Me-110 Underrated

[Glider]

An observation on the climb chart. I am sure that I have read a tactical comparison report that stated that whilst the climb rate was better for the Hurricane (+12lb boost) the Me110 could climb at a steeper angle which made it impossible for the Hurricane to follow. Pilots were advised to not follow it in a climb, but use the best performance of the Hurricane and re-initiate combat when they had the advantage.

 

[Shortround6]

from the website the Hurricane I.
Guns:

type/ammo.....................................................ROF..................Duration................WB Punch..................Muzzle Velocity................Ammo/Gun
Primary:4x.303 Browning MG..............15.1/s.......................23.3s...................7.6x.30cal/ping.............2,600ft/s...............................350
Secondary:4x.303 Browning MG........15.1/s.......................23.3s...................7.6x.30cal/ping.............2,600ft/s...............................350

numbers in bold are in error. I have no idea what .WB Punch is.

correct numbers are................................19-20/s....................16.7s.....................---------------...............2,440fps...................................334

Those are the numbers you will find in most sources.

Numbers for the IIC
Primary
:2x20mm Hispano-Suiza Cannon...........11.2/s.................8.1s.............................2.8x20mm/ping............2,790ft/s..................................90

Bolded numbers are in error. correct 10.0/s..................9.0 seconds.............-----------------..............2880fps.....................................90

Likewise many of the gun numbers for the Spitfire show similar errors. Compounded by the problem of only 3 Spitfires in the game so some of their details get "blended"
LIke MK Vb's getting the 20mm ammo load of the Vc (Vbs had drums)

The gun/ammo details are not hard to find and if the game can't get those right (not talking past the decimal point but 10-25% changes in rate of fire) then what am I to think of the performance data?

 

[Vincenzo]

I've not found other german primary sources on the speed of Bf 110
but it's available online the Vultee analisys that report a max speed of 365 mph at 19,000 feet, the engines are reported as DB 601 A, the data on the engine are in accord on the german data on the DB 601A-1, there is only a 2500 rpm for TO power that i'm not aware.
it's available also a in english report, from test of captured plane, of april '42 by D.E. Morris with a speed of 340 mph at 22,000 feet, engine reported as DB 601, w/o letter designation

 

[John Vasco]

He didn't interview the ones who were shot down over Kent.

I interviewed a few...

 

[pbehn]

I interviewed a few...

And?

 

[John Vasco]

So, what led to this inadequate understanding of how to use this type of aircraft? Was it as simple as matters of doing successfully in the earliest days of the war?

Commanders of bomber units insisting that their fighter escort flew close escort to them, so that they would feel more protected. These Commanders carried the day with the result that Bf 109 & Bf 110 units had to fly close escort, meaning a lot slower than anywhere near their best speed. It's all in Stephen Bungay's book, and Christer Bergström's.

Instead of carrying out forward interception, finding and attacking, shooting down, and disrupting the enemy formations, the Lw fighters on close escort were at a distinct disadvantage given that the RAF fighters were under no such speed constraint.

The Luftwaffe High Command got it badly wrong, thank God...

 

[John Vasco]

And?

Every one to a man were happy flying the Bf 110. But they were not happy at flying close escort knowing, as I posted above, the potential fatal constraint it placed upon them.

 

[Shortround6]

This should not be a surprise for us to find out now as the British ran into the same problems early in the "Lean into France" campaign. Flying at long range cruise speeds was finally judged to near suicidal even for Spitfires. It took a Spitfire V about 2 minutes to go from a cruise speed of just over 200mph to full speed.

German fighters, of any type, putzing along at bomber cruise speeds would be flying too slow to successfully engage attacking fighters with the amount of warning time they had.
Starting every fight in a much lower energy state than your opponents is not a good way to fight.

 

[pbehn]

The surprise is that Goering was behind it. As planes got faster everything became more spaced out. Between two close and too far what is "just right" became bigger because times had changed. In WW1 if you spotted an enemy you had much more time to do something. The finger four or schwarm formation was considered better because things were faster so a looser formation is better. The RAF did a reasonable job of protecting the beaches at Dunkerque but few on the ground would agree, the conflicts took place out of sight of those on the ground who only saw the ones who got through, have a feeling there was something of this in German bomber crew complaints about protection.

 

[Peter Gunn]

This should not be a surprise for us to find out now as the British ran into the same problems early in the "Lean into France" campaign. Flying at long range cruise speeds was finally judged to near suicidal even for Spitfires. It took a Spitfire V about 2 minutes to go from a cruise speed of just over 200mph to full speed.

