Me-110 Underrated (1 Viewer)

[Peter Gunn]

No point missed

Were not the Mustangs (and Thunderbolts) initially tied to close escort and later sent on more of a search and destroy type of mission? Also, even when cruising with the bomber stream, were not Mustangs crisscrossing over the bombers at higher speeds so as not to get caught with their pants (or speed) down? One of you more learned gentlemen can correct me on that if I'm wrong.

Not really meaning to derail the thread, it was just an observation.

P.S. so John, how came you to have such an interest in the Bf 110?

 

[glennasher]

After Doolittle took over from Eaker, things took a turn for the better. Doolittle understood what Eaker apparently missed, that they had to destroy the Luftwaffe before they could be more effective with the bombers. Doolittle was the one who turned the fighters loose.

 

[wuzak]

No point missed

Were not the Mustangs (and Thunderbolts) initially tied to close escort and later sent on more of a search and destroy type of mission? Also, even when cruising with the bomber stream, were not Mustangs crisscrossing over the bombers at higher speeds so as not to get caught with their pants (or speed) down? One of you more learned gentlemen can correct me on that if I'm wrong.

Not really meaning to derail the thread, it was just an observation.

P.S. so John, how came you to have such an interest in the Bf 110?

The P-51s also didn't have to escort the bombers all the way to target and back, thanks to the relay system.

If I am not mistaken, there was less than a month between the P-51 first arriving in combat and Doolittle taking over.

 

[John Vasco]

P.S. so John, how came you to have such an interest in the Bf 110?

It's a bit of a long story.

When my son was 2-2½ (1979/early-1980), I started making model aircraft again to hang from his ceiling. I'd always had an interest in the Battle of Britain, and so made models of the main fighters: SPitfire, Hurricane, 109 & 110. I also started reading up on the Battle and got numerous books from the library. Now, in these books the same event was recounted, but different books said completely different things. So, I thought, rather stupidly, I could do as good as that! Everything you wanted to know about the Spitfire, Hurricane, etc. had been published almost to saturation point, so I looked on the German side, and one particular unit kept cropping up with a rather unusual role in the Battle of Brtitain: Erprobungsgruppe 210 and its fighter-bombers. Someone MUST have written about that unit, I thought, but after a thorough search, nothing. So I then set out to find out as much as I could on the unit. Writing to publishers to contact authors, etc.. By 1983 I had gathered some information, but not a lot. One last shot - I wrote to the Gemeinschafet der Jagdflieger and asked for my letter of help to be published, which they did. I got ONE reply, from a former membr named Karl-Fritz Schröder. If anyone was instrumental in my work on Erprobungsgruppe 210, 'Bombsights over England', seeing the light of day, it was Karl. He told me there was a bi-yearly reunion involving Erprobungsgruppe 210 former members called the 'Wespentreffen', and invited me to attend the following year, which I did. There I met other former members, who put me in touch with other former members, and so the 'domino effect' kicked in. I had also gathered loads of info from the other side by visiting the Public Record Office (PRO), now the National Archive, and getting into the Fighter Command combat reports and airfield ORBs. I also obtained a complete set of Namentliche Verlustmeldungen of Erpr. Gr. 210 from the Deutsche Dienststelle in Berlin (Karl opened the door for me on that one!). So I wrote the whole thing and offered it to several publishers - they all rejected it. SO I got a bank loan and published it myself.

During my research, I contacted Peter Cornwell, THE pre-eminent Battle of Britain researcher (Battle of Britain Then and Now loss/damage tables), and visited him. I mentioned to him that I was thinking of diong all of the Bf 110 units in 1940 as my next project, and he suggested we do it together. And so, as well as attending the Wespentreffen in the 1980s, me and Peter were zipping around Germany and Austria every year interviewing and copying the photos of the Bf 110 veterans we could track down, and who were prepared to meet us, Like Wolfgang Falck and Hans-Joachim Jabs. We had some hilarious adventures along the way. I published our work 'Zerstörer' in 1995.

With 'Bombsights' selling out its 1,000 print run, I offered a second edition to Schiffer, and they accepted, and asked if I had anything else. So I told them I had rather a lot of photos of SKG 210/ZG 1, 1941-44, would they like to do a photo history? Yep, they would, so those two volumes were published in 2001 & 2002. Theythen asked if I could do a 'Profiles' book on the 110, and I said yeah, if the right profiles artist came along. Well, an internet contact in Brazil sent me an e-mail with a profile done by his friend and asked for my comments. 'Give me this guy's feckin' e-mail address!' That is how I got in contact with Fernando Estanislau, and we did the 'Profiles' book together. So I was up to around 3 in the morning every night for years chatting to Fernando, exchanging views (we did not always agree on things!) settling on the aircraft photos to use, and going through every single variant & sub-variant of the 110. We have never met - everything has been done via the internet.

