Lessons Learned Pre-WWII Conflicts (1 Viewer)

[Boom]

Much is made of the fact that the Luftwaffe went to war in 1939 with highly skilled aircrew, courtesy of the experience gained in the Spanish Civil War.

British accounts especially make much of this, perhaps as a way of explaining away Luftwaffe successes in tactics in the early part of the war. And perhaps to emphasize how good the RAF was to defeat the Luftwaffe in the Battle Of Britain.

Either way, it is fair to say that the Luftwaffe did develop highly efficient tactics in fighter and ground attack.

But Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union too fought in several conflicts pre war. The Regia Aeronautica fought in Libya, Ethiopia, Spain and Albania prior to WWII.
Japan fought in China and Mongolia.
The Soviet Union fought in Spain, China, Khalkhin Gol and Finland.

Japan learned lessons from those conflicts to effectively employ them very successfully at the start of the Pacific War.

But Italy and the Soviets seemed to have missed a golden opportunity. The VVS especially, given it's combats against skilled adversaries.

Why is that?

 

[buffnut453]

I think the USSR's pre-war lack of adaptation had more to do with Stalin's purges than anything else. He gutted senior military leadership and even aircraft design teams. The replacements were relatively inexperienced and, unsurprisingly, fearful for their futures and so they tied the line…which doesn't exactly promote innovation.

The Italy situation is more interesting because they entered the war still with biplanes as their primary fighters when EVERYONE else was into monoplanes. It's definitely a topic worth discussing.

 

[Shortround6]

I think we can cut the Italians a bit of slack.
In 1939-40 several other air forces were still using a number of biplanes.
Soviet Union built over 3400 I-153 biplanes between 1939 and 1941.
Japanese army did go to monoplanes but insisted on either biplane maneuverability or near biplane maneuverability and they sacrificed firepower and protection to get it.

A problem for the Soviets was a lack of training. Not only in basic levels but in ongoing training in service. Some accounts say that pilots in active-duty squadrons that were not in combat (fighting the Japanese in Manchuria?) only flew around 30 hours per year (?). Which is barely enough to keep currant on a Cessna and not a high-powered fighter.
Soviets were obsessed with numbers (how many aircraft of each type; fighters, bombers, recon, etc) and not with actual effectiveness.
Italians also fought poorly equipped opponents during most of the 30s. A lot of biplane vs biplane combat. Or biplane vs no aircraft.

British may have been doing a bit of covering their own asses in some of their assessments. British got a lot things right in the 1930s. Training and tactics were not on the list. Being able to fly in tight formation was placed ahead (well ahead) of air-to-air gunnery. British spent a lot time figuring out how to not train pilots in air-to-air gunnery. Turret fighters and zero allowance shooting sucked up a lot of time and effort.

Italy also had major problems with production. Of aircraft, tanks, artillery and even rifles. Italy industrial base was well under 10% of Germany's it was hard to change over anything once they were in WW II. Italy had 3 monoplane fighters in development/production in 1939 but stopping CR 42 production in order to switch over might have meant the loss of 100-200 planes during the changeover in production. The other problem was that 2 of the monoplanes used the same engine as the CR 42 so they weren't that good even in 1940. 290-300mph monoplane vs 270-275mph biplane?

 

[Just Schmidt]

Much is made of the fact that the Luftwaffe went to war in 1939 with highly skilled aircrew, courtesy of the experience gained in the Spanish Civil War.

British accounts especially make much of this, perhaps as a way of explaining away Luftwaffe successes in tactics in the early part of the war. And perhaps to emphasize how good the RAF was to defeat the Luftwaffe in the Battle Of Britain.

Either way, it is fair to say that the Luftwaffe did develop highly efficient tactics in fighter and ground attack.

But Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union too fought in several conflicts pre war. The Regia Aeronautica fought in Libya, Ethiopia, Spain and Albania prior to WWII.
Japan fought in China and Mongolia.
The Soviet Union fought in Spain, China, Khalkhin Gol and Finland.

Japan learned lessons from those conflicts to effectively employ them very successfully at the start of the Pacific War.

