part due to lower saturation of defences due to the smaller force. BUT "it seems very likely that the lower losses of the Lancaster on general operations was due partly to the presence of lower performance and more visible aircraft in the force."
• The issue wasn't entirely due to aircraft type. In 1943, Halifax crews in 6-Group had a higher rate of loss than those in 4-Group. This was determined to be due inexperience and difficulties due to the formation of new squadrons (in 6-Group) and conversion to Heavy Bombers, which reduced the amount of training done and instruction given within the individual squadrons. Appropriate steps were taken to remedy the situation.
• No. 4-Group believed that their higher rate of loss might be because they were in the final wave of attacks. Analysis by ORB indicated that later Halifaxes had a higher rate of loss than those same aircraft in the earlier waves, but in both cases Halifaxes had a higher rate of loss than Lancasters. The main differences loss rates between Halifaxes and Lancasters could not be attributed to their allotted place in the attack.

Wakelam dives deeply into the controversy. First, Harris did not like the Halifax and he was at odds with the Air Ministry for continuing the contracts with Handley Page, in the manufacture of the type. He wanted the factories to retool and build more Lancasters. In 1942 it was determined that:

• Halifaxes were more easily visible at 1600 feet astern because of the glow from the exhausts.
• There was concern about the stability of the fully loaded Halifax during evasive turns, possibly due to lack of reserve speed. ORS in October 1942 recommended: "all possible means of improving performance and stability of the Halifax be given urgent priority.
• When exhaust covers were added they caused excessive drag, further exacerbating handling and performance.
• They recommended that pilots gain more experience on the type before becoming operational. Harris responded grumpily: "He (AOC, 4-Group) can try it. It is the aircraft not the crews that require improvement.
• Four issues had been raised with Sir Handley Page. 1) The Lancaster was outperforming the Halifax in speed and operational ceiling. 2)The rudders were of concern. 2)The known rudder-stall problem was believed to contribute to losses both directly, 3) and indirectly owing to lack of confidence in an ability to make a particular manoeuvre in the machine. 4) The issues with exhaust flame dampening. Dickens was not satisfied with Handley Page: "I was left with a feeling that Handley Page organization has said its last word in the Halifax III. We should therefore press on with consideration of the best results obtained with this type in order to see if they promise that the machine will meet future operational requirements. If they do not then we know we have little more to expect from the Halifax and must act accordingly…With regard to the new fin and rudder I feel that we should immediately attempt to get the trial installation machine at present under test at Boscome Down flight tested in an operational Squadron. If test promise well, the greatest possible pressure should be brought to bear in order in order to speed up the introduction of this modification. Otherwise I fear that the promised introduction in August [1943] may be somewhat deferred." A/Cdre Roach was in agreement with Dickens "the boffin had been given exactly the sort of 'guff' a stranger could expect…from that firm and I don't think I can answer the minute better than to use the C.in C.'s [Harris] own words: 'I don't believe one word of the firm's statement and I have no faith in any promises made'".
• 500 modification kits had been ordered for the rudder modification of existing operational aircraft but it would take 8 man-hours each to install and would create a huge engineering bill on the units.
• 70 Halifax III's per month would be produced beginning in October 1943 and by April 1944, only this type would be produced by the firm.
• On the modification of the tail assembly, in February 1944, the ORS scientists had concluded there had been no appreciable reduction in losses as a result of its installation.
• The results of a study reported in October 1943, showed the Lancaster as the clear winner in tonnes of bombs dropped per missing aircraft: Lancaster 112.6, Halifax 45.4, Mosquito 29.8. A further study by the Air Ministry in April 1944 the Lancaster cost 20 man-months per tonne dropped, the Halifax 60, and the Mosquito 20. While the figures were intended to show the relative value of the Mosquito, it was a damning indictment of continuing to use the Halifax as a front-line bomber.
• In February, 1944, the scientists had completed a study comparing the Halifax III with the Lancaster III. While the sample size was small, they had concluded that the Lancaster type had 40% lower losses. Dickens reported this to Harris, who replied "Very Interesting". Updating this in March, 1944, Dickens was able to report that owing to the 30% lower loss-rate and the larger bomb-load, the relative usefulness of the aircraft was 1:2.6, in favour of the Lancaster. Harris used this information in a letter to the Air Chief Marshall Wilfred Freeman (March 28, 1944): "We now have sufficient experience with the Halifax III to make a firm comparison between it and the Lancaster." He restated ORS's comments. Harris further noted that Lancaster crews were forced to provide a shield around Halifaxes, with less protection than the Halifaxes in the centre of the stream. In addition, Lancasters were obliged to conform to the Halifaxes routing requirements which were driven to a large extent on their range limitation. (Note that the fuel requirements of the Halifax were almost 275 gallons greater than the Lancaster). "On the whole, therefore it is apparent that the Halifax III will be in the same position next Autumn [1944] as the Stirling and Halifax II and V are today, shows every indication of coming true."

