Light fighters alternatives, 1935-1945 (10 Viewers)

[SaparotRob]

Could the light fighter been useful in a naval role?

Maybe solely as a CAP specialist? Some of the worst naval defeats occurred after all CAP aircraft had been pulled down to lower altitude.

Escort carriers could field quite a few lighter aircraft which could bolster the number of aircraft protecting carriers. Oftentimes simply firing a 7.7mm gun at torpedo bomber or dive bomber was enough to throw its aim off.

Even a unit of Claude A5M could have distracted the Helldivers at Midway and saved some ships. Additionally, had an escort carrier been present at Midway, like the Hosho, it might have pulled some bombs off the fleet carriers.

I can't think of any carrier air battle in the pivotal years of 1942 to 1943 where simply adding some light and obsolete aircraft to a CAP wouldn't have helped draw fighters down to lower altitudes or interfere with bombing runs.

But then the question arises: is training pilots to fly in vulnerable aircraft is a wise decision? Pilot training and survival has consistently proven to be highly important to winning in long, drawn out wars.

Just my 2 satang but I think the F8F might be as close as we could get to a light naval fighter.

 

[AerialTorpedoDude69]

I think an argument against light/cheap naval fighters is that space on a carrier is extremely limited. For the plane itself obviously, but also crew, stores etc. On land there might be a case for having a larger number of cheaper aircraft, just park them besides the others. On a carrier, not so much. So for carrier aircraft I think the logic would dictate packing as much capability into the very limited space you have, if it turns out to be expensive then so be it.

Then again, escort carriers were successfully flying Wildcats long after it had been superseded on the frontline fleet carriers, so..

The limited space is actually an advantage of having light fighters. The Hosho (which was IIRC the world's first purpose-built aircraft carrier) was too small to fly modern aircraft. The Claude was the only monoplane with a short enough takeoff that could fly from its deck.

For this reason, the Japanese used it in a support role and not as a mainline unit. It was not attached to the main strike force at Midway. I believe its strike force consisted of biplanes. Useless against modern carrier forces. Its Claude fighters, though, were still potent dogfighters but had been relegated to training duties after Midway.

The Claude's smaller dimensions, meant more fighters could be fielded aboard a smaller carrier. The Japanese had some escort carriers that could only field artillery spotters. however, the Claude should have been able to take off from one of these because of its light weight.

 

[tomo pauk]

Could the light fighter been useful in a naval role?

Maybe solely as a CAP specialist? Some of the worst naval defeats occurred after all CAP aircraft had been pulled down to lower altitude.

Escort carriers could field quite a few lighter aircraft which could bolster the number of aircraft protecting carriers. Oftentimes simply firing a 7.7mm gun at torpedo bomber or dive bomber was enough to throw its aim off.

An imperfect CAP beats having no CAP any day of week.
Look at the Germans - during the hunt for KM Bismarck, even a dozen of Sea Gladiator equivalents or the Skuas equivalents would've hampered the British patrols performed by the Catalinas, and the later torpedo attacks by the Swordfishes. Even better if something better is navalized, like the He 112, or the Bf 109T is in service. A simple 10K ton carrier, with a bit of forethough would've offered them such an option without costing them an arm and a leg, let alone something like the RN Hermes that went to 15K tons fully laden.
Italians were in teh same bag - having no carrier cost them three heavy cruisers and two destroyers in a day, toghether with 2300 killed and more than 1000 men captured, and that is just for one battle.

Escort carriers don't need to be fancy, either. Use the planks and beams to make an escort carrier out of a merchant ship that still can be used partially as a cargo carrier.

But then the question arises: is training pilots to fly in vulnerable aircraft is a wise decision? Pilot training and survival has consistently proven to be highly important to winning in long, drawn out wars.

These pilots are protecting something else. Loosing many dozens of pilots and A/C more while saving thousands of lives and dozens of ships seems like a very good (if a cold) trade. KM Bismarck was sunk with 2200 men loosing their lives.

