DarrenW
Staff Sergeant
Yes and Lt. Cmdr John Thach, developer of the highly successful aerial combat tactic known as the "Thach Weave"....
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Going from memory, but I believe Grumman's engineers had a Q&A session with Butch O'Hare when he toured their plant.
I think it is always wise to remember we not always have the full facts when dealing with German stuff given how much was lost. Yes, 43 aircraft was its declared air group... but the thing had 2 hangars with an area almost as large as Ark Royal's, only the large IJN carriers beat it, but most IJN aircraft didnt have folding wings.
You can fit 70+ aircraft there if you want to or need to...
The KM delayed its 2nd carrier after signing the building contracts in order to give priority to the BBs, have them NOT change their minds, thus retaining their building priority, and the KM could have started the war with 2 CVs.
Early recon planes were dead meat when caught by fighters... how do you like the odds of a Fulmar (or Skua, rather) against a radar directed 109T in 1940?
Graf Zeppelin had so many design faults, it is unlikely she could even have fielded 40 a/c at sea.
Her power rating of over 208000 shp meant a lot of space was taken up with machinery spaces. The insistence that she be able to carry a heavy gun broadside limited her hangar space. Her catapult launching system was relatively weak and inefficient, and had aircraft of greater weight than those of the original CAG been embarked, would have required major work on the carrier, as the belated resurrection of the project in 1942 was to find.
There were significant problems in achieving a decent wing folding system for the Bf109Ts
There were 3 Versions
T-0 produced by Fieseler 7 prototypes
T-1 produced by Fieseler 70 aircraft
T-2 de-navalised T-1 --- means that all naval features were removed. when the first stop for GZ came, the T-1 were modified to T-2 and assigned to "Luftflotte 5" as fighter bomber. December 1941 order came to rebuild the T-2 to T-1 standard again as it was thought they would be needed for GZ.
T-0 and T-1 had folding wings so that width of a Bf-109 below deck was 4590mm. In T-2 this feature was deactivated, but still there. The wings folded outboard of the wing mounted cannon, and wing folding required the removal and refit of the wing stabilisers each time. This was far from ideal, as it basically wrecked the spot rate for the carrier. It was impossible to use wing folding and retain the ability for scrambles with the Bf109T.
Seafire had similar issues with wing folding, and it took some years for the RN to receive an effective wing folding system. Because of the limited height of the hangars on British Carriers, the Seafire required a double joionted wing folding system. The Germans did rather better with their Ju87Cs, which incorporated a swivel hinge that allowed the wings to be folded and then turned, but the wings could not be deployed b below decks. Forcing so much work to be done on the flight deck and slowing the spot rate down because of the wing folding issues limited the maximum strike sizes to about 25% of the CAG, or 10 plane strikes.
Never seen an authentic photo of wings folded F-167, but I believe they used a similar system as the Ju87C
once again the Germans get to "tweak" their forces while the British stumble along fat, blind and stupid.
British might have adjusted their own carrier building program had the the Germans changed their building program to stop a battleship (which one pray tell? the Bismark?) and build a 2nd carrier in time for 1939/40.
I like the odds of the Fulmar against the 109T a whole lot better than the odds of a Fi 167 against a radar directed Fulmar.
The only way that Germany could have two carriers approaching readiness in 1939-40, was if major warship construction was commenced before the signing of the Anglo-german naval agreement in 1935. Even as it was, with the limited construction of surface warships started in Nazi Germany after 1935, the british had embarked on an ambitious naval rearmament program. by 1939, the naval program had been pushed forward and was already underway. If DKM had been so impatient as to embark on capital warship construction earlier than the agreement allowed, the likely result is that the RN would also embark on such a program to match and eclipse any accelerated building program by DKM. If carriers were favoured by DKM as their primary weapon system, the British would almost certainly have done two things, firstly to hand back control of the FAA to the fleet, and secondly, rather than slow the procurement program down by introduction of the illustrious class, would simply have repeated more Ark Royals in 1937 and 1938. Britain would have gone to war with probably 3 Ark Royals, with maybe two or three more becoming available 1940-41. Germany was never going to win a naval arms race, except in U-Boats. Moreover given the severe operating limitations affecting the Graf Zeppelin design, and the limits of the aircraft conversions they were stuck with, the chances of an upset by DKM over the RN were nearly zero. ,
Adding the new 1939 program to the previous programs, British dockyards and shipyards in the course of the year were engaged in constructing some 200 vessels, or a total of 870,000 tons. An achievement like this had never been approached before in peace-time. The British were building, in the course of the year 1939, nine battleships, six aircraft carriers, 25 cruisers, 43 destroyers, 19 submarines, and a large number of small vessels. Most were completed and expanded upon during the next 3 years. The annual tonnage output in 1940 and 1941 was even greater by no less than 30 per cent, than the annual tonnage output in those three pre-war years, 1912–14. The British planned to complete on an average, in 1940–41, 220,000 tons a year of naval tonnage. The german naval capacities simply had no hope of competing with that and therein lies the reason they would never succeed. add to that their relative inexperience in carrier based aviation and the inherent faults in their carrier design and it readily becomes apparent why they abandoned the carrier in 1940. An this takes no account of the French and US navies that in 1938-9 nobody knew would happen......
