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He didn't interview the ones who were shot down over Kent.
And?I interviewed a few...
So, what led to this inadequate understanding of how to use this type of aircraft? Was it as simple as matters of doing successfully in the earliest days of the war?
And?
Which to me, highlights just how valuable the Mustang was that it was able to cruise at a reasonably good clip and still get the mileage needed to go deep into Germany.This should not be a surprise for us to find out now as the British ran into the same problems early in the "Lean into France" campaign. Flying at long range cruise speeds was finally judged to near suicidal even for Spitfires. It took a Spitfire V about 2 minutes to go from a cruise speed of just over 200mph to full speed.
German fighters, of any type, putzing along at bomber cruise speeds would be flying too slow to successfully engage attacking fighters with the amount of warning time they had.
Starting every fight in a much lower energy state than your opponents is not a good way to fight.
An observation on the climb chart. I am sure that I have read a tactical comparison report that stated that whilst the climb rate was better for the Hurricane (+12lb boost) the Me110 could climb at a steeper angle which made it impossible for the Hurricane to follow. Pilots were advised to not follow it in a climb, but use the best performance of the Hurricane and re-initiate combat when they had the advantage.
Was this based on the bomber commanders or Goering himself? Also, was this idea based on earlier experience in the Spanish civil war?Commanders of bomber units insisting that their fighter escort flew close escort to them, so that they would feel more protected.
Would they have been able to fly as far at the higher speeds necessary for this?Instead of carrying out forward interception, finding and attacking, shooting down, and disrupting the enemy formations, the Lw fighters on close escort were at a distinct disadvantage given that the RAF fighters were under no such speed constraint.
Calais to London is 100 miles approx. However some major raids on London were plagued with head winds which slowed the bombers dramatically and gave the escorts a headache flying that slow.Would they have been able to fly as far at the higher speeds necessary for this?
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1 Was this based on the bomber commanders or Goering himself? Also, was this idea based on earlier experience in the Spanish civil war?
2 Would they have been able to fly as far at the higher speeds necessary for this?
3 It does seem our victory over the Germans was largely due to ineptitude on their part.
Goering doesn't seem to have known what he was up against in any way. Numerically in terms of RAF strength and ability to replenish, tactically, he didn't know how the RAF worked or even where it was. Because of that he didnt have strategy or plan. If he had been systematic in pushing the RAF back from Maston and Dover then spreading further in and along I could see it working. Goerings problem was with intelligence, until shortly before he gave up he and lots of others were convinced they were winning. Its like hitting mike Tyson with two body shots, two jabs, two shots to the head then trying the wild haymaker to knock him out.1 Bomber Commanders. I'll find the reference to the meeting for you.
2 If the Luftwaffe were looking for total air superiority over an invasion area, they would not have been looking to fly as far as London, but rather only as far as the English Channel coast. That would have increased the 109s' combat time considerably. It would not have proved to be any constraint on the 110.
3 I think Stephen Bungay calls it the 'cock-up theory'. The less you do (i.e. you keep things simple), the less cock-ups, the more likely you are to win.
And ineptitude, yes I agree. Previously, right up to the end of the Western Campaign in the Spring of 1940, there were clear goals. For the Battle of Britain, there appears to be hesitancy, and a case of not quite knowing what to do next. For just over a month there were attacks on shipping in the Channel and up the south-easy coast of England. Then the attacks on the airfields and the land targets. Then on 7th September the major attacks on London. Doesn't seem t have been a single coherent strategy. Perhaps down to the fact that a negotiated peace was hoped for - an acquiescent British Empire leaving Germany free to do as it wished. When that didn't happen, what next? Well, knock out Fighter Command as a prelude to invasion. Which, in its wake, brough out disagreements across the three German forces. It is as well for us that that happened. Coupled with poor intelligence on the German side, and attrition that could not eventually be sustained, as well as a host of other factors.
Goering didn't really have a clue. He had no idea of how much he had lost of "his" Luftwaffe until he was told at the end of the battle of France, the losses to all reasons were huge. It is part of strategic bombing that the bomber force is "bait" to attack a target that the enemy must defend and destroy the defences. This is OK as long as you do destroy the defenders but Goering wasn't doing that. The LW was drawing up defenders and getting shot down. The very last raids on London had a bomber to fighter ratio that was huge because bombers were so much harder to keep in service. He gave up before he had lost the last of his bombers and their crews wiped out and it all petered out as the attacks migrated into the night time Blitz, which did nothing to advance any German invasion.It does seem our victory over the Germans was largely due to ineptitude on their part.
Which to me, highlights just how valuable the Mustang was that it was able to cruise at a reasonably good clip and still get the mileage needed to go deep into Germany.
I think you've missed the point.
If the P-51 was tied closely to the bombers, it would not be able to cruise at the higher speeds and would be at a disadvantage when contact was made with enemy fighters.
The Spitfire could cruise at a higher speed if necessary. It was a recommendation from tactical trials with a captured Fw 190 that Spitfire Vs over Europe fly at higher cruise speeds. The higher cruise speed gave some chance, low cruise speed gave little to none.
I didn't read Peter Gunn's post that way.
I don't read him advocating tying the P-51 closely to the bombers.