North American A-36 Apache

[junkman3353]

Strange tail code BH shot down ( if it is a A-36 to begin with...) October 1943

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To revive an old post: this plane was assigned to the 522nd Fighter Bomber Squadron 27th FBG. The 27th identified their planes by the use of 2 letter combos on the tail with the lower letter being the plane-in-squadron.. For whatever reason the 523rd FBS used "C" and the 524th FBS used "A". Also the early markings included red spinners for the 522nd with the 523rd having blue and 524th white. Later MTO theater markings required red noses and yellow wing stripes for all fighter type aircraft.

 

[Tom Hail]

The British lacked Mustang Mk 1's in the Med and borrowed an A-36 for recon. They tried to escort the A-36 with Spitfire V's and found they could not stay with the A-36. As to why the RAF did not borrow some P-51-1's in the Med, I guess there were just not enough of them available.

The 310 P-51A's began to be delivered in March 1943, following the 500 A-36's that began delivery in Sept 1943.

Only 35 P-51 were sent to North Africa, They were intended for the 68th Observation Group (111th & 154th Observation Squadrons). Some were dammaged beyound repair in shipping. They arrived in March and the first samples were delivered in April . 4 P-51s were given to the 225 Squadron (RAF). they used Spitfire V, but needed the P-51s cameras. The 154th Observation (supporting the front) received 8 on April 2, 1943 and the unit was able to retire the camera A-20 and the last (of 5) F-4 that they were using to get pictures for the 12th Air Support Command and the II Corps. The 12th Air Force always called these airplanes P-51. The 12th Air Force's F-6A were camera equipped P-51Cs that arrived in the spring of 1944 in Italy.

 

[Tom Hail]

That last one is not an A-36A. It is a P-51-1, known as the Mustang Mk 1A in the RAF. P-51-1's were used with a USAAF tactical recon unit in the Med and the A-36 unit acquired a few to use in strafing targets that needed a little extra punch.

The attached picture is labeled A-36 pilot but in fact he is standing next to a P-51-1 and was assigned to the tac recon unit.

I also have attached a few A-36 photos.

View attachment 542969View attachment 542971View attachment 542972View attachment 542973View attachment 542974View attachment 542975

The top picture is Captain Dave Herrel, the operations officer of the 111th Observation/Tactical Recon Squadron. in late 1943. The snopper's badge was added at Progomillo Airfield near Naples, Italy where they stayed for 8 months.

 

[ColFord]

Only 35 P-51 were sent to North Africa, They were intended for the 68th Observation Group (111th & 154th Observation Squadrons). Some were dammaged beyound repair in shipping. They arrived in March and the first samples were delivered in April . 4 P-51s were given to the 225 Squadron (RAF). they used Spitfire V, but needed the P-51s cameras. The 154th Observation (supporting the front) received 8 on April 2, 1943 and the unit was able to retire the camera A-20 and the last (of 5) F-4 that they were using to get pictures for the 12th Air Support Command and the II Corps. The 12th Air Force always called these airplanes P-51. The 12th Air Force's F-6A were camera equipped P-51Cs that arrived in the spring of 1944 in Italy.

A number of USAAF P-51s were on short term loan to units of the RAF in the MTO, including No.14 Squadron RAF, and No.225 Squadron RAF, with the primary stated reason for the temporary loans being one of range - none of the aircraft the RAF had in theatre at the time had the range and performance to cover the primary target areas of interest from the airfields that the RAF Squadrons were operating from.

The Spitfire Vs being operated by No.225 Squadron were fitted to carry a single oblique reconnaissance camera, but the majority of the targets they needed to cover were outside the range of their Spitfire Vs at the time. They handed backed the USAAF P-51s when they were due to receive newer Spitfires from the UK that had additional fuel capacity/capability to give them increased range.

No.14 Squadron RAF was operating Martin B-26 Marauders on distant reconnaisance sorties where their aircraft had been intercepted and lost to enemy single engine fighters. The use of the loaned P-51s from the USAAF enabled them to operate into the contested areas with a higher chance of survival if intercepted. Loan was only for a short period until other units with more suitable aircraft could take on the tasking.

