Maximowitz
Tech Sergeant
There's accuracy and accuracy. During Operation Steinbock the Luftwaffe were so hopeless they could barely find the right country let alone the right target.
Luftwaffe philosophy
- Thread starter ralphwiggum
- Start date
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There's accuracy and accuracy. During Operation Steinbock the Luftwaffe were so hopeless they could barely find the right country let alone the right target.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
But the Allies believed in the old adage "Throw enough crap at a wall and some of it has to stick!" They were more persistant toward success. Plus I think they could afford any losses as opposed to the Luftwaffe's loss rates.
Exactly. Plus, the RAF decided fairly early on to not worry about accuracy but plaster entire cities at night. If your target is "Places where lots of Germans live and work", the RAF did a fine job with accuracy. They killed lots of people and broke lots of things. So did the USAAF when they pretended they were precision-bombing factories or railyards in major urban areas. The Luftwaffe couldn't manage either on a sustained basis during the BoB even when they tried to.
One can argue the morality or overal strategic value of bombing cities, but measured in terms of de-housed workers and deaths caused, the Allied campaign was clearly a success, while all Luftwaffe attempts to do the same against well-defended targets were failures. That's because they lacked the right planes and operational doctrine to do a proper job.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
Prior to 1944 that isn't true. There are numerous examples of RAF raids involving hundreds of bombers that entirely or almost entirely missed major cities. RAF Bomber Command required almost 5 years experience before they could reliably bomb German cities and major industrial complexes.
Colin and Njalco made the crucial points in initial posts. The only thing to add is Göring's personal perspective on the Zerstörer concept, which was his baby. As mentioned it was not for escort fighters per se but long range attack-fighters which would dive upon climbing and scrambling interceptors ahead of the bomber stream. British radar of course made this tactic redundant but it worked beautifully in France. Many fighter airfields were rendered devoid of any sizeable response well before the bombers appeared, the Me-110 accelerated ahead on the final leg and dove on them with cannon, spotters were only concerned with the approaching bombers. The Zerstörer squadrons were employed more as escorts in Poland only because most of them were still equipped with the Me-109D whilst awaiting Me-110 deliveries, so France and the Eastern Front in 1941-2 were the only places we really saw Göring's tactic at work as intended.
It is noteworthy that Messerschmitt himself never believed in the Zerstörer concept and believed the Me-110 or any similar "heavy fighter" would wind up caught between ideal roles and no good at any of them. It did finally turn out to be an excellent light attack aircraft and nightfighter later in the war though, for a little time during 1942 the Me-110G-2 was a formiddable attack-fighter with a great optional armament, good speed, reliability and range and lively manoeuvrability in its class. It even had some success as a straight day fighter.
It is noteworthy that Messerschmitt himself never believed in the Zerstörer concept and believed the Me-110 or any similar "heavy fighter" would wind up caught between ideal roles and no good at any of them. It did finally turn out to be an excellent light attack aircraft and nightfighter later in the war though, for a little time during 1942 the Me-110G-2 was a formiddable attack-fighter with a great optional armament, good speed, reliability and range and lively manoeuvrability in its class. It even had some success as a straight day fighter.
Saturday March 28 1942 - The British utilize the "Gee" electronic navigation system for the first time.
Saturday May 30 1942 - RAF Bomber Command attack Cologne with 1,046 aircraft in the first of their "1,000 Bomber" raids
Saturday August 1 1942 - De Havilland DH 98 Mosquito twin-engine fighters are assigned as "Pathfinder" units charged with lighting up ground targets via flares and incendiary ordnance for ensuing RAF heavy bombers.
Thursday September 10 1942 - 100,000 incendiary bombs are dropped on Dusseldorf by no fewer than 476 RAF bombers.
Friday January 1 1943 - The H2S navigation system is delivered to the RAF for installation into bombers.
Friday March 5 1943 - For the first time, RAF bombers make use of the "Oboe" navigational aid in a large-scale operation.
Now what is this 1944 and 5 years?
I don't think that's a fair characterisation. For 1941, and 1942 to some extent, yes, but not as late as 1944.
Don't forget, every air force could suffer navigation problems. The Germans managed to bomb one of their own cities, Freiburg, on 10 May 1940, in broad daylight. They managed to bomb Dublin later on by mistake. The USAAF bombed Switzerland on numerous occasions. In the most damaging attack, on Schaffhausen, they thought they were bombing Ludwigshaven, 125 miles away.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
Data from "The Other Battle" by Peter Hinchliffe.
18/19 Nov 1943. Berlin
440 Lancaster bombers
7 Mosquitos
PFF did not mark accurately. Bombs widely scattered.
19/20 Nov 1943. Leverkusen.
Attacking force of 266.
A single HE bomb hit the city.
26/27 Nov 1943. Berlin.
