Museum sheds light on Canada's wartime effort

Guys, I don't think there is anyone here that wants to insult the sacrifice of those who served their country. {Except perhaps those with a Homer Simpson pea-brain Avatar... }

freebird said:

Syscom, thanks for posting the topic, I don't believe you were trying to deliberately insult the Canadian veterans, but I think Adler is correct, it was an extremely poor choice of words.

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syscom3 said:

Yes it was.

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Syscom had admitted that he wasn't trying to belittle anyone's service, the term "wasted" is just short for "Someone who paid the ultimate sacrifice, but who's bravery was squandered by some incompetent idiot in high command, by sending them on a stupid mission that served no real purpose"

Did I summarize that correctly Syscom?

The Dieppe raid the loss of the PoW Repulse spring to mind as some really stupid command decisions that needlessly quandered men material.

So let's move on from the Syscom bashing, and look at the two questions he raised.
{Otherwise I think this thread is going to get nuked}

1.) Was the defence of Hong Kong in 1941 a good idea or not?

2.) Did Canada have any meaningful contribution to the PTO ? {after Hong Kong - Dec 1941}

Brilliant, Butters

Heh. Can't wait to see what he says about the "waste" of men on Bataan and Corregidor. Same upper-eschelon reasoning as the HK standoff.

Or Wake Island...

JL

Wake Island was close enough to Hawaii to be defended. And it was the USN that let them down. There's a thread somewhere in this forum that explained just what happened. There's a difference in reinforcing your troops with the expectations they can be successful, and throwing good troops into an impossible situation.

The PI? MacArthur brought stupidity to a new level when he allowed his air force to be destroyed. Prior to that, there is every possibility that he could have fought the Japanese well into late 1942.

And sadly for the "Battling Bastards of Bataan", they too had their lives wasted. They didn't slow down the Japanese a minute.

Butters said:

Lets see...

All the US troops ( and other inconsequential Allied soldiers) that died after the Soviet destruction of Army Group Center...wasted completely because now the Russians were ready to launch the decisive campaign that ended with the occupation of Berlin and the surrender of the Third Reich.

At least by your 'logic'...

JL

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Huh?

freebird said:

Did I summarize that correctly Syscom?

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Yes.

The Dieppe raid the loss of the PoW Repulse spring to mind as some really stupid command decisions that needlessly quandered men material.

So let's move on from the Syscom bashing, and look at the two questions he raised.
{Otherwise I think this thread is going to get nuked}

1.) Was the defence of Hong Kong in 1941 a good idea or not?

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Not one bit. Any honest war gaming would show the the forces there were inadequate to the task, and were essentially deep in Japanese controlled waters and territory. They would have been better employed in the PI or Malaya where they add to the concentration of power.

2.) Did Canada have any meaningful contribution to the PTO ? {after Hong Kong - Dec 1941}

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No.

Canada's contribution was to the Atlantic and Europe. Token forces dont count. Canada did make contributions to the war in Italy and later Normandy, and of course the Dieppe disaster.

What about Canadians whom served under non Canadians in the PTO. Do they count?

vikingBerserker said:

What about Canadians whom served under non Canadians in the PTO. Do they count?

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Individuals? There couldnt have been too many of them. And that would mean they were token forces.

Then answer this sys:

Did or did not the Canadian forces in the ETO contribute to the defeat of Germany?

Simple answer will do. Just give me a yes or no answer.

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:

Then answer this sys:

Did or did not the Canadian forces in the ETO contribute to the defeat of Germany?

Simple answer will do. Just give me a yes or no answer.

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Yes.

syscom3 said:

Yes.

#1 Was the defence of Hong Kong in 1941 a good idea or not?
Not one bit. Any honest war gaming would show the the forces there were inadequate to the task, and were essentially deep in Japanese controlled waters and territory. They would have been better employed in the PI or Malaya where they add to the concentration of power.

#2 Did Canada have any meaningful contribution to the PTO ? {after Hong Kong - Dec 1941}
No.

Canada's contribution was to the Atlantic and Europe. Token forces dont count. Canada did make contributions to the war in Italy and later Normandy, and of course the Dieppe disaster.

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My reply to #2 later...