 

[MIflyer]

Some A-36A's were sent to the CBI. There they found that for small jungle airstrips the A-36 was better than the P-47 for carrying bombs.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Germans sure did not like the A-36s that were deployed in Italy.

 

[MIflyer]

The Germans sure did not like the A-36s that were deployed in Italy.

The RAF wished they could buy A-36A for Overlord. They had a fine interceptor in the Spit IX but it was a lousy fighter bomber, with an absurdly short range when carrying bombs and it did not handle combat damage well. The P-40N was much better as a fighter bomber but not adequate for ETO air combat. Of course there were no new A-36's available and the production run was so short there was no stock of them anywhere. If only GM/Fisher had not wasted so much effort on that useless XP-75 and started building A-36's, or perhaps Vultee could have built them instead of the Vengence, or even put Brewster to work!

 

[drgondog]

The RAF wished they could buy A-36A for Overlord. They had a fine interceptor in the Spit IX but it was a lousy fighter bomber, with an absurdly short range when carrying bombs and it did not handle combat damage well. The P-40N was much better as a fighter bomber but not adequate for ETO air combat. Of course there were no new A-36's available and the production run was so short there was no stock of them anywhere. If only GM/Fisher had not wasted so much effort on that useless XP-75 and started building A-36's, or perhaps Vultee could have built them instead of the Vengence, or even put Brewster to work!

The AAF doctrine shifted from dive bombing for tactical support to all around 'low level multi role pursuit' for battlefield supremacyjust after the A-36 was procured. Plans and Military Requirements (Giles/Fairchild) regained authority over Echols/Materiel Command with respect to driving AF design to mission. The P-51A was selected as the replacement just two months after the A-36 contract was executed and just as the A1 priority for Packard V-1650-3 was tasked for the XP-51B. Based on the performance of the XP-51B, Fairchild negotiated a clause in the P-51A contract to switch to P-51B. This is how NA-99 eventually transformed to NA-104.

July 1942 is also when Kindelberger officially requested AAF to name all the fighter derivatives 'Mustang', including the P-51-1 and A-36.

For those that wonder why the P-47 was not ever considered for CAS until late 1943, the P-47B through D-4 were not capable of carrying even one standard AAF bomb (or drop tank) until B-7 kits were introduced in July 1943.

 

[drgondog]

P-51-1 was the USAAF designation for the NA-91, what the RAF called the Mustang Mk1A. After being fitted with cameras the USAAF called them the F-6A. They retained their four 20MM guns and were used in N Africa and the Med.

The USAAF designation for the first production NA-73 aircraft, which the RAF called Mustang Mk1, was the XP-51, two of which the USAAF got from the initial RAF production run. The RAF also bought 300 NA-83, which they also called Mustang 1, and which the USAAF never had any.

The NA-99 was the P-51A in the USAAF, and became the F-6A or F-6B when it got cameras. I think the only Allison Mustangs used by the USAAF in the ETO were F-6A or F-6B. In the RAF the NA-99 was the Mustang II. The NA-99 had the 1200 hp V-1710-81 engine, which seems to have been set up for higher altitude performance than the earlier Mustangs. I'd have to look up the specs on the engine.

There is a tendency to call all Allison powered Mustangs the P-51A but that is not really accurate.

At that time the first production model of any aircraft had no letter designation. The first P-40's were called just P-40. In the case of the P-39 they got carried away with designating minor modifications and used up a lot of letters as result. Eventually they used the letter plus dash number, so that in the case of the P-47D you could have both bubble top and razorback D models, with dash numbers for changes and then dash letters after the numbers to indicate if it was built in Farmingdale or Evansville. Today we use Block numbers.

Slightly picky.
The P-51-1-NA was the NAA first design/mount camera version at Inglewood. The P-51-2-NA were modified under control of AAF for subsequent recon versions. Later named F-6.