443 Lancaster bombers.
Target marking was scattered and the bombing was not concentrated.
2/3 Dec 1943. Berlin.
442 heavy bombers
18 Mosquitos.
Bombing was widely dispersed.
20/21 Dec 1943. Frankfurt.
647 heavy bombers.
Bad marking and widely scattered bombing.
1/2 Jan 1944. Berlin.
800 bombers.
Approximately 100 houses destroyed and 100 civilians killed.
14/15 Jan 1944. Brunswick.
500 heavy bombers.
The city reported only a light raid as most bombs missed the city entirely.
21/22 Jan 1944. Magdeburg.
650 heavy bombers.
Poor marking by pathfinders. Few bombs hit the city.
23/24 Jan 1944. Berlin
379 Lancaster bombers.
PFF marking poor. Bombs widely scattered. Many missed Berlin entirely.
29/30 Jan 1944. Berlin.
712 heavy bombers.
Scattered damage.
I could go on. However it's readily apparent that RAF Bomber Command could not reliably hit a city size target even after 4 years of experience. Firestorms like Hamburg and Dresden were the exception, not the rule.
18/19 Nov 1943. Berlin
440 Lancaster bombers
7 Mosquitos
PFF did not mark accurately. Bombs widely scattered.
19/20 Nov 1943. Leverkusen.
Attacking force of 266.
A single HE bomb hit the city.
26/27 Nov 1943. Berlin.
443 Lancaster bombers.
Target marking was scattered and the bombing was not concentrated.
2/3 Dec 1943. Berlin.
442 heavy bombers
18 Mosquitos.
Bombing was widely dispersed.
20/21 Dec 1943. Frankfurt.
647 heavy bombers.
Bad marking and widely scattered bombing.
1/2 Jan 1944. Berlin.
800 bombers.
Approximately 100 houses destroyed and 100 civilians killed.
14/15 Jan 1944. Brunswick.
500 heavy bombers.
The city reported only a light raid as most bombs missed the city entirely.
21/22 Jan 1944. Magdeburg.
650 heavy bombers.
Poor marking by pathfinders. Few bombs hit the city.
23/24 Jan 1944. Berlin
379 Lancaster bombers.
PFF marking poor. Bombs widely scattered. Many missed Berlin entirely.
29/30 Jan 1944. Berlin.
712 heavy bombers.
Scattered damage.
I could go on. However it's readily apparent that RAF Bomber Command could not reliably hit a city size target even after 4 years of experience. Firestorms like Hamburg and Dresden were the exception, not the rule.
Glider
Captain
I think its fair that some perspective should be put into this thread.
4 Industrial premises totally destroyed, 28 damaged
German records show 38 war industry factories were destroyed and many others damaged.
The raids you have selected were amongst the least successful of the period and even then some damage was normally inflicted. A large number of other raids had more success and some indeed achieved a lot. In any campaign of this type there will be missions that fail, some that are exceptional and many average.
All my comments are from the Bomber Command War Diaries
Germany have no excuse for missing London in early 1944. London is 60 miles from the German controlled French coast with the Thames pointing like a dagger straight into the centre of Town clearly visible from France. The German cities you mention are hundreds of miles behind German lines a very different proposition.
Comparing the two is way off the mark.
True but the local Berlin report listed
4 Industrial premises totally destroyed, 28 damaged
True and in fact 27 other towns were also hit what I would call scattered bombing
Target marking was 6-7 miles out but still hit Berlin.
German records show 38 war industry factories were destroyed and many others damaged.
This was a poor raid with losses of 8.7% and bombing was scattered
Again this was a poor raid with 117 bombs hitting industrial targets and 6.3% losses were incurred.
There was one lucky hit that blocked a major canal for several days. 28 planes were lost.
Its worth noting that the German fighter controllers were directing fighters into the bomber stream from 40miles off the British coast. 7.6% losses
Again losses were high 8.8% Halifax losses were 15.6%!!
Interesting as the Bomber Command Diary doesn't mention any major raid only minor operations without loss.
Again the diary doesn't mention a raid on this night, only minor operations without any loss. There was a Berlin raid on 28/29 Jan where German records show that 180,000 people were bombed out that night so it was clearly hard hit.
The raids you have selected were amongst the least successful of the period and even then some damage was normally inflicted. A large number of other raids had more success and some indeed achieved a lot. In any campaign of this type there will be missions that fail, some that are exceptional and many average.
All my comments are from the Bomber Command War Diaries
Germany have no excuse for missing London in early 1944. London is 60 miles from the German controlled French coast with the Thames pointing like a dagger straight into the centre of Town clearly visible from France. The German cities you mention are hundreds of miles behind German lines a very different proposition.
Comparing the two is way off the mark.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
Operation Steinbock OOB. as of 20 January 1944.
