Maneuverability vs Speed

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The Quality issue is important. I believe however that sometimes the quality vs quantity issue is sometimes finer that it is often made out to be.
The British may very well have been able to win the BoB using the Hurricane. It might have cost scores more pilots (or a few hundred?) and since the British were having trouble suppling pilots at the time this proposition is iffy. It also depends on the BoB ending in Sept and Oct of 1940 and not extending past that or restarting. At least the daylight part.
Part of the problem here is that some of the aircraft were not running on the same time schedule. The Hurricane I may have been able to defend Britain against 109E-3/4s but might have been in trouble against 109E-7s. Of course by the time the E-7 shows up in more than handful You have Hurricane IIs starting to trickle in and in the no Spitfire scenario. Hurricanes with Merlin XII starting to show up in July of 1940?
Now in the spring of 1941 when the 109Fs show up the Hurricane is toast and without the Spitfire it becomes a disaster.

It also not just the quality of the planes (or tanks or ships) and it is not just the training/tactics either. It was the ability to decide were the important battles were and concentrate accordingly. The British took too long to send enough "stuff" to Malta and Africa to handle the Italians before the Germans got involved. Understandable in part but we can't have it both ways. Either Germany could not stage a sea borne invasion of Britain after the BoB or it could. Either Germany could make a strong attack (air craft ) against Britain in 1941 after June of 1941 or it couldn't. If it couldn't then send some more 'Stuff' to Africa and a bit more further east.

The Ki-43 and the A6M2 were excellent, world class fighters were good in early 1942, but they faded fast, very fast. Here is where the Japanese stumbled.
They had identified the need to improve the Zero in early 1941 and started working on two prototypes in May and June, they didn't build a 3rd prototype until Jan 1942 and this was the one with the clipped wing. It took until Aug of 1942 to show up in a combat unit. It had the 100round magazines, it rolled better and had a higher dive speed (may not be saying much), it had the two speed supercharger. What it did not have was the fuel capacity of the earlier Zero and thus the range. It took until Dec of 1942 for the long wing A6M3 to leave the production lines with the extra fuel tanks in the wings to restore the fuel capacity.
Now on the world stage you had Spitfire IXs and XIIs by this time, you had Typhoons, FW 190s and BF 109Gs and bunch of Russian stuff.
In the Japanese's backyard you had F4U-1s going into combat in small number. And with the Japanese producing the first long wing A6M3 six months after the first P-38G rolled out?
The Japanese need the long wing A6M3 to start showing up in the summer of 1942 to "hold the line" for the A6M5 to show up in early 1943, not late 1943.

compare planes in squadron service (more than one squadron) and not first flights.

the 109 had problems as it's armament didn't keep up with "world" standards. You need armament average pilots can succeed with, not just experts. Needed two or more fighters to get an effective amount of fire power into the air is hardly efficient use of resources or pilots. This is even more telling against the Ki-43.
 
That was the only kind of war the axis could win. In particular the Japanese were doomed in any war lasting much more than year. They should have been gambling it all in 1942. For example finishing off the transports at Savo Island would have been worth losing a cruiser or 2. Instead of attacking With strength the IJN piecemealed their forces conserving the main force for a decisive battle that never came.
 

Yes, I agree with all that. Hurricane was just about good enough in BoB, though slightly behind the 109 and as you say, the numbers in terms of aircrews were getting sketchy for the British. There is also kind of a propaganda / morale issue here. The Germans had this whole superiority propaganda theme. The British felt the same way about themselves, but with everything collapsing all over, I think the fact that the Spitfire was clearly such a good design, and at least in some respects potentially (and aesthetically) better than the Bf 109, gave the British pilots that little extra edge which I suspect really helped, though I couldn't prove it. I think the Mosquito later on gave them the same kind of charge.


Yeah there seems to be kind of a decision paralysis for the Germans after being stymied in Britain. I can't say what their best strategy would have been.

The Ki-43 and the A6M2 were excellent, world class fighters were good in early 1942, but they faded fast, very fast. Here is where the Japanese stumbled.

I don't think they faded that fast, they lost their fairly heavy initial advantage as the Allies adapted tactics and fielded some improved designs, but in terms of overall capability the Ki-43 and A6M were still holding their own pretty well I'd say even into 1943. And that in part may have been the problem, I think it contributed to a lack of urgency to upgrade. It feels like a bit of a 'boiling frog' situation for the Japanese. You had types like the P-40, A-20, B-25 which were not so overwhelming of a problem at first, but became more capable (faster P-40s, more heavily armed and better protected A-20s and B-25s) and then new types showing up like the P-38, F4U, Beaufighter, B-24 and Spitfire which were posing greater challenges. And then the Hellcat came and they were SOL.