The V-1710-81 was a very good engine. When tested with WI, the P51A achieved 1500HP at 12,000 feet and was faster and climbed faster than the P-51B under 10K

 

[drgondog]

Resp:
I've heard the same from a ground support crewman who said that they had less jungle to cut out (three if I remember correctly) for an air strip to support the Chindits as they moved closer to Japanese forces. The P-51As required less runway length as compared to the P-47. He also said that they did put 2 1,000 pounders on the Mustangs, even though they were now rated for this weight. They likely didn't have to fly very far since they were operating from an improvised forward runway.

Actually the A-36 rack was rated for 1,000 but AAF put out a TO to reduce to 500. The reason behind the TO was that two fatal crashes occurred when the wings ripped off in dive. The actual cause was opening dive brakes After imitating dive, rather than follow the manual. The field ignored the TO.

The primary reason that P-47s weren't used for CAS is that they were not designed with standard B-7 centerline rack until July 1943, or wing pylons with B-10 until October. The secondary reason is that they were still in high demand for escort and only limited in availability to 9th, 12th and 11th AF beginning 1944. Even then all the 9th AF P-47s were tasked for 8th AF escort until May 1944 when they began dual 2TAC missions pre-invasion.

 

[drgondog]

Resp:
Wow! Nice job; "for all North American fighters of P-51 type." Is there more info in the rest of the memo?

Yes, he requested that all B-25s be Mitchell's and AT-6s be Texans - but Brits continued to use Harvard.

 

[drgondog]

Reap:
A ok, as they are Allison engine Mustang variants. Note that the P-51A shared the production line at North American Aviation with A-36As.

As well as P-51B-1 thru June 1943

 

[fubar57]

Welcome back Bill. Your comments have been missed

 

[MIflyer]

The V-1710-81 was a very good engine.

Indeed. P-51A was faster at 20,000 ft than a Spit IX. Too bad the -81 did not have a two speed supercharger of a suitable size, which would have been trivial to incorporate.

Was the MLG for the A-36A, P-51A, and P-51B all the same?

 

[ColFord]

The RAF wished they could buy A-36A for Overlord. They had a fine interceptor in the Spit IX but it was a lousy fighter bomber, with an absurdly short range when carrying bombs and it did not handle combat damage well. The P-40N was much better as a fighter bomber but not adequate for ETO air combat. Of course there were no new A-36's available and the production run was so short there was no stock of them anywhere. If only GM/Fisher had not wasted so much effort on that useless XP-75 and started building A-36's, or perhaps Vultee could have built them instead of the Vengence, or even put Brewster to work!

Actually the UK Air Ministry documentation says that the RAF did not want the A-36A. The concept of a dedicated close air support aircraft for the Army, particularly a dedicated dive bomber, ran contrary to the RAF's long held doctrine. At the time it was offered, and then trialled in the UK, the AM and RAF knew it was a limited production run of 500 aircraft, no further production was planned, and the first of the Merlin engine Mustangs was in prospect.

Greg Baughen's series of books provide a good analysis of the RAF's views on support for the Army as it evolved from the interwar years and through WW2, and close air support was considered to run contrary to the RAF's main aims of air supremacy and strategic bombing - bombing the enemy into submission.

In terms of more Allison engine Mustangs, the AM and RAF were more interested, if at all possible, in additional aircraft for the fighter reconnaissance/tactical reconnaissance role - their view was towards a 20mm cannon armed variant of the P-51A. Their projections for possible operational losses in the period leading up to D-Day and after for aircraft in the Tac/R role were quite high and they feared running short of airframes for the frontline squadrons. Hence the consolidation of all the available Allison engine Mustang airframes to support the front line squadrons. A number of 'second llne' squadrons were re-equipped with other types to help build up the pool of spare Mustangs in preparation for the invasion. For example three of the existing Mustang I squadrons, 26, 63 and 309 were converted to other types - Sptifire V and Hurricane II, and plans were put in place for the production of 100+ modified Hawker Typhoons for the FR-Tac/R role - the Typhoon FR.1b. The number of Mustangs at the FR-Tac/R OTU was drawn down and major work was put into repair of damaged Mustangs previously considered uneconomical to repair to provide additional operational airframes - 'frankensteining'.