Germany and the Second World War ... - Google Books
Intruder aircraft.
25 x Fw-190.
27 x Me-410A
Light bomber / photo recon / pathfinder aircraft.
270 x Ju-88
35 x Ju-188
46 x He-177 heavy bombers.
121 x Do-217. Relatively good payload for a twin engine bomber.
----------------------------------------------
167 level bombers total.
Hmmm. Rather optimistc to think that 167 German medium/heavy bombers are going to burn London to the ground.
Germany and the Second World War ... - Google Books
Intruder aircraft.
25 x Fw-190.
27 x Me-410A
Light bomber / photo recon / pathfinder aircraft.
270 x Ju-88
35 x Ju-188
46 x He-177 heavy bombers.
121 x Do-217. Relatively good payload for a twin engine bomber.
----------------------------------------------
167 level bombers total.
Hmmm. Rather optimistc to think that 167 German medium/heavy bombers are going to burn London to the ground.
Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
Operation Steinbock OOB. as of 20 January 1944.
Hmmm. Rather optimistc to think that 167 German medium/heavy bombers are going to burn London to the ground.
The 270 odd Ju-88s may also have been used for level bombing, same with the Ju-188s. After all, the Ju-88s had spent a lot of time level bombing above London about three years earlier.
Afterall, the book you linked clearly states that 440 bombers in two waves of 220 dropped 475 tons on the first night of the operation. A little difficult if there were only 167 bombers available...
The Ju-88 was at least as capable as the Do-217K/M for night bombing.
This is, as usual, besides the point.
The question was, did the Germans believe in the concept of the self defending bomber?
To my mind, the answer is no.
As a continental power, Germany was vastly more concerned with the use of the bomber as a tactical weaponto support its ground operations. The usurpation of heavy bomber plans in favour of larger numbers of smaller, lighter bombers that could perform dive bombing points to this. The countries that believed in the self defending bomber (US, UK, Italy) were generally maritime powers, where bombers would be forced to operate at long range out of necessity.
German bombers were (quite reasonably and, as the war showed, generally in practice as well) expected to operate under the protection of the fighter units. This was generally accomplished across the Polish, Norwegian, French, Russian, Italian and Mediterranean campaigns.
German bombers didn't need to be self protecting, as the fighter units were supposed to eliminate/drive-off fighter opposition that they might encounter.
When this wasn't achieved, such as some of the long range forays into northern UK during 1940 or long range ops in support of the war in the desert in 1943, German bombers suffered accordingly. As a result, under these circumstances they took the British avenue, and switched to night bombing.
Another indication would be the lack of powered turrets in bombers, as well as their generally light defensive armament. The US/UK, which both believed in the 'self-defending bomber' expected that the powered defensive turrets they had developed would be sufficient to provide enough weight of fire to drive off enemy fighter attacks.
Initial combat results showed the opposite. This forced the US/UK to switch tactics. The RAF switched to night bombing (as it lacked any real escort fighter, and showed little interest in the concept through the war) after the shock of having its Wellingtons not come back in 1939/1940 . Even when the Lancaster debuted, with even heavier defensive armament, their early losses in daylight bombing operations were enough to ensure that the RAF never really canvassed daylight bombing again until 1944.
The US was forced to adopted a policy of heavy fighter escort for its even better defended bombers. Fortunately the right tool for the job, the P-51, appeared at the right time.
Maximowitz
Tech Sergeant
Operation Steinbock OOB. as of 20 January 1944.
Germany and the Second World War ... - Google Books
Intruder aircraft.
25 x Fw-190.
27 x Me-410A
Light bomber / photo recon / pathfinder aircraft.
270 x Ju-88
35 x Ju-188
46 x He-177 heavy bombers.
121 x Do-217. Relatively good payload for a twin engine bomber.
----------------------------------------------
167 level bombers total.
Hmmm. Rather optimistc to think that 167 German medium/heavy bombers are going to burn London to the ground.
There's a new book out soon on Steinbock, hopefully definiive which should lay a few myths about this operation to rest once and for all.
Operation Steinbock
Order of Battle
21/22nd January 1944
Unit - Location - Type - Strength
I/KG2 - Melun - Do217 - 25
III/KG2 - Gilze-Rijen - Do217 - 10
V/KG2 - Vitry-en-Artois - Me410 - 20
I/KG6 - Chievres - Ju188 - 25
II/KG6 - Le Culot - Ju88 - 15
III/KG6 - Melsbroek - Ju88/188 - 30
II/KG30 - Eindhoven - Ju88 - 15
III/KG30 - St. Trond - Ju88 - 15
I/KG40 - Chateaudun - He177 - 15
I/KG54 - Juvincourt - Ju88 - 20
II/KG54 - Laon/Athies - Ju88 - 20
I/KG66 - Montdidier - Ju88/188 - 15
I/KG76 - Laon/Couvron - Ju88 - 15
I/KG100 - Chateaudun - He177 - 15
I/SKG10 - - FW190 - 20
The opening 'Steinbock' gambit by Peltz's crews was planned for Friday 21st January. The airmen assembling for briefing were probably unaware of the fact that just 24 hours before their RAF contemporaries had taken to the air in numbers approaching 800 Lancasters and Halifaxes for the latest strike against Berlin. Adverse weather conditions over the Nazi capital caused a well-scattered bomb pattern with a fair proportion of the bombs descending well outside the city boundaries; this poor result was achieved at a cost of 35 aircraft and crews. Now, with a much shorter distance to fly and a geographically easier target to navigate to, the Luftwaffe attackers would appear to have a distinct edge in delivering an accurate and punishing strike against London.
