MOST UNDERRATED AIRCRAFT OF WWII?

I have to say I might agree with you, James, in your last paragraph above, at least in spirit. Not quite the "chop-bound" you said, but definitely a bit outperformed with pilots of the same skill level in both planes. Sometimes it is necessary; sometimes not. Can't say for the somewhat vague timeframe you state, but the "help" coming from the USA might or might not have been there yet, depending on when in 43 you are talking about.

If not, then perhaps it WAS necessary. If the help had just arrived, then perhaps the same. Once blooded and trained, then both the British and American pilots could have used a better aircraft than the Hurricane by sometime in mid-1943. Before that, it was sort of hit and miss with available airframes of top performance. Our best didn't arrive until even later, and the Hurricane might have been the best available until they did ... somewhat depending upon the level of familiarity with any "new mounts." A better airplane with which you are unfamiliar might be worse in the end than an "old faithful" mount. Many late-war Bf 109 pilots might agree with that, I'm sure.

So it might not have been "unfair" at all, again depending on timeframe. Certainly by 1944 it might have been unfair.

Spitfires didn't exactly grow on trees and were likely in somewhat short supply with regard to summarized world-wide British theaters of action needs / requests in early-to-mid 1943, considering that everyone wanted them, all at the same time, in large quantities, together with gasoline (nay, petrol) and pilots / maintenance personnel / spares / tools / and ammunition.

Even if you HAD the Spitfires, what good is a Spitfire without ammunition, a good crew chief, fuel, and maintenance crew ... or pilot? So reliable sea supply lanes were also sorely needed along with Naval presence for same, at least pretty much away from the ETO.

Methinks the British did OK in the end, with what they had. Jolly good, chaps, altogether a fine effort.

P. Clostermann is sometimes known for not letting facts get in the way of a good story.

BTW the 184 squadron logs are on line. Standard load was eight rockets and in Dec of 1943 they lost more aircraft due to crashes and maintenance problems than they did to enemy action. Flak being a much bigger problem than enemy fighters. Weather being generally crappy and visibility poor most days in December.
The Squadron was flying Hurricane MK IVs.

BLine22 said:

1. A-20 Havoc/Boston
2. F4F Wildcat
3. Petlyakov Pe-2
4. Hawker Hurricane
5. Vickers Wellington
6. P-40 Warhawk
7. Lavochkin La-5
8. Bristol Blenheim
9. P-39 Airacobra
10. P-38 Lightning

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There is a difference between being underrated and under appreciated.
With some of these planes serving for 4-5 years and going through (in some cases) a number of different models/versions trying to decide when and where they were under rated gets a little difficult.

Shortround6 said:

With some of these planes serving for 4-5 years and going through (in some cases) a number of different models/versions trying to decide when and where they were under rated gets a little difficult.

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Quite right. The Hurricanes operating in France and then during the BoB in 1939/40 were neither under rated, nor under appreciated!

In other theatres, at later dates, they always suffer with the comparison to the Spitfire. Malta, 1942, would be the best known example of this. The Hurricanes did just fine in the preceding two years, with the exception of dealing with JG 26, but the Island was 'saved' by the arrival of the Spitfire.

Cheers

Steve

The Hurricane is overshadowed by the Spitfire and the BF-109, but when compared to its other 1935/6 contemporaries, it shines; P-35, P-36, Gladiator, F3F, Ki-27, A5M.

James W. said:

Maybe he meant 4 rockets under each wing, even so those Hurricanes were well past their best by date for those duties,
I suppose they were kept going in production for politico-economic reasons, & to soak up a few thousand excess Merlins.

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What a/c would be used instead of the Hurricane?
How many Hurricane Mk IVs made?

James W. said:

Too many! 15,000 Hurricanes built all up VS 3,300 Typhoons, which were a far superior war machine.
Brit industry was too slow & disorganised to get enough Napier Sabre engines properly & timely built.

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You mean Napiers was too slow and disorganised to get enough Sabre engines properly and timely built.

The Hurricane was probably kept in production due to all the problems with the Typhoon which not only had engine problems but structural problems as well. Several aircraft broke apart in flight. The Hurricane provided good service as a ground attack aircraft in North Africa and the MK IV was intended as a ground attack aircraft with additional armor, 40mm cannon and provisions for bombs and rockets.

James W. said:

The Typhoon was pretty well sorted out by mid 1942, several were even sent for trials with the DAF in Africa,
but the major problem was too few Sabre engines, Typhoon airframes were sitting idle - waiting for them, through 1943.

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wiki-
In August 1942, Hawker's second test pilot, Ken Seth-Smith, while deputising for Chief Test Pilot Philip Lucas, carried out a straight and level speed test from Hawker's test centre at Langley, and the aircraft broke up over Thorpe, killing the pilot.

James W. said:

Too many! 15,000 Hurricanes built all up VS 3,300 Typhoons, which were a far superior war machine.
Brit industry was too slow & disorganised to get enough Napier Sabre engines properly & timely built.