After that, hey presto, publishers started coming to ME with projects on the Bf 110, and so over the years I've done stuff for Ian Allan, who then sold the rights on to Crecy without ever telling me, and most recently a two volume series on every Bf 110 Staffel in the Battle of Britain.

It's been one hell of a ride, but I wouldn't have missed it for the world. Who else has ever stood on the doorstep of Wolfgang Falck's house in St. Ulrich am Pillersee in Austria on an early Spring evening, and having the door open and be greeted by the man himself saying to me and Peter Cornwell 'Ah, you are the two mad Englishmen Jabs told me about!'. We had met Jabs a few days earlier, and then there was a big Nightfighter reunion that they both attended. I can imagine Jabs saying to him: 'I had two mad Englishmen visit me the other day, Vasco & Cornwell', and Falck saying,'They're coming to see me Sunday night!'

So, there's the story of how I started, and ended up, putting out a lot on the Bf 110. Phew!

Covers of my two latest, if you are interested.

I can also post some sample pages of the above if you wish.

 

[Shortround6]

A great story, and one that was lucky to occur when it did so you could talk to the men involved.

 

[pbehn]

It's a bit of a long story.

When my son was 2-2½ (1979/early-1980), I started making model aircraft again to hang from his ceiling. I'd always had an interest in the Battle of Britain, and so made models of the main fighters: SPitfire, Hurricane, 109 & 110. I also started reading up on the Battle and got numerous books from the library. Now, in these books the same event was recounted, but different books said completely different things. So, I thought, rather stupidly, I could do as good as that! Everything you wanted to know about the Spitfire, Hurricane, etc. had been published almost to saturation point, so I looked on the German side, and one particular unit kept cropping up with a rather unusual role in the Battle of Brtitain: Erprobungsgruppe 210 and its fighter-bombers. Someone MUST have written about that unit, I thought, but after a thorough search, nothing. So I then set out to find out as much as I could on the unit. Writing to publishers to contact authors, etc.. By 1983 I had gathered some information, but not a lot. One last shot - I wrote to the Gemeinschafet der Jagdflieger and asked for my letter of help to be published, which they did. I got ONE reply, from a former membr named Karl-Fritz Schröder. If anyone was instrumental in my work on Erprobungsgruppe 210, 'Bombsights over England', seeing the light of day, it was Karl. He told me there was a bi-yearly reunion involving Erprobungsgruppe 210 former members called the 'Wespentreffen', and invited me to attend the following year, which I did. There I met other former members, who put me in touch with other former members, and so the 'domino effect' kicked in. I had also gathered loads of info from the other side by visiting the Public Record Office (PRO), now the National Archive, and getting into the Fighter Command combat reports and airfield ORBs. I also obtained a complete set of Namentliche Verlustmeldungen of Erpr. Gr. 210 from the Deutsche Dienststelle in Berlin (Karl opened the door for me on that one!). So I wrote the whole thing and offered it to several publishers - they all rejected it. SO I got a bank loan and published it myself.

During my research, I contacted Peter Cornwell, THE pre-eminent Battle of Britain researcher (Battle of Britain Then and Now loss/damage tables), and visited him. I mentioned to him that I was thinking of diong all of the Bf 110 units in 1940 as my next project, and he suggested we do it together. And so, as well as attending the Wespentreffen in the 1980s, me and Peter were zipping around Germany and Austria every year interviewing and copying the photos of the Bf 110 veterans we could track down, and who were prepared to meet us, Like Wolfgang Falck and Hans-Joachim Jabs. We had some hilarious adventures along the way. I published our work 'Zerstörer' in 1995.

With 'Bombsights' selling out its 1,000 print run, I offered a second edition to Schiffer, and they accepted, and asked if I had anything else. So I told them I had rather a lot of photos of SKG 210/ZG 1, 1941-44, would they like to do a photo history? Yep, they would, so those two volumes were published in 2001 & 2002. Theythen asked if I could do a 'Profiles' book on the 110, and I said yeah, if the right profiles artist came along. Well, an internet contact in Brazil sent me an e-mail with a profile done by his friend and asked for my comments. 'Give me this guy's feckin' e-mail address!' That is how I got in contact with Fernando Estanislau, and we did the 'Profiles' book together. So I was up to around 3 in the morning every night for years chatting to Fernando, exchanging views (we did not always agree on things!) settling on the aircraft photos to use, and going through every single variant & sub-variant of the 110. We have never met - everything has been done via the internet.