At the end of the day, the conclusions should be based on the weight of bombs dropped over the operational life of an aircraft during the entire course of the war. This is difficult for us to do so we must rely on what ORS found. You cannot just focus on the final variants of the type (Halifax III's and VII's). That is irrelevant to the families whose sons were lost due to the deficiencies of the Halifax II's and V's. There was no doubt in Harris's mind, or those of the scientists that the Halifax III was not the aircraft that the Lancaster was.

Jim

 

[Greyman]

Harris to the Secretary of State for Air on Handley Page:

... always weeping crocodile tears in my house and office, smarming his unconvincing assurances all over me and leaving me with a mounting certainty that nothing whatever ponderable is being done to make his deplorable product worthy for war or fit to meet those jeopardies which confront our gallant crews. Nothing will be done until H.P. and his gang are kicked out, lock, stock and barrel. Trivialities are all they are attempting at present, with the deliberate intent of postponing the main issue until we are irretrievably committed ...​

​

Unless we can get these two vital factors* of the heavy bomber programme put right, and with miraculous despatch, we are sunk. We cannot do this by polite negotiation with these crooks and incompetents. In Russia it would long ago have been arranged with a gun, and to that extent I am a fervid Communist! If I write strongly it is because I feel strongly, as I know you do, for the jeopardy my gallant crews and the compromising of our only method of winning this war.​

EDIT: *two vital factors = Stirling and Halifax

 

[pbehn]

Whether through bad luck or lack of fore sight on behalf of the Halifax designers and good fore sight for the Lancaster the Halifax just wasn't as good at being a heavy bomber, it was better at carrying troops and cargo though. The bombs that the Halifax had difficulty being adapted to carry weren't in the original design brief. The propeller issues mentioned in the other link werent experienced by any other aircraft that I know of, I dont know whether that is even a Handley Page design issue, or why the Lancaster didnt have the same issue.

 

[pbehn]

• 70 Halifax III's per month would be produced beginning in October 1943 and by April 1944, only this type would be produced by the firm.

A great post but I think this part is the most significant, production of the one variant that was equal to the Lancaster in most respects only started in late 1943 and only became full production in April 1944. It takes many months from starting to produce an aircraft to it getting in service, most of the 2000+ Halifax IIIs that were produced took to the air on operations when much of the fighting was done and disposition of aircraft and missions was pretty much sorted.

 

[ClayO]

They would be, from Feb 1942 to May 1945 the war changed completely, and had changed as the report was written, even the massively expensive turrets on B-29s that were remotely controlled and 0.5" were removed apart from the tail gun. The Canberra which had no turrets started in design in 1944. BTW many rear gunners removed the Perspex screen from the turret to see better, the turret was always freezing cold, just a question of how easy it was to get out, in some cases, it was impossible.

