Most successful Anti Ship aircraft

I put the F6F in the same category as a Fw-190G. An aircraft that had a much greater payload then the Me-109.

I would say the B25 gunships to.

difficult to pin down the greatest tonnage to a particular type. However i think the single most efficient ship killing excercises could be short listed.

Some thoughts

1) Operations of Flieger Fuhrer Atlantik August 1940 to April 1941
2) RAAF and USAAAF operations in the Bismarck Sea, 1943
3) Beafort and Swordfish ops out of Malta, 1941-42
4) Operations of IJN Ryujo April 1942, Bay Of Bengal...extremely efficient use of forces
5) Luftlotte V operations against arctic convoys, particulalry PQ17
6) Operations of LW and Regia Aeronautica in the mediterranean
7) Minelaying operations by BC in the Baltic 1944-5

GrauGeist said:

wow...seriously? The F6F?

I had no idea it put that much hurt on the Japanese. My guesstimate would have favored the Dauntless as a serious contender for the title at least in the Pacific.

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It's sorties attacked. Not tonnage sunk.

As has been quoted by famous writers, "Lies, damn lies and statistics".

Based solely upon those two tables one might conclude polar opposites of (1) F6F was the most effective shipping killer or (2) the most ineffective shipping killer.

Need much more information.

timshatz said:

Really not that suprising that the F6 did a lot of ground/surface work. It may've been designed and made it's name as a fighter but towards the end of the war, it became more of an Attack Bird. Couple of reasons this happened.

1. Fewer dive bombers were brought aboard as the Kamikaze threat grew. Why bring on a plane that only bombs (SB2c) when you can bring on one that bombs and dogfights/defends the carrier (F6F).

2. As the Japanese airforces became less of a threat, the job of the F6s to escort dropped off. So, send them along with bombs and rockets on board. Only a short step from that point to getting rid of the birds they were escorting altogether.

3. F4U became the fighter bird towards 1945 with the F6 going more to Attack work.

4. Japan's economy is based on a lot of inter-island sea traffic. Small ships of less than 1000 tons. Sinking them would've been right in the F6Fs wheelhouse. Search and destroy runs up the coast.

5. Ground attack during the Okinawa and Iwo Jima campaign went to anything that could carry a bomb. F4F, F6F, TBM, SB2C, all of them did a lot of work in that realm. It was what was needed so they did it.

The F6 was a do anything kind of bird. Was somewhat suprised it didn't survive to fly in Korea. It really had the right qualifications for the job.

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That's a good post, with the exception that the F6F did not have the F4U speed.

Matt (and Thor) are dead on, I've been trying to find any type of detail about the results of these attacks but to no avail. This is the best info I've been able to find yet in regards to the US Results (only aircraft related results included from The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee:



http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/JANAC-Losses/JANAC-Losses-2.html

The only plane I've seen anything specifically stating about the tonnage sunk has been the Fw 200 so far with a range of 365k to 388k tons.

HyperWar: Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses [Chapter 4]
57,758 tons. Dec 1941
73,865. Jan 1942.
37,291. Feb 1942.
103,095. Mar 1942.
42,796. Apr 1942.
105,123. May 1942.

Not much during the crucial first 6 months of the war. It wasn't for lack of targets as the Japanese were moving millions of tons of cargo around the Pacific during this time frame. Nor was it due to lack of assets. The USN had dozens of submarines in the Pacific and the U.S. Army had plenty of aircraft.

It's rather embarrassing that our military forces were so poorly trained during December 1941.

davebender said:

HyperWar: Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses [Chapter 4]
57,758 tons. Dec 1941
73,865. Jan 1942.
37,291. Feb 1942.
103,095. Mar 1942.
42,796. Apr 1942.
105,123. May 1942.

Not much during the crucial first 6 months of the war. It wasn't for lack of targets as the Japanese were moving millions of tons of cargo around the Pacific during this time frame. Nor was it due to lack of assets. The USN had dozens of submarines in the Pacific and the U.S. Army had plenty of aircraft.

It's rather embarrassing that our military forces were so poorly trained during December 1941.

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I'm going on memory a bit here but I think the Subs were not up to the job for any number of reasons. The Torpedoes were pretty poor (magnetic exploder and depth settings for start) and there was also a problem with the Sub Commanders not being agressive enough. End result was an asset that wasn't producing.

As for the Aircraft, there is some truth to the lack of training perspective. The prewar doctrine focused more on conservation of assets (in short, don't screw up or it's your career down the tubes) than affective training. Further, the doctrine hadn't been worked out on a tactical level. The training really focused on activities that would cause the least chance of accident rather than effective use of aircraft. The US wasn't in a war at that time and experience had not yet shown that the war they planned for was not the one they were fighting (high level bombers attacking ships, ect).

The Japanese, on the other hand, were and trained that way. They'd learned the lesson that more sweat equals less blood.