On fourteen airfields well spaced out in a rough arc between Soesterburg in central Holland, St. Trond - due east of Brussels, and Montdidier - north of Paris, the crews were informed that the strike would be conducted in two waves. Peltz was at Chateaudun, the forward operational base for I/KG40 and I/KG100 equipped with He177s. These bombers, in common with some of the other participating units' machines, had been dispersed elsewhere in a bid to escape Allied fighters or 'intruders' before assembling at their selected forward airfields within the last 24 hours. A good example of this was provided by II/KG54 who transferred from Marx near Wilhelmshaven in northern Germany to Laon/Athies, northeast of Paris. II/KG54's crews were to return to Laon/Athies after the first sortie, but go directly back to Marx after the second.
Nearly 20 crews of I/KG76 were alerted just after noon and took off from Varrelbusch, still in ignorance as to the reason for this precipitate transfer to Laon/Couvron. The Gruppe's troubles began even before the crews reached their forward base. The Ju88 flown by Leutnant Ernst Rethfeldt was shot down by a prowling fighter thirty miles from his destination; only one of the five man aboard survived. At their destination crews of I/KG76 were briefed for their part in the revenge attack (Vergeltungsangriff) on London, but they did not take part in the first attack. On the second attack I/KG76 left Couvron, but those that survived were to return directly to Varrelbusch from London.
This nomadic existence was to be a recurring feature of 'Steinbock' operations and was another indication that the air war was not going well for the Luftwaffe. It caused a great deal of difficulty, such as when only a single Ju188 crew of II/KG2 was able to take part in the night's first attack from the forward base of Coulommiers, due to a lack of preparation on the part of the airfield's staff.
The first wave was briefed to attack a four square-kilometre zone around Waterloo. The target-marking method was to be based on the 'Leuchtpfad' principle, that is, with the target area marked by incendiary bombs alone. The pathfinder crews were expected to have little difficulty in carrying out their key duty since the weather forecast predicted the necessary level of visibility. The electronic services of 'Egon' and 'Y-Verfahren' were also available to the pathfinder crews to pinpoint the target – at least in theory. From Montdidier, Hauptmann Schmidt, Staffelkapitän of 2/KG66 took off with a captured Gee system aboard his Ju188 and a second observer/navigator (Truhe-Beobachter) whose job was to accurately mark the target with flares.
An estimated force of 230 aircraft, carrying around 500 tons of bombs and incendiaries, opened up their engines and lifted off into the January night sky between 19.30 and 20.00 hours. In the case of II/KG54 the crews had been briefed to cross the English coast near Rye at an altitude of around 16,000 feet and to complete their bombing run by 21.15 hours at a reduced altitude of 13,000 feet. Navigation was down to deduced (also known as 'Dead') reckoning. Approach to London, given the disposition of the Continental airfields would see the bombers funnelling in and out along a cone-shaped flight-path whose limits were roughly between the Sussex and Essex coastlines.
By 20.30 hours the first 'blips' appeared on British radar screens. The final count of around 100 such 'signatures' recorded between 20.30 and 22.00 hours on stations located between Hastings and Dungeness was the first indication that plans for the mass assault were going badly wrong. Even worse was the paltry number of crews (15) recorded as over-flying London. As if this abysmal operational return was not bad enough, nine bombers were lost, four of which came down on British soil after encountering Mosquitos.