 

[GrauGeist]

Even a unit of Claude A5M could have distracted the Helldivers at Midway and saved some ships

The Dauntless was known to defend itself once committed to a dive and an A5M or an A6M would not have deterred them.

At the Battle of Coral Sea, Lefla even skidded his SBD to shoot down an A6M that was attacking the Dauntless ahead of him during a dive.

 

[andy1967]

The bent wings were likely from the pull-out from the high speed dive.

One wonders where the propeller and reduction gear landed.

Eric Brown spoke about this incident and credited physical strength as one of the reasons that the test pilot managed to survive.

 

[tomo pauk]

The Dauntless was known to defend itself once committed to a dive and an A5M or an A6M would not have deterred them.

At the Battle of Coral Sea, Lefla even skidded his SBD to shoot down an A6M that was attacking the Dauntless ahead of him during a dive.

Apart from skill and courage, Americans have had also a bit of the luck playing the part; granted, a lot of the crews were very unlucky. Besides the Nautilus being chased by a destroyer, that was spotted by the Dauntless package when returning to the Kido Butai and thus spilled the beans wrt. the actual position of the KB, there was just a single hit that doomed Akagi. With a greater number of CAP fighters, the 'excursion' by Best and his wingmen might've not materialized, leaving Akagi free to contribute to the battle on the Japanese side.

BTW - employing the yesterday's fighters as the anti-torpdo-bomber protection should've been worth more than employing the SBDs in that role, as the USN did in 1942.

 

[Shortround6]

Trouble is that we keep ignoring the limited capacity of the existing carriers or we come up with scenarios were swapping 6-12 planes will make a difference. We ignore what problems having 6-12 planes less of another type in the same battle/campaign might do.

The US and British tried to use multi role aircraft.
The Dauntless was an SBD. Scout/Bomber/Douglas
The Devastator was an TBD. Torpedo/Bomber/Douglas.
Bomber in this case meant level bomber.

Using yesterday's fighters in Pacific in 1942 would have meant fewer strike aircraft and/or fewer scout aircraft trying to find the enemy. Maybe it would work and maybe it wouldn't.

Japanese tried to cheat. Used floatplanes off their cruisers to raise scout/recon numbers. This did not work as hoped at times. Floatplanes tended to try to radio their own ship or cruiser squadron rather than the carrier group. Making procedures up as you go tends to screw up communications.

Hosho was originally rated for 15 planes. Her early fighters were small (wingspan around 30ft) and used small engines. Maybe the Japanese changed her aviation fuel tanks and maybe they didn't. Early carriers were not built for keeping even 1-2 airplanes aloft during daylight for 5-7days. Fuel storage was often not up to the needs of either modern aircraft or modern operations.

Italians were in teh same bag - having no carrier cost them three heavy cruisers and two destroyers in a day, toghether with 2300 killed and more than 1000 men captured, and that is just for one battle.

Italians lost 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers because the Italian air force would not talk to/cooperate with the Italian navy. Having to build 20,000 ton plus carriers because your armed forces won't cooperate with each other is a real problem. I do mean real, at times the US Navy and US Army were not cooperating well either.

 

[GrauGeist]

Italians lost 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers because the Italian air force would not talk to/cooperate with the Italian navy. Having to build 20,000 ton plus carriers because your armed forces won't cooperate with each other is a real problem. I do mean real, at times the US Navy and US Army were not cooperating well either.

Both the Italians and the Americans pale in comparison when compared to the lack of Army/Navy co-operation of the Japanese.

*Had* the IJN and IJA embraced a cohesive interoperability plan early on, the Pacific War would have been a tough row to hoe for the Allies.

 

[tomo pauk]

Italians lost 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers because the Italian air force would not talk to/cooperate with the Italian navy. Having to build 20,000 ton plus carriers because your armed forces won't cooperate with each other is a real problem.