After that, hey presto, publishers started coming to ME with projects on the Bf 110, and so over the years I've done stuff for Ian Allan, who then sold the rights on to Crecy without ever telling me, and most recently a two volume series on every Bf 110 Staffel in the Battle of Britain.

It's been one hell of a ride, but I wouldn't have missed it for the world. Who else has ever stood on the doorstep of Wolfgang Falck's house in St. Ulrich am Pillersee in Austria on an early Spring evening, and having the door open and be greeted by the man himself saying to me and Peter Cornwell 'Ah, you are the two mad Englishmen Jabs told me about!'. We had met Jabs a few days earlier, and then there was a big Nightfighter reunion that they both attended. I can imagine Jabs saying to him: 'I had two mad Englishmen visit me the other day, Vasco & Cornwell', and Falck saying,'They're coming to see me Sunday night!'

So, there's the story of how I started, and ended up, putting out a lot on the Bf 110. Phew!

Covers of my two latest, if you are interested.
View attachment 586074

View attachment 586075

I can also post some sample pages of the above if you wish.

Great post. By coincidence, since I cannot face any more BLM or CV-19 news I watched an episode of "The World at War" last night. It had night fighter pilot Wilhelm Herget explaining night fighter tactics, I don't know if you met him. However the piece was introduced by an explanation of the Kammhuber line and said "The LW was acutely aware of the lesson RADAR equipped fighters had taught it during the Battle of Britain. But when did they learn that lesson? During or after? How much were the actual pilots aware of the part played by RADAR at the time in the BoB.

 

[Zipper730]

Calais to London is 100 miles approx. However some major raids on London were plagued with head winds which slowed the bombers dramatically and gave the escorts a headache flying that slow.

I assume that many fighter & Zerstorer units were based at Calais?

Goering doesn't seem to have known what he was up against in any way. . . Goerings problem was with intelligence, until shortly before he gave up

I'm curious why he had shortcomings with intelligence? Also, why didn't he simply ask his subordinates to report to him what's going on? If I was in charge of something that serious -- I would want to be kept posted.

He had no idea of how much he had lost of "his" Luftwaffe until he was told at the end of the battle of France

Wait, I thought France fell prior to the Battle of Britain?

It is part of strategic bombing that the bomber force is "bait" to attack a target that the enemy must defend and destroy the defences. This is OK as long as you do destroy the defenders but Goering wasn't doing that.

I'd be okay with using bombers as bait, but I'd want heavy fighter cover (I'd prefer them to make it home), a series of feints.

Bomber Commanders. I'll find the reference to the meeting for you.

Okay. I'm surprised that over 1-2 months they wouldn't have changed tactics, though it proved beneficial to the UK (as well as the US).

If the Luftwaffe were looking for total air superiority over an invasion area, they would not have been looking to fly as far as London, but rather only as far as the English Channel coast. That would have increased the 109s' combat time considerably. It would not have proved to be any constraint on the 110.

I kind of forgot about the fact that the goal of the German high command was essentially to pave the way for a coastal-invasion (yes, I know that sounds stupid), so much as a way to knock them out of the war. For that, you'd want to extend out to the British side of the channel, and probably a certain number of miles inland from that point.

Since the British would fight this with everything they got with fighter-command, and retaliate with bomber-command: Attacking the fighter-bases would hamper flight-operations (I'm not sure what the policy was on all sides regarding strafing airplanes on the ground), and attacking the bomber-bases would prevent retaliatory-strikes of increasing magnitude (if sufficient headway was achieved, I would imagine the RAF would have more quickly switched their attacks into the cities in full force).

For these missions, the Bf.110 would be able to fly out at cruise speeds similar to the outbound interception speeds used by the Hurricane without incident in terms of range?

3 I think Stephen Bungay calls it the 'cock-up theory'. The less you do (i.e. you keep things simple), the less cock-ups, the more likely you are to win.

Also known as K.I.S.S.