For the close air support role in the ETO, the AM was looking at the numbers of Hawker Typhoons already in service with RAF Squadrons and the numbers held in GSUs and MUs and their armament and load carrying capabilities. Use of the Typhoon for the CAS role also didn't take numbers away from aircraft allocations to the UK from the USA under Lend Lease and kept a number of UK aircraft manufacturers fully employed.

If you look at the AM and RAF documentation related to the introduction of the Mustang III into RAF service, its original intended role was largely tactical, similar to how many of the early P-51Bs received in the ETO went to the US 9th TAC rather than 8th AF FC. The superior bomb carying capacity and additional range of the Mustang III was considered 'suited' for the interdiction of targets further behind the immediate front line, beyond the reach of the Spitfires and Typhoons - so going after transportation and supply nodes,enemy airfields, etc. The pressure for more long range escorts to support initially the USAAF daylight bombing campaign and then later the RAF's daylight bombing campaign by both medium and heavy bombers then forced a quick rethink of the priorities for use of the Mustangs.

 

[drgondog]

Indeed. P-51A was faster at 20,000 ft than a Spit IX. Too bad the -81 did not have a two speed supercharger of a suitable size, which would have been trivial to incorporate.

Was the MLG for the A-36A, P-51A, and P-51B all the same?

yes

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The 9th Air Force says for the war its fighters flew 12,590 effective sorties escorting heavy bombers. The fighters flew 14,460 effective sorties to end April 1944, then 19,479 sorties in May.

9th Air Force first months of operations, P-51 December 1943, P-47 February 1944, P-38 April 1944., short tons of bombs dropped.

Air Force	8th	9th	9th	9th
Type	fighter	P-38	P-47	P-51
Nov-43​	16.8​	n/a	n/a	n/a
Dec-43​	10.5​	n/a	n/a	0.0​
Jan-44​	37.5​	n/a	n/a	0.0​
Feb-44​	22.4​	n/a	0.0​	0.0​
Mar-44​	18.7​	n/a	77.0​	25.8​
Apr-44​	351.3​	0.0​	902.1​	149.8​
May-44​	295.3​	148.5​	2974.5​	117.6​

Early 8th Air Force fighter bomber missions, all by P-47, 25 November 1943, B-24 used as "sighter", 23 December 1943, 23, 25 and 31 January 1944, 14 and 15 February 1944, 17, 19, 26 and 30 March 1944 (special test by 2 P-47 on 15th?)

Roger Freeman, 4 January 1944 first use of paddle blade P-47, 24 January first use of area patrol tactics.

The P-47 was the intended USAAF single seat single engine air superiority fighter but was initially running about a year later production wise than the P-51, to end 1942 533 P-47 of which the 170 P-47B were not rated combat worthy, to 772 P-51 (plus 142 A-36). The fact the Curtiss P-47 line started production in September and the Evansville line in October 1942 meant by end 1943 it was 4,961 P-47 to 2,482 P-51 (plus 500 A-36), the Dallas P-51 line opened in August 1943.

For the P-47 1943 was more devoted to mass production, doubling the Farmingdale monthly output while bringing Evansville into full production. The decision to go with non standard fittings in order to have room for 200 gallons of fuel under the fuselage for lower altitude ferry operations turned out to be wrong, meantime the P-51 already had a better range plus wing racks thanks to the A-36 version.

