Navy Corsair vs P-51B Climb Test, March 1944
- Thread starter Old Crow
- Start date
Snautzer01
Marshal
- 46,292
- Mar 26, 2007
You watch Greg. I can tell.
How else would I conclude the truth? As a fighter bomber compared to a Corsair it holds all the aces, first of al it wasnt a horrible blue colour, second it couldnt operate from a carrier which cuts losses by a massive amount.
Snautzer01
Marshal
- 46,292
- Mar 26, 2007
The P-47 could.
GregP
Major
It could take off froma carrier.
Never heard of a P-47 landing on a carrier ... but yes, it did operate from one on occasion (delivery flights).
Never heard of a P-47 landing on a carrier ... but yes, it did operate from one on occasion (delivery flights).
pinehilljoe
Staff Sergeant
Barrett
Staff Sergeant
the 1969 "Soccer War" between Honduras and El Salvador was a brief border dispute. Both sides flew Corsairs while El Sal also had Mustangs. The only victories were scored by a Honduras F4U-5 pilot who downed three planes: I forget whether one or two Mustangs or one or two Corsairs (FG-1s, I believe). I wrote an article for Flight Journal, probably on line.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
drgondog
Major
USAF DID hold on to the very late P-47D and P-47N. The only P-47 worth keeping for post WWII in Korean War was the P-47N (because of range). That version was a.) in very limited supply, mostly in east coast Guard units, b.) a major gravel gobbler unsuited for air operations in S.Korea, and c.) had no common logistics base in Japan where several P-51 groups were operational. Additionally, the ROK, SAAF and RAAF were equipped with P-51Ds.
The P-51D could and did operate from Japan when the Pusan perimeter was so constrained that air ops were not flown on the peninsula. The P-47N could have operated from Japan also.
Factually, the F-51D losses per sortie were just barely above the F4U, and there was no analogous WWII scenario in which long range low level CAS was conducted in the same mobile flak environment the Mustang and Corsair faced in Korea - so we'll never know how vulnerable the combined oil cooler, pilot wound, turbo hits would have affected the P-47D/N ability to fly home.
Statistically the F6F was a better fighter bomber than the F4U, because of more protected oil cooler.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
BarnOwlLover
Staff Sergeant
That's sort of my argument against why by early World War II radial engine aircraft weren't much better off than liquid cooled inline engine aircraft. Even rifle caliber machine gun fire can take out a radial engine if enough bullets punch holes in the cylinder heads or engine block, let alone the oil cooler or oil lines.
Oil does function still as a secondary coolant for air cooled engines, if you don't have oil, the engine will seize up anyways, oil can (and often will) catch fire if it vaporizes and/or finds a suitable ignition source. And by later in World War II and in Korea, the Germans especially and North Koreans weren't running rifle caliber pea shooters unless it was out of desperation or all they had at a particular place. The Germans didn't take anything as flak seriously unless it was 20mm full auto, and a lot of the times, the bigger, the better in their view. Smallest AA guns used in Korea by North Korea and Chinese volunteer units were 12.7mm (.50 cal) Dushkas (DShKs, also used by Russia in limited numbers during World War II, more widely there after). Both the Germans and NKs had a lot of 37mm automatic flak cannons. And a 37mm or larger shell will swat a P-47 out of the sky just about as easy as any other single seat fighter with a direct hit.
Not to mention that I believe that the Soviets were supplying NK and China with decent proximity fuses by the time of the Korean War.
Also on the US/UN/NATO end in Korea, we didn't have much trouble either shooting down Il-10s, which were a faster, more formidable version of the World War II Il-2. Slower than a P-47, but even more of a literal flying tank than a P-47. What P-51s or P-80s or F-86s didn't get, 20mm or 40mm AA had no trouble with.
