Most important British battle Imphal-Kohima

[syscom3]

So the Japanese commitments and huge losses were irrelevant in Burma? Once Stalingrad fell Overlord wasn't relevant to the outcome of the war either by that logic.

That's despite the Germans being bled white in Normandy (German casualties averaged about 2,300 men per Division per month in Normandy compared with just under 1,000 in the East for the same period).

Just what does Stalingrad have to do with the Pacific War? Different circumstances, different type of war, different armies.

A better analogy would have been "Was it worth continuing offensive operations in Italy after Operation Dragoon".

 

[syscom3]

Military historians, including some Americans would disagree.

Admirals King and Nimitz, and General Marshall didnt think it was worthy of much to begin with. Even less so after the Mariana's were taken.

 

[buffnut453]

And of course King and Nimitz didn't have a vested interest in promoting their accomplishments, did they? And that's before we get onto King's rabid Anglophobia - hardly objective commentators on the situation.

 

[Junglerot]

One way to look at the decisiveness of the battle is to examine the consequences of a Japanese victory. The IJA did not have the ability to exploit a victory at Imphal. The offensive was supported over jungle trails and any advances would have lengthened the tenuous Japanese supply lines while shortening British supply lines. A Japanese victory at Imphal would only have spoiled the British offensive into Burma. All that would have meant was Burma would have been in Japanese hands on VJ Day, along with Malaysia, Singapore, French Indochina, Java, Sumatra, etc.

 

[vinnye]

I agree with Buffnut, Admiral King in particular would be a hostile witness against any British accomplishments so needs to be taken with a pinch of salt!
The length of the Japanese supply lines was a problem for them and was not something the British had any control over - but could maybe exploit?
A similar situation to the Western Desert - firstly the Germans had problems with long supply lines, then latterly the British.
The fact still remains you can only defeat your enemy wherever they are - you do not always get to choose where they will be.
A long supply train puts a strain on your enemy - well that's good from where I am sitting. Let them over extend themselves and have difficulties in re-supplying their troops. If this makes defeating them a little easier - all well and good. But you still need to defeat them.

 

[stona]

Just what does Stalingrad have to do with the Pacific War? Different circumstances, different type of war, different armies.

A better analogy would have been "Was it worth continuing offensive operations in Italy after Operation Dragoon".

The Soviets would have prevailed eventually over Germany, particularly with continuing aid from the West, just as the United States would have over Japan,without the help of 3 million Indians.
Goebbel's "Iron Curtain" would have fallen along the coast of Europe and Germany, France, Holland, Belgium etc would have been occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of hostilities.
That makes "Overlord" redundant by your logic (assuming you can palate the political consequences post war. Why on earth did we bother?

"War is the continuation of "Politik" by other means."

Cheers

Steve

 

[syscom3]

You seem to confuse the difference between a maritime war with a continental war. The ETO/MTO was a continental affair in which army groups could be moved around with relative ease.

The PTO was a maritime war with a couple of divisions in battle side by side is considered to be a major campaign. And since all the combatants needed sealift to move about and be supported, movement was far more difficult.

For Burma; If the Japanese win or lose, their forces stay in place. They could not be redeployed without exposing the Japanese flank. Thus the assertion they helped tie down forces that could be used against the US and ANZAC is absurd.

Now look at what the US did in Jan/Feb 1944; The taking of the Admiralties and Kwajelein/Eniwetok completely isolated the Japanese forces in the Central Pacific and forced the IJN westwards to their bases in the Dutch New Indies. That had huge ramifications for Tokyo. When the Mariana's were taken in June, Japans inner defense lines were shattered and it was now a matter of when they would be beaten.

Now explain to me why the battles in Burma, in 1943 and 1944, were so strategically important to the eventual defeat of the Japanese? Either way you look at it, whether the IJA is on the offense or defense; they are on the periphery far removed from the interior sea lanes where the decisive battles were starting to take shape.

 

[stona]

Now explain to me why the battles in Burma, in 1943 and 1944, were so strategically important to the eventual defeat of the Japanese?

In simple terms, it killed a lot of Japanese and occupied a lot of Japanese resources.

Why was the cross Channel invasion by the Western Allies strategically important to the defeat of Nazi Germany. It would have lost, eventually, anyway? Why didn't we just carry on bombing Germany into next week and supporting the Russians in other ways?
That's what the British used to do in the 18th and 19th Centuries. Basically pick the side you want to win and send them money. We even gave that money a name.....St George's Cavalry.

Of course the whole idea is ridiculous but it makes a point.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stug3]

Agree with all. Slim was one of the greats and the contribution of not just the Indian Army but the entire British effort in Burma has been overlooked compared to the more glamourous island-hopping campaign in the Pacific.

glamourous is not a word I would use to describe those battles. Maybe you overlooked what they were actually like since they involved those self-centered, self-involved Americans, all of whom only ever consider their own efforts accomplishments important.

 

[buffnut453]

I was not demeaning the bravery of American soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. Neither did I say that the battles were glamourous - I said the campaign was. And I stand by my statement. The Burma Campaign remains the Forgotten War. Despite inflicting over 200,000 casualties on the enemy, the contribution of the British Commonwealth forces in that theatre continue to be under-represented in the historical record and undervalued by many...as this thread proves.

 

[merlin]

One way to look at the decisiveness of the battle is to examine the consequences of a Japanese victory. The IJA did not have the ability to exploit a victory at Imphal. The offensive was supported over jungle trails and any advances would have lengthened the tenuous Japanese supply lines while shortening British supply lines. A Japanese victory at Imphal would only have spoiled the British offensive into Burma. All that would have meant was Burma would have been in Japanese hands on VJ Day, along with Malaysia, Singapore, French Indochina, Java, Sumatra, etc.

With the Japanese defeated at Kohima/Imphal it enabled the British offensive to take place, such were Japanese losses.

However a Japanese victory there could have had much bigger consequences:

- from Kohima it was only a short distance to Dimapur - an important rail-head both for the Army and for supplies to the Chinese, moreover it was not defensible unlike the others which were.

- the Japanese had requited disaffected Indian POWs, to form their own Indian Army, it's likely that would grow.

- another Imperial failure, would likely see more disturbances in India, there may be calls for Indian troops to be brought back to India to defend it.

- supplies for China would be compromised.

Japanese losses in the battle were substantial:

Before Battle After Battle Losses
15th Division 20,000 4,000 16,000
31st Division 20,000 7,000 13,000
33rd Division 25,000 4,000 21,000
Army &Admin 50,000 35,000 15,000
Total 115,000 50,000 65,000

A big hole in Japanese manpower in the area.