Yes I think this was exactly the moment of the big stumble. The A6M3 wasn't a very good improvement - in terms of range it was a step back. What they needed at that exact time was the A6M5 but I guess the engine wasn't ready yet.


Agreed


I'm not so sure. I think the 109F was really one of the most successful models, though the big problem of the strategic bombing campaign was just getting going at that point. The Ki-43 seems to have also continued to do quite well for a while even though it seems that the IJAAF wasn't nearly as well trained as the IJN pilots (so maybe it didn't need experts). I believe against other fighters and light bombers the lighter guns were still ok in an aircraft with some performance or maneuverability advantages, but obviously when the heavier armed planes started showing up it wasn't ideal.
 

Might have committed Yamato to one or two of those early surface engagements around Guadalcanal or New Guinea...
 
I read a while back somewhere that the waters in and around Guadalcanal were considered too shallow for BBs by both sides.

They sent in plenty of BBs to bombard it and they were slugging it out around Savo island, with several sunk and heavily damaged around there. Kongo, Haruna, Kirishima, South Dakota et.c

I think one of the big issues with the BBs, besides not wanting to risk losing them, was fuel. They used an incredible amount of fuel.
 
Had the IJN committed Yamato and Musashi to the battle of Guadalcanal (or Solomon's in general), which happened to coincide with Musashi's entrance to service, the USN would been in serious trouble and Henderson field would have been wiped clean off the map with an extended bombardment by either or both of those battlewagons.

With the USN's limited numbers in late 1942, they would have been hard-pressed to counter a show of force by the IJN.
 
Yes I think this was exactly the moment of the big stumble. The A6M3 wasn't a very good improvement - in terms of range it was a step back. What they needed at that exact time was the A6M5 but I guess the engine wasn't ready yet.
The A6M3 got the two speed supercharger, what it did not get were the ejector exhaust stacks and water injection. The water injection never seemed to work on the Zero, or at least did not give the performance improvement promised/hoped for.
The 109F was successful but the opposition wasn't that difficult. The MG 151 fired both faster and had more velocity (easier to aim) than the MG/FFMs in the E's so the reduction firepower was nowhere near impression that a simple barrel count gives. That and the 150 shells in the 109F compared to 110-120 shells in the E also comes out in favor of the F.
The F also had enough performance to take underwing 20mm gondolas without loosing too much performance. By the fall of 1942 with the G-6 the 109s performance was not enough better to take the weight of 20mm gondolas and stay competitive as a fighter. The G had better performance than the F but the allied aircraft had also gotten better. The 109 was not keeping pace.

The Ki-43 was having to face things like B-25s and B-24s and they had to resort to using 3 or more Ki-43s to attack one B-24s and do it multiple times to get kills.
For trying to stop bombers the question is not if you can shoot down a few, the question is if your defending fighters can shoot down enough to make the enemy stop. They don't have shoot down all of them, just enough to cause unacceptable losses so they give up or try something else.
If the Japanese had a plane with just four 12.7mm machine guns instead of two they could have doubled (or more than doubled, wings guns are not synchronized) the amount of rounds fired per firing pass. This would not have doubled the amount of kills but it should have done something. The Ki-43 just offered two little firepower for the amount of effort.
Think 109 with just two 13mm cowl guns.
 
The A6M3 got the two speed supercharger, what it did not get were the ejector exhaust stacks and water injection. The water injection never seemed to work on the Zero, or at least did not give the performance improvement promised/hoped for.

Yes the two speed was helpful and the belt feed with twice as much ammunition was I would think a fairly easy innovation that could have come earlier (and would have helped a lot) but it didn't. The range limitation was a big problem for the A6M3 though and the speed didn't improve enough.

The 109F was successful but the opposition wasn't that difficult.

Well it seems to have competed well with the best Allied fighters - Spit V, Yak 1b, Yak 9, P-38, I think they even did alright against Spit VIII and IX


That plus it being a nose gun, far more accurate and easier to aim


Wait I don't follow that. The F had the performance for underwing 20mm gondola but the G didn't? (I agree they didn't, I think the underwing gondola was for dealing with the heavier bombers which obviously became a bigger and bigger problem)

The Ki-43 was having to face things like B-25s and B-24s and they had to resort to using 3 or more Ki-43s to attack one B-24s and do it multiple times to get kills.

yes and the later B-25s had a lot more guns. This is what I meant. Even the A6Ms were having problems with the heavy bombers (partly due to limited cannon ammunition per above). This became a major weakness, but one they maybe didn't notice at first because the B-17 and the early B-24s were mostly just being used for recon since they almost never hit any ships. But it's not safe to allow the enemy free recon wherever they want to go.