Oil does function still as a secondary coolant for air cooled engines, if you don't have oil, the engine will seize up anyways, oil can (and often will) catch fire if it vaporizes and/or finds a suitable ignition source. And by later in World War II and in Korea, the Germans especially and North Koreans weren't running rifle caliber pea shooters unless it was out of desperation or all they had at a particular place. The Germans didn't take anything as flak seriously unless it was 20mm full auto, and a lot of the times, the bigger, the better in their view. Smallest AA guns used in Korea by North Korea and Chinese volunteer units were 12.7mm (.50 cal) Dushkas (DShKs, also used by Russia in limited numbers during World War II, more widely there after). Both the Germans and NKs had a lot of 37mm automatic flak cannons. And a 37mm or larger shell will swat a P-47 out of the sky just about as easy as any other single seat fighter with a direct hit.
Not to mention that I believe that the Soviets were supplying NK and China with decent proximity fuses by the time of the Korean War.
Also on the US/UN/NATO end in Korea, we didn't have much trouble either shooting down Il-10s, which were a faster, more formidable version of the World War II Il-2. Slower than a P-47, but even more of a literal flying tank than a P-47. What P-51s or P-80s or F-86s didn't get, 20mm or 40mm AA had no trouble with.
They did. F-47s were in regular USAF service until late 1950, and equipped Air National Guard Fighter Squadrons in the Eastern US. Activated Air National Guard units flew F-47s until mid-1952 as part of the Air Defense Command.
When the 405th Fighter-Bomber Wing was activated in December 1953, they were initially equipped with F-47s, until they converted to F-84s in 1953.
The thing is, Far East Air Force needed Fighter-Bombers Right Now. They had the F-51s available, Pilots, Maintainers, and more importantly, the Logistics Train to get them in the air immediately, and keep them flying. Getting P-47s over there, and then setting up new Maintenance Hubs, Spare Parts Dumps, (You're talking everything from Spark Plug Wire to Tires, and every part in between) and keeping that going would take too long.
The USAF, and FEAF preferred jet fighter-bombers. They were more accurate bombers, less vulnerable due to their higher speeds and shorter exposure time to ground fire, and were able to respond to a call for support in less time. As airfields opened up in Korea, and jet became available, most units that had switched from F-80s to F-51s switched back.
That's a possibility, but then again, during the War, there was something on the order of 10 times more F6F Carrier Landings than F4U Carrier Landings.
So the number of photos is an unreliable indicator. What is more useful are the USN statistics on aircraft accidents, which aren't completely available in a form that can be automatically analyzed yet. It's an interesting question, and I'd love to dig into it.
But what about the P-47s equipped for, and launched from Escort Carriers? (This was done to get the planes to forward airfields in the Island Hopping Campaign.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,269
- Sep 30, 2021
USN Statistics transcribed by R Leonard.
The USN definition of Action Sortie is the aircraft or at least one of its formation saw combat, as a result this under counts the total number of sorties. The data below is the number of action sorties then the percentage losses, to AA to A/c and operational. Next are total losses on other flights and when then their base was attacked. The figures do not detail what other flights were or how many of them occurred, it is probably not safe to assume they reliably relate to the number of action sorties.
Another factor is when the sorties took place, accident rates tended to climb early in the war then decline, a hint of that is in the F4F versus FM operational loss rates. The bigger the carrier the generally lower the accident rate, the land based aircraft had fewer operational losses percentage wise. The USN reports 5,164 night sorties by land based and 636 by carrier based aircraft (note that is sorties NOT action sorties), with predictably higher operational loss rates than day operations.
Possibly the USMC units were on average more experienced with the F4U to account for the difference in operational losses, the carrier based Corsair units look like they were doing more fighter bomber work given the AA losses.