Agreed. You've probably seen this, but for those who haven't, there's a gripping description of the conditions for the Lancaster crew in Inferno: The Fiery Destruction of Hamburg, 1943. According to the author, when a fighter first came into range, it would be the size of a speck of dirt on the screen. It would be impossible to keep any part of an airplane spotlessly clean, so the tail gunners would remove the Perspex.

 

[gruad]

No crickets here. I apologize for the long-winded reply, but as always the devil is in the details and the chronology.

Halifax vs Lancaster

Randall Wakelam, The Science of Bombing, summarizes the research done by ORS (Operational Research Section) on the issues with the Halifax Bomber. The summary of this research is also available in a extant document by Basil Dickens, the lead scientist of ORS "Operational Research in Bomber Command."

The study is complicated and responses evolved over time. ORS offers the following:

• When the force was a mixed group of aircraft types, the Lancaster had a lower loss rate than the Stirling and Halifaxes.
• When the Lancaster was operating on its own, the raid was often to a more difficult target and the loss-rate increased by 50%. This was considered in part due to lower saturation of defences due to the smaller force. BUT "it seems very likely that the lower losses of the Lancaster on general operations was due partly to the presence of lower performance and more visible aircraft in the force."
• The issue wasn't entirely due to aircraft type. In 1943, Halifax crews in 6-Group had a higher rate of loss than those in 4-Group. This was determined to be due inexperience and difficulties due to the formation of new squadrons (in 6-Group) and conversion to Heavy Bombers, which reduced the amount of training done and instruction given within the individual squadrons. Appropriate steps were taken to remedy the situation.
• No. 4-Group believed that their higher rate of loss might be because they were in the final wave of attacks. Analysis by ORB indicated that later Halifaxes had a higher rate of loss than those same aircraft in the earlier waves, but in both cases Halifaxes had a higher rate of loss than Lancasters. The main differences loss rates between Halifaxes and Lancasters could not be attributed to their allotted place in the attack.

Wakelam dives deeply into the controversy. First, Harris did not like the Halifax and he was at odds with the Air Ministry for continuing the contracts with Handley Page, in the manufacture of the type. He wanted the factories to retool and build more Lancasters. In 1942 it was determined that:

• Halifaxes were more easily visible at 1600 feet astern because of the glow from the exhausts.
• There was concern about the stability of the fully loaded Halifax during evasive turns, possibly due to lack of reserve speed. ORS in October 1942 recommended: "all possible means of improving performance and stability of the Halifax be given urgent priority.
• When exhaust covers were added they caused excessive drag, further exacerbating handling and performance.
• They recommended that pilots gain more experience on the type before becoming operational. Harris responded grumpily: "He (AOC, 4-Group) can try it. It is the aircraft not the crews that require improvement.
• Four issues had been raised with Sir Handley Page. 1) The Lancaster was outperforming the Halifax in speed and operational ceiling. 2)The rudders were of concern. 2)The known rudder-stall problem was believed to contribute to losses both directly, 3) and indirectly owing to lack of confidence in an ability to make a particular manoeuvre in the machine. 4) The issues with exhaust flame dampening. Dickens was not satisfied with Handley Page: "I was left with a feeling that Handley Page organization has said its last word in the Halifax III. We should therefore press on with consideration of the best results obtained with this type in order to see if they promise that the machine will meet future operational requirements. If they do not then we know we have little more to expect from the Halifax and must act accordingly…With regard to the new fin and rudder I feel that we should immediately attempt to get the trial installation machine at present under test at Boscome Down flight tested in an operational Squadron. If test promise well, the greatest possible pressure should be brought to bear in order in order to speed up the introduction of this modification. Otherwise I fear that the promised introduction in August [1943] may be somewhat deferred." A/Cdre Roach was in agreement with Dickens "the boffin had been given exactly the sort of 'guff' a stranger could expect…from that firm and I don't think I can answer the minute better than to use the C.in C.'s [Harris] own words: 'I don't believe one word of the firm's statement and I have no faith in any promises made'".
• 500 modification kits had been ordered for the rudder modification of existing operational aircraft but it would take 8 man-hours each to install and would create a huge engineering bill on the units.
• 70 Halifax III's per month would be produced beginning in October 1943 and by April 1944, only this type would be produced by the firm.
• On the modification of the tail assembly, in February 1944, the ORS scientists had concluded there had been no appreciable reduction in losses as a result of its installation.
• The results of a study reported in October 1943, showed the Lancaster as the clear winner in tonnes of bombs dropped per missing aircraft: Lancaster 112.6, Halifax 45.4, Mosquito 29.8. A further study by the Air Ministry in April 1944 the Lancaster cost 20 man-months per tonne dropped, the Halifax 60, and the Mosquito 20. While the figures were intended to show the relative value of the Mosquito, it was a damning indictment of continuing to use the Halifax as a front-line bomber.
• In February, 1944, the scientists had completed a study comparing the Halifax III with the Lancaster III. While the sample size was small, they had concluded that the Lancaster type had 40% lower losses. Dickens reported this to Harris, who replied "Very Interesting". Updating this in March, 1944, Dickens was able to report that owing to the 30% lower loss-rate and the larger bomb-load, the relative usefulness of the aircraft was 1:2.6, in favour of the Lancaster. Harris used this information in a letter to the Air Chief Marshall Wilfred Freeman (March 28, 1944): "We now have sufficient experience with the Halifax III to make a firm comparison between it and the Lancaster." He restated ORS's comments. Harris further noted that Lancaster crews were forced to provide a shield around Halifaxes, with less protection than the Halifaxes in the centre of the stream. In addition, Lancasters were obliged to conform to the Halifaxes routing requirements which were driven to a large extent on their range limitation. (Note that the fuel requirements of the Halifax were almost 275 gallons greater than the Lancaster). "On the whole, therefore it is apparent that the Halifax III will be in the same position next Autumn [1944] as the Stirling and Halifax II and V are today, shows every indication of coming true."

At the end of the day, the conclusions should be based on the weight of bombs dropped over the operational life of an aircraft during the entire course of the war. This is difficult for us to do so we must rely on what ORS found. You cannot just focus on the final variants of the type (Halifax III's and VII's). That is irrelevant to the families whose sons were lost due to the deficiencies of the Halifax II's and V's. There was no doubt in Harris's mind, or those of the scientists that the Halifax III was not the aircraft that the Lancaster was.

Jim

The Mosquito was probably the same margin better than the Lanc as the Lanc was better than the Hx 3.

The same operational research revealed that stopping Hx production and retooling for Lancs would not be as effective as phasing out the Hx while increasing production of the Lancaster.

Other advantages were:

Cost - a L lot cheaper than Hx.
Maintenance - modular construction allowed reuse of crashed planes. The level of ground crew skill required was lower.

The labour required for production was less skilled.

People tend to think Lanc and Hx on a par though.

For US planes the myth is reversed.

Surprisingly the B24 was close in performance to the B17, each better at different things, when the B24 is regarded as the Wildebeest of the skies.

 

[33k in the air]

I will point out again the one point in favour of the Halifax: its crews stood a nearly three times better chance of successfully surviving being shot down.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Perceptions of the B-24 are based on experience over Europe. In the Pacific, B-17s were phased out in early 1943 in favor of the longer ranged B-24. Over Europe, the B-17's survivability far outshined the B-24. I believe it was General Quesada, who said that had the Germans perfected the proximity fuse, the B-24 would have had to be withdrawn completely from the European Theater

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Perceptions of the B-24 are based on experience over Europe. In the Pacific, B-17s were phased out in early 1943 in favor of the longer ranged B-24. Over Europe, the B-17's survivability far outshined the B-24. I believe it was General Quesada, who said that had the Germans perfected the proximity fuse, the B-24 would have had to be withdrawn completely from the European Theater

I bet it really depended on where a -24 was hit. An 88 in the wing would stand a good chance of being fatal. In the fuselage, possible but less-likely (especially after bombs had been dropped). While the Pacific was the better theater for a more-fragile airplane, my understanding is that -17s were replaced by -24s was due to range, rather than concerns about survivability, though the latter was a good benefit (not much flak over open ocean).