As noted already production change to standard USAAF shackles under fuselage, P-47D-6-RE (July 1943), P-47D-4-RA (August 1943), wing racks P-47D-15 (October 1943 for RE= Farmingdale, November for RA= Evansville), RE built -1, -2, -5, -6, -10, -11, -15, RA built D (no block number), -2, -3, -4, -11, -15

8th Air Force fighter group strengths, 26 December 1943,
79 P-47C
2 P-47C-5
465 P-47D (no block number given)
18 P-47D-2
7 P-47D-4
83 P-47D-5
44 P-47D-6
54 P-47D-10
9 P-47D-11

End January 1943, P-51 program including completed and unsigned contracts (Dallas producing C-1 and E-1)

Type	Britain	E	G	H	I	Total
A-36A			500​			500​
NA-73(P-51)	620​					620​
P-51		148​				148​
P-51A-1					100​	100​
P-51A-5					210​	210​
P-51B-1					400​	400​
P-51B-5					400​	400​
P-51C-1				400​		400​
P-51D-1				550​	640​	1,190​
P-51E-1				600​	350​	950​
Total	620​	148​	500​	1,550​	2,100​	4,918​

E program Mar-41 First Defense Aid, F program Oct-41 Second Defense Aid, G program Jan-42 Follow On, H program Apr-42 Acceleration, I program Jun-42 Fiscal Year 1943

P-47 orders were 224 under A, 548 under B, 1,397 under D, 5,050 under G, 2,000 under H and 500 under I programs, total 9,719

Last P-51 acceptances on 30 September 1942, first A-36 acceptance 14 October 1942, last A-36 acceptance 30 March 1943, first P-51A acceptance 6 March 1943, from 6 to 30 March 1943 inclusive, 17 A-36 and around 61 P-51A acceptances.

RAF Mustang III strength
31 December 1943, 15 with 2nd TAF
31 January 1944, 53 with 2nd TAF
29 February 1944, 55 with 2nd TAF
31 March 1944, 51 Air Defence Great Britain, 73 2nd TAF (another 14 including reserves in Mediterranean)
30 April 1944, 60 Air Defence Great Britain, 134 2nd TAF (another 14 including reserves in Mediterranean)
31 May 1944, 28 Air Defence Great Britain, 100 2nd TAF (another 23 including reserves in Mediterranean)
30 June 1944, 34 Air Defence Great Britain, 105 2nd TAF (another 72 including reserves in Mediterranean)

I thought the V-1 assault resulted in the transfer of Mustang units to defence, for the RAF Brian Cull lists 851.75 V-1 destroyed by Tempests, 377.67 by Spitfire XIV and 246.5 by Mustang III. After the V-1 threat reduced the results of operations in France indicated the Mustangs were not as important as pre invasion planning thought, making them available as Britain based escorts for Coastal and Bomber Command day raids. So on 28 December 1944 Fighter Command had 10 Mustang III squadrons plus 2 re-equipping with Mustang III while 2nd TAF only had reconnaissance P-51, but did have most of the Tempest squadrons and, I think, most of the Spitfire XIV units.

In the Mediterranean the Merlin Mustangs could be used to replace P-40 as fighter bombers.

 

[SaparotRob]

...

Roger Freeman, 4 January 1944 first use of paddle blade P-47, 24 January first use of area patrol tactics.

...

Do you know if "paddle blade" was the official designation for that blade design?

 

[MIflyer]

 

[ColFord]

I thought the V-1 assault resulted in the transfer of Mustang units to defence, for the RAF Brian Cull lists 851.75 V-1 destroyed by Tempests, 377.67 by Spitfire XIV and 246.5 by Mustang III. After the V-1 threat reduced the results of operations in France indicated the Mustangs were not as important as pre invasion planning thought, making them available as Britain based escorts for Coastal and Bomber Command day raids. So on 28 December 1944 Fighter Command had 10 Mustang III squadrons plus 2 re-equipping with Mustang III while 2nd TAF only had reconnaissance P-51, but did have most of the Tempest squadrons and, I think, most of the Spitfire XIV units.

The Air Ministry files and the Squadron ORBs reflect a quickly changing situation in the thinking about the best use of the Mustang IIIs when the RAF first started to receive them. Added to that were the pressures coming from different sources within the Allied High Command about where priorities were at given points in time.