Putting all the figures together and including "service unknown" sorties, Hellcat versus Corsair, percentage losses on action sorties to AA 0.83 versus 0.54, to enemy aircraft 0.41 to 0.3, operational 0.51 to 0.36, the latter heavily influenced by where the aircraft flew from, 93.8% Hellcat action sorties from carriers, versus 15% Corsair, the overall action sortie operational loss rate from carriers was 0.68%, land 0.25%. To give any passing statisticians a heart attack, to mimic the Hellcat sortie mix, multiply the number of Corsair carrier sorties by 6, reducing the land based sortie proportion accordingly, use the average carrier and land based action sortie operational loss figures and the Corsair action sortie operational loss figure becomes 0.64%. Whatever the exact number the figures indicate the Corsair had the higher action sortie operational loss percentage.
The USN definition of Action Sortie is the aircraft or at least one of its formation saw combat, as a result this under counts the total number of sorties. The data below is the number of action sorties then the percentage losses, to AA to A/c and operational. Next are total losses on other flights and when then their base was attacked. The figures do not detail what other flights were or how many of them occurred, it is probably not safe to assume they reliably relate to the number of action sorties.
Another factor is when the sorties took place, accident rates tended to climb early in the war then decline, a hint of that is in the F4F versus FM operational loss rates. The bigger the carrier the generally lower the accident rate, the land based aircraft had fewer operational losses percentage wise. The USN reports 5,164 night sorties by land based and 636 by carrier based aircraft (note that is sorties NOT action sorties), with predictably higher operational loss rates than day operations.
| Losses by Aircraft type, | Action | To Enemy | To Enemy | Operational | on other | On ship or |
| basing and branch | sorties | A/A % | A/C % | Percent | flights, number | ground, number |
| CARRIER-BASED, TOTAL | 147,094 | 0.97 | 0.31 | 0.68 | 1,988 | 974 |
| Navy Total | 143,357 | 0.96 | 0.30 | 0.68 | 1,932 | 936 |
| F6F | 62,240 | 0.86 | 0.39 | 0.52 | 829 | 403 |
| F4U, FG | 6,488 | 1.43 | 0.28 | 0.74 | 182 | 76 |
| FM | 12,925 | 0.48 | 0.10 | 0.58 | 283 | 71 |
| F4F | 1,102 | 1.54 | 4.26 | 2.81 | 49 | 22 |
| SB2C, SBW | 18,808 | 1.42 | 0.10 | 1.16 | 184 | 88 |
| SBD | 6,048 | 0.66 | 0.71 | 0.79 | 65 | 35 |
| TBF, TBM | 35,564 | 0.98 | 0.08 | 0.65 | 339 | 227 |
| TBD | 182 | 6.04 | 13.74 | 4.40 | 1 | 14 |
| Marine Total | 3,737 | 1.36 | 0.43 | 0.59 | 56 | 38 |
| F4U, FG | 3,093 | 1.42 | 0.52 | 0.68 | 47 | 38 |
| F6F | 146 | 1.37 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 8 | 0 |
| F4F | 2 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 50.00 | 0 | 0 |
| TBM | 496 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1 | 0 |
| LAND-BASED TOTAL | 136,979 | 0.40 | 0.33 | 0.25 | 1,057 | 339 |
| Marine Total | 114,127 | 0.34 | 0.24 | 0.23 | 724 | 135 |
| F4U, FG | 52,852 | 0.39 | 0.27 | 0.30 | 458 | 48 |
| F6F | 1,646 | 0.30 | 0.12 | 0.18 | 27 | 5 |
| F4F | 1,074 | 0.37 | 6.98 | 1.02 | 34 | 26 |
| F2A | 25 | 0.00 | 56.00 | 0.00 | 0 | 0 |
| SBD | 40,872 | 0.23 | 0.06 | 0.14 | 104 | 36 |
| SB2C, SBW | 2,023 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 13 | 0 |
| SB2U | 17 | 5.88 | 5.88 | 17.65 | 1 | 0 |
| TBF, TBM | 7,151 | 0.74 | 0.15 | 0.20 | 56 | 16 |
| PBJ | 8,390 | 0.21 | 0.00 | 0.14 | 23 | 2 |
| PV | 52 | 1.92 | 1.92 | 0.00 | 5 | 2 |
| PB4Y | 16 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0 | 0 |
| PBY | 9 | 0.00 | 11.11 | 0.00 | 3 | 0 |
| Navy Total | 21,373 | 0.79 | 0.87 | 0.39 | 333 | 202 |
| F6F | 2,470 | 0.32 | 0.93 | 0.65 | 21 | 5 |
| F4U | 1,269 | 0.39 | 1.10 | 0.32 | 5 | 0 |
