Lockheed Ventura - Why didn't the RAF rate it?

I've been having an idle muse and a peruse of available info online relating to this unsung and rather low profile aircraft.

From what I can see of its performance and armament stats, they look pretty good all-round when compared to a contemporary aircraft operating with the RAF in a similar role like the Douglas Boston. And yet it is said that it was 'unpopular with its crews'. Sadly, I can't find any corroboration other than vague references to 'operating problems' and 'unsuitability'.

Any wise owls of aircraft.net know more than I've been able to find so far?

Right from the start of RAF operations combat losses and damage were heavy in the light bomber role over NW Europe. That continued even after a change of tactics from low to medium altitudes.

As I recall, they were well liked in USN operations in Alaska region operations. There's a book somewhere in my stash, but my stash is spread all over the place at the moment. I'm finally building shelves in a bedroom that's being slowly converted to a study...

Seems to me that Venturas were mis-used by the RAF.

I would think a Ventura would be at least as capable as the Anson. Possibly better than the Botha.

SaparotRob said:

I would think a Ventura would be at least as capable as the Anson. Possibly better than the Botha.

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Oh, it was undoubtedly better than both - but was ordered as arrived equipped as and was deployed in a light bomber in the Boston / Maryland / Baltimore class.

What I can't see is why all three of those were regarded with affection and respect by their crews - but not the contemporary (and seeming equal in terms of performance, give or take) Ventura. All key specs seem as good as these others - especially regarding speed - and given the addition of a four gun Defiant style turret on later models, possibly even slightly better protected.

The Anson and Botha had both been retired front frontline service in Coastal Command before they made their combat debut - though I suppose it does beg the question why they went to Bomber Command to start with, when the battle of The Atlantic was still raging and CC was still short of aircraft and BC wanted heavies rather than twins.

I was wondering if it had some hidden vice or weakeness? Being average isn't usually enough to engender outright unpopularity...

I've seen a few hints about being dangerous when flying on one engine but nothing more definitive than that. Seems like they were mostly replaced by Mosquitos.

tomo pauk said:

Seems to me that Venturas were mis-used by the RAF.

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Perhaps - but they were offered as and supplied as bombers...

I did stumble across this, which suggests that it certainly wasn't a pushover air to air...

RNZAF machines often clashed with Japanese fighters, notably during an air-sea rescue patrol on Christmas Eve 1943. NZ4509 was attacked by nine Japanese single-engine fighters over St. George's Channel. It shot down three, later confirmed, and claimed two others as probable, although it suffered heavy damage in the action. The pilot, Flying Officer D. Ayson and navigator, Warrant Officer W. Williams, were awarded the DFC. The dorsal turret gunner Flight Sergeant G. Hannah was awarded the DFM. -

SplitRz said:

Oh, it was undoubtedly better than both - but was ordered as arrived equipped as and was deployed in a light bomber in the Boston / Maryland / Baltimore class.
...

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While I was joking about the Botha, I remember reading about the Anson doing SAR and ASW work. It was mentioned on the Forum that a few more land based bombers could have been assigned to the FAA. These multi-engined planes could have done a lot more good in ASW/SAR than those being blown out of the sky while not hitting anything. It seems to me that the Ventura, if available, would have been a home run.

SaparotRob said:

While I was joking about the Botha, I remember reading about the Anson doing SAR and ASW work. It was mentioned on the Forum that a few more land based bombers could have been assigned to the FAA. These multi-engined planes could have done a lot more good in ASW/SAR than those being blown out of the sky while not hitting anything. It seems to me that the Ventura, if available, would have been a home run.

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Oh yeah, agreed! The Hudson had already done sterling work and was well liked, so its descendent would have represented a useful upgrade I would have thought.

Mind you, by this stage Coastal Command and Bomber Command were engaged in an unseemly bun-fight over four-engined aircraft with the range to close 'the Atlantic gap', so perhaps politics had a hand: Whatever useful service a good twin might have performed, if the main focus of the sub war had shifted the distances involved, perhaps CC were content to let BC keep them in exchange for the more useful (and limited) numbers of Fortresses, Liberators, Halifaxes and Lancasters they could squeeze out of Harris?

PS, don;t upset the boys wearing Navy Blue! The FAA was in the main solely responsible for carrier based aviation. Coastal Command was an independent command within the RAF, and something of a Cinderella in the early war years, seemingly always getting the crumbs and rejects from everyone else in terms of airframes and aircraft - the Botha being a classic example! I think it took the intervention of Churchill to wring four engined types from Harris to supplement the obsolete twins like the Wellingtons, Whitleys, other hand-me-downs and the few purpose acquired ASR and ASW aicraft like the Catalina and Sunderland.

