No Eastern front. What next?

[michaelmaltby]

...."it was a victory at the end and that was all that mattered."

"just Enough ground to bury our dead", the Soviet General said

 

[Admiral Beez]

If the Germans do not invade USSR in 1941 then what happens?

Germany goes broke by end 1942, Stalin invades from Poland, taking all of Europe.

 

[Freebird]

And since the U.S. is neutral, no Lend-Lease to Britain and the Soviet Union...

Why would Hitler's choice to invade the Soviet Union (or not) in June 1941 affect Lend Lease to Britain? (passed in Mar 1941?)

Interesting what if, but in Mein Kampf, Hitler made it clear there would a War in the East. Hitler's War was ideological, not political, War with Russia was inevitable. If the War in the East were delayed one or two years, Spain could have been annexed into the Reich and Gibraltar taken. Operation Hercules could have happened and Malta taken.

OK, so the Axis spends considerable resources & logistics to capture Gibraltar.
(Vast amounts of ammunition, re-guaging Spanish railway lines to allow the transport of heavy railway artillery, building airbases & barracks for troops)

Then what?

Britain seizes the Canaries, and probably occupies Madeira & Azores too.
Britain gains some key bases to control the mid-Atlantic and the approaches to the Med.
The Axis gain - a rock?!?

Worse yet, after the civil war Spain is heavily dependent on imports of oil, food & resources, so with Spain now subject to blockade, oil and other scarce commodities need to be supplied by Germany.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Why would Hitler's choice to invade the Soviet Union (or not) in June 1941 affect Lend Lease to Britain? (passed in April 1941)

And why is Germany neutral? What happened to Germany's pact with Japan? The latter will still attack Pearl Harbour et al.

 

[michaelmaltby]

I'm impressed ...
Mikhail Meltyukhov - Wikipedia

 

[swampyankee]

Regardless of the alliance between Japan and Germany, WWII in Europe and the Pacific do not seem to be particularly related, as Japan's strategic goals were not really related to Germany's except, perhaps, in mutual hatred of the USSR, but even that was not equivalent. Japan was interested in the USSR in its being a threat to Japanese interests in China and Korea; Germany's interest in the USSR was for leibensraum and general exploitation of its resources, rather in the same way that Japan was interested in China. Unlike some people, I think it highly likely that any government of Russia, whether bolshevik, autocratic monarchy, or parliamentary democracy would have been attacked by Hitler's Germany.

A major, indeed keystone, of Hitler's ideology was an attack eastward, into Slavic lands, especially, the USSR. For him to forego an attack on the USSR would be as unlikely as for Japan to forego an attack on China.

 

[pinehilljoe]

Regardless of the alliance between Japan and Germany, WWII in Europe and the Pacific do not seem to be particularly related, as Japan's strategic goals were not really related to Germany's except, perhaps, in mutual hatred of the USSR, but even that was not equivalent. Japan was interested in the USSR in its being a threat to Japanese interests in China and Korea; Germany's interest in the USSR was for leibensraum and general exploitation of its resources, rather in the same way that Japan was interested in China. Unlike some people, I think it highly likely that any government of Russia, whether bolshevik, autocratic monarchy, or parliamentary democracy would have been attacked by Hitler's Germany.

A major, indeed keystone, of Hitler's ideology was an attack eastward, into Slavic lands, especially, the USSR. For him to forego an attack on the USSR would be as unlikely as for Japan to forego an attack on China.

Read Mein Kampf. Hitler's War in the East was ideological, not political, not economic, not strategic. From Mein Kampf you realize his life's goal was to eliminate Judeo-Bolshevism. IMHO to understand the War, you should read Mein Kampf, and Schirer's Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Regardless of the alliance between Japan and Germany, WWII in Europe and the Pacific do not seem to be particularly related, as Japan's strategic goals were not really related to Germany's except, perhaps, in mutual hatred of the USSR, but even that was not equivalent. Japan was interested in the USSR in its being a threat to Japanese interests in China and Korea; Germany's interest in the USSR was for leibensraum and general exploitation of its resources, rather in the same way that Japan was interested in China. Unlike some people, I think it highly likely that any government of Russia, whether bolshevik, autocratic monarchy, or parliamentary democracy would have been attacked by Hitler's Germany.

A major, indeed keystone, of Hitler's ideology was an attack eastward, into Slavic lands, especially, the USSR. For him to forego an attack on the USSR would be as unlikely as for Japan to forego an attack on China.

Exactly, they can't be Nazis and not focused on attacking the USSR. Combating Bolshevism was a core tenent.

 

[The Basket]

A few points

The Azores is Portugal and UK would probably not invade.

Gibraltar is vital for British naval interest in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. It's loss would be a strategic disaster. As well as a propoganda disaster.

Spain was not going to be a player in ww2 regardless of which side it chose.