Apart from the work on new construction, the British harnessed productive effort to secure the rearmament of the 649 existing Fleet units, mainly directed to meet the increase in anti-aircraft armament by the fitting of more accurate systems of fire control (particularly radar). During the past three years the number of guns firing a shell of 2 lbs. and upwards has increased by 75 percent in the existing Fleet. Production in 1939 was running at the rate of 60 guns a month, and towards the end of the year production would reach over 80 guns a month. Productive effort of such immense proportions demanded foresight, continuous preparation, and planning years in advance. DKM had none of that in 1939. they were still largely planning their fleet expansion, and in any case were never in a position to compete with that output for naval ordinance and shipping tonnages.
I just noticed the Graf Zeppelin had almost the same engine power as an Iowa class battleship and the same speed. Yet the Iowa's weighed 15,000 tons more.
Something isn't right either the numbers are wrong or the design of the GZ was wrong.
Hull form has a lot to do with it. A longer ship will go faster on the same power which is one reason for the long but skinny bow on the Iowa's.I just noticed the Graf Zeppelin had almost the same engine power as an Iowa class battleship and the same speed. Yet the Iowa's weighed 15,000 tons more.
Something isn't right either the numbers are wrong or the design of the GZ was wrong.
How would have RN control of the FAA affected aircraft design?
They abandoned the carrier because of politics, Göring kept messing with the aircraft, Hitler wanted BBs, the KM needed all sorts of ships and the CVs were shoved down the priority list already in 1936 with carrier B delayed to make space and wait for practical experience acquired on Carrier A, so every shortage meant the CVs suffered it worse further delaying its completion. Once the war began it became obvious Germany would either win a short war or lose, there would be no time for training and working up a completely new kind of untested vessel so the CV had some parts cannibalized for sale to the soviets and others used in Norway, sealing its fate. In that context the 1942 project was a mere curiosity...
Well, British AAA wasn't really that effective as war would demonstrate.
The RN gained control of the FAA in something like 1938; it's likely that they did not have the time to develop the staff expertise to have any positive effect on aircraft design.
military procurement decisions are political, especially in a war-worshiping dictatorship like nazi Germany. The fact that Goering, Hitler, Doenitz, etc were all arguing at cross purposes is one of the flaws of an autocracy.
Nobody's was as effective as they had thought it would be pre-war.
Yeah, but the RN was putting a lot of faith in theirs, more than anyone else, they even relied on it (plus armored decks) to defend their carriers instead that on their FAA fighters which is a bit much.
It was a lot more complicated than Duuhh why are they so dumb.
In 1930 to 1938 period there was a belief that fast high level (say 180 mph at 10 to 15,000ft) bombing was the way to defeat a naval force and it was believed that such a bomber was untouchable in the time available.
A naval fighter of the early 30s was the Hawker Nimrod which had a climb rate of about 2,400ft per minute maximum and it didnt have constant speed props or high octane fuels so no ramming the throttle to the max at sea level unless you wanted a piston to pop out the block.
Without Radar a lookout on a Destroyer or Cruiser using the MkI eyeball has to spot the high level bomber force, use his telephone or voice tube to inform the bridge, a message has to be sent to the Carrier a fighter has to be scrambled or a patrol aircraft has to be signalled to engage no fighter carried radios till late 30s so a light signal or a gun I dont know. Even in perfect blue skies with zero movement of the ship I am going to guess the maximum distance a bomber force could be spotted by eye was less than 20 miles.
I dont know how long it took to launch a fighter from a deck in this period but the RAF took about 3 minutes to scramble in 1940. Then the Nimrod has to climb to say 12,000 feet to attack a 10,000 feet target. All the while the bombers are closing at 3 miles a minute.
Who is going to win the race.
The fact we know level bombing of ships was not very sucessful was not known in the 30s look at the Boeing B17 it wasnt designed as a bomber to smash cities it was designed to protect the US from naval attack. Look at the SM79 tri engine bomber its initial use was to attack ships from 10,000 feet.
The RNs idea of striking all aircraft below and relying on AAA was a legitimate idea in the time of the ships design. Hindsight tells us it wasnt the right idea but it was a common misconception.