And ineptitude, yes I agree. Previously, right up to the end of the Western Campaign in the Spring of 1940, there were clear goals. For the Battle of Britain, there appears to be hesitancy, and a case of not quite knowing what to do next. For just over a month there were attacks on shipping in the Channel and up the south-easy coast of England. Then the attacks on the airfields and the land targets. Then on 7th September the major attacks on London. Doesn't seem t have been a single coherent strategy. Perhaps down to the fact that a negotiated peace was hoped for

That seemed to be a big thing, actually. I'm surprised they were so stunned that they'd oppose it, though it's probably a good thing: The Germans would have plowed all over the place with minimal resistance; then extended and extinguished the British for good.

We wouldn't have been able to attack Germany in any real way, and the Japanese demonstrated they could plow across the Pacific with the same ease that Germany plowed over Europe.

When that didn't happen, what next? Well, knock out Fighter Command as a prelude to invasion. Which, in its wake, brough out disagreements across the three German forces. It is as well for us that that happened.

What kind of disagreements?

 

[GrauGeist]

I'm curious why he had shortcomings with intelligence? Also, why didn't he simply ask his subordinates to report to him what's going on? If I was in charge of something that serious -- I would want to be kept posted.

In a totalitarian regime, it is often unhealthy to report negative data.
So Goering (who already lived in a vacuum) did not have a black and white assessment of the situation. It went further up, though, as Hitler was not always given hard details because of his temper tantrums.

This was not unique to the Third Reich, though, the Japanese and the Soviet leaders did not take negative reports very well, either.

 

[Milosh]

I assume that many fighter & Zerstorer units were based at Calais?

Assume incorrectly.

https://www.bing.com/images/blob?bcid=SBiD6sTec3sBqxcxoNWLuD9SqbotqVTdP0k

 

[Peter Gunn]

John,

Great story, thanks for sharing, I'm always interested to see how someone sets out on a journey like this. Good job.

I can also post some sample pages of the above if you wish.

YES PLEASE!

 

[John Vasco]

John,

Great story, thanks for sharing, I'm always interested to see how someone sets out on a journey like this. Good job.

YES PLEASE!

PART ONE:

The above caption mainly covers another photo of A2+LK on the opposite page.

PART TWO:

S9+AH was the Bf 110 of Martin Lutz, Staffelkapitän of 1./Erpr. Gr. 210, later third Gruppenkommandeur. He pranged this one, so being the Boss, he comandeered another from the unit, S9+DH, and on 27th September 1940 was shot down and killed in S9+DH in a raid against The Parnall Aircraft Factory at Yate, near Bristol.

With this last photo, the only info myself and a Swedish researcher (who I had liaised with for years) had was the in the first sentence of the caption. It took many weeks to arrive at the position of the unit, the aircraft, and most importantly, who the pilot was addressing the groundcrew upon return from a cambat mission over southern England.

Profiles by Fernando Estanislau.

 

[Dimlee]

I hope those great books will be published in electronic format in the future.
Currently, I can find only hardcovers on Amazon...

 

[John Vasco]

What kind of disagreements?

Zipper,
Rather than type out a long post, here's four pages from Stephen Bungays 'The most dangerous enemy' which highlights the differences of opinions between the three German armed forces.

Hope this helps.

 

[John Vasco]

I hope those great books will be published in electronic format in the future.
Currently, I can find only hardcovers on Amazon...

Thank you for your very kind words - appreciated.

 

[pbehn]

I assume that many fighter & Zerstorer units were based at Calais?
I'm curious why he had shortcomings with intelligence? Also, why didn't he simply ask his subordinates to report to him what's going on? If I was in charge of something that serious -- I would want to be kept posted.
Wait, I thought France fell prior to the Battle of Britain?
I'd be okay with using bombers as bait, but I'd want heavy fighter cover (I'd prefer them to make it home), a series of feints.
?

Most airfields at Calais were Bf 109 they had the shortest range so were closest to the coast.

Books are written on things like intelligence and its use. As I remember, his reports on UK fighter production were old and so underestimated strength, same with pilot training. At the start his idea of RAF strength was correct, but believing claims and not believing production had changed in UK meant he was increasingly deluded about the RAF he was facing. Numerically the RAF increased slightly in strength through the battle wile Goering and many top staff believed it was almost eliminated. Such thinking becomes self reinforcing, the appearance of the Duxford wing in the battle 50 aircraft together was seen as proof that this desperate measure was a last throw of the dice, the fabled "last 50 airplanes".