German fighters, of any type, putzing along at bomber cruise speeds would be flying too slow to successfully engage attacking fighters with the amount of warning time they had.
Starting every fight in a much lower energy state than your opponents is not a good way to fight.

Which to me, highlights just how valuable the Mustang was that it was able to cruise at a reasonably good clip and still get the mileage needed to go deep into Germany.

 

[Mike Williams]

An observation on the climb chart. I am sure that I have read a tactical comparison report that stated that whilst the climb rate was better for the Hurricane (+12lb boost) the Me110 could climb at a steeper angle which made it impossible for the Hurricane to follow. Pilots were advised to not follow it in a climb, but use the best performance of the Hurricane and re-initiate combat when they had the advantage.

That's in good agreement with the Tactical Trials I have although here the engine boost and r.p.m. for each aircraft are not mentioned.

Some snippets: "It was found that there is little difference between the rates of climb of the Me.110 and Hurricane, but the Hurricane fell away when it attempted to follow and shoot on the climb, owing to the much steeper angle of the Me.110."

"At 5,000 ft. the Hurricane was 15 – 20 m.p.h. faster than the Me.110 but at 20,000 ft. the Me.110 was 2 or 3 m.p.h. faster than the Hurricane."

It appears that operating the pitch of the propellers on the Me110 was a real headache as was maintaining proper engine rpm while engaged in combat (see paragraph 37).

I might treat this report with some reserve since the Me 110 was captured after a forced landing, the superchargers were modified to bring the engines up-to-date and the camera was removed and replaced with ballast to represent the weight of the two cannon and ammo.

 

[Zipper730]

Commanders of bomber units insisting that their fighter escort flew close escort to them, so that they would feel more protected.

Was this based on the bomber commanders or Goering himself? Also, was this idea based on earlier experience in the Spanish civil war?

Instead of carrying out forward interception, finding and attacking, shooting down, and disrupting the enemy formations, the Lw fighters on close escort were at a distinct disadvantage given that the RAF fighters were under no such speed constraint.

Would they have been able to fly as far at the higher speeds necessary for this?

It does seem our victory over the Germans was largely due to ineptitude on their part.

 

[pbehn]

Would they have been able to fly as far at the higher speeds necessary for this?

.

Calais to London is 100 miles approx. However some major raids on London were plagued with head winds which slowed the bombers dramatically and gave the escorts a headache flying that slow.

 

[John Vasco]

1 Was this based on the bomber commanders or Goering himself? Also, was this idea based on earlier experience in the Spanish civil war?

2 Would they have been able to fly as far at the higher speeds necessary for this?

3 It does seem our victory over the Germans was largely due to ineptitude on their part.

1 Bomber Commanders. I'll find the reference to the meeting for you.

2 If the Luftwaffe were looking for total air superiority over an invasion area, they would not have been looking to fly as far as London, but rather only as far as the English Channel coast. That would have increased the 109s' combat time considerably. It would not have proved to be any constraint on the 110.

3 I think Stephen Bungay calls it the 'cock-up theory'. The less you do (i.e. you keep things simple), the less cock-ups, the more likely you are to win.
And ineptitude, yes I agree. Previously, right up to the end of the Western Campaign in the Spring of 1940, there were clear goals. For the Battle of Britain, there appears to be hesitancy, and a case of not quite knowing what to do next. For just over a month there were attacks on shipping in the Channel and up the south-easy coast of England. Then the attacks on the airfields and the land targets. Then on 7th September the major attacks on London. Doesn't seem t have been a single coherent strategy. Perhaps down to the fact that a negotiated peace was hoped for - an acquiescent British Empire leaving Germany free to do as it wished. When that didn't happen, what next? Well, knock out Fighter Command as a prelude to invasion. Which, in its wake, brough out disagreements across the three German forces. It is as well for us that that happened. Coupled with poor intelligence on the German side, and attrition that could not eventually be sustained, as well as a host of other factors.

 

[pbehn]

1 Bomber Commanders. I'll find the reference to the meeting for you.

2 If the Luftwaffe were looking for total air superiority over an invasion area, they would not have been looking to fly as far as London, but rather only as far as the English Channel coast. That would have increased the 109s' combat time considerably. It would not have proved to be any constraint on the 110.

