Late 1941 - late 42: Bf-109 vs. Fw-190

[stona]

The turning quote was made after the assesment of Pingel's F at the AFDU. The aircraft was delivered by Pingel on 10th July,hardly the autumn. It wasn't tested until later,something that led to some frustration amongst serving officers. Bader even wrote a letter demanding that he and other senior officers be allowed to fly it. He wanted some hard figures but gives no impression that the F was causing undue concern. Nor does anything in any Air Ministry or Air Staff document that I have seen. The same cannot be said of the Fw 190.

When Verney made his comments the Bf 109 F had been in service for months. It was not an unknown quantity to the RAF. The RAF was well aware (as evidenced in their own intelligence reports) that they were faced by Jagdgeschwader equipped with the new type in June/July 1941.

The minutes of the Air Staff meetings refer to the Me 109 for the entire war without any consistent reference to type or dash number.

Losses for the RAF mounted when they started their ill conceived operations across the Channel. The type of operations undertaken can have a great effect on losses. They were able to maintain these losses at,to them,an acceptable level until late 1941. At this time,which happens to coincide with the appearance of the Fw 190,they rose to unacceptable numbers. This is a year after the first Bf 109 Fs enterd service. Is it any wonder that the RAF linked it's loss of superiority over the Channel with the introduction of the new aircraft?


Cheers

Steve

 

[nuuumannn]

I have to agree with Steve regarding the overall impact the Fw 190 had on the British when it first appeared compared to the Bf 109F - as smart an aeroplane as that was. The Fw 190 caused the hasty improvisation that became the Spitfire Mk.IX by fitting a two-speed, two-stage supercharged Merlin to the Mk.V airframe. There was even a somewhat desperate plan for commandoes to parachute into a LW airfield in France and capture an example and fly it across the Channel. That was before Arnim Faber followed a reciprocal course and landed at RAF Pembry in Wales...

 

[Tante Ju]

The 190's boogeyman status may have been the way the RAF perceived it, but it was without any factual foundation.

Hooton notes that between June - December 1941 RAF FC lost 416 fighters in six months during 20 495 day sorties flown (2 % loss rate), plus BC's 108 bombers in 1406 sorties (7.6 % loss rate...!).
This was pretty much the 109F period, just before the JGs started to convert to the 190A. Luftflotte 3 was flying 19535 sorties but lost only 93 fighters (0.4 % loss rate)..

The numbers pretty much speak for themselves - 4 RAF fighters and a bomber was lost for every German fighter . RAF fighter command at the time was however believed that it had shot down over 700 German fighters.

In the next six months (January - June 1942), when the Fw 190 was making appearance, the RAF lost another 295 fighters in 22 729 (1.2% loss rate) day sorties while BC flew 1007 day sorties and lost only 16 (1.5% loss rate).

It's quite clear that the first six months of Fw 190ish 1942 was much easier on the RAF than the previous six months of 1941. 109F equipped JGs were kicking the brown out of Fighter Command in 1941 much worse than 190As did in 1942. Fighter Command's losses did not, as you'd believe, increase in 1942. In fact they were decreasing, but the RAF had enough. Similar losses for the same period for the Jagdwaffe are not available, but Hooton notes that in the four months leading to June 1942, RAF FC has lost 264 fighters for 58 German - a ratio of

To summerize:

In the second half of 1941 the Germans, largely equipped with 109Fs shot down 416 RAF fighters and 108 bombers, for the loss of 93 of their own fighters - a loss ratio of 5.6 to one!
In the four months leading to June 1942 the Germans, largely re-equipped with 190As shot down 264 RAF fighters and about a dozen bombers, for the loss of 58 of their own fighters - a loss ratio of 4.7 to one!

Thus actually the LW was doing relatively worse with the 190 (meaning that they 'only' shot down about 5 RAF planes for each of their own instead of 6..) and Fighter Command actually slightly better.

