Losses in France for British 1940

[The Basket]

The Germans had days to organise Sealion so poor planning can be expected. D-day took about 2 years.
Navy could be an issue in the channel as they would be in range of Stukas so unless the RAF was fully operational in the channel then could be in bother. If the Germans had air superiority over the beaches then this mythical invasion could take place..
So in war games the German lands in force? Dieppe or Anzio?

 

[stona]

The Germans had days to organise Sealion so poor planning can be expected. D-day took about 2 years.
Navy could be an issue in the channel as they would be in range of Stukas so unless the RAF was fully operational in the channel then could be in bother. If the Germans had air superiority over the beaches then this mythical invasion could take place..
So in war games the German lands in force? Dieppe or Anzio?

First meetings at which the feasibility of a landing in England were discussed were on 20th June. Hitler did not seem very interested and Raeder assumed that the issue was not of current interest, nonetheless Rear Admiral Fricke was already working on such a plan and an earlier study from November 1939 was revived and developed. On 30th June General Jodl produced a report on the continuation of the war against 'England' which argued that preparations for a 'sea-strike' against Britain should be made to exert political pressure on Britain to remain inactive, however, the actual invasion should be a last resort. The Germans were preparing for months, not days, but I agree that three or four months was far too little time for such a undertaking, the magnitude of which everyone, with the possible exception of the Kriegsmarine, underestimated. What the Germans achieved in that time was remarkable.

The Luftwaffe could only be effective against British shipping (assuming some degree of local air superiority could have been achieved, and the Germans never came close to it) in reasonable weather and in daylight. Just how effective the Luftwaffe might have been is debatable. Simulations are usually based on RN losses at Dunkirk and the Norwegian campaign in which the dive bombers were not as effective as the mythology would have us believe. The destroyers would also have plenty of sea room, manoeuvering in the Channel.
The Royal Navy could operate against the beaches and against any supply convoys by night when almost any kind of Luftwaffe operations would have been impossible. It took years for Coastal Command to develop tactics for attacking shipping by night and the Luftwaffe had none in 1940. It would be impossible for supply convoys to sail, unload and return in the hours of daylight.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

I've just been reading some of the details of the November 1939 study commissioned by Raeder for an invasion of England. It envisioned a landing by only 7,500 men initially and is essentially pessimistic. Called 'Study Red' it makes the point that if the conditions for a successful invasion were met, that is the defeat or containment of both the RAF and RN, then Britain would already be defeated and an invasion would not be necessary, which is a fair point

It was the army that rejected the study and in its own invasion plan, coded 'Study North West' envisaged a far more ambitious undertaking involving 100,000 men.
This was the genesis of the arguments between the navy and army about what could and could not be achieved, the eventual compromise was of course 'Sealion'.

Incidentally the Luftwaffe agreed with the navy. In a December report the OKL expressed the view:

"A combined operation with a landing in England must be rejected. It would only be the last act of a war against England which had already taken a victorious course, as otherwise the conditions required for the success of a combined operation do not exist."

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

• The BEF left the following equipment behind in France, much of it to be recycled by the German Army -
o 2,472 guns
o 63,879 vehicles
o 20,548 motorcycles
o 76,097 tons of ammunition
o 416,940 tons of stores
•

I have very similar figures. I guess under 'stores' would be the 165,000 tons of petrol. Not everyone came home with a rifle, 90,000 were left behind. I also have a figure of 615 tanks, though which tanks I don't know.
The Chiefs of Staff complained that losses in guns, artillery and anti-tank, amounted to 60% of overall stocks.
Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

In another thread I recommended Peter Schenk's 'Invasion of England 1940' for a detailed view of German preparations and planning for Sealion.
If you don't want to plough through papers like the Newbold one I have already quoted, then by far the best British perspective can be had from Leo McKinstry's 'Operation Sealion'. This also covers the military and political situation in the preceding period, including,obviously, the losses at Dunkirk.
Cheers
Steve

 

[pbehn]

I have very similar figures. I guess under 'stores' would be the 165,000 tons of petrol. Not everyone came home with a rifle, 90,000 were left behind. I also have a figure of 615 tanks, though which tanks I don't know.
The Chiefs of Staff complained that losses in guns, artillery and anti-tank, amounted to 60% of overall stocks.
Cheers
Steve

I hope that 165,000 tons of fuel were not left behind, surely it is easy to put a match to it.

 

[stona]

You'd hope so, but there was a lot of confusion. The Germans captured really substantial quantities of French fuels, so who knows what British stocks might have been among that.
Cheers
Steve

 

[fastmongrel]

I hope that 165,000 tons of fuel were not left behind, surely it is easy to put a match to it.

I once watched as a friend tried to get a slightly damp bonfire lit with the help of a can of petrol from his lawnmower. The resultant 50 foot column of flame makes me think you would need a very long match.