3 I think Stephen Bungay calls it the 'cock-up theory'. The less you do (i.e. you keep things simple), the less cock-ups, the more likely you are to win.
And ineptitude, yes I agree. Previously, right up to the end of the Western Campaign in the Spring of 1940, there were clear goals. For the Battle of Britain, there appears to be hesitancy, and a case of not quite knowing what to do next. For just over a month there were attacks on shipping in the Channel and up the south-easy coast of England. Then the attacks on the airfields and the land targets. Then on 7th September the major attacks on London. Doesn't seem t have been a single coherent strategy. Perhaps down to the fact that a negotiated peace was hoped for - an acquiescent British Empire leaving Germany free to do as it wished. When that didn't happen, what next? Well, knock out Fighter Command as a prelude to invasion. Which, in its wake, brough out disagreements across the three German forces. It is as well for us that that happened. Coupled with poor intelligence on the German side, and attrition that could not eventually be sustained, as well as a host of other factors.

Goering doesn't seem to have known what he was up against in any way. Numerically in terms of RAF strength and ability to replenish, tactically, he didn't know how the RAF worked or even where it was. Because of that he didnt have strategy or plan. If he had been systematic in pushing the RAF back from Maston and Dover then spreading further in and along I could see it working. Goerings problem was with intelligence, until shortly before he gave up he and lots of others were convinced they were winning. Its like hitting mike Tyson with two body shots, two jabs, two shots to the head then trying the wild haymaker to knock him out.

 

[pbehn]

It does seem our victory over the Germans was largely due to ineptitude on their part.

Goering didn't really have a clue. He had no idea of how much he had lost of "his" Luftwaffe until he was told at the end of the battle of France, the losses to all reasons were huge. It is part of strategic bombing that the bomber force is "bait" to attack a target that the enemy must defend and destroy the defences. This is OK as long as you do destroy the defenders but Goering wasn't doing that. The LW was drawing up defenders and getting shot down. The very last raids on London had a bomber to fighter ratio that was huge because bombers were so much harder to keep in service. He gave up before he had lost the last of his bombers and their crews wiped out and it all petered out as the attacks migrated into the night time Blitz, which did nothing to advance any German invasion.

 

[wuzak]

Which to me, highlights just how valuable the Mustang was that it was able to cruise at a reasonably good clip and still get the mileage needed to go deep into Germany.

I think you've missed the point.

If the P-51 was tied closely to the bombers, it would not be able to cruise at the higher speeds and would be at a disadvantage when contact was made with enemy fighters.

The Spitfire could cruise at a higher speed if necessary. It was a recommendation from tactical trials with a captured Fw 190 that Spitfire Vs over Europe fly at higher cruise speeds. The higher cruise speed gave some chance, low cruise speed gave little to none.

 

[gjs238]

I think you've missed the point.

If the P-51 was tied closely to the bombers, it would not be able to cruise at the higher speeds and would be at a disadvantage when contact was made with enemy fighters.

The Spitfire could cruise at a higher speed if necessary. It was a recommendation from tactical trials with a captured Fw 190 that Spitfire Vs over Europe fly at higher cruise speeds. The higher cruise speed gave some chance, low cruise speed gave little to none.

I didn't read Peter Gunn's post that way.
I don't read him advocating tying the P-51 closely to the bombers.

 

[wuzak]

I didn't read Peter Gunn's post that way.
I don't read him advocating tying the P-51 closely to the bombers.

I didn't read his post as advocating that either.

The point that Shortround made was that the Bf 109s and 110s were tied to the bombers and had to use a cruise speed lower than they otherwise would. Similarly, in the "Lean into France" campaign the Spitfires were tied to the bombers and had to use a slower cruise speed than otherwise.

The 109s, 110s and Spitfires had the capability of using higher cruise speeds, but weren't allowed to, thus putting them at a disadvantage.

Yes, P-51s could fly farther than those, and it could fly at higher cruise speeds, thanks to its aerodynamics. But it was also given the freedom to do so, through the use of the relay system and a different mission aim (from early in 1944) of destroying the enemy air force rather than defending their own bombing force.

My point is that had the P-51 been hamstrung by the same tactics used by the 109, 110 and Spitfire it would have been less effective.

 

[Milosh]

Wuzak, the P-51s were hamstrung for a time til there was a command change. This command change then had the P-51s hunting the Lw.

John Vasco knows what he is talking about, John Vasco (Author of Messerschmitt Bf 110)