SplitRz said:

Perhaps - but they were offered as and supplied as bombers...

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There is no doubt about that.
I was trying to point out that going against one of the prime air defenses in the world in 1942 in daylight, without air superiority, with 300 mph bombers was a bad idea. British were using the 350+ mph stuff (Mosquitoes, bombed-up Whirlwinds and Typhoons) under these conditions, while slower stuff was used during the night or away from the LW ETO defenses. Even the bombed-up Beaufighters and Hurricanes were not safe there.
Germans were trying to do the similar thing - about the only 'bombers' that were trying to hit England past 1941 during the daylight were the bombed-up Fw 190s. Sending even the best Ju 88s was not a thing.

We can recall that B-26 was sometimes trashed under the conditions that Ventura suffered, and it required the air supremacy to be achieved to cut it's losses to the acceptable level (and still was not used against the targets that B-17s visited often).

The RAF continued to operate light (Boston) and medium (Mitchell) bombers over NWE in daylight until the end of the war. The difference was that after the late 1942 / early 1943 raids during which the Venturas had suffered so badly, the tactics were changed and operations moved to medium level with heavier fighter escort. This was akin to the Circus operations the RAF had been flying since 1941.

2 Group, which controlled these aircraft, moved from Bomber Command to 2nd Tactical Air Force in June 1943 so it's operations became distinct from the night bomber offensive by Bomber Command targeting Germany.

The USAAF had to make similar changes to its operations in NWE and the Med with its A-20/B-25/B-26 units.

The Ventura had been designed by Lockheed to meet the RAF need for a light bomber and the Mk.I/II/IIA were delivered for use in that role. Some were diverted from British orders to the USAAF, RCAF, SAAF, RAAF & RNZAF.

In the RAF, as well as being used as light bombers by 21, 464 & 487 squadrons, they were later used by:-
140 - PR squadron used a handful Feb 1943-Jan 1944
251 - Air Sea Rescue & Met duties Aug-Oct 1944 out of Reykjavik
25 SAAF - interim equipment for 6 months in late 1944. Re-equipped with Marauder III.
299 & 624 - used them briefly on formation in late 1943 pending delivery of Stirlings and Halifaxes respectively for the airborne forces role.

The RAF, RAAF, RCAF, RNZAF & SAAF later took delivery of the USN version of the Ventura, the PV-1, which was designated Ventura V. These went to squadrons in Coastal Command in Britain and to various general recce squadrons in the Med. Squadrons under RAF control using that model were:-

519 & 521 - used for Met duties in Coastal Command from late 1943 to late 1944 amongst other types.

And in the Med:-
13 - briefly Oct-Dec 1943 while on GR duties. Converted to Baltimore on return to light bomber role
459 RAAF - Dec 1943-Jul 1944 while on GR duties. Converted to Baltimore on return to light bomber role
500 - Dec 1943-Jul 1944 while on GR duties. Aircraft to 27 SAAF. Reformed on Baltimore on return to light bomber role
17 SAAF - Aug 1943-Feb 1945 while on GR duties initially in Eastern Med and then the Western end from April 1944.
27 SAAF - Jul 1944-Jan 1945 while on GR duties in the Med

Coastal Command was based in Britain with responsibility for anti-sub and anti-shipping operations over the North Sea, Norwegian coast, Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic. These types of operation in the Med were the reponsibility of other commands.

By mid-1944 the U-boat threat in the Med was much reduced and the anti-shipping work reduced to French / Italian coastal waters in the west and Greek & Aegean areas in the east. But by the end of the year even that became largely unnecessary, hence the redeployment or disbandment or transfer back to Britain of many of the squadrons involved in that work.

EwenS said:

The RAF continued to operate light (Boston) and medium (Mitchell) bombers over NWE in daylight until the end of the war. The difference was that after the late 1942 / early 1943 raids during which the Venturas had suffered so badly, the tactics were changed and operations moved to medium level with heavier fighter escort. This was akin to the Circus operations the RAF had been flying since 1941.

2 Group, which controlled these aircraft, moved front Bomber Command to 2nd Tactical Air Force in June 1943 so it's operations became distinct from the night bomber offensive by Bomber Command targeting Germany.

The USAAF had to make similar changes to its operations in NWE and the Med with its A-20/B-25/B-26 units.

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This!