Order of Battle
21/22nd January 1944
Unit - Location - Type - Strength
I/KG2 - Melun - Do217 - 25
III/KG2 - Gilze-Rijen - Do217 - 10
V/KG2 - Vitry-en-Artois - Me410 - 20
I/KG6 - Chievres - Ju188 - 25
II/KG6 - Le Culot - Ju88 - 15
III/KG6 - Melsbroek - Ju88/188 - 30
II/KG30 - Eindhoven - Ju88 - 15
III/KG30 - St. Trond - Ju88 - 15
I/KG40 - Chateaudun - He177 - 15
I/KG54 - Juvincourt - Ju88 - 20
II/KG54 - Laon/Athies - Ju88 - 20
I/KG66 - Montdidier - Ju88/188 - 15
I/KG76 - Laon/Couvron - Ju88 - 15
I/KG100 - Chateaudun - He177 - 15
I/SKG10 - - FW190 - 20
The opening 'Steinbock' gambit by Peltz's crews was planned for Friday 21st January. The airmen assembling for briefing were probably unaware of the fact that just 24 hours before their RAF contemporaries had taken to the air in numbers approaching 800 Lancasters and Halifaxes for the latest strike against Berlin. Adverse weather conditions over the Nazi capital caused a well-scattered bomb pattern with a fair proportion of the bombs descending well outside the city boundaries; this poor result was achieved at a cost of 35 aircraft and crews. Now, with a much shorter distance to fly and a geographically easier target to navigate to, the Luftwaffe attackers would appear to have a distinct edge in delivering an accurate and punishing strike against London.
On fourteen airfields well spaced out in a rough arc between Soesterburg in central Holland, St. Trond - due east of Brussels, and Montdidier - north of Paris, the crews were informed that the strike would be conducted in two waves. Peltz was at Chateaudun, the forward operational base for I/KG40 and I/KG100 equipped with He177s. These bombers, in common with some of the other participating units' machines, had been dispersed elsewhere in a bid to escape Allied fighters or 'intruders' before assembling at their selected forward airfields within the last 24 hours. A good example of this was provided by II/KG54 who transferred from Marx near Wilhelmshaven in northern Germany to Laon/Athies, northeast of Paris. II/KG54's crews were to return to Laon/Athies after the first sortie, but go directly back to Marx after the second.
Nearly 20 crews of I/KG76 were alerted just after noon and took off from Varrelbusch, still in ignorance as to the reason for this precipitate transfer to Laon/Couvron. The Gruppe's troubles began even before the crews reached their forward base. The Ju88 flown by Leutnant Ernst Rethfeldt was shot down by a prowling fighter thirty miles from his destination; only one of the five man aboard survived. At their destination crews of I/KG76 were briefed for their part in the revenge attack (Vergeltungsangriff) on London, but they did not take part in the first attack. On the second attack I/KG76 left Couvron, but those that survived were to return directly to Varrelbusch from London.
This nomadic existence was to be a recurring feature of 'Steinbock' operations and was another indication that the air war was not going well for the Luftwaffe. It caused a great deal of difficulty, such as when only a single Ju188 crew of II/KG2 was able to take part in the night's first attack from the forward base of Coulommiers, due to a lack of preparation on the part of the airfield's staff.
The first wave was briefed to attack a four square-kilometre zone around Waterloo. The target-marking method was to be based on the 'Leuchtpfad' principle, that is, with the target area marked by incendiary bombs alone. The pathfinder crews were expected to have little difficulty in carrying out their key duty since the weather forecast predicted the necessary level of visibility. The electronic services of 'Egon' and 'Y-Verfahren' were also available to the pathfinder crews to pinpoint the target – at least in theory. From Montdidier, Hauptmann Schmidt, Staffelkapitän of 2/KG66 took off with a captured Gee system aboard his Ju188 and a second observer/navigator (Truhe-Beobachter) whose job was to accurately mark the target with flares.
An estimated force of 230 aircraft, carrying around 500 tons of bombs and incendiaries, opened up their engines and lifted off into the January night sky between 19.30 and 20.00 hours. In the case of II/KG54 the crews had been briefed to cross the English coast near Rye at an altitude of around 16,000 feet and to complete their bombing run by 21.15 hours at a reduced altitude of 13,000 feet. Navigation was down to deduced (also known as 'Dead') reckoning. Approach to London, given the disposition of the Continental airfields would see the bombers funnelling in and out along a cone-shaped flight-path whose limits were roughly between the Sussex and Essex coastlines.
By 20.30 hours the first 'blips' appeared on British radar screens. The final count of around 100 such 'signatures' recorded between 20.30 and 22.00 hours on stations located between Hastings and Dungeness was the first indication that plans for the mass assault were going badly wrong. Even worse was the paltry number of crews (15) recorded as over-flying London. As if this abysmal operational return was not bad enough, nine bombers were lost, four of which came down on British soil after encountering Mosquitos.
Second Raid
The second wave of attackers on 21/22nd January was dispatched in the early hours in the face of deteriorating weather conditions that included a continued build-up of cloud that had encountered in part by the preceding 'Steinbock' force. The need to use electronic means to mark the target area meant that the pathfinder crews had to have recourse to the 'Y-Verfahren' system. By this stage of WWII counter-measures were in force that could, and often did, subvert its proper function. Whether or not this was the case, the fact remains that no better rate of success was achieved on this occasion. Barely half of the estimated force of 200 bombers even crossed into southern England, while only 25 aircraft were adjudged to have got through to London to release their loads.