A German proximity-fuse would likely have done terrible carnage to both those bomber types.

 

[ClayO]

I think a lot of the favorable view of the B-17 over the B-24 is based on pilots' perceptions. The B-24 was a heavy fuselage suspended from a long narrow set of wings, which made it stable on long flights, but heavy on the controls. Even though the B-17 was slower and shorter range, many pilots preferred it because it was easier to fly.

The B-24 was difficult to ditch; if done wrong, the 'garage door' style bomb bay doors would collapse on impact with the water, turning the rear lip of the bomb bay into a giant sea water scoop. The water pressure would snap the airplane in two pieces, both of which would quickly sink. That knowledge would tend to play in a person's mind during a long flight over water.

The B-17 was also solidified in the public's mind by the movies, such as 12 O' Clock High and the wartime documentary Memphis Belle. I don't know of any movies featuring the B-24.

 

[JDCAVE]

From his book on the subject, Arthur Harris. 1947. Bomber Offensive.

"The Lancaster was so far the best aircraft we had that I continually pressed for its production and at the expense of other types; I was even willing to lose nearly a year's industrial production from the Halifax factories while these were being converted to produce Lancasters."

Page 103.

Jim

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The B-24 was difficult to ditch; if done wrong, the 'garage door' style bomb bay doors would collapse on impact with the water, turning the rear lip of the bomb bay into a giant sea water scoop.

It's hard to imagine doing a water-landing right in that thing.

 

[ThomasP]

Some Cdo values
Lancaster B MK I/III____.0302
Lancaster B MK II_____ .0325
Halifax B MK II Srs 2___.0347

 

[Milosh]

It's hard to imagine doing a water-landing right in that thing.

 

[SaparotRob]

I think a lot of the favorable view of the B-17 over the B-24 is based on pilots' perceptions. The B-24 was a heavy fuselage suspended from a long narrow set of wings, which made it stable on long flights, but heavy on the controls. Even though the B-17 was slower and shorter range, many pilots preferred it because it was easier to fly.

The B-24 was difficult to ditch; if done wrong, the 'garage door' style bomb bay doors would collapse on impact with the water, turning the rear lip of the bomb bay into a giant sea water scoop. The water pressure would snap the airplane in two pieces, both of which would quickly sink. That knowledge would tend to play in a person's mind during a long flight over water.

The B-17 was also solidified in the public's mind by the movies, such as 12 O' Clock High and the wartime documentary Memphis Belle. I don't know of any movies featuring the B-24.

The movie "Unbroken" features the B-24. I've never seen it myself so I don't know how much the plane is featured other than getting shot down.

 

[ClayO]

The movie "Unbroken" features the B-24. I've never seen it myself so I don't know how much the plane is featured other than getting shot down.

That's right. I should have said that I don't know of any movies of that era that featured the B-24. By the time Unbroken came out, the reputations of the two planes were pretty well established.

 

[ClayO]

According to the narration, this is part of a longer training film. I don't know the year. Note that the narrator says not to enter the water nose-high like this pilot did, but I have to think that the pilot knew that nose-high was the safer option. The narration also says to land along the waves in high seas, but doesn't say why. I suspect that having the waves not smash into the bomb bay was a factor.

 

[ClayO]

Back to the Halifax: here's a new YouTube extolling the virtues of the plane from a self-proclaimed fan. I haven't finished watching it yet, but the first part is pretty interesting, with shots of the interior and descriptions of what it was like to be in the crew. It's telling that even one of the plane's boosters calls the Mk I a "deathtrap."

 

[pbehn]

Pilots in the North Sea had difficulty finding an impressive bridge to ditch in front of. There are times when the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean are as smooth as that, but they are rare indeed.