All that happened that the RAF was slow to realize it. It took them a year and a number of high profile engagements in the spring of 1942, when JGs practically annihilated a number of Spitfire Squadrons in combat: on 1st June 1942 9 Spitfires of the Debden wing were shot down, the next day seven out of 12 Spitfires of No. 403 Sqn were shot down by JG.

This must have rose some heads in the air ministry and Dougles was told to stop this nonsense over France at once. The RAF began to realize the reality of the situation that was going on for a year and they finally had enough of the hammering they received over France - either from 109Fs or 190As.

They may have perceived that this was caused by the 190s, but with the hindsight it seems it was an easy excuse for everyone, since essentially it was the failure of the tactics and lack of concept, aka the human factor. Surely post-war historians were keen to build on that. After all, 'the Fw 190 menace' and blaming it all on a supposedly unbeatable uberfighter sounds a whole lot nicer in the history books than 'we were banging our head against the concreate hoping it would yield and it took us a year to realize this was a stupid concept'.

So, in short your earlier statement that 'RAF only started to suffer losses which they considered unsustainable after the introduction of the Fw 190' is demonstrably untrue.

As for the June 24th 1941 the minutes of a meeting of the Air Staff regarding the Merlin 61 and having Verney resisting any change to the Spitfire V and making the "This [Spitfire V] is the mainstay of the Spitfire first line strength for it is proving superior to the Me 109 and we cannot run any risks with it."

I cannot comment anything else on it that given the above, Verney either had his own reasons for sticking to the Mark V or he had a bad case of overusing mushrooms. To be fair, he might have erred in believing the fanciful claims of pilots over France, after all if those were to be true, the RAF would have been shooting down the LW in a 2 to one rate over France.

But he seems to be rather alone with his opinion. Shacklady for example quotes a signal from the Wing Commander of the Hornchurch wing on 15 July 1941, 'listing the essentials if the Spitfire was to cope with the 109'. He noted the following, regarding the superiority of the 109F at altitude, which was a great concern for RAF fighter pilots appearantly (and it would seem logical that this lead to fitting a high altitude bomber engine to the Mark V and thus renamed Mark IX):

"Reserve of power and manoeuvrability are the foremost requirements for efficient air fighting at great heights. The superiority in this respect of the 109, particularly the 109F must, to a large extent, be due to its light weight. At present the Spitfire V has insufficient reserves of power to stay in combat with the 109 at 35 000 feet. The latter definietely has greater speed at that height on the level, climb or dive."

BTW he also clearly uses '109' for 109E and 109F for the latter. In fact this was expressively requested to avoid confusing the two.

 

[tomo pauk]

The turning quote was made after the assesment of Pingel's F at the AFDU. The aircraft was delivered by Pingel on 10th July,hardly the autumn. It wasn't tested until later,something that led to some frustration amongst serving officers. Bader even wrote a letter demanding that he and other senior officers be allowed to fly it. He wanted some hard figures but gives no impression that the F was causing undue concern. Nor does anything in any Air Ministry or Air Staff document that I have seen. The same cannot be said of the Fw 190.

When Verney made his comments the Bf 109 F had been in service for months. It was not an unknown quantity to the RAF. The RAF was well aware (as evidenced in their own intelligence reports) that they were faced by Jagdgeschwader equipped with the new type in June/July 1941.

The minutes of the Air Staff meetings refer to the Me 109 for the entire war without any consistent reference to type or dash number.

Losses for the RAF mounted when they started their ill conceived operations across the Channel. The type of operations undertaken can have a great effect on losses. They were able to maintain these losses at,to them,an acceptable level until late 1941. At this time,which happens to coincide with the appearance of the Fw 190,they rose to unacceptable numbers. This is a year after the first Bf 109 Fs enterd service. Is it any wonder that the RAF linked it's loss of superiority over the Channel with the introduction of the new aircraft?