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15000 Hurricane Mk IVs were produced.

James W. said:

I blame Beaverbrook, Napier & sons was apparently like some kind of Dickensian engineering craft/workshop rather than a real factory.

As for then siting the main Sabre production works in an area with virtually zero skilled workforce, well, c'mon..
No wonder only ~5,000 Sabres were produced, sadly for those Hurricane pilots who got the chop, so needlessly.

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That suggests a lack of investment in their own facilities.

The MAP did force Bristol to help (ie hand over) their sleeve production techniques. Something which cost Bristol millions of pounds to develop.

And they did have machine tools diverted from another aero engine company to help with sleeve valve production.

James W. said:

The Typhoon was pretty well sorted out by mid 1942, several were even sent for trials with the DAF in Africa,
but the major problem was too few Sabre engines, Typhoon airframes were sitting idle - waiting for them, through 1943.

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How many Typhoons were produced in 1942? And how many Sabres?

I think the Typhoon's wing was so thick it probably could have accommodated the 40mm cannon internally, rather than underslung, as was the case for the Hurricane.

James W. said:

Yeah, test piloting can be dangerous, esp'when a machine is ordered in to production straight off the drawing board.
The Typhoon was really pushing the envelope too, as a 2,000+ hp fighter, much as the "ensign killer" F4U was, stateside..

Roland Beamont writes of his Typhoon testing, doing violent high-speed, high-G manoeuvres to try instigate stress tell-tales,
at the risk of provoking the tail to fall off!

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You stated problem solved by mid '42 but this aircraft fell apart in Aug. Typhoon wasn't ready, hence, further Hurricane production.

Shooter, stop the trolling.

The R-3350 first ran in 1937. For the Sabre it was 1938. The R-3350 was still having problems in 1945 when the Sabre had become a rather reliable engine.

James W. said:

"15,000 Hurricanes all up."
( Hurricane Mk IV serials are listed as consecutive in production with Mk IIs, & there are heaps of 'em!)

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Source is ......

James W. said:

You are wrong, Hurricane production was continued 'til mid 1944, but NO Hurricane had the speed to catch a Focke-Wulf,
which is why the Typhoon was rushed into service, bugs & all ( as was the FW 190 itself, as it happens).

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What exactly was I wrong about? I never stated that the Hurricane could catch the 190. That the test airplane's tail fell off in August? It is your timeline that is wrong. The Typhoons were deployed in late 1941 when they began to have problems. Mod 286 was developed after the Aug '42 incident. I'm sure it took a while to implement. Who knows when the Air Ministry finally gained confidence in the Typhoon as a viable platform.

James W. said:

D.N. James 'Hawker an Aircraft Album' - he lists the serials & from the prototype Mk IV to "The Last of the Many",
it goes KX, KZ, LA, LB, LD, LE, LF, MW, PG, PZ, with hundreds of numbers, per letter group.

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So lets see a breakdown of production by MK and the production dates.

Milosh said:

How many Hurricane Mk IVs made?

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524 - all at Langley.

Data sheet says:
205 mph at 2,000 ft - max weak mixture - eight rockets with 60 lb heads

There is a huge oversimplification of the issues and a lack of understanding of Air Ministry policies and the role of the various aero engine manufacturers expressed in some of the posts above.

Rolls Royce themselves suggested to the Air Ministry, in 1939 that their production be concentrated on one 'standard engine', the Merlin. Ernest Hives wrote.

"Our proposal is that it should be a definite policy of the Air Ministry that the plant for producing the standard engine, in our case the Merlin, should not be broken down to produce another type."

The immediate consequence was that Rolls Royce's development programmes were cut back. The early casualties were the Peregrine and the Exe, as Rolls Royce concentrated on increasing the output of the Merlin.

A fundamental tenet of the selection process of the Air Ministry was that quality could only be maintained by competition. In the mid 1930s Napiers nearly went out of business on several occasions. As early as 1935 the then Secretary for Air, Sir Christopher Bullock. was arguing that it was

"essential Messrs Napiers should be kept alive as a separate entity, in order to prevent the engine industry being constituted on too restricted a basis."

In February 1937 it was Freeman arguing that

"The loss of experienced personnel making up the technical organisation [of Napier] would be a serious loss to the RAF"

In May 1939 there were fears that not only Napiers, but also Armstrong Siddely were on the verge of leaving the aero engine business, and in Freeman's opinion

"It was a most unhealthy position for the Air Ministry to dependent substantially on two firms only."

During 1937 a development order was placed for 6 Napier Sabres, and in the same year plans were drawn up for a new Sabre engined fighter that would become the Typhoon.
The other aero engine firms were running into problems developing the next generation of high performance reciprocating engines. The Rolls Royce Vulture suffered repeated failures during 1939. The Bristol Centaurus was still in the most rudimentary phases of early development and the Air Ministry had been forced to make arrangements for production of the Bristol Hercules before it was certain that it would be a success.
The decision to gamble on the Sabre was primarily based on two considerations. Firstly, to provide a 'third string' should the Vulture and Centaurus fail, and secondly to maintain Napiers in the aero engine industry.
This hardly reflects disorganisation in either the Air Ministry or the aero engine industry.