As for RN AAA it might not have been very good at shooting down aircraft but it was good at preventing ships being sunk which is the whole idea for Naval AAA. In 1939 the RN was the only navy with a proper unified air defence gunnery system, compare a modern RN Destroyers AAA with an equivalent USN Destroyer. Most USN Destroyers in September 39 were lucky to have anything more sophisticated than a man, a Browning M2 and a ring bead sight. Even in 1945 with Radar, VT fuses, mechanical loading, Mk33 computers and lots and lots of extra guns the USN struggled against the Kamikaze so much that some captains switched off the complicated Mk33 system loaded contact fuses and slaved the 5 inch guns to the relatively unsophisticated Bofors director which was a design borrowed off the British who borrowed it off the Dutch.
I don't pretend to know what the standard operating procedure for the DKM was supposed to be but its fair to point out that the USN could have one the same as I believe some of them had catapults in the Hanger.The USN and IJN went for a CAP as a means to counter the threat, the RN could have done the same, they chose differently. Same for the DKM, they went for a very German system to cold launch fighters from the hangar...
It's a mistake to believe that the DKM had cutting edge AA weapons.Save for the Dutch, did anyone else had their flak on triaxial stabilized, RPC mounts with tachymetric predictors like the DKM?
I don't pretend to know what the standard operating procedure for the DKM was supposed to be but its fair to point out that the USN could have one the same as I believe some of them had catapults in the Hanger.
It's a mistake to believe that the DKM had cutting edge AA weapons.
The 37mm used in the first half of the war was a single shot semi automatic gun where each round was manually loaded (see below). The chances of hitting anything was at best minimal
View attachment 505458
The standard 20mm gun was a much more effective gun but even here the earlier versions were prone to jamming and only had a 20 rd magazine resulting in frequent stoppages to reload.
The problem being that the 20mm had too short a range to stop the aircraft before it dropped its weapon
The USN and IJN went for a CAP as a means to counter the threat
I found this article comparing the German carrier to the contemporary Yorktown class
http://www.nnapprentice.com/alumni/letter/GRAF_ZEPPELIN.pdf
As an aside, the British did not know the Germans were building three carriers, and neither did the Germans, until after the repudiation of the Anglo-German agreement. under the agreement, the germans were limited to a tonnage in carriers of 42000 tons, and within the earlier plan, limited themselves to laying down just one carrier, and getting materials ready for a second. There may have been some keel laying work done for this second carrier as well.
The third and fourth carriers for DKM were not even projected until the adoption of the Z plan in 1938-39, and their construction scheduled for completion some time after 1945...…
The british did not react to the knowledge of a second carrier (because the germans were allowed to build two carriers under the 1935 agreement...although they did finally cheat a bit with their tonnage admissions) , but if a third carrier had been declared, it would have served as clear evidence of Germany not intending to honour the agreement. already in several crucial planning sessions I think in 1937, people like Churchill at those committee hearings were baying for an expansion in capital ship construction.....by that I mean carriers incidentally. Without the fully rounded and balanced fleet to support their carriers, ships like the GZ really had no role. Being deployed in such limited numbers, by a nation lacking in much experience in their operation, the likely outcome should not be arguable.
There were some detail problems with the GZ,,,,,,but probably the worst was its catapult system. it had two catapults, running off a compressed air system, each catapult limited to just under 10000 lbs I believe, and good for just 9 launches (theoretically) each before a 75 minute recharge was required. There were some advantages to the compressed air system (such as being able to launch whilst the main turbines were not fired up) but these features were really more in the "nice to have" category as opposed to 'essential for operation". The hangar decks, already very narrow, suffered a great deal of cramping due to the lift positions.....it might not have been possible to range the required strike composition in a quick order and in the right mixes because of that, though we cant be sure of that. In contrast the three big navies spent a lot of time ensuring their hangar, lift and deck arrangements would allow the necessary shuffling of a/c and quick, continuous turn around of a/c so that the ships chances of being caught with a/c on the deck would be minimised. this does not appear to have even been considered by the Germans
The SBD was used as a CAP supplement and proved their worth in that capacity on many occasions.So did the RN the plan to strike all aircraft below was quietly dropped prewar.
Without voice to voice radios and radar a CAP can't be flexible enough to cover all heights and directions. Unless they have a lot of fighters in the air and even big carriers like Lexington and Saratoga only carried a squadron of fighters. To keep 2 fighters aloft at all times required an absolute minimum of 16 fighters and probably more than 16 pilots.
So did the RN the plan to strike all aircraft below was quietly dropped prewar.
Without voice to voice radios and radar a CAP can't be flexible enough to cover all heights and directions. Unless they have a lot of fighters in the air and even big carriers like Lexington and Saratoga only carried a squadron of fighters. To keep 2 fighters aloft at all times required an absolute minimum of 16 fighters and probably more than 16 pilots.