In ww2, one does not need to make fully-fledged 20K+ ton carriers in order to have organic air defense for the fleet. Start with 10K ton ships, cruiser machinery, two shafts. The organic air group will have far better rection time - minutes vs. hours - when compared with the air group that is shore-based, the turn-around time will be much shorter, allowing for several sorties vs. two at best in a high-tempo battle. Time on station vs. total time used will also favor the organic air group, meaning that one needs far fewer aircraft, crew and fuel to cover the same needs.

 

[z42]

The limited space is actually an advantage of having light fighters. The Hosho (which was IIRC the world's first purpose-built aircraft carrier) was too small to fly modern aircraft. The Claude was the only monoplane with a short enough takeoff that could fly from its deck.

For this reason, the Japanese used it in a support role and not as a mainline unit. It was not attached to the main strike force at Midway. I believe its strike force consisted of biplanes. Useless against modern carrier forces. Its Claude fighters, though, were still potent dogfighters but had been relegated to training duties after Midway.

The Claude's smaller dimensions, meant more fighters could be fielded aboard a smaller carrier. The Japanese had some escort carriers that could only field artillery spotters. however, the Claude should have been able to take off from one of these because of its light weight.

Sure, using previous generation aircraft on small and old or otherwise 'low end' carriers might work out fine in secondary roles. But there might be a reason why navies wanted the latest and greatest aircraft on the fleet carriers.

There's also the issue that aircraft carrying capacity as a function of carrier size is a step function rather than a linear function. If you can, say, park three aircraft side by side in the hangar, increasing hangar width by 10% or 20% does nothing. But increase the width by 33% and suddenly you can park four aircraft side by side, and the capacity increases drastically. Or in other words, is your cheap fighter sufficiently narrower with wings folded than your more expensive and capable model that you can fit an extra column of aircraft in the hangar? If not, you have sacrificed aircraft capability for no increase in numbers.

Another issue might be sortie rate, or how quickly you can launch and recover aircraft. I don't think there's much difference between lighter and heavier aircraft here, so a more capable aircraft would have an advantage here.

Of course, this argument goes the other way as well: If you design your carrier for the generation aircraft then under development, what happens a few years down the line when the next generation aircraft shows up? If you designed your carrier to fit three aircraft side by side, and the next generation aircraft is a bit wider you can only fit two of them side by side and you lose a third of your capacity. A serious problem in the interwar years when aircraft developed very quickly.

 

[topspeed]

Roussel 30 was small and light...had they had 300 of these...would it have changed the outcome ?

 

[z42]

An imperfect CAP beats having no CAP any day of week.
Look at the Germans - during the hunt for KM Bismarck, even a dozen of Sea Gladiator equivalents or the Skuas equivalents would've hampered the British patrols performed by the Catalinas, and the later torpedo attacks by the Swordfishes. Even better if something better is navalized, like the He 112, or the Bf 109T is in service. A simple 10K ton carrier, with a bit of forethough would've offered them such an option without costing them an arm and a leg, let alone something like the RN Hermes that went to 15K tons fully laden.

On some level I kind of like the what-if scenario of Germany going for carrier aviation. There are of course many issues with that, but first and foremost I think it requires a rather different navy. Carriers work best as part of task forces, with destroyers and maybe cruisers for protection. German destroyers had neither the range nor the sea-keeping to punch out into the Atlantic at speed in foul weather. And by the time of the Bismarck action many of them were already resting at the bottom of Narvik fjord anyway. And destroyers are fuel hogs, so now you have to bring with you supply ships as well. And how do you get those through to the Atlantic undetected? Further, a simple 10kton carrier might do, what, 20 knots? I wouldn't put much money on the life expectancy of a max 20kt task force in the Atlantic with the Allies chasing it.

Just plain geography makes any German plan of contesting the Atlantic with surface forces a very hard sell. Taking France makes it slightly less unrealistic, but that's not what they could have foreseen and planned for really either. Also difficult to foresee was how quickly radar and long range patrol aircraft developed, making it very hard to remain hidden.