From the invasion of Poland Germany had been making aircraft and losing them. It seems that Goering was mainly concerned with production and combat losses, but the LW had many other losses other than combat losses, a lot of accidents and planes being cannibalised. When France (and Belgium) fell that was the end of campaigns in Poland Netherlands Norway Belgium France and Goering had only paid a passing interest because they were winning. When he visited France and totted up the numbers of planes actually available a huge number were missing from his mental picture. As a bomber force the LW was at its strongest before the France campaign, it never regained that strength at any time later.
Towards the end of the BoB the ratio of fighters to bombers was huge, but the S/E fighters didnt have the range and the twin engined fighters were instructed to stay close to the bombers, I suspect to ensure there was something there at all times.

 

[pbehn]

Assume incorrectly.

https://www.bing.com/images/blob?bcid=SBiD6sTec3sBqxcxoNWLuD9SqbotqVTdP0k

Its a great map. I mentioned the distances purely to illustrate how short the actually were. Most airfields in and around Calais were for Bf109 because they had the shortest range. Manston was closer to those LW airfields than many RAF airfields than many RAF fields in 11 group. It doesn't matter where the Bf 110 fields were (unless you are attacking them). To attack London you have to take the shortest route because of the 109s, the bombers and Bf 110s had ample range. However they were most of the time in range of Chain home as your map shows, forming up at Cap Griz Nez is also in range of Chain Home low. For the 109s who weren't actually at Calais, they had to take off and form up, then form up at the RDV with the bombers and then chug into a head wind across the channel, when things went wrong with timing some were getting low on fuel before they crossed the English coast.

 

[Zipper730]

In a totalitarian regime, it is often unhealthy to report negative data.
So Goering (who already lived in a vacuum) did not have a black and white assessment of the situation. It went further up, though, as Hitler was not always given hard details because of his temper tantrums.

Okay, so the fact that he had inaccurate data was because his subordinates were afraid of reprisals? This probably proved a major disadvantage for the Germans, Japanese, Soviets.

Assume incorrectly.

https://www.bing.com/images/blob?bcid=SBiD6sTec3sBqxcxoNWLuD9SqbotqVTdP0k

I appreciate the effort, but the link doesn't load.

Zipper,
Rather than type out a long post, here's four pages from Stephen Bungays 'The most dangerous enemy' which highlights the differences of opinions between the three German armed forces.

Okay, so the basic plan called for the following

​

I. Kriegsmarine​

A. Provide an invasion fleet to move army units ashore​

B. Protect the invasion fleet from the Royal Navy and shore-based artillery​

II. Luftwaffe​

A. Prevent the RAF from intervening​

B. Attack coastal points and support landing Army units.​

C. Attack Royal Navy vessels​

D. Disrupt transportation lines​

III. Heer​

A. Storm-ashore & attack any remaining resistance​

B. Capture England.​

​

It seemed the Luftwaffe didn't see the invasion as being a feasible idea, the Kriegsmarine didn't think it would be possible, Hitler felt that the UK was ready to give up and wanted to carry out the invasion faster than his experts wanted to, and saw the threat of problems with the USSR.

 

[pbehn]

Okay, so the fact that he had inaccurate data was because his subordinates were afraid of reprisals? This probably proved a major disadvantage for the Germans, Japanese, Soviets.

I appreciate the effort, but the link doesn't load.

Okay, so the basic plan called for the following

​

I. Kriegsmarine​

A. Provide an invasion fleet to move army units ashore​

B. Protect the invasion fleet from the Royal Navy and shore-based artillery​

II. Luftwaffe​

A. Prevent the RAF from intervening​

B. Attack coastal points and support landing Army units.​

C. Attack Royal Navy vessels​

D. Disrupt transportation lines​

III. Heer​

A. Storm-ashore & attack any remaining resistance​

B. Capture England.​

​

It seemed the Luftwaffe didn't see the invasion as being a feasible idea, the Kriegsmarine didn't think it would be possible, Hitler felt that the UK was ready to give up and wanted to carry out the invasion faster than his experts wanted to, and saw the threat of problems with the USSR.

If someone like Hitler tells you he wants a plan, you come up with a plan. They had plans to bomb the USA and build massive broad gauge railways all over Europe. They stopped work on the railways in 1945, because to say "this isn't gonna happen" is defeatism and will get you shot.

 

[Schweik]

No, I don't question statistics and they are not my own. 1079 spitfires and hurricanes were lost and 1/3 were shot down by 110s. The rest 2/3s by 109s. How do I question stats. It's simple math.

The RAF had more planes and were also producing at higher rates. What does any of that have to do anything with what Dowding said? You are trying to connect irrelevant things.

I think a fair amount was shot down by defensive Gunners on bombers.

 

[pbehn]

I think a fair amount was shot down by defensive Gunners on bombers.

I got lost at "the RAF had more planes".