But Italy and the Soviets seemed to have missed a golden opportunity. The VVS especially, given it's combats against skilled adversaries.

Why is

I think the USSR's pre-war lack of adaptation had more to do with Stalin's purges than anything else. He gutted senior military leadership and even aircraft design teams. The replacements were relatively inexperienced and, unsurprisingly, fearful for their futures and so they tied the line…which doesn't exactly promote innovation.

The Italy situation is more interesting because they entered the war still with biplanes as their primary fighters when EVERYONE else was into monoplanes. It's definitely a topic worth discussing.

I think there's two dimensions to this. Technical design and tactical experience. For the USSR it was a factor that Stalin was especially suspicious against citizens that had been abroad. Also, their air force was so large, that those who gained personal experience was a smaller percentage than in other air forces involved.

 

[Dimlee]

Regarding the purges in the USSR, just two points.
1. The total number of VVS and VMF (Naval) aviation personnel affected was not very high compared to the entire Red Army and to civilians. Net loss, after counting those who returned to service: probably under 5,000. Executed or sent to GULAG: under 2,000. But several layers of high command were heavily affected or wiped out.
Four Commanders-in-Chief, all military district commanders, three commanders of Naval Aviation, and a large number of middle-rank officers. The executions continued even after the German invasion began.
And there were "incidents". General Kopets, Commander of the Western District, allegedly drank tea shot himself on 22nd or 23rd June 1941.
2. Another, often understated factor: destructive impact on morale. If you can be punished and even executed for doing nothing wrong. If your commanders were arrested and disappeared, one after another... How will you serve and fight?
People have chosen different ways of survival in such a toxic environment.
One extreme example: Viktor Maltsev, a VVS colonel and ROA-KONR general.
Мальцев, Виктор Иванович — Википедия (No English article on Wiki, but Google Translate helps).

 

[Dimlee]

Regia Aeronautica in Ethiopia.
I always wondered - was it a useful experience? Except for what was gained in logistics and field trials of the equipment.
But experience overall and its impact on the personnel's mentality and skills? Bombing and strafing the targets with almost no opposition. And then receiving the honours and benefits from the state and public. Rather corrupting, in my opinion.

 

[Boom]

And how much does it have to do with aircraft?

The Germans developed very effective tactics out of the Spanish Civil War, but they also had the aircraft to do it. Namely Bf 109, Ju 87 and He 111

The Japanese also developed effective tactics from the China air war. And had the aircraft to do it, namely the Type 0, Ki-27, G3M bomber.

The Italians and Soviets though seemed to have been stuck in the biplane era. The Italians went from the Cr.32 to the Cr.42 in primacy, with approx 70% of all fighters being biplane in June 1940 The Fiat G.50 fighter (Italy's first monoplane) first flew in 1937, but by June 1940 it only have 100 odd on strength.

The Soviets were in a similar boat. They possessed roughly 5,000 fighter aircraft in June 1941, the bulk being I-15 bis, I-153 and I-16. Modern monoplane fighters like the MiG-3, Yak-1 and Lagg-3 counted for less than 1,000.

 

[Shortround6]

The Germans developed very effective tactics out of the Spanish Civil War, but they also had the aircraft to do it. Namely Bf 109, Ju 87 and He 111

There may have been Three Ju 87s in Spain, early bombing raids were by Ju 52s.
Germans did learn a lot, but they used a lot of different aircraft and it was tactics and technique that they learned. Regardless of aircraft used it was the ability of the ground troops to get the aircraft to attack the right targets that was important. Laying out sheets of fabric on the ground didn't work regardless of Ju 87 or He 51.

The Japanese also developed effective tactics from the China air war. And had the aircraft to do it, namely the Type 0, Ki-27, G3M bomber.

Japan had been bombing China for years. Japan actually leaned some of the wrong stuff. small bombers with very light bomb loads worked against Chinese cities and the Chinese and very little for AA guns.

The Italians and Soviets though seemed to have been stuck in the biplane era. The Italians went from the Cr.32 to the Cr.42 in primacy, with approx 70% of all fighters being biplane in June 1940 The Fiat G.50 fighter (Italy's first monoplane) first flew in 1937, but by June 1940 it only have 100 odd on strength.