At Laon/Couvron the briefed route for I/KG76 was initially 232 degrees true to a radio beacon (Funkfeuer) VIII 4 at Luzarches. The route then went roughly north-west to 'Zange 11 and 12' directional searchlights at St. Valery-en-Caux and continued out across the Channel. Finally a third course alteration took them due north from Eastbourne to London. Take off was scheduled to commence at 02.30 hours. Release of the loads of two ABB 500 container-held, and twelve 50 kg, incendiaries was to commence at 05.00 hours from 14,500 feet. All aircraft would be clear of the target by 05.30 hours at the latest. The return route would be via Zandvoort and Hardenburg to Varrelbusch. Briefed weather conditions were for a north-west wind at 40 kph at 1,500 metres and 80 kph at 4,000 metres. This contrasted noticeably with the equivalent figure of 100 kph westerly briefed to I/KG40, and could have been a material factor in the ensuing dispersal of the bomber stream. It would not, however, account for why so many crews failed to even cross the British coast!
The defences took a further toll of their adversaries to the tune of twelve aircraft lost in combat. Three more aircraft lost in accidents. Of the six confirmed 'kills' over Britain, three each was credited to night-fighters and AA batteries.
The second I/KG2 loss this night was Do217M U5+CK, that was struck by radar-predicted fire from batteries stationed at Chelmsford. The bomber plunged to its destruction into a mental hospital at Wickford along with all four of Unteroffizier Kablitz's crew. Three crews from III/KG2 failed to return to Gilze-Rijen.
Anti aircraft fire brought down the Ju88A-4 of 3/KG76; F1+BL near Canterbury. Its crew had suffered partial compass failure, but believed they were over London around ten minutes ahead of the briefed bomb-release time. Earlier they had failed to pick out the St. Valery searchlight guide and in fact were over Kent when attacked and therefore well adrift from the target. The AA fire struck home to fatally disable the controls, whereupon the bale-out order was promptly given. Although Unteroffizier Marliot seemingly managed to get clear, along with his three companions, his headless body was later discovered hanging from a building. A second Gruppe bomber was temporarily thrown out of control by damage caused by AA guns, whereupon the pilot ordered a bale-out. A precipitate response by two crew members witnessed their parachute descent into the pitiless Channel waters. Subsequently their bodies were washed-up near Worthing – all the more tragic since control was recovered and the aircraft brought back home.
II and III/KG30 based at Eindhoven and St. Trond were participating in what would be their only 'Steinbock' operation up to mid-March. The II/KG30 crews would face one of the most protracted flights to the target, as evidenced by 4D+EP from 6 Staffel flown by Leutnant Petzinna. The Ju88A-4 took off at 02.30 hours and headed for Beauvais, just north of Paris, from where, having picked up the signal from H/F Beacon VIII/2, it would head up to St. Valery's visual beacon, scheduled to be crossed at 04.29 hours. The remainder of the course to London would be the same as for the main bomber stream. The Beobachter's (observer / navigator) notes referred to a bombing time of 05.00 hours. Twenty minutes after passing over Tonbridge the bomber was ten minutes ahead of its flight-plan as it prepared to go in on the target. Suddenly what Feldwebel Scherrer described as an AA shell struck the starboard engine, and almost immediately he baled out.
In fact the 'shell' damage was caused by 20mm cannon shells fired from Sub Leiutenant Wakelin's Mk. XIII Mosquito. The 96 Squadron night fighter had lifted off from West Malling at 03.44 hours and was handed over by Sector Control to Wartling GCI, who instructed Wakelin to climb to 20,000 feet on a southerly course. Around 04.25 hours 4D+EP made a 'trace' on Williams's Mk. VIII radar scope, indicating a north-westerly course at 19,000 feet. It was closed in upon and visually identified, as Leutnant Petzinna described an easy weaving manoeuvre conducted both in azimuth and elevation. Wakelin's initial dive to firing range was too swift and he pulled off to one side before easing into position. His fire from 700 feet was observed to strike the starboard engine, which blew up. The wing was seen to crumple, and the now flaming mass heeled over to crash close to Paddock Wood railway station.
A second He177, this belonging to 2/KG40, went down in the Channel in the early hours of the 22nd, having participated in the second wave. This time the night-fighter was a Mk. XII Mosquito from No. 85 Squadron flown by Flying Officer Nowell along with Flight Sergeant Randall. The West Malling based aircraft had already tackled a Ju88 that, although struck by gunfire, managed to evade destruction in the solid cloud cover existing around 13,000 feet. Almost immediately a second 'contact' developed into what was also described as a 'Ju88'. This time the cannon shells caused a large explosion that appeared to throw the bomber out of control, with objects cast out that were regarded as two crew members bailing out. This was probably correct since two airmen did reach the ground alive.