Cheers

Steve

Thanks for the contribution, Steve.
The non-differentiation between the F1/F2 and F4 (with a restricted engine, second half of 1941) is a most striking one. The difference in performance between 601N and 601E engined planes was akin to the difference between Spit V and Spit IX. Let aloe when, starting in 1942, the 601E was allowed to do the full power.
If the type of fuel is mentioned in the minutes, we can easily make out what sub-type is the plane.

Tante Ju, many thanks.

 

[stona]

Losses are very dependent on the missions undertaken.

The RAF decided that the losses early in 1942 were unsustainable,not me.

How much combat was taking place at 35,000 ft?

The Wing Commander may have been keen to differentiate the E and F. The very fact he wrote that would seem to indicate that it wasn't being done and it wasn't done after his plea either.
He obviously wrote it prior to the arrival of Pingel's F in July.

RAF intelligence reports do differentiate between different types (not always dash numbers,though they may quote the data plate) and almost invariably note the werknummer, place of manufacture, engine type,armament and often fuel. That is not the same as the minutes of meetings attended by the men from the Ministry and senior officers.

Cheers

Steve

 

[davebender]

After June 1941 the RAF massively outnumbered the Luftwaffe in western Europe. Under such circumstances how can one speak of "forcing the RAF back across the channel"? British daytime air raids could go anywhere they wanted to the limit of aircraft combat radius. Luftwaffe defenders could and did inflict losses but the RAF steamroller could not be stopped.

 

[Tante Ju]

I don't think the Germans cared much if the RAF would bomb France back to stone age... save for a couple of railway lines leading to their U boot pens in Atlantic ports.

 

[nuuumannn]

(and it would seem logical that this lead to fitting a high altitude bomber engine to the Mark V and thus renamed Mark IX)

Nope. The Mk.IX was produced in a hurry to combat the Fw 190. The first 60 series Merlin powered Spit was the VII; the Mk.VIII was to be the next mass produced variant of the Spit; the IX was initially a stop-gap - it was not planned.

Tante Ju, whilst your facts and figures point to the Bf 109F as being the highest scorer - and I'm ceratinly not disputing them; the Fw 190 was a shock, not necessarily because it had shot down more aircraft at that time, but because it could outperform the Mk.V Spit. The Brits had more reason to be concerned by the potential the Fw 190 offered.

I don't think the Germans cared much if the RAF would bomb France back to stone age... save for a couple of railway lines leading to their U boot pens in Atlantic ports.

I really don't think that was the case at all!

 

[davebender]

I don't think the Germans cared much if the RAF would bomb France back to stone age

I doubt that.

Vichy France will not remain diplomatically aligned with Germany if the Luftwaffe cannot provide an adequate air defense of French territory.

 

[stona]

After June 1941 the RAF massively outnumbered the Luftwaffe in western Europe. Under such circumstances how can one speak of "forcing the RAF back across the channel"? British daytime air raids could go anywhere they wanted to the limit of aircraft combat radius. Luftwaffe defenders could and did inflict losses but the RAF steamroller could not be stopped.

Go back and read the thread. In both late '41 and early '42 RAF operations acroos the Channel were either halted or severely limited by order of the Air Staff. This was due to an unacceptable level of losses which the RAF perceived,at the time,as being due to the introduction of the Fw 190. Whether this was infact due to the Fw 190 or not is obviously,with the benefit of hindsight up for debate.

What is quite clear is that the RAF did not feel could not go "anywhere they wanted" at this time,at least not with an acceptable level of losses.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Aozora]

Attached is the Air Ministry's guide for Spitfire pilots flying over enemy territory, published August 1942:

The advice was to cruise at high speeds: +16 Lbs boost was now available and could be used without a threat of the engine blowing up, but fuel consumption increased exponentially.