The Soviets were in a similar boat. They possessed roughly 5,000 fighter aircraft in June 1941, the bulk being I-15 bis, I-153 and I-16.

I-16 was a monoplane and it came in several flavors. But the Soviets had over 1600 I-16s in the west at the start of Barbarossa.

Modern monoplane fighters like the MiG-3, Yak-1 and Lagg-3 counted for less than 1,000.

Very true but then the VVS was almost 50% Monoplane fighters. What they didn't have was radios or many of them so ground to air vectoring didn't work. Air to air communications was waving of hands or wagging of wings.

 

[Dimlee]

he Soviets were in a similar boat. They possessed roughly 5,000 fighter aircraft in June 1941, the bulk being I-15 bis, I-153 and I-16. Modern monoplane fighters like the MiG-3, Yak-1 and Lagg-3 counted for less than 1,000.

About 5,000 fighter aircraft in June 1941 is correct, but only for the Western districts and the "Western" Navy (i.e. Black Sea, Baltic, North). The total number of fighters in all districts, including PVO (Air Defence) and the Pacific Fleet, was over 11,000.

 

[MikeMeech]

Germans did learn a lot, but they used a lot of different aircraft and it was tactics and technique that they learned. Regardless of aircraft used it was the ability of the ground troops to get the aircraft to attack the right targets that was important. Laying out sheets of fabric on the ground didn't work regardless of Ju 87 or He 51.

Hi
I would presume that the German forces went to Spain using instructions from the 'Truppenfuhrung Part II' of 1934, which includes the statement "Improvised signals generally serve only to attract the attention of friendly aircraft to a particular point. Such improvised signals include reflecting metal, signal flares, tracers fired into the ground, panel signals or flags."
These are similar to the methods used during WW1 and would show the location of 'friendly' troops to the aircraft, not always successfully. During to Battle of France there are numerous images of German armoured vehicles with NAZI flags and/or white rectangles on to show they were friendly to their own aircraft.

However, the Germans had many 'friendly fire' incidents with, for example, von Richthofen's VIII Fliegerkorps HQ issuing a memo down to company level on 24 May 1942 giving details on the methods to use, it also states that: "It has become increasingly evident that our troops use visual identification panels unwillingly or not at all. If the attacking infantry is to force its way forward, the cooperation of close air support aircraft is essential. The effectiveness of this air support depends upon use of such recognition procedures. Their use is also essential so that our own troops are not endangered by bombs dropped from our own aircraft." (Page 217 of 'The Luftwaffe's Way of War, German Air Force Doctrine 1911-1945' by Corum and Muller).
These were the same problems met during WW1 by all sides, there is much correspondence on the subject in various official files throughout that war. Below is an aerial photo of French troops during 1918 in the front line with some of their panels exposed:

I have written several articles on this subject relating to WW1 and the problems involved including (For those interested) one for The Society for Army Historical Research Commemorative Special Publication on the First World War 'A Long, Long Trail A-Winding':

The same problems that arose during WW1 arose again during WW2 and later wars. From the web there are also useful images of methods used by the allies during WW2, along with the White Star, with or without a circle around it, including:

Many other methods were also used at different periods in various theatres. However, there were very few methods apart from visual, including coloured/white panels, smoke or shiny items that were of use, indeed many of the methods were still in use during the Gulf War.

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

The problem wasn't just recognition which was important in reducing friendly fire but actually directing the aircraft to hit what the ground troops wanted them to hit.
Divebombing a hill without any troops of either side on it instead of the hill with dug in infantry and AT guns didn't do the attackers any good and it might be several hours to get another air mission or artillery fire support mission.
Having a Luftwaffe officer on the ground (or in a vehicle) with a radio that could signal/talk to the aircraft about to attack and with the ground formation leader was very important.
A flyer who knew what things looked like from the air could give better instructions to the attackers than a ground officer who had never flown. Luftwaffe officer could give better advice as to what the aircraft could and could not do to the field commander in charge helping him make a good plan.