Oberfeldwebel Billing of I/KG40 had previously served with 9/KG40 and his crew were experienced operationally on the FW200. The Beobachter, Feldwebel Andrae had been with 8/KG40 (later 2/KG40) up to August 1942 when the Staffel transferred to Fassberg. He returned briefly to 9/KG40 before moving back to Fassberg. He also briefly attended an Hs293 course at Garz, before being posted back again to Fassberg. The Bordmechaniker, Feldwebel. Beitter, had served with III/KG40 up to August 1943 before joining this crew and had completed 23 sorties in FW200s.
According to either Beitter or Oberfeldwebel Andrae one engine failed as the He177 was approaching the English coast at 20,000 feet and the pilot called for a bale out, to which both airmen responded. They were fortunate to survive since the wind direction caused their parachutes to drift sufficiently northwards for both to descend safely near Hastings. Later the same day two more of the crew were washed ashore between Dover and Lydd. The remaining two men almost certainly went down inside the bomber that was adjudged to have gone in several miles south of Hastings.
Once again the 'executioner' appears to have been a night-fighter from West Malling, this time a Mk. XII Mosquito from No. 85 Squadron. Take-off time and initial GCI directions for Flying Officer Nowell were almost identical to Sub Lieutnant Wakelin's. Around 50 minutes into his sortie Howell engaged a Ju88, which was claimed as 'damaged' since it disappeared into the solid undercast. Howell was then informed of a second 'bandit'. This aircraft was on a north-bound course and was duly picked up on radar four miles east of the Mosquito's heading. The 'Ju88' as identified by Nowell was maintaining a level flight-path at 19,000 feet and presented no aiming problem for its attacker. Just forty 20mm shells were fired, but these induced a huge explosion that sent the bomber immediately diving out of apparent control. In addition, Nowell and Flight Sergeant Randall noticed two objects falling out, which ties in neatly with Beitter's and Andrae's bale out.
ps There is more but don't know how to insert the pdf file.
The second wave of attackers on 21/22nd January was dispatched in the early hours in the face of deteriorating weather conditions that included a continued build-up of cloud that had encountered in part by the preceding 'Steinbock' force. The need to use electronic means to mark the target area meant that the pathfinder crews had to have recourse to the 'Y-Verfahren' system. By this stage of WWII counter-measures were in force that could, and often did, subvert its proper function. Whether or not this was the case, the fact remains that no better rate of success was achieved on this occasion. Barely half of the estimated force of 200 bombers even crossed into southern England, while only 25 aircraft were adjudged to have got through to London to release their loads.
At Laon/Couvron the briefed route for I/KG76 was initially 232 degrees true to a radio beacon (Funkfeuer) VIII 4 at Luzarches. The route then went roughly north-west to 'Zange 11 and 12' directional searchlights at St. Valery-en-Caux and continued out across the Channel. Finally a third course alteration took them due north from Eastbourne to London. Take off was scheduled to commence at 02.30 hours. Release of the loads of two ABB 500 container-held, and twelve 50 kg, incendiaries was to commence at 05.00 hours from 14,500 feet. All aircraft would be clear of the target by 05.30 hours at the latest. The return route would be via Zandvoort and Hardenburg to Varrelbusch. Briefed weather conditions were for a north-west wind at 40 kph at 1,500 metres and 80 kph at 4,000 metres. This contrasted noticeably with the equivalent figure of 100 kph westerly briefed to I/KG40, and could have been a material factor in the ensuing dispersal of the bomber stream. It would not, however, account for why so many crews failed to even cross the British coast!
The defences took a further toll of their adversaries to the tune of twelve aircraft lost in combat. Three more aircraft lost in accidents. Of the six confirmed 'kills' over Britain, three each was credited to night-fighters and AA batteries.
The second I/KG2 loss this night was Do217M U5+CK, that was struck by radar-predicted fire from batteries stationed at Chelmsford. The bomber plunged to its destruction into a mental hospital at Wickford along with all four of Unteroffizier Kablitz's crew. Three crews from III/KG2 failed to return to Gilze-Rijen.
Anti aircraft fire brought down the Ju88A-4 of 3/KG76; F1+BL near Canterbury. Its crew had suffered partial compass failure, but believed they were over London around ten minutes ahead of the briefed bomb-release time. Earlier they had failed to pick out the St. Valery searchlight guide and in fact were over Kent when attacked and therefore well adrift from the target. The AA fire struck home to fatally disable the controls, whereupon the bale-out order was promptly given. Although Unteroffizier Marliot seemingly managed to get clear, along with his three companions, his headless body was later discovered hanging from a building. A second Gruppe bomber was temporarily thrown out of control by damage caused by AA guns, whereupon the pilot ordered a bale-out. A precipitate response by two crew members witnessed their parachute descent into the pitiless Channel waters. Subsequently their bodies were washed-up near Worthing – all the more tragic since control was recovered and the aircraft brought back home.
