MacArthur vs. King

[renrich]

The problem in comparing Mac and King is that both are hard to view with out intense emotion. Both had their faults but both also were competent in some ways. IMO MacArthur, despite his egotism was one of the great leaders in US history.

 

[parsifal]

How about transporting ground troops to garrison strategically important islands? These units were certified combat ready and sitting in California awaiting transport to the Philippines:

41st Infantry Division. Ship to Rabaul.
34th Infantry Regiment. Ship to Guadalcanal.
161st Infantry Regiment. Ship to Tarawa.

These transport missions, conducted with no enemy opposition during December 1941, would likely shorten the Pacific War by a year.

None of these formations could be considered combat ready in any sense of the word.

Moreover, it is simply untrue that there was no opposition in the areas wher you are proposing to send the formations.

In the case of Tarawa, they are in range of the anti-shipping units based at Kwaj and the Marshall islands generally. Whilst I dont doubt that the forces could get ashore, keeping them supplied would have been problematic. In the case of the 41st and the 34th Divisions, there simply was not the transport available at that time to undertake such a large sealift. In 1941 there was barely 500000 tons of shipping available, this had roughly tripled by the end of February. However it would have taken time to assemble and load these units, so it would probably be midMarch before the unit could sail.

If a more realistic lift is adopted and an RCT is sent in for these formations, they probably would have made it in time for Rabaul, but lacking any sort of proper taining, or Jungle skill, they would have been bagged with ease. The Japanese had already demonstrated the ease with which untrained troops could be dispatched by their seasoned veterans, and ther is nothing to suggest that these green formations would have done any better at all. The RCT that was already there could not stop the Japanese at that time, and this formation had far more experience than eithe the 34th or the 41st.

And supply of these formations would have been well nigh impossible, and would have placed the inexperienced US fleet, particularly her carriers at great risk whilst undertaking the deperate re-supply efforts that would have been required. And even Guadacanal would have been under sever blockade, with the Americans enjoying none of the advantages that the airfield and secure (relatively) supply lines gave their troops in August.

Far from shortening the war this strategy would have lengthened it. Instead if sending these formations off to be trained as they needed to be, they would have been thrown into battle green, and in all probability lost, along with a sizable portion of the US fleet as it tried to resupply and support them. The later campaigns in NG would have faltered and possibly stalled by their absence.

 

[Juha]

Agree with Parsifal
Rabaul was important in Dec 41 but Tarawa and Guadalcanal became important only after Japanese occupied them and begun built airfields on them. Even in 43 US knowledge on Tarawa was very limited, that was one of the reasons why Betio landing was so close run thing. And even if there were US troops on Tarawa, what would have hindered Japanese occupation Makin and other atols they occupied in the area? On Guadalcanal, Japanese could have landed on a neighboring island or on Guadalcanal away from US base, as they did later even there was a USMC division there.

Juha

 

[syscom3]

One thing that does give credit to both of them:

King over saw the expansion and manning of the USN to a size that we will never see again. Just the issues involved in the planning, construction, logistics, training of the fleet was something that required a commander with an incredible talent for planning and identifying subordinates who could carry out his vision and responsibilities.

Mac gets the nod from me for being one fast learner and being adaptable to make the most of what what was given him. He may have been a megalomaniac, but he delivered when he had too.

 

[renrich]

Sys, excellent summation that cuts to the meat. The only people who never make mistakes are those who never do anything.

 

[Glider]

One thing that does give credit to both of them:

King over saw the expansion and manning of the USN to a size that we will never see again. Just the issues involved in the planning, construction, logistics, training of the fleet was something that required a commander with an incredible talent for planning and identifying subordinates who could carry out his vision and responsibilities.

Mac gets the nod from me for being one fast learner and being adaptable to make the most of what what was given him. He may have been a megalomaniac, but he delivered when he had too.

I have to agree re King which is a pretty major change to my original understanding and position says he eating considerable portions of humble pie. There is little doubt that his reaction to Operation Drumbeat was little more than a disaster and his anti british feelings were not exactly helpfull when co operation was needed. However that said, he did do good things in the Pacific and pre war had a major part in increasing the number of naval aviators which was very important once war broke out.
So as long as you keep him away from the British or anti submarine warfare, he was pretty good.

However we will have to agree to disagree over MacArthur I don't see him as being a slow learner let alone a fast learner. The mistakes he made in Korea are very similar to the ones he made at the start of WW2. He was warned that an attack was on its way (WW2) or was likely to come (Korea), took no action, attack took place result, total chaos.