Light fighters alternatives, 1935-1945 (1 Viewer)

[SaparotRob]

Could the light fighter been useful in a naval role?

Maybe solely as a CAP specialist? Some of the worst naval defeats occurred after all CAP aircraft had been pulled down to lower altitude.

Escort carriers could field quite a few lighter aircraft which could bolster the number of aircraft protecting carriers. Oftentimes simply firing a 7.7mm gun at torpedo bomber or dive bomber was enough to throw its aim off.

Even a unit of Claude A5M could have distracted the Helldivers at Midway and saved some ships. Additionally, had an escort carrier been present at Midway, like the Hosho, it might have pulled some bombs off the fleet carriers.

I can't think of any carrier air battle in the pivotal years of 1942 to 1943 where simply adding some light and obsolete aircraft to a CAP wouldn't have helped draw fighters down to lower altitudes or interfere with bombing runs.

But then the question arises: is training pilots to fly in vulnerable aircraft is a wise decision? Pilot training and survival has consistently proven to be highly important to winning in long, drawn out wars.

Just my 2 satang but I think the F8F might be as close as we could get to a light naval fighter.

 

[AerialTorpedoDude69]

I think an argument against light/cheap naval fighters is that space on a carrier is extremely limited. For the plane itself obviously, but also crew, stores etc. On land there might be a case for having a larger number of cheaper aircraft, just park them besides the others. On a carrier, not so much. So for carrier aircraft I think the logic would dictate packing as much capability into the very limited space you have, if it turns out to be expensive then so be it.

Then again, escort carriers were successfully flying Wildcats long after it had been superseded on the frontline fleet carriers, so..

The limited space is actually an advantage of having light fighters. The Hosho (which was IIRC the world's first purpose-built aircraft carrier) was too small to fly modern aircraft. The Claude was the only monoplane with a short enough takeoff that could fly from its deck.

For this reason, the Japanese used it in a support role and not as a mainline unit. It was not attached to the main strike force at Midway. I believe its strike force consisted of biplanes. Useless against modern carrier forces. Its Claude fighters, though, were still potent dogfighters but had been relegated to training duties after Midway.

The Claude's smaller dimensions, meant more fighters could be fielded aboard a smaller carrier. The Japanese had some escort carriers that could only field artillery spotters. however, the Claude should have been able to take off from one of these because of its light weight.

 

[tomo pauk]

Could the light fighter been useful in a naval role?

Maybe solely as a CAP specialist? Some of the worst naval defeats occurred after all CAP aircraft had been pulled down to lower altitude.

Escort carriers could field quite a few lighter aircraft which could bolster the number of aircraft protecting carriers. Oftentimes simply firing a 7.7mm gun at torpedo bomber or dive bomber was enough to throw its aim off.

An imperfect CAP beats having no CAP any day of week.
Look at the Germans - during the hunt for KM Bismarck, even a dozen of Sea Gladiator equivalents or the Skuas equivalents would've hampered the British patrols performed by the Catalinas, and the later torpedo attacks by the Swordfishes. Even better if something better is navalized, like the He 112, or the Bf 109T is in service. A simple 10K ton carrier, with a bit of forethough would've offered them such an option without costing them an arm and a leg, let alone something like the RN Hermes that went to 15K tons fully laden.
Italians were in teh same bag - having no carrier cost them three heavy cruisers and two destroyers in a day, toghether with 2300 killed and more than 1000 men captured, and that is just for one battle.

Escort carriers don't need to be fancy, either. Use the planks and beams to make an escort carrier out of a merchant ship that still can be used partially as a cargo carrier.

But then the question arises: is training pilots to fly in vulnerable aircraft is a wise decision? Pilot training and survival has consistently proven to be highly important to winning in long, drawn out wars.

These pilots are protecting something else. Loosing many dozens of pilots and A/C more while saving thousands of lives and dozens of ships seems like a very good (if a cold) trade. KM Bismarck was sunk with 2200 men loosing their lives.

 

[GrauGeist]

Even a unit of Claude A5M could have distracted the Helldivers at Midway and saved some ships

The Dauntless was known to defend itself once committed to a dive and an A5M or an A6M would not have deterred them.

At the Battle of Coral Sea, Lefla even skidded his SBD to shoot down an A6M that was attacking the Dauntless ahead of him during a dive.

 

[andy1967]

The bent wings were likely from the pull-out from the high speed dive.

One wonders where the propeller and reduction gear landed.

Eric Brown spoke about this incident and credited physical strength as one of the reasons that the test pilot managed to survive.

 

[tomo pauk]

The Dauntless was known to defend itself once committed to a dive and an A5M or an A6M would not have deterred them.

At the Battle of Coral Sea, Lefla even skidded his SBD to shoot down an A6M that was attacking the Dauntless ahead of him during a dive.

Apart from skill and courage, Americans have had also a bit of the luck playing the part; granted, a lot of the crews were very unlucky. Besides the Nautilus being chased by a destroyer, that was spotted by the Dauntless package when returning to the Kido Butai and thus spilled the beans wrt. the actual position of the KB, there was just a single hit that doomed Akagi. With a greater number of CAP fighters, the 'excursion' by Best and his wingmen might've not materialized, leaving Akagi free to contribute to the battle on the Japanese side.

BTW - employing the yesterday's fighters as the anti-torpdo-bomber protection should've been worth more than employing the SBDs in that role, as the USN did in 1942.

 

[Shortround6]

Trouble is that we keep ignoring the limited capacity of the existing carriers or we come up with scenarios were swapping 6-12 planes will make a difference. We ignore what problems having 6-12 planes less of another type in the same battle/campaign might do.

The US and British tried to use multi role aircraft.
The Dauntless was an SBD. Scout/Bomber/Douglas
The Devastator was an TBD. Torpedo/Bomber/Douglas.
Bomber in this case meant level bomber.

Using yesterday's fighters in Pacific in 1942 would have meant fewer strike aircraft and/or fewer scout aircraft trying to find the enemy. Maybe it would work and maybe it wouldn't.

Japanese tried to cheat. Used floatplanes off their cruisers to raise scout/recon numbers. This did not work as hoped at times. Floatplanes tended to try to radio their own ship or cruiser squadron rather than the carrier group. Making procedures up as you go tends to screw up communications.

Hosho was originally rated for 15 planes. Her early fighters were small (wingspan around 30ft) and used small engines. Maybe the Japanese changed her aviation fuel tanks and maybe they didn't. Early carriers were not built for keeping even 1-2 airplanes aloft during daylight for 5-7days. Fuel storage was often not up to the needs of either modern aircraft or modern operations.

Italians were in teh same bag - having no carrier cost them three heavy cruisers and two destroyers in a day, toghether with 2300 killed and more than 1000 men captured, and that is just for one battle.

Italians lost 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers because the Italian air force would not talk to/cooperate with the Italian navy. Having to build 20,000 ton plus carriers because your armed forces won't cooperate with each other is a real problem. I do mean real, at times the US Navy and US Army were not cooperating well either.

 

[GrauGeist]

Italians lost 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers because the Italian air force would not talk to/cooperate with the Italian navy. Having to build 20,000 ton plus carriers because your armed forces won't cooperate with each other is a real problem. I do mean real, at times the US Navy and US Army were not cooperating well either.

Both the Italians and the Americans pale in comparison when compared to the lack of Army/Navy co-operation of the Japanese.

*Had* the IJN and IJA embraced a cohesive interoperability plan early on, the Pacific War would have been a tough row to hoe for the Allies.