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The turning quote was made after the assesment of Pingel's F at the AFDU. The aircraft was delivered by Pingel on 10th July,hardly the autumn. It wasn't tested until later,something that led to some frustration amongst serving officers. Bader even wrote a letter demanding that he and other senior officers be allowed to fly it. He wanted some hard figures but gives no impression that the F was causing undue concern. Nor does anything in any Air Ministry or Air Staff document that I have seen. The same cannot be said of the Fw 190.
When Verney made his comments the Bf 109 F had been in service for months. It was not an unknown quantity to the RAF. The RAF was well aware (as evidenced in their own intelligence reports) that they were faced by Jagdgeschwader equipped with the new type in June/July 1941.
The minutes of the Air Staff meetings refer to the Me 109 for the entire war without any consistent reference to type or dash number.
Losses for the RAF mounted when they started their ill conceived operations across the Channel. The type of operations undertaken can have a great effect on losses. They were able to maintain these losses at,to them,an acceptable level until late 1941. At this time,which happens to coincide with the appearance of the Fw 190,they rose to unacceptable numbers. This is a year after the first Bf 109 Fs enterd service. Is it any wonder that the RAF linked it's loss of superiority over the Channel with the introduction of the new aircraft?
Cheers
Steve
(and it would seem logical that this lead to fitting a high altitude bomber engine to the Mark V and thus renamed Mark IX)
I don't think the Germans cared much if the RAF would bomb France back to stone age... save for a couple of railway lines leading to their U boot pens in Atlantic ports.
I doubt that.I don't think the Germans cared much if the RAF would bomb France back to stone age
After June 1941 the RAF massively outnumbered the Luftwaffe in western Europe. Under such circumstances how can one speak of "forcing the RAF back across the channel"? British daytime air raids could go anywhere they wanted to the limit of aircraft combat radius. Luftwaffe defenders could and did inflict losses but the RAF steamroller could not be stopped.
By mid 1942, there were almost no Bf-109s RAF was to fight against in the ETO (corrections welcomed).
Performance margin not as great over the Spitfire.
I wonder how much of the notice of the Fw-190 is also due to the 109F-4 not showing up until June/July of 1941?
The 109F-1/2 having the lower powered engines and less effective armament. Performance margin not as great over the Spitfire.
Which would be another good reason to equip units facing the RAF's Spitfires with the Fw 190.
Cheers
Steve