In regards to the first question, did you read my post yesterday? First off, Commonwealth deployment to the PI is a non-starter, the British Empire has enough on it's plate already. Anyways, the PI has 150,000 troops and 5 or 6,000 more will make no difference.


As regards to the HK defenders, as far as I can determine, there were about 5 or 6,000 quality trained ground troops in HK, + ~4,000 fortress, RAF, logistics, artillery, RN etc. Also ~4,000 raw Indian Chinese aux. troops

The "fortress" personnel won't make any difference in Malaya, as they can't bring the fixed artillery, and Singapore already has enough "support" personnel. The raw Chinese troops couldn't be transported to Malaya, and would be of no use there anyways. So there are perhaps 6,000 troops that could be taken to Singapore, where they will provide little improvement. (There are already 140,000 Empire military personnel there!

About the ONLY thing that is not needed in Malaya is troops! The fact that there were over 90,000 that surrendered is proof that lack of troops was not the problem.

What Malaya desperately needed was

1.) 6 pdr. anti-tank guns flown in ASAP.
2.) HE ammo for the fortress guns, which had almost exclusively useless AP ammo
3.) About a dozen or two Valentine or Matilda II tanks
4.) More Hurricanes some COMPETANT RAF leadership.
5.) Perhaps a couple of light cruisers supported by the Hermes to prevent Japanese amphibeous flanking attacks on the west side of the peninsula.
6.) Most important, some COMPETANT overall leadership, Percival was totally out of his league


Now, on the other hand, the Japanese, with only 70,000 troops were badly short on troops, and if they had an additional 40,000 troops from Hong Kong, the results would be devestating, as they could then mount constant large-scale amphib. flanking attacks, cutting off most of the Empire troops. So in effect you are allowing the enemy to add 60% to his forces, but gaining at most a 5% increase, that isn't really needed anyways.

By withdrawing ~40,000 troops from HK, the remaing 8 - 12,000 could easily over-run the abandoned city, as the raw Chinese troops wouldn't put up much of a fight.

And yes, I HAVE done a strategic scale of the Pacific theater, and allowing the Japanes to re-deploy the HK invasion army group is a fatal mistake for Malaya

freebird said:

Syscom, you can't use 20/20 hindsight to make assumptions about the plans made prior to Dec 6 1941!

Could I say that the USA was silly to waste resources building the BB Arizona training the crew, because it had zero useful role in WWII?

Of course not, it's ludicrous.

The same way that you criticize the plans for the defence of SE Asia, based on 20/20 hindsight.

Basic thumbnail of history:

Prior to WWII, the British Admiralty planned for Singapore to be able to hold out fro 6 months, as in the event of war, the French fleet would keep the Italians bottled up, while a British fleet would be sent east to link up with the Americans and deal with the Japanese.

Obviously the collapse of France in 1940 threw a wrench in the plans.

The British American later made plans for two possible actions from the Japanese.

1.) Japan attacks Malaya Indonesia, at this point the US fleet engages the Japanese, and uses it's bombers to devastate Japan es military bases assets {this is why all the B-17's were in Philippines} Meanwhile a British fleet would arrive to provide relief of Malaya/Singapore

or 2.) Japan attacks the Philippines as well, in addition to the above.

The US never contemplated Japanese attacks on Hawaii, other than sabotage.


In either case, the Philippines Malaya were to hold out until strong Allied Naval Air forces could arrive in theater.


The original plans were tossed on the trash heap of history by the devastating attack on "Pearl".

Now, the Philippines was attacked by 130,000 Japanese troops {vs. ~150,000 US allied troops.}
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Philippines_(1942)

Malaya was attacked by 70,000 Japanese troops vs. ~ 100,000 Commonwealth {Later arrivals would boost this to ~140,000 Allied}
Battle of Malaya - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In Hong Kong the ~2,000 Canadians made up around 35% - 40% of the ~5,500 "solid" army ground forces.
{In addition RAF, RN, Indian, fortress Chinese aux. troops pushed the total to ~14,000 military personnel
Instead of the Japanese occupying an undefended HongKong with a brigade or 2, they committed over 52,000 troops to capture the city. - Almost 4x the number of allied military


Battle of Hong Kong - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Had things gone according to pre-war plans the sacrifice of these troops in HK would deny the Japanese ~40,000 - 45,000 troops which could not be used to attack Malaya. Even with the disasters of early Dec 1941, Malaya/Singapore SHOULD have been able to hold out, with competent organization. {Percival Whitehall dropped the ball - badly}

However, add another ~45,000 troops to the 70,000 already committed to Malaya, and the task becomes almost impossible.