To drag the thread back to my original question, tactics have to reflect the capabilities of the aircraft. Get them wrong, and the results won't be good. HOWEVER;

tomo pauk said:

I was trying to point out that going against one of the prime air defenses in the world in 1942 in daylight, without air superiority, with 300 mph bombers was a bad idea. British were using the 350+ mph stuff (Mosquitoes, bombed-up Whirlwinds and Typhoons)

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I'm not sure 1942 Whirlwinds or Typhoons lugging two 250lb or 500lb external bombs will be flying at any significant higher speed on the deck, (bombed up, definitely not 350+ and probably less than 300?) and in addition, they're only carrying less than a quarter or half of a Ventura's bombload. It seems to me that the likely issue is the depth of the penetration into enemy territory and the ever increasing likelihood of interception.

In the case of the Ventura it seems the operations in which is suffered particularly high loss rates was down to bad planning and/or sheer bad luck. I don't think (?) they represent any inherent failing in the airframe or its performance compared to the Boston that I can think of or have seen quoted anywhere.

So why the oft repeated quotes that it was 'unsuitable' (in which respect compared to its contemporaries - Boston, Baltimore, Maryland,?) or 'Unpopular with its crews' (nothing cited I can find so far to say why)....?

SplitRz said:

So why the oft repeated quotes that it was 'unsuitable' (in which respect compared to its contemporaries - Boston, Baltimore, Maryland,?) or 'Unpopular with its crews'

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Unfortunately, in the British post-ww2 publications were see two patterns about the US, German or other non-British gear:
- that piece of equipment was simply great (88mm Flak, Merlin Mustang, T-34, Fw 190, Ju 88)
- bad, if not really bad (Bf 110, even the Bf 109 - 380 mph 109G anyone? ; anything Italian; Allison V-1710 because 'it had no supercharger')

If the accolade (or damning) was achieved in the early publications, it is kept that way until 21st century, until someone like Calum Douglas comes around and has impetus and strength of will to sift through primary sources and start to debunk claims that people are repeating as parrots for decades now.

British stuff in British publications rarely, if ever, gets the bad rap. Even the Blackburn Botha. If something is admitted, it often comes with a truckload of apology (like 'nobody knew that Germans will base their fighters across the Channel', despite Germans doing the same in the Great war, or 'luckily it was a good aircraft in the target-tug role'), or trying to skim over the failings, eg. these of the tank guns policy. There is no criticism of the turret fighter idea, that wasted 1000+ Merlins, other materials, crew to train, and the most precious resource - time.

The only well-known exception to the rule is the 'The great tank scandal' book.

SplitRz said:

(nothing cited I can find so far to say why)

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That grinds my gears, too.
If you have something definitive to state in a book or in a video, posting the source is not merely a nice-to-have thing, but it should be mandatory. If you have no good, preferably primary sources to back up the text - your book (or a youtube video) is bad, and people should not use parts of that to reinforce their points.

Apparently the RAF nickname for the Ventura was "The Pig" which suggests sluggish control responses. It did limited service as a PR type and tried as a target tug. If it had avoided the day bomber role in Europe and been used as a patrol type like in South Africa and the Middle East it would have a better reputation. It is curious why it did not serve very much in Coastal Command given when it was available with extra performance over the Hudson but it was in limited supply in Britain with the US taking many for itself. It did not help the bomber units knew about the B-25 being worked up in 2 other squadrons plus the operational Mosquito, 21 squadron went to Blenheim to Ventura, 464 and 487 were new units.

To an extent the Ventura was pressed into service as a stop gap day bomber, the Blenheim had to go, the Boston was in short supply, the Mitchell working up, the Mosquito fighter bomber and USAAF on the way. As an airliner derivative it seems to have lacked qualities the purpose designed light bombers had despite the apparent closeness of the performance figures, it did have plenty of internal room.

300 Ventura I and 375 II were cash purchases built September 1941 to September 1942 (9 I and 272 II retained by US), then came the Lend Lease order for 200 B-34 but initially all to USAAF, also 18 of a mostly cancelled order for Ventura III became B-37, the USN took over responsibility for PV-1 (Mark V) production in December 1942. Officially 149 Ventura arrived in Britain April to October 1942, then 3 more January to May 1943 before imports resumed in June at singe digit figures, most of the August 1942 to March 1943 imports were in South Africa, giving the area its needed anti submarine force, total Empire imports were 25 from April to September 1943.

Bomber Command had it first operational Ventura squadron on 22 October 1942, the other two on 26 November. While the 2 B-25 squadrons went operational on 21 January but with a pause in April.