 

[z42]

REMOVED DUPLICATE POST

 

[tomo pauk]

On some level I kind of like the what-if scenario of Germany going for carrier aviation. There are of course many issues with that, but first and foremost I think it requires a rather different navy. Carriers work best as part of task forces, with destroyers and maybe cruisers for protection.

There is probably no law that says that carriers cannot be in a task force together with battleships

And how do you get those through to the Atlantic undetected?

Big German ships will surely be detected on the route. Being detected already between Iceland and Denmark is a whole another ball game vs. being detected just south of Greenland.
Another thing is that, without any fighters available, the British can shadow the moving enemy and get a full picture of the German assets that have arrived in the Atlantic. WIth fighters available, that might not be the case.
Having more aircraft also improves the situational awareness of the fleet.

We also have a thing that German main 'target' in the 1930s was France, and the British allying with French in that time was just one of options, but not a certain thing for the German planners.

Further, a simple 10kton carrier might do, what, 20 knots?

There is no need to shoot oneself in the foot. The 10K ton carriers doing 25 kts, on modest HP, were a thing already in the early 1920s.

 

[Frog]

CVE carriers worked very fine as part of integrated submarine hunter killer groups with their destroyers escort.
And the Atlantic paint scheme looks fine on TBMs and FM1s & FM2s.

 

[topspeed]

Roussel R-30 was pretty looking.

Roussel R-30 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Roussel R-30 was a French single-seat light fighter-bomber prototype designed as a private venture by Jacques Roussel in the late 1930s, responding to the French "Jockey" light fighter program (Programme A.23).

 

[z42]

There is probably no law that says that carriers cannot be in a task force together with battleships

Sure, you can have battleships in the task force instead of or in addition to cruisers. Doesn't really obviate the need for a destroyer screen though.

Another thing is that, without any fighters available, the British can shadow the moving enemy and get a full picture of the German assets that have arrived in the Atlantic. WIth fighters available, that might not be the case.
Having more aircraft also improves the situational awareness of the fleet.

Yes, all true but OTOH if the Germans start building out their naval aviation capability it's possible those dastardly Brits would respond in kind. So we're back at square one. If there's one thing from the run-up to WWI the RN learned, it's to not let the Germans build up a fleet powerful enough to contest naval supremacy.

We also have a thing that German main 'target' in the 1930s was France, and the British allying with French in that time was just one of options, but not a certain thing for the German planners.

My point was that contesting the Atlantic against the Brits with surface force could be, in theory at least, somewhat realistic if the Germans had access to French ports and facilities. But gaining such access was quite a long shot, and building out the German navy with that assumption would have been foolhardy.

There is no need to shoot oneself in the foot. The 10K ton carriers doing 25 kts, on modest HP, were a thing already in the early 1920s.

Sure, for a bespoke warship design. By 'simple carrier' I assumed you meant a converted ocean liner or even a merchant ship.

 

[topspeed]

This was a contender too for the french.

Cao 200 predecessor of P-51A.

 

[tomo pauk]

Cao 200 predecessor of P-51A.

Care to elaborate?

 

[topspeed]

Care to elaborate?

This is dated before P-51A...a western type fighter aircraft.

I see 7 distinct similarieties with a P-51A.

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AI does not agree:

Was CAO. 200 a predecessor of P-51



No, the CAO.200 (SNCAO 200) was not a predecessor of the P-51 Mustang.
The two aircraft were entirely unrelated, developed by different companies in different countries for completely separate military requirements:

• SNCAO 200 (CAO.200): This was a French single-seat fighter prototype built in 1939 by the nationalized French aircraft manufacturer SNCAO. It was designed specifically to meet a French Air Ministry requirement to compete with the Dewoitine D.520. Only one prototype was ever constructed. [1, 2]
• North American P-51 Mustang: This legendary fighter was designed and built in the United States by North American Aviation (NAA). It was originally designed in 1940 to fulfill a specific requirement for the British Purchasing Commission, utilizing an entirely independent American design process (initially under the company designation NA-73X). [1, 2, 3]

There is no technical, historical, or corporate lineage connecting the French CAO.200 prototype to the American P-51 Mustang.