But the US also hadn't started producing the numbers it would have later in the war and those that were produced were rarely in the right place. It took time for the production, equipment, organization, ect, to produce the results that would later destroy Japan. In early 42, it wasn't there. By late 43, it was starting to show up.

davebender said:

HyperWar: Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses [Chapter 4]
57,758 tons. Dec 1941
73,865. Jan 1942.
37,291. Feb 1942.
103,095. Mar 1942.
42,796. Apr 1942.
105,123. May 1942.
.

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Interesting to not the losses spiked in March and May. I am guessing one would be around the invasion of Java and Borneo (March) while the later might be Coral Sea.

Just guessing though.

parsifal said:

Some thoughts

1) Operations of Flieger Fuhrer Atlantik August 1940 to April 1941
2) RAAF and USAAAF operations in the Bismarck Sea, 1943
3) Beafort and Swordfish ops out of Malta, 1941-42
4) Operations of IJN Ryujo April 1942, Bay Of Bengal...extremely efficient use of forces
5) Luftlotte V operations against arctic convoys, particulalry PQ17
6) Operations of LW and Regia Aeronautica in the mediterranean
7) Minelaying operations by BC in the Baltic 1944-5

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I agree with all those but see the JANAC summary post, at least two others must be added from Pacific War:
8 ) USN carrier groups especially in 1944-45 in the 'inner zone' of Japan's defenses, sank a very large amount of tonnage in a short time, much more than US Army a/c.
9) B-29 mining in 1945, which sank a considerable though smaller chunk of Japanese shipping, in an even shorter time period, also slowed it down a lot which is another benefit of offensive mining even when ships aren't actually sunk.

Likewise German aerial magnetic mining in British waters early in WWII was a notable innovation in antiship air operations (though the British had laid magnetic mines from ships even late in WWI).

Another highly effective innovation of late WWII was SCR-717/APQ-5/LAB system onboard B-24's, which allowed accurate blind bombing of ships. Aerial radar was used through much of the war by many air arms to locate ships, but the LAB system allowed skip bomb-like low level attack at night with no moonlight or flares. It was particularly effectively used off the coast of China by 14th AF, and effective B-24 antishipping ops were one reason the Japanese determined to seize 14th AF bases in their 1944-1945 offensive in China.

Someone stated that rockets weren't accurate againt ships but that's not true. Rockets were an ideal weapon against a certain size range of relatively small ships. Rocket accuracy was questionable against smaller, tank sized, target. But unlike tanks, ships and boats too small to hit reliably with rockets were usually highly vulnerable to .50 cal or 20mm strafing. USN fighter bombers late in the war (among other cases of other air arms) were quite effective against typical coastal shipping.

Joe

Prussia learned that lesson during 1806, then worked methodically to fix problems in operational doctrine, training and officer selection. Why didn't the USA learn a similiar lesson from the slaughter of 1861 to 1865?

The USA was not short of military personnel and military hardware during December 1941. If our military forces had proper training and leadership Japan would have been defeated during December 1941. Or more likely, Japan would have been deterred from attacking in the first place.

JoeB said:

I agree with all those but see the JANAC summary post, at least two others must be added from Pacific War:
8 ) USN carrier groups especially in 1944-45 in the 'inner zone' of Japan's defenses, sank a very large amount of tonnage in a short time, much more than US Army a/c.
9) B-29 mining in 1945, which sank a considerable though smaller chunk of Japanese shipping, in an even shorter time period, also slowed it down a lot which is another benefit of offensive mining even when ships aren't actually sunk.

Likewise German aerial magnetic mining in British waters early in WWII was a notable innovation in antiship air operations (though the British had laid magnetic mines from ships even late in WWI).

Another highly effective innovation of late WWII was SCR-717/APQ-5/LAB system onboard B-24's, which allowed accurate blind bombing of ships. Aerial radar was used through much of the war by many air arms to locate ships, but the LAB system allowed skip bomb-like low level attack at night with no moonlight or flares. It was particularly effectively used off the coast of China by 14th AF, and effective B-24 antishipping ops were one reason the Japanese determined to seize 14th AF bases in their 1944-1945 offensive in China.

Someone stated that rockets weren't accurate againt ships but that's not true. Rockets were an ideal weapon against a certain size range of relatively small ships. Rocket accuracy was questionable against smaller, tank sized, target. But unlike tanks, ships and boats too small to hit reliably with rockets were usually highly vulnerable to .50 cal or 20mm strafing. USN fighter bombers late in the war (among other cases of other air arms) were quite effective against typical coastal shipping.

Joe

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Agree completely Joe, particularly the operations of th4e fast carriers in 1944-45

Japanese Carriers did similar work off Java in 1942, incidentally

davebender said:

Prussia learned that lesson during 1806, then worked methodically to fix problems in operational doctrine, training and officer selection. Why didn't the USA learn a similiar lesson from the slaughter of 1861 to 1865?

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Think it was a different situation. Napoleanic Wars were episodic. They would start and stop, leaving time in between to consider what had happened. In that, you are right. Napolean was actually teaching the Prussians (and the Austrians and the Russians...) how to fight the war as he figured it out. They changed their methods and got a lot better.