So the point is this: far from doing "absolutely nothing of value", the Canadians troops were there to buy crucial time to save Malaya.

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syscom3 said:

Any honest war gaming would show

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War gaming! No wonder we can get no cogent reply to the questions. Forget war gaming and get real. Read and study the history books and then take time to digest them. Don't confine yourself to just military history, the politics and the social scene are integral to understanding what went on. The attackers hold most of the advantages, they are skilled and more importantly, experienced. The UK at one and the same time had to defend the British Isles, expand its forces and develop its war production, whilst trying to do the same thing in the Middle East (including East Africa) and the Far East, look after its Empire as best it could and supply Russia at the very time it was fighting in North Africa. This meant scarce equipment was diverted elsewhere and the ebb and flow of the Desert campaigns had a lot to do with them having to pass on desperately needed materiel to Russia/Far East. For them war was certainly not a game.

lingo said:

War gaming! No wonder we can get no cogent reply to the questions. Forget war gaming and get real. Read and study the history books and then take time to digest them. Don't confine yourself to just military history, the politics and the social scene are integral to understanding what went on. The attackers hold most of the advantages, they are skilled and more importantly, experienced. The UK at one and the same time had to defend the British Isles, expand its forces and develop its war production, whilst trying to do the same thing in the Middle East (including East Africa) and the Far East, look after its Empire as best it could and supply Russia at the very time it was fighting in North Africa. This meant scarce equipment was diverted elsewhere and the ebb and flow of the Desert campaigns had a lot to do with them having to pass on desperately needed materiel to Russia/Far East. For them war was certainly not a game.

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Could HK be supplied over available land routes in 1940? Even without a war or hostile forces in the way, it cannot. End of story.

Could HK be supplied by ship? Yes, but it would be contested waters with the Japanese controlling the airspace nearly every bit of the way.

Did the Japanese have airfields in French Indochina in 1941 which could shut down the sealanes? Yes.

Did the Allied naval commands know that the IJN could deploy some large forces in the South China Sea if it wanted to? Yes.

End result, there was no possibility of a successfull defense of HK and only token defenses should have been implimented.

As forwhat to do with the Canadian forces;
If it went to the PI, then it would have ended up with the US troops and at least fight into March 1942
If it went to Malaya, it would have suffered just like the other commonwealth troops and squandered by inept leadership.

As for tying up the IJA forces at HK?
Well if you are arguing that they held up Japanese forces that might have been used in Malaya and prevented a debacle from becoming a "worse-than-a-debacle", I would agree. What could be worse than having you arse kicked hard and your arse getting kicked twice as hard?

Hong Kong was a hopeless defence, as it turned out, but nevertheless important to the war in China. The Japanese had spent a lot of effort isolating China by the capture of her Ports. Hong Kong more than anything represented the potential to stage a Malta style battle against the Japanese in the South China Sea. It was, of course dependant on the successful defence of the rest of South East Asia. If Hong Kong had been abandoned before the war, the Japanese would have occupied it, with a probable massacre to accompany that, and the repecusions arising from such an abandonment would have been massive, to say the least. It was a protected territory, which suggests to me that the British had a responsibility to at least try and defend it. The experiences of Shanghai and nanking rang all too loudly in everybodies ears at that time......

If the US had managed to hold the PI, and Britain and the Dutch to hold their respective territories, things may have turned out differently. Even a modest increase in success may have made the defence of Hong Kong less futile. There was just one Division available for the attack into Hong Kong, the 38th (from memory) and this unit had to spend many months recovering as a result of the malling it suffered from the Canadians. This was the division that eventually went to a little known island in the South west pacific, called Guadacanal. Who knows, if it had been a little less wounded than it had been at Hong Kong, perhaps it may have been successful at Guadacanal.....now that draws the thing into some perspective

With its flanks secure, the Allies may have been able to pour more men, aircraft and ships into the battle, as per the war plan Orange arrangements (and their British equivalents) and start to put real pressure on the Japanese from a very early point. Retention of Hong Kong under a successful defence of South East Asia scenario would have been a crucial element in the victory over Japan in this "alternate" history scenario. It would have initially occupied a position similar to Malta, drawing ever more Japanese resources into a cauldron, similar to Guadacanal, to suck the life out of the Japanese war machine. Later it would have served as a possible Point Of Entry into the China Theatre.