France and Britain were seemingly willing to support Finland militarily in the winter 1939, 1940 so with a bit of tweaking there could have been an alliance against USSR plus the Japanese in the east.

That scenario is not one Stalin is walking away from.

 

[Dimlee]

Germany's interest in the USSR was for leibensraum and general exploitation of its resources,

It was more complicated, in my opinion. Lebensraum was a famous slogan, indeed. So as the "world revolution" in the Soviet propaganda and even more, in official program documents of the Communist Party until the 1960s. (It was replaced by the "peaceful coexistence" but as a temporary phase only, as the ultimate goal remains the same - communism system all over the world). Yet the Soviets never attacked those hated capitalists openly, except in Finland and they were very flexible in tactics and strategy. Peace conferences, subversive actions, peace talks again, arming the proxies, buying the pacifists and other useful idiots, another subversion, another conflict far away from the Western capitals and from the Soviet borders, etc.
What I want to say: the political or "spiritual" goal declared by a totalitarian regime or its leader does not restrict further actions to this one goal only. The ultimate goal can be postponed or even modified if there are benefits.
After all, this is what we see in the history of German-Soviet relations. A shift from the mutual hostility to the de-facto alliance in a period of several months. Close cooperation in all matters, including the military. Serious considerations of going further and of including the USSR in the Axis alliance. Mutual disappointment after the negotiations in Berlin in November 1940 and decisions of both "partners" to go to war as soon as possible.
So, going back to the quote, I'd say that Germany's interest in the USSR was dictated by the strategy of today. It could be fighting for lebensraum and for resources and ideological Crusade, or close economical and military alliance or just a peaceful (if only temporary) coexistence, etc. And Soviet policy towards Germany was also opportunistic.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Well stated. Let's remember, however, there was a precedent to the period you speak of, D, -- 1922-33. This clandestine affair between the Bolsheviks and the Weirmar is, IMO, a true indicator of the pragmatic symbiosis that served a pariah military state's need for professional training -- from the Experten. And the Experten's need to bypass the Treaty of Versailles restrictions . The 2 were as hand and glove. The Axis of Opportunity . The Reds were enthusiastic about hosting 'the whole show' and its clandestine side appealed to be subvertive character of the reds, IMO .

But, D, to your defense of Suvorov I posted this:
"... with a military never, bloodied on a scale larger than Nomonhon ....."

You did not challenbge my claim, D, so I ask, what military actions bloodied** the Red Army? [** schooled]

-- Civil War, nasty, nasty but unique and hardly full scale industrial war
-- Poland. Early wins but out-fought by the Poles to an embarrassing settlement IIRC When Poland saved Europe -
-- China and Spain, volunteers operating as 'unofficials'. Useful lessons and skillls, but not full scale war
-- Nomonhon. June, 1938. Initially caught on the back foot and out-fought by the Japanese, Stalin responded by giving Zhukov a free hand and, with vastly superior resources and a rail line for supplies the Red Army crushed the Japanese Army
-- Finland, six months later, a true 'blooding' of the Red Army but the only lessons were how to die in the cold and accept it.

So if this is the resume of the Red Army and the leadership truly believes that they -- after purging the cream of their officer corps -- can take on Hitler, they are delusional beyond comprehension, IMO.

The German army, after May, 1940, was in a position to repel the theoretical two-pronged Soviet offensive. and then would have kept rolling from the South out of Romania into Ukraine and onward toward Baku oil.

Having lost a preemptive strike` against Germany the Soviet leadership would be in serious trouble, IMHO.

Surely Soviet American historian is correct when he claims that learning to fight and win against Hitler's Germany was the experience that made the Red Army great. "August Storm", August, 1945, was the Doctorate the Red Army earned after their 4 year schooling at Eastern Front University. "Bagration" after 3 years, was the Masters thesis, IMO.

 

[swampyankee]

One question about any military planning is whether there is any expectation to actually execute the plan. Since I don't tend to think Stalin was a complete fool, he would look at his army's lack of success against Finland and Poland and postpone any attack on Germany until his armed forces were sufficiently competent to function against what was an army that was technologically, tactically, and operationally superior.


I think it's arguable that all the military invasions started by the USSR were as much, or more, revanchism than an intent to spread bolshevism, as the areas that were invaded were nearly all countries created in the aftermath of WW1 from nations previously subject to the Russian Empire. It's interesting, and rather ironic, that Hitler enabled the USSR to establish a ring of puppet states in Eastern Europe. Hitler did more to spread bolshevism than all the communist parties outside the USSR>

 

[GrauGeist]

One issue that hindered the Red Army, were Uncle Joe's purges after the Soviets experienced setbacks.
The collective martial experience that was wasted cost the Soviets dearly in the early days of the German invasion.