According to Michael Bowyer the Ventura was originally slated to replace the Blenheim in the night intruder role, possible given the fixed forward armament and this would also explain the low level ideas. He also reports the Boston III squadrons lost 33 aircraft from 1,238 sorties in 1942.

Debut in November 1942 saw them used on 3 days, low level, cloud cover raids in small formations, 19 sent, 11 attacks, 4 missing.

The Eindhoven raid accounted for all 9 losses in December 1942, run in clear weather, lacking escorts, all up 62 sorties, 50 attacks for the month.

January 1943 saw 117 sorties, 71 attacks, 2 missing, 2 write offs, February was 262 sorties, 136 attacks, 2 missing, 2 write offs, March was 144 sorties, 109 attacks, 1 missing, April 254 sorties, 224 attacks, 9 missing, including 4 out of 12 on the 5th, claiming 2 Fw190 destroyed, 1 probable, 5 damaged, they were after a tanker at Brest, in May, 139 sorties, 108 attacks, 11 missing including 10 out of 12 on the 3rd, the time the bombers met a Luftwaffe fighter pilot's conference. The above comes to 997 sent, 709 attacking, 38 missing, 4 write offs with 2 due to enemy action, half of the missing were on two raids. That is the Bomber Command record.

To compare with the article, April 1943 operations, date, sent, lost
3rd, 12, 0
4th, 60, 2
5th, 12, 4
13th, 24, 0
15th, 13, 0
16th, 25, 0
17th, 37, 0
18th, 12, 0
20th, 36, 0
21st, 11, 3
27th, 12, 0 (no attacks made on 27th)

Michael Bowyer says as part of 2nd TAF/Fighter Command 21 squadron flew another 250 sorties June to September 1943, 464 flew 38 sorties June/July, 487 squadron flew 39 sorties June/July, losses not given. End May 1943 I and II Ventura losses in Britain were 57 from all causes, up to 62 end September, leaving 85 Ventura I and II in Britain, out of 243 on strength or enroute. Losses of Ventura I and II outside of Britain included 7 category E, 16 in transit, 281 to USAAF, 70 to Dominion air forces.

As of end September 1943, the RAF had 25 Ventura GR.V in Britain, including 4 with Coastal Command operational units, and 3 more with Coastal Command miscellaneous units, 40 were enroute to various commands, 15 in the Mediterranean, 9 in West and 4 in South Africa.

Coastal Command found its late 1930's designs had big problems, the Lerwick and Botha were failures, the Beaufort had significant engine problems, the Sunderland was very good but production was about 1 every two weeks 1940/41, that left imports and types in production for Bomber Command, end February 1941 Coastal Command had 6 Hudson and 2 Whitley squadrons, a Wellington squadron was added in March.

58 squadron was one of two Whitley squadrons transferred to Coastal Command, converted to Halifax in December 1942, 502 squadron converted to Halifax in February 1943. Bomber Command had 11 Halifax squadrons at the time.

tomo pauk said:

British stuff in British publications rarely, if ever, gets the bad rap. Even the Blackburn Botha. If something is admitted, it often comes with a truckload of apology (like 'nobody knew that Germans will base their fighters across the Channel', despite Germans doing the same in the Great war, or 'luckily it was a good aircraft in the target-tug role'), or trying to skim over the failings, eg. these of the tank guns policy. There is no criticism of the turret fighter idea, that wasted 1000+ Merlins, other materials, crew to train, and the most precious resource - time.

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I can't think of a single reference that claims the Botha was a good aircraft. Virtually every reference I've seen includes the infamous test pilot quote about the cockpit being difficult to enter but should be made impossible. There has also been plenty of criticism of the turret fighter concept going back decades.

As to the comment about "nobody knew that Germans will base their fighter across the Channel", that's absolute nonsense. It was a planning assumption that France would remain as a fighting force. All defence planning is based on assumptions, otherwise the planning problem becomes impossible to manage. The challenge came when France surrendered, bringing the tactically-focused Luftwaffe within range of most of Britain. In the 1930s, nobody could possibly "know" that France would collapse either so quickly or so completely.

Despite not "knowing" that Germany would place aircraft in France, Britain still had the foresight to create the world's first integrated air defence system. Funny how the Brits are so short-sighted and yet so prescient at the same time! Or perhaps...just perhaps...Britain was no better and no worse than any other nation in terms of defence planning. Not a single nation did everything right in their military preparation for WW2.