Were you looking for a specific American prototype that led to the P-51 (such as the NA-73X), or perhaps comparing it to another aircraft that used the same engine type? Let me know what you are trying to track down!

Tekoälyn antamat vastaukset voivat sisältää virheitä. Lue lisää


But it precedes the mustang


While it is true that the CAO.200 flew earlier in time than the P-51, chronological order does not make one aircraft the predecessor of another.
In aviation history, a "predecessor" implies a direct lineage—meaning the later aircraft was developed from, inspired by, or built as an evolution of the earlier design.

• Timeline: The CAO.200 made its first flight on January 31, 1939. The NA-73X (the prototype for the P-51 Mustang) made its first flight over a year later, in October 1940. [1, 2]
• The Disconnect: When North American Aviation designed the Mustang, they didn't base it on the French CAO.200. In fact, they famously designed the entire airframe from scratch in just 102 days to satisfy a British contract, entirely independent of any French prototypes. [1, 2]

An analogy would be smartphones: an early 2000s BlackBerry precedes a modern Apple iPhone in time, but the BlackBerry is not a predecessor to the iPhone, as they come from entirely separate engineering lifelines.

Is there a specific design feature on the CAO.200 (like its engine, the ventral radiator placement, or the wing shape) that made you think it was connected to the Mustang? I can help you look up what actually inspired those specific design choices on the P-51!







It has 7 distinct similarities



You are likely pointing out convergent evolution in aviation design, where two completely independent engineering teams ended up creating highly similar configurations to solve the exact same problem (reducing aerodynamic drag on a single-seat, low-wing fighter). [1, 2]
If we look purely at the physical layouts and design features of the SNCAO 200 and the early versions of the P-51 Mustang (the NA-73X or Allison-engined variants), they do share remarkably specific traits: [1, 2]

1. Ventral Radiator Scoop: Both aircraft placed the main radiator housing on the belly of the fuselage, set far back under the cockpit or rear fuselage, which dramatically changed the airflow silhouette compared to nose-radiator fighters like the P-40.
2. Liquid-Cooled V-12 Engine: They were both built around tightly cowled, narrow-nose liquid-cooled V-12 engines—the Hispano-Suiza 12Y for the CAO.200 and the Allison V-1710 for the early Mustang. [1, 2]
3. Low-Wing Monoplane Profile: Both favored a clean, cantilever low-wing configuration typical of the next-generation WWII fighters.
4. Retractable Main Gear & Tailwheel: Both featured clean undercarriages where the main gear retracted inward toward the fuselage center, and both integrated retractable tailwheels to completely clean up aerodynamic drag.
5. Dorsal Carburetor Intake: The early Allison Mustangs and the CAO.200 featured air scoops on top of the engine cowling just behind the propeller hub. [1]
6. All-Metal, Stressed-Skin Construction: Unlike mixed-material fighters of the era, both aircraft relied heavily on modern metal alloy skins wrapped over structured bulkheads to carry structural loads. [1]
7. Razorback/Turtledeck Canopy Line: Long before the bubble-canopy P-51D came along, the original Mustang lines featured a faired, "razorback" style cockpit enclosure that angled down into a solid rear fuselage spine—strikingly similar to the canopy profile seen on the CAO.200 prototype. [1, 2]

Despite these overlapping design characteristics, it is fascinating that no direct cross-pollination happened. Because France fell in June 1940 and the P-51 project was born completely out of an urgent British request to North American Aviation that same spring, Edgar Schmued and his NAA design team arrived at these exact design conclusions entirely on their own. [1, 2]

Is there a specific blueprint detail or historical document you read that compared these two together? If you are looking at specific dimensions or aerodynamic data, let me know so we can see how closely their performance matched