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Perhaps the better yardstick for vulnerability is loss/sortie. ETO numbers 1942-1945:
P-47: 0.7%
P-51: 1.2%
P-38: 1.4%
The P-47's dropped around 20 times as much bombs as P-51. So it was the dedicated late war fighter-bomber, where as P-51's could seek more lightly defended targets.
See the data in this page:
P-51 Mustang by Ray Wagner - Page 3
Bill most probably know this but one book from which one might find some clues is Osprey's A/c of the Aces 51 Special "Down to Earth" Strafing Aces of the Eight Air Force. It is based on the training manual compiled by battle-seasoned USAAF fighter pilots during the war. IMHO with Osprey's A/c of the Aces 31 Special VIII Fighter Command at War "Long Reach" and Osprey's A/c of the Aces 61 Special "Twelve to One" V Fighter Command Aces of the Pacific, which both are also based on same kind war time material, it is the most important book published in that series. They give a good insight of thinking the leading USAAF aces and of course some inkling to their ability to transfer their thoughts onto paper.
Juha
So, what is your definition of 'lightly defended targets'?
Defined by those P-51 bomber escort pilots who had no specific orders to strafe any target after they were released by other escort groups. It was their call.
Versus fighter-bomber groups who were under orders to attack a predestined target, whatever the resistance or cost.
Russell Brown also states,
The inability of the German Fighter force to support its ground forces effectively, contrasted sharply with the evolution of the RAF's tactics and operational procedures as the Desert War progressed.
The tactical use of Medium Bombers, and the highly effective Kittyhawks which were able to offer direct support to the troops with their bombing and strafing was never matched by the Luftwaffe. The fact that many of the fighter pilots ran up big personal scores was irrelevant to the prosecution of the war and the undue emphasis placed on such achievements was an indication of the failure by German Commanders at all levels to understand the principles of Air Power.
Also, having recently read "Bomber Command" by Max Hastings, do you know if there is a comparable book about the USAF Bomber Groups. I am particularly interested in Government v USAF strategy on such things as area bombing of German cities.
Thank you
Spurius
Thank you forthe reply Mhuxt. However I can but concur with Vincenzo that the link comes up with an error stopping any investigation on the site you pointed me to. Any thougts?There's a good docco here:
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Indexes/author_ndx_bks.htm
with supporting spreadsheets etc here:
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/catalog/books/Davis_B99.htm
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/books/Davis_B99/Davis_B99.pdf
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Davis CD/Pages/i.htm
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Davis CD/Pages/IIb.htm
The claims of the Germans in Western Desert in time of Marseille were pretty accurate, not the most accurate claiming or even most accurate German claiming ever seen, but pretty good. Of course it's always hard to determine from opposing records exactly who shot down which plane, but the total German credits often didn't exceed the total Allied losses by that much, and Marseilles' claims often a significant % of total German claims, so implying he was a relatively accurate claimers. This has beed seen ever since "Fighters Over the Desert" by Shores, an old book now (1969).For example wrt the daily records of the DAF in North Africa, many of Marsielle's kills were SAAF machines which may not have been entered as RAF losses. His 6 P-40 kills during one mission on 5 June 1942 were variously confirmed by fellow pilots and German ground forces, who noted they had SAAF markings, but what was remarkable to the propaganda machine was his ground crew report that only 10 twenty-millimetre shells and 180rds of 7.92mm ammunition had been used from his magazines during that mission.
Notably, the USSR had a prohibitively strict method of recording pilot kills: the enemy aircraft had to leave a wreck within Soviet held territory for the kill to be recorded, irrespective of pilot and peer claims or ground observer correlation. Hence among Soviet pilots their actual kills are likely to be almost always much higher than their individual records suggest.
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Seems like maybe you are talking about two different 'systems', 'system' of actually shooting down more planes than you lose, and 'system' of claim verification so number of planes you credit your pilots with doesn't exceed the actual number shot down by too wide a margin.I dont want to denigrate Luftwaffe claims but how does the so called best system manage to have so many aircraft shot down in the Battle of Britain. I dont know the exact figures but didnt the Luftwaffe claim about twice as many victories as the RAF lost, just as RAF claims were about twice the Luftwaffe losses.
Re: Soviets, in Korea they *theoretically* had the same standard, but in reality their claims were highly exaggerated according to evidence in opposing secret records. And serious holes are apparent in the 'wreck confirmation' of Soviet claims in Korea as soon as you look at them closely. In the 1939 war with Japan the Soviets overclaimed about as much as in Korea (6+ *times* as many official victories credited as actual opposing losses in air combat). So while I've never seen a comprehensive accounting for WWII for the Soviets, my bet would be their credits in that war too were also exaggerated more than most otherAF's, not less. The theory of the claim verification process is only one part of the story. The theory of the German process didn't change explicitly later in WWII either, but the actual results clearly became a lot more exaggerated than in Marseille's time.
In general I think there are relatively few cases in history where individual official credits were strongly influenced by propaganda considerations, though there were certainly some such cases. For example the first USAAF ace of WWII, Buzz Wagner, seems to have been officially credited with victories he didn't originally claim (and there's no evidence the Japanese suffered) to get somebody up to the 5 kill mark quickly in the disastrous early campaigns. But again once things got going on a larger scale there was no reason to exaggerate kills when you could just focus on the pilots and units honestly claiming success (accurately or not is another issue) and neglect those who were having a tougher go.