The key to understanding HK is to appreciate its potential rather than to measure it by what happened. Hong Kong fell early because the foundations that its successful defence depended on also failed.

Finally, the argument that forward defence is hopeless is a furphy....if you abandon your forward positions, your rear areas all of a sudden become your front lines. It was a newcessary and vital sacrifice that the units in the far east fight for as long as possible, as hard as possible. Every hour gained in these forward areas decreased the possibility of even greater losses in more important locations.

And finally, the allied victory was just that, an ALLIED victory. I find these arguments about who contributed what and who was really responsible for the victory very silly. The US was crucial to ultimate victory, but could it have won by itself, no. The Canadians were less crucial, but could Britian have survived without their help. No. So were they crucial to the outcome of the war. In that sense yes.

parsifal said:

There was just one Division available for the attack into Hong Kong, the 38th (from memory) and this unit had to spend many months recovering as a result of the malling it suffered from the Canadians. .

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How big was a Japanese division? If there were Japanese 52,000 troops there, were the rest independant regiments?

A standard Japanese Type B Infantry Division had 20,000 men.

It seems that parts of the S.E.A.G command also participated

Southern Expeditionary Army Group

Components

[South Seas Western Command]


14th Infantry Division
IJA 49th Independent Mixed Brigade
IJA 53rd Independent Mixed Brigade

The Southern Expeditionary Army (南方軍 , Nanpo gun?) was a army group of the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II. It was responsible for all military operations in South East Asian and South West Pacific campaigns of World War II. [1]

The Southern Expeditionary Army Group was formed on November 6, 1941, under the command of Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, with orders to attack and occupy Allied territories and colonies in South East Asia and the South Pacific.

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In addition, some elements of the 23 Army were also in the Hong Kong attack


China Expeditionary Army
23rd Army

Components

104th Infantry Division

108th Infantry Regiment
137th Infantry Regiment
161st Infantry Regiment
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129th Infantry Division

91st Infantry Brigade
92nd Infantry Brigade
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130th Infantry Division

93rd Infantry Brigade
94th Infantry Brigade
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23rd Independent Mixed Brigade
8th Independent Infantry Brigade
13th Independent Infantry Brigade

Glider said:

A standard Japanese Type B Infantry Division had 20,000 men.

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Thats correct, but if you include the non-divisional support elements (the socalled tail) , it blows out to about 30000 men. A british Division in Burma for example, was about 18000 men, but if you include its supporting 'tail" it is about 55000.

Allied units tended to be short on teeth, and big on tail. This gave them great stying and logistic power, compared to the axis units, but it meant that every casualty sustained had a greater effect on decreasing the units combat capability

parsifal said:

Thats correct, but if you include the non-divisional support elements (the socalled tail) , it blows out to about 30000 men. A british Division in Burma for example, was about 18000 men, but if you include its supporting 'tail" it is about 55000.

Allied units tended to be short on teeth, and big on tail. This gave them great stying and logistic power, compared to the axis units, but it meant that every casualty sustained had a greater effect on decreasing the units combat capability

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So we might assume that the Axis 52,000 is one division tail {30,000} + some independant brigades ~15,000 tail {~22,000 l}?

As for the Allies, there were 2,000 Canadians in two battalions + 2 British + 2 Indian
If they were 900 - 1,000 per battalion then it's 5,500 - 6,000 combat troops.

Infantry

2nd Battalion, The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment)
1st Battalion, The Middlesex Regiment (Machine gun battalion)
5th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment
2nd Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment
The Winnipeg Grenadiers {battalion}
The Royal Rifles of Canada {battalion}

Also:
Hong Kong Chinese Regiment
Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC)

So if there were about 2,000 - 3,000 aux. Chinese + HKVDC, then the remaining ~ 5 or 6 thousand out of the 14,000 would be the "tail"?