When did the Ki-44 get four 12.7 guns?
 
Fw 190 was a good replacement for the 109, but it never had the high altitude performance really needed to cope with the heavy bombers and their high performance escorts (until the far too late D), which is why the 109 remained until the end. If they had fielded something like the D in early 1943 we may have seen more tragic results for the Allies.
 
There is one technical area where the Japanese were 2-4 years ahead of the "West." They pioneered the use of certain aluminum alloys, in particular their use of 75ST (now 7075) aluminum. It was lighter than the standard 2024 aluminum alloy but significantly stronger. This alloy (75ST) was not unknown among the waring powers before the war but required more specialized heat treatment and there was some question about its long-term brittleness. Late in the war the U.S. starting using this alloy more in their latest designs. When the original B-29 was updated to the "B-50" (or B-29D, as it was originally designated) the 75ST alloy was used much more in the airframe structure which saved considerable weight. Of course, the re-design was "beefed up" in weak areas and the resulting weight of the B-50 was about the same as the B-29, resulting in a smaller improvement in performance than what was originally hoped for. (The B-50 used the more powerful R-4360 engines.)
 
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It's odd how while their strategy was based around Kantai Kessen, they regularly refused it when it the opportunity arose. Park Yamato and Musashi off Guadalcanal with carriers for air cover, and dare Halsey to try and save the Marines.
 
That plus it being a nose gun, far more accurate and easier to aim
This is something of a falsehood. The pilot is supposed to be using the sights, not just pointing the aircraft at the target.
Now perhaps the wings flex a bit but that is part of the installation problem and can vary from aircraft to aircraft.
If the nose gun ammo gets to the target in 5/6 the time it took the wing gun ammo to get to the target than also makes it easer to aim. A German expert may have said that one nose gun was worth 2 wing guns but he didn't say if the guns were the same, had the same velocity or had the same ammo capacity. He also was not working with guns on a test range.

If you have to aim 4-6 plane lengths ahead (or more) of the target in order to pull enough lead does it really matter if the gun is pointing down the fuselage or not?
ait I don't follow that. The F had the performance for underwing 20mm gondola but the G didn't?
It was relative, the F has better performance than the 1941/early 1942 fighters it was up against and could afford to take a hit to the performance from the extra weight and drag.
The G trying to fight the allied fighters in late 1942 and into 1943 could not take the performance penalty. The G would perform better than the F but the Allied fighter had also gotten better.

Some 109Fs with the wing guns showed up in NA.
In 1944(?) the Germans were sending up 3 gun 109s to escort the 5 gun planes. Or at least that is what some accounts say. Germans had waited too long to replace the 109.
Something like one of the Italian fighters that could hold 3 cannon and still perform well would have been better than trying to use two planes to do the job of one.
 




The British were able to prevail in the B of B because the Germans stopped attacking their airfields. The B of B was lost thanks to strategic decisions made by Goering. The Soviets were able to come back because we GAVE them millions of tons of munitions, 600,000 Studebaker trucks, thousands of airplanes, and thousands of tanks. The USA made up the losses they suffered during Barbarossa.
 
The British were able to prevail in the B of B because the Germans stopped attacking their airfields. The B of B was lost thanks to strategic decisions made by Goering.

That, and the heavy, heavy losses inflicted by the RAF every step of the way. And British radar, British fighter command... well trained, brave British pilots, and the Spitfire and the Hurricane. The short range of the Bf 109.

The Soviets were able to come back because we GAVE them millions of tons of munitions, 600,000 Studebaker trucks, thousands of airplanes, and thousands of tanks. The USA made up the losses they suffered during Barbarossa.

That, and the Siberian Transfer, the defenders at Leningrad and Moscow, the masterful, ruthless counterattack at Stalingrad. Marshal Zhukov, and probably the T-34, Katyusha, and PPsh-41. The P-39s we sent, and all the other tanks and planes, butter and fuel etc. also definitely helped. But I think the indigenous Soviet aircraft really helped as well. A lot of things came together in 1943.
 

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