 

[stona]

And,once again,specific mention of the Fw 190 ("At the present stage of the war the enemy is equipped with the Fw 190......."). It was the perceived threat.
Cheers
Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Steve, the paper specifically mentions France as the current area of interest. By mid 1942, there were almost no Bf-109s RAF was to fight against in the ETO (corrections welcomed). Fw-190 of that era was holding all cards vs. the Spit V, bar turning abilities, so it's no wonder they specify it in the document. The document therefore does not tries to proove that 190 was a better fighter than 109, just acknowledges the current adwersary in the war theatre of major RAF's interest.

 

[stona]

By mid 1942, there were almost no Bf-109s RAF was to fight against in the ETO (corrections welcomed).

I'd have to check that,but let's assume that is so. Why would that be?. The Luftwaffe still had plenty of Bf 109s.
Cheers
Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

The ETO was not the area the bulk of Luftwaffe was fielded, that would be the Eastern front. Plus, we have MTO. In those two 'remote', but huge areas, Fw-190 was arriving in penny packets from late 1942 on. Bf-109, in 1942, was a far less a troublesome machine than it was the case for the Fw-190 (due to BMW engine issues). The teething problems were much easier to resolve in 'sanitized' conditions of France Low caountries, near to Gemany, than in the remote and dusty steppes deserts of EF and MTO.
We can draw paralels here with RAF's experiences with Typhoon.

 

[Shortround6]

I wonder how much of the notice of the Fw-190 is also due to the 109F-4 not showing up until June/July of 1941?

The 109F-1/2 having the lower powered engines and less effective armament. Performance margin not as great over the Spitfire.

 

[stona]

Performance margin not as great over the Spitfire.

Which would be another good reason to equip units facing the RAF's Spitfires with the Fw 190.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Vincenzo]

I/2 the 190 came in june '42, last 3 Gustav leave in november '42 (some back in september '43 and stay until april '44). (june, june, june '42)
II/2 the 190 came march '42, last Friedrich leave in may '42 (some Gustav came in september '42 and stay until november, in april '43 became a 109 unit) (NA, march, april '42)
III/2 the 190 came in may '42, last Friedrich leave in july '42 (some Gustav came in february/may '43) (may, may, june '42)
10/2 the 190 came in june '42, last 4 Friedrich leave in july '42 (may, march, NA)
11/2 some 190 came in january/february '43 otherwise is a Gustav unit
I/26 last 12 Friedrich leave in april '42 (some Gustav came november/december '42) (march, march, april '42)
II/26 had only 190 already 1/3/42, (some Gustav came in december '42- february '43) (NA)
III/26 had only 190 already 1/3/42 (some Gustav came in august '42 and stay in it, in october '43 became a 109 unit) (NA)
10/26 190 came june '42, last 7 Friedrich leave in july '42 (june, june, NA)
11/26 was a Gustav unit

p.s. added month last loss, before of full reequip with 190, a 109 enemy related, not enemy related, last sent to overhaul

 

[Kryten]

couple of things to ponder,

the Typhoon was rushed into service to counter the Fw190 threat as well as the Spit iX, also the Spit XII was developed to put a high powered Spit into combat asap.

Spit mkV was used in Malta and considered up to the job of dealing with Me109F and early G.

 

[tomo pauk]

Don't think anyone would claim the Fw-190 as a non-issue for RAF in 1942. It did have edge in performance, the great roll rate making it even a tougher costumer. Hence the rushing of Typhoon in service, along with introduction of Spit V airframe mated with 2-stage Merlin (ie. Spit IX). The RAF was starting to get aware of disproportional losses, and they saw the Fw-190 as the cause.
As for Malta/MTO, do we have a creditable list of kills/losses (not the claims), Spit V vs. Bf-109F?

I wonder how much of the notice of the Fw-190 is also due to the 109F-4 not showing up until June/July of 1941?

The 109F-1/2 having the lower powered engines and less effective armament. Performance margin not as great over the Spitfire.

The notice about the Fw-190 was issued in August of 1942 - the F1/F2 were long gone by then.

Which would be another good reason to equip units facing the RAF's Spitfires with the Fw 190.
Cheers
Steve

RAF should not be facing the F1/F2, anywhere, by 1942.