Initial intended useage was as a fighter bomber in support of the invasion, with the focus to be on targets beyond the range of the Spitfires and Typhoons and not considered suitable for attack by medium or heavy bombers. One Wing of three squadrons in each of 83 Group and 84 Group in 2TAF to convert over from primarily Spitfire IXs. Programs of training in dive bombing and attendance at armament camps was planned in addition to conversion from the Spitfire to Mustang.

As the conversion was getting underway the priority changed to long range bomber escort operations - a response to requests for stronger fighter escorts for medium and heavy bomber operations. As a result a large percentage of the early operations by the two RAF Mustang III wings became bomber escort duties, interspersed with the occasional supporting longer ranged fighter sweep.

In the middle of that, a number of senior pilots from the various Squadrons were sent off to do dive bombing and ground strafing courses.

Soon after the three squadrons in turn in the first Wing went off to APCs for dive bombing and ground strafing courses and practice. Then they went straight back to bomber escort sorties, mixed in with a couple of escort sorties for CC Beaufighter maritime strikes. In May 1944 they shifted to dive bombing operations against transportation targets. D-Day and after 'armed recces' in areas beyond the immediate front line interdiction role - transport choke points, supply dumps, etc further back from the frontline, along with attacks against the Seine bridges, punts and crossings, interspersed with a few escorts to the medium bombers of 2TAF. They moved to ALGs in France in late June 1944. They basically followed the advance by the ground army all the way through into October 1944 before they moved back to the UK. From there their primary focus for the rest of 1944 was providing long range escorts to RAF heavies performing daylight bombing raids. Early 1945 they started to add into the mix of long range escort, work with the CC strike wings, but were still doing escort for RAF and USAAF heavies on daylight raids.

The second Wing to re-equip, they also did APCs on dive bombing and ground strafing early in their conversion to the Mustang III. May 1944 they became involved in escort of USAAF and RAF medium and heavy bombers as well as attacks against V-1 sites in northern France, adding in transportation targets in northern France and Belgium. Immediate lead up to D-Day their focus shifted to transportation targets, again primarily in northern France, then 'armed recces' against transportation, supply dumps, enemy HQs, etc. Early July 1944 they were urgently retasked to anti-Diver patrols which remained their main focus through until September 1944, when they became involved in operations in support of Op MARKET-GARDEN. October 1944, they refocussed providing long range fighter escort for CC strike wings as well as RAF and USAAF medium and heavy bombers on daylight raids.

The follow on RAF Squadrons to re-equip with the Mustang III in the ETO, one re-equipped before D-Day and initially largely did fighter escort for CC strike wings, then was redeployed urgently in early July for anti-Diver patrols for a couple of months. They then returned to long range esscort for CC operations.

Others started re-equipping last three months of 1944 and were mainly tasked with long range fighter escort for RAF and USAAF medium and heavy bombers on daylight raids with the occasional sweep, usually as a support or distraction to a large heavy bomber raid.

What played a large part in the changes to disposition of Squadrons between 2TAF and ADGB/FC was the speed with which ALGs became available in France after D-Day, allowing more shorter range types eg Spitfire & Typhoon to carry heavier loads against the targets in the enemy rear behind the front lines. The speed with which liberated airfields in northern France and Belgium became available and new ALGs were established - with a couple of exceptions during the rapid advance north after the breakout - meant more supporting aircraft could be based on the continent, rather than having to operate from the UK.

The aircraft with the longest in built range - the Mustang IIIs were then pulled back to the UK to largely take on long range escort roles to the bombers and CC strike wings. In the long range escort role, they would be supplemented by shorter range Spitfire squadrons based in the UK, but staging through airfields on the continent - usually refuelling on the return leg, but sometimes refuelling before proceeding on their escort operation. In a couple of instances the RAF Mustang III squadrons landed at airfields on the continent to refuel on return from a long escort, or as a diversion if poor weather had settled in over their primary bases in the UK.

MTO, a whole different situation.