As for Hitler handing eastern Europe to Stalin, this was most certainly not his idea of how things were supposed to turn out.

In regards to Hitler never striking a peace with the Soviet Union, it was certainly possible even with as much hatred he had for Communists. If he played his hand properly, with a negotiated peace, could have contained Stalin through a monopoly of trade and import/export policies (especially if Japan was in board).
At the very least, when he invaded the Soviet Union, act as the great liberator and capitalize on the citizens welcoming the Germans as heroes as well as accept the scores of defecting Red Army soldiers into "White Russian" battalions.
This in itself would have weakened the Communists' hold on the people and put Stalin's war effort in jeopardy.

 

[swampyankee]

One issue that hindered the Red Army, were Uncle Joe's purges after the Soviets experienced setbacks.
The collective martial experience that was wasted cost the Soviets dearly in the early days of the German invasion.

Autocrats frequently, if not always, have an ambiguous relationship with their military and their security services, as they are both necessary for their maintenance of power and are the source of most of the threats to their power. The histories of China, the Eastern (and Western) Roman Empires, and perhaps even Russia.

As for Hitler handing eastern Europe to Stalin, this was most certainly not his idea of how things were supposed to turn out.

No, Hitler's goal was to largely depopulate Eastern Europe and move in Germans as a ruling class. His failure to meet this strategic goal gave Eastern Europe to the USSR. It would have been wonderful had Stalin actually behaved in an fair and equitable manner towards Eastern Europe, and return the countries to genuine self-rule, as was done in Western Europe, but that is never the way of tyrants and rarely the way of nations. It's also extremely likely, given nazi ideology, that the people of Eastern Europe would have been worse off under the rule of Germany than they were under the horrors of rule by the USSR.

 

[Freebird]

A few points

The Azores is Portugal and UK would probably not invade.

On the contrary, any move by Hitler into the Balkans was likely to trigger immediate reaction by the British.
Madeira is only 540 miles from Portugal, so well within range of Luftwaffe bases in SW Spain/Portugal.
The British had the Royal Marine division on standby in 1940/41, with plans prepared for occupation of Canaries/Azores/Madeira (Operations Puma/Thruster/Springboard)

1940 Operation Springboard
Springboard | Operations & Codenames of WWII
Thruster (i) | Operations & Codenames of WWII

Salazar was not keen on Hitler moving into Iberia, so was leaning to cooperation with the British, the "invasion" might be more like Iceland's occupation.
Events would move quickly, so Salazar would have to either tacitly allow British occupation of the islands, or it would be done by force.

Gibraltar is vital for British naval interest in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. It's loss would be a strategic disaster. As well as a propoganda disaster.

"Disaster" is rather overstated. Loss of Gibraltar might be temporarily inconvenient, but a reciprocal seizure of Canaries/Madiera would leave the British on a better strategic position.
With the German surface navy largely sunk or badly damaged by summer of 1941, and the Italian navy damaged, sunk or lacking fuel, it's not like the Axis had a real need to transit Gibraltar anyways.

As for propaganda, the loss of the "Rock" would be followed by several Axis island groups seized, so mostly a wash.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... Salazar was not keen on Hitler moving into Iberia"
Have some Madeira, Madeara ...
Portugal is England's oldest ally, IIRC

 

[XBe02Drvr]

With the German surface navy largely sunk or badly damaged by summer of 1941, and the Italian navy damaged, sunk or lacking fuel, it's not like the Axis had a real need to transit Gibraltar anyways.

That's not the point. Axis control of both jaws of the Straits of Gibraltar denies the Allies access to the Mediterranean except by "the long way around" (South Atlantic, Capetown, Suez), which wouldn't last long once Rommel had secure supply routes. Now what stands in the way of German access to Middle East oil? Not much. British forces in the Levant are pretty much cut off, and U-boats are prowling the Indian Ocean. Not a happy scene.

 

[Dimlee]

You did not challenbge my claim, D, so I ask, what military actions bloodied** the Red Army? [** schooled]

No, I did not. I agree that the Red Army is not really prepared to challenge Wehrmacht in 1941, especially in the offensive. Soviet leaders (not all, probably) were convinced in the opposite, apparently.

 

[Dimlee]

Since I don't tend to think Stalin was a complete fool, he would look at his army's lack of success against Finland and Poland and postpone any attack on Germany until his armed forces were sufficiently competent to function against what was an army that was technologically, tactically, and operationally superior.

I assume that Stalin did not consider Finland as luck of success. Not a "clean" success, obviously. But all goals were reached.
As for Poland, there was a lot of internal criticism, especially on the logistics, and the Red Army really tried to learn to correct mistakes.

 

[michaelmaltby]

When I spoke of 'Poland' in the context of the Red Army, in an earlier post, I was referring to the 1920 conflict. In 1939 the Soviet entry was slow and horsedraw, iirc