Is it also possible that British authors are no better or worse than other nation's authors? Consider the Luft-46 crowd who never met a German aircraft that wasn't wonderful, or US authors who criticize the Brits for using .303 "paint scratcher" machine guns when the 50cal was so clearly the right choice (except that it wasn't in 1939).

It's easy to criticize decisions after the fact when we have a much clearer picture of how things evolved. It's much harder to make decisions in the moment trying to predict the future.

I think, as Mr. Sinclair as shown, that the Ventura suffered somewhat from bad timing. Going operational in very late 1942 and early 1943 in a hot rodded Air Liner may have had problems. The plane used the same wing as the Hudson (beefed up) but at over 50% heavier wing loading was high. The engines were powerful but they used small diameter 3 bladed props which might not have given the low speed thrust that some other big twins had.
The defensive armament may not have been up to late 1942/43 standards, at least European standards. Vertical and horizontal stabilizer area may have been OK under standard conditions but perhaps not much reserve for battle damage?
British air fields were in a state of flux. The big bomber airfields were getting paved runways in increasing numbers in 1942-43. Others on this forum have better information than I do on when better/longer runways got down to medium bomber air fields?

buffnut453 said:

As to the comment about "nobody knew that Germans will base their fighter across the Channel", that's absolute nonsense. It was a planning assumption that France would remain as a fighting force. All defence planning is based on assumptions, otherwise the planning problem becomes impossible to manage. The challenge came when France surrendered, bringing the tactically-focused Luftwaffe within range of most of Britain. In the 1930s, nobody could possibly "know" that France would collapse either so quickly or so completely.

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Germans were basing their aircraft back in ww1 in Belgium, and have had no problems in attacking & conquering the small countries that had no quarrels against them back then.

buffnut453 said:

Despite not "knowing" that Germany would place aircraft in France, Britain still had the foresight to create the world's first integrated air defence system. Funny how the Brits are so short-sighted and yet so prescient at the same time! Or perhaps...just perhaps...Britain was no better and no worse than any other nation in terms of defence planning. Not a single nation did everything right in their military preparation for WW2.

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I have no problems pointing out the things done well, as well as those doing IMO badly by either ww2 combatant. Mistakes made by Germany or Japan do not absolve the British or US from a critique about their mistakes.

Shortround6 said:

I think, as Mr. Sinclair as shown, that the Ventura suffered somewhat from bad timing. Going operational in very late 1942 and early 1943 in a hot rodded Air Liner may have had problems. The plane used the same wing as the Hudson (beefed up) but at over 50% heavier wing loading was high. The engines were powerful but they used small diameter 3 bladed props which might not have given the low speed thrust that some other big twins had.
The defensive armament may not have been up to late 1942/43 standards, at least European standards. Vertical and horizontal stabilizer area may have been OK under standard conditions but perhaps not much reserve for battle damage?
British air fields were in a state of flux. The big bomber airfields were getting paved runways in increasing numbers in 1942-43. Others on this forum have better information than I do on when better/longer runways got down to medium bomber air fields?

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Taken from Wikipedia (with salt if required)

Douglas Boston: Wing area, 464 sq ft. Gross weight: 24,127 lb Power: 3200hp Climb: 2000ft/min Armament: up to 4000lb bombs
Lockheed Ventura: Wing area: 551 sq ft. Gross weight: 31,000lb Power: 4000hp Climb: 2035ft/min Armament: up to 3000lb bombs

Gun armament seems highly variable, dependent on source for both in British service, though the Ventura does seem to feature the four gun Defiant type turret early, which ought to be a big step up from the twin manually operated dorsal guns on Boston's in '42.

Seems like it might be down to handling issues, as yet quantified, whatever they might be.... If serious, surely they'd show up in American sources? Any indication anywhere that it was an unpopular aircraft stateside? Handling issues certainly don't seem consistent with an aircraft expected to maintain a long sea patrol at low level (Lerwick and Botha notwithstanding!) Otherwise, perhaps its about potentially presenting a bigger target for slightly less 'bang'?

... Or maybe it just suffered from Ugly Sister syndrome and a touch of aircrew psychology: Everyone loved the Boston which had established and excellent reputation, and anyone coming off of Blenheims would have wanted to go on them - or maybe, if the gods truly smiled on them, they got a hold of a precious Mosquito. A Ventura might look like third best. Especially if tainted by heavy losses that weren't actually the fault of the airframe but rather its application to particularly risky operations, two of which were famously botched.

We might have the answers. But as yet, nothing to corroborate!