II and III/KG30 based at Eindhoven and St. Trond were participating in what would be their only 'Steinbock' operation up to mid-March. The II/KG30 crews would face one of the most protracted flights to the target, as evidenced by 4D+EP from 6 Staffel flown by Leutnant Petzinna. The Ju88A-4 took off at 02.30 hours and headed for Beauvais, just north of Paris, from where, having picked up the signal from H/F Beacon VIII/2, it would head up to St. Valery's visual beacon, scheduled to be crossed at 04.29 hours. The remainder of the course to London would be the same as for the main bomber stream. The Beobachter's (observer / navigator) notes referred to a bombing time of 05.00 hours. Twenty minutes after passing over Tonbridge the bomber was ten minutes ahead of its flight-plan as it prepared to go in on the target. Suddenly what Feldwebel Scherrer described as an AA shell struck the starboard engine, and almost immediately he baled out.
In fact the 'shell' damage was caused by 20mm cannon shells fired from Sub Leiutenant Wakelin's Mk. XIII Mosquito. The 96 Squadron night fighter had lifted off from West Malling at 03.44 hours and was handed over by Sector Control to Wartling GCI, who instructed Wakelin to climb to 20,000 feet on a southerly course. Around 04.25 hours 4D+EP made a 'trace' on Williams's Mk. VIII radar scope, indicating a north-westerly course at 19,000 feet. It was closed in upon and visually identified, as Leutnant Petzinna described an easy weaving manoeuvre conducted both in azimuth and elevation. Wakelin's initial dive to firing range was too swift and he pulled off to one side before easing into position. His fire from 700 feet was observed to strike the starboard engine, which blew up. The wing was seen to crumple, and the now flaming mass heeled over to crash close to Paddock Wood railway station.
A second He177, this belonging to 2/KG40, went down in the Channel in the early hours of the 22nd, having participated in the second wave. This time the night-fighter was a Mk. XII Mosquito from No. 85 Squadron flown by Flying Officer Nowell along with Flight Sergeant Randall. The West Malling based aircraft had already tackled a Ju88 that, although struck by gunfire, managed to evade destruction in the solid cloud cover existing around 13,000 feet. Almost immediately a second 'contact' developed into what was also described as a 'Ju88'. This time the cannon shells caused a large explosion that appeared to throw the bomber out of control, with objects cast out that were regarded as two crew members bailing out. This was probably correct since two airmen did reach the ground alive.
Oberfeldwebel Billing of I/KG40 had previously served with 9/KG40 and his crew were experienced operationally on the FW200. The Beobachter, Feldwebel Andrae had been with 8/KG40 (later 2/KG40) up to August 1942 when the Staffel transferred to Fassberg. He returned briefly to 9/KG40 before moving back to Fassberg. He also briefly attended an Hs293 course at Garz, before being posted back again to Fassberg. The Bordmechaniker, Feldwebel. Beitter, had served with III/KG40 up to August 1943 before joining this crew and had completed 23 sorties in FW200s.
According to either Beitter or Oberfeldwebel Andrae one engine failed as the He177 was approaching the English coast at 20,000 feet and the pilot called for a bale out, to which both airmen responded. They were fortunate to survive since the wind direction caused their parachutes to drift sufficiently northwards for both to descend safely near Hastings. Later the same day two more of the crew were washed ashore between Dover and Lydd. The remaining two men almost certainly went down inside the bomber that was adjudged to have gone in several miles south of Hastings.
Once again the 'executioner' appears to have been a night-fighter from West Malling, this time a Mk. XII Mosquito from No. 85 Squadron. Take-off time and initial GCI directions for Flying Officer Nowell were almost identical to Sub Lieutnant Wakelin's. Around 50 minutes into his sortie Howell engaged a Ju88, which was claimed as 'damaged' since it disappeared into the solid undercast. Howell was then informed of a second 'bandit'. This aircraft was on a north-bound course and was duly picked up on radar four miles east of the Mosquito's heading. The 'Ju88' as identified by Nowell was maintaining a level flight-path at 19,000 feet and presented no aiming problem for its attacker. Just forty 20mm shells were fired, but these induced a huge explosion that sent the bomber immediately diving out of apparent control. In addition, Nowell and Flight Sergeant Randall noticed two objects falling out, which ties in neatly with Beitter's and Andrae's bale out.
ps There is more but don't know how to insert the pdf file.
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If you just want an excerpt from a PDF, use the 'Snapshot' button in your PDF wiever (saves the snapshot in clipboard automaticaly), then start the MS Paint (or any other such program) and paste the snapshot there. Save the snapshot as an JPG file. Now use the advice from 1st sentence.