American Civil War was one long slogging match that changed a lot over the 4 years of the war. Started out with straight lines and a mishmash of weapons an officers. By the time it ended, there were repeating rifles and more open formations (not to mention a prototype of the Machine Gun and land mines) to say nothing of trench warfare with officers who knew what they were doing and had a pretty good idea of how to put their troops in a spot to do the most killing. It was a precursor of the 1st World War more than anything else.

In that, they did change, but a lot of Europe missed it. The Euros looked at the American Civil War as, to use the words of Von Schlieffen "One armed mob chasing another around the country".

However, that being said, the lesson of moving troops by rail was not lost on the Prussians. Picked that part up.

".... the lesson of moving troops by rail was not lost on the Prussians" ... nor the telegraph.

MM

JoeB said:

Someone stated that rockets weren't accurate againt ships but that's not true. Rockets were an ideal weapon against a certain size range of relatively small ships. Rocket accuracy was questionable against smaller, tank sized, target. But unlike tanks, ships and boats too small to hit reliably with rockets were usually highly vulnerable to .50 cal or 20mm strafing. USN fighter bombers late in the war (among other cases of other air arms) were quite effective against typical coastal shipping.

Joe

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Without a doubt the rockets were effective.....when they hit. I'm just stating that rocket accuracy was extremely poor. You even see alot of aerial footage of rockets missing the target by a wide margin.

Russian RS-82/RS-132 rockets, which were very similar to the standard 5" HVAR used on Thunderbolts, Corsairs, etc., had an accuracy of 1.1% of 186 rockets fired at a single tank and 3.3% when fired at a column of tanks when fired at a distance of 500 meters. 100% of rockets fired at a distance of greater than 500 meters failed to hit any target. Results were better when an attack fired a salvo instead of a single shot.

Everything I could find (in 10 minutes of searching) all stated that the early rockets (Russian and U.S.) were very inaccurate and best used in salvos. If you have documentation (because I couldn't find any) on a hit ratio of the 5" HVAR in WW2, that would be interesting to see. If you don't, hopefully someone else does.

Yes, I know ships are bigger than tanks and present a larger target! I'm simply stating that early rockets were extremely inaccurate.

michaelmaltby said:

".... the lesson of moving troops by rail was not lost on the Prussians" ... nor the telegraph.

MM

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Yeah, good point.

Thorlifter said:

Without a doubt the rockets were effective.....when they hit. I'm just stating that rocket accuracy was extremely poor. You even see alot of aerial footage of rockets missing the target by a wide margin.

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But again you're talking about rockets v tanks, first in general, now in the specific example you gave. And besides ships being a lot bigger, they were usually less numerous and so more a/c and more rockets would typically be concentrated on each ship than each tank. Rockets proved effective against ships, in hitting and causing damage, in contrast to the situation with tanks, where hit rates were a lot lower, and in addition many rockets used against tanks had limited lethality against tanks. For example, the tube launched 4.5" rockets used by USAAF fighter bombers until late in the war were only likely to blow a track off or set external storage on fire, at best, against most German tanks of 1944, even if they hit. But the original point was about late war ops by USN fighter bombers v smaller ships. They were mainly using 5" HVAR, so a quite different situation, a faster more consistent rocket as well as much bigger targets, and targets definitely vulnerable to the HVAR's (5"/38 common shell) warhead.

Controlled testing in late 1950 in Japan w/ 5" HVAR fired by F-51 at typical combat range in salvo's of 6 resulted in an impact pattern 92ft long and 50ft wide, with mean impact point 50% likely to be within 25ft of the aim point, v a T-34-sized target, giving a hit probability of 7.4% per rocket (37% for at least one rocket in a 6 shot salvo). In a separate test in Korea at around the same time against actual captured T-34's, F-80's achieved 5 hits w/ 64 HVAR's. Those results are from original USAF test reports. I don't know the source of your numbers but would likely be a pre-HVAR rocket unless it was from 1945. HVAR was quite accurate enough against ships, even considering that accuracies would probably be worse in real combat than in those tests.

We could make a similar comparison when it came to bombs. German tests showed that a 250kg bomb would not do serious damage to either T-34 or M4even at 3 meters miss distance, though it would kill the crew (killed test animals inside, See "German Air Dropped Weapons to 1945"), and that kind of accuracy was very unlikely in real combat. But of course 250kg/500# class bombs were quite effective against unarmored ships, either by direct hit or mining effect of a near enough miss...because ships were much bigger than tanks and more bombs could typically be brought to bear v. a given ship than a given tank.

Joe

Its good information about the post war testing of rockets but it should be remembered that controlled tests are never close to what happens in combat. The targets tend to be stationary in the open and of course, no one is trying to shoot down the attacking aircarft.

true enough, however if an inherent error arises due to combat stressers, this would apply for all weapon types would it not????

parsifal said:

true enough, however if an inherent error arises due to combat stressers, this would apply for all weapon types would it not????

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Oh yes