It was as a result of this that the decision to erect the factory at Liverpool, with a capacity of 2,000 Sabres a month was taken. Incidentally, after the outbreak of war, skilled workers could be compelled to go where they were required.

An often forgotten side product of the investment in the Sabre is the effect it had on Rolls Royce. Their most likely competitor to the Sabre would have been the Vulture, but development was cut and some at Rolls Royce seem to already have harboured doubts about the engine. At the beginning of 1939, just as the investment in Napiers was being agreed, a much simpler design project was started at Rolls Royce. This was for a new 37 litre engine based on the Schneider Trophy 'R' type. Hives wrote to Freeman in February 1939.

"The fact that the engine follows closely on the Rolls Royce standard design, and the fact that we have an engine of such dimensions on which we shall shortly be running an endurance test, and also the fact that it is a similar engine to the 'R' engine, means that we are taking the minimum of risk; far less risk than when jigs and tools are ordered for new aircraft."

This of course became the Griffon engine. No investment in Napiers would almost certainly have meant no Griffon. Rolls Royce was responding to a commercial threat.

The Air Ministry was understandably delighted because this reduced one of the biggest risks to production, as Freeman noted later that year.

"In wartime, when it is difficult to introduce new types of aircraft without a great falling off in production, it is essential that we improve the performance of the types which are already being produced."

The Sabre engine, like several of its contemporaries, proved more difficult to develop and get into production than anyone had anticipated, but the Air Ministry did have other options. At no time did the RAF not have at least one competitive fighter, even if that meant improving the performance of types already in service (as Freeman had noted) whilst the problems were overcome.

Cheers

Steve

James W. said:

D.N. James 'Hawker an Aircraft Album' - he lists the serials & from the prototype Mk IV to "The Last of the Many",
it goes KX, KZ, LA, LB, LD, LE, LF, MW, PG, PZ, with hundreds of numbers, per letter group.

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KX and KZ serials are in Hawker Production Block 8, delivered between 11/42 and 4/43 comprising 972 aircraft. There were 1,200 aircraft in the block, the other serials were in the KW range which you did not include.

KZ, LA, LB and LD serials are in Hawker Production Block 9, delivered between 4/43 and 9/43, comprising 1,184 aircraft

LE, LF, MW, PG and PZ serials are in Hawker Production Block 10, delivered between 9/43 and 5/44, comprising 1,357 aircraft.

I haven't checked if the serials you quoted are all to Mk IV standard, if they are that's a total of 3,513 aircraft, a little short of 15,000

Cheers

Steve

James W. said:

No Steve,
Sydney Camm repeatedly rejected the Griffon as a Sabre substitute, once the R-R Vulture proved a dud, ( like all their X-engines, & their Sabre 'Chinese copy', the Eagle II) - as did de Havilland.

& Bristol were even less capable of getting the Centaurus reliable, or built in meaningful production numbers, during the war.

The R-R Merlin was over-produced, with British engines in the over 2,000 hp category being very sparsely built indeed.

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It really wasn't up to Sidney Camm to reject the Griffon. He could point out to the air ministry, and rightly so, that the Griffon didn't offer the power needed to get the job done (power the Typhoon airframe to the desired speed) and the time in question. The Griffon offering 3-400hp less than the Sabre most of the time in the early years.
The Eagle was hardly a 'Chinese copy' of the Sabre, 10mm more bore and 10mm more stroke gave about an extra 10 liters of displacement and the engine weighed about 50% more than the Sabre. I doubt anything but a few nuts and bolts were interchangeable between the two engines.
Bristol had their hands full building the Hercules in the needed numbers and it didn't help that Fedden was fired by the Bristol Board of directors in 1942.

The Merlin can only be considered to be over-produced if you can point to reports of hundreds of extra engines just laying around in crates waiting for somebody to order them. Please remember that it was quite customary to order about 50% more engines than airframes to ensure an adequate number of spare engines.

2000hp engines were not as easy to build as many people thought (or seem to think now). A lot also depended on fuel. The type of engine you build trying for 2000hp when you have 87 octane fuel is a lot different than the type of engine you build trying for 2000hp with 100/130 fuel.
RR with the Merlin took advantage of the improving fuels and were able to push the Merlin into producing almost double what the early development engines did. going from about 900hp to over 1700hp. Having 1700hp Merlins ( and higher using emergency power) took the pressure off having a "2000hp" engine. Of course by 1944/45 the "2000hp" engines were now running 2200-2600hp.

The Americans, for all their industrial capacity managed only two production 2000hp class engines during WW II. The R-2800 and the R-3350 and the R-3350 wasn't fully sorted out until very late in the game. It took P & W around 5 years to get the R-4360 into service and it used cylinders that were based on the R-2800 (same bore and stroke, may have used same valves and rocker arms and other parts). Work on the R-4360 started in 1940.