| F4F, FM | 450 | 0.67 | 12.44 | 1.56 | 29 | 20 |
| SBD | 5,283 | 0.32 | 0.23 | 0.08 | 55 | 19 |
| SB2C, SBW | 332 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 2 | 6 |
| TBF, TBM | 3,290 | 0.49 | 0.27 | 0.46 | 20 | 3 |
| PB4Y | 3,624 | 1.66 | 0.77 | 0.50 | 85 | 72 |
| PV | 2,636 | 1.06 | 0.19 | 0.46 | 34 | 22 |
| PBY | 1,371 | 1.09 | 2.55 | 0.36 | 47 | 43 |
| PBM | 506 | 2.57 | 0.59 | 0.20 | 33 | 9 |
| PB2Y | 142 | 0.70 | 0.00 | 0.70 | 2 | 3 |
| Service Unknown | 1,479 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0 | 2 |
| F4U | 349 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0 | 2 |
| F6F | 28 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0 | 0 |
| VF type unknown | 440 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0 | 0 |
| SBD | 484 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.21 | 0 | 0 |
| TBF | 137 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0 | 0 |
| VPB type unknown | 41 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0 | 0 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 284,073 | 0.70 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 3,045 | 1,313 |
Possibly the USMC units were on average more experienced with the F4U to account for the difference in operational losses, the carrier based Corsair units look like they were doing more fighter bomber work given the AA losses.
Putting all the figures together and including "service unknown" sorties, Hellcat versus Corsair, percentage losses on action sorties to AA 0.83 versus 0.54, to enemy aircraft 0.41 to 0.3, operational 0.51 to 0.36, the latter heavily influenced by where the aircraft flew from, 93.8% Hellcat action sorties from carriers, versus 15% Corsair, the overall action sortie operational loss rate from carriers was 0.68%, land 0.25%. To give any passing statisticians a heart attack, to mimic the Hellcat sortie mix, multiply the number of Corsair carrier sorties by 6, reducing the land based sortie proportion accordingly, use the average carrier and land based action sortie operational loss figures and the Corsair action sortie operational loss figure becomes 0.64%. Whatever the exact number the figures indicate the Corsair had the higher action sortie operational loss percentage.
Thanks, Geoff.
Some thoughts - These numbers are for the whole war, if I understand them correctly. The nature of the Combat Losses depends on the nature of the fight. I don't think too many people would expect the SB2C to have such a low level of Air-Air losses if it had been flying in the Coral Sea/Midway/Solomon Islands environment. I expect that there were more Air-Air encounters vs Ground Attack sorties in 1943-early 1944, which would skew the Air-Air numbers lower for the Corsair. As for Marine Ground Based Operational Losses vs. Navy Carrier Based losses of the F4U, There's a big difference between landing on an airstrip, and on a Carrier, particularly a Straight-Deck, and especially with parked airplanes on the forward part of the flight deck. For all the arguments that can, and have, been made of the merits of the Hellcat vs the Corsair, the one that no one disputes is that the Hellcat was much better around the Boat than the Corsair. Short of Combat, (And sometimes even then) that's about the most dangerous thing you can do with an airplane.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
pinehilljoe
Staff Sergeant
Its very interesting to see the data. When I add all the F4F (not FM) sorties, I get 2,628. Considering the F4F was the only USN, USMC at least until March 1943, that's an average of 6 sorties a day over the first months of the War (Dec '41 to Feb '43). Ignoring F4Fs continued to be used. I would have thought the number would have higher, but admit, I don't a have sense of the values.
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