GregP
Major
The process of vetting is described in "Naval Aviation Combat Statistics World War Two," but not exactly in great detail.
The method used in compiling these data deserves brief description. The basic source material for most actions was the squadron ACA-1 report for each mission, or the individual
squadron or mission action report for actions prior to adoption of the ACA-1 form. Where no action reports were available, carrier battle narratives or squadron monthly war diaries were used. A check list of all carriers and squadrons in combat areas was maintained, and the war diaries of all such squadrons, and battle narratives of all such ships, were checked for possible actions in the event that no action reports had been received from any of these units.
Naval Air Anti-submarine data is omitted.
Also excluded are complete data for flights not involving contact with the enemy. Things like search, recon, defensive flights not in action, etc. So, losses sustained on such flights are excluded, too.
Operations of VO-VS aircraft are excluded.
Data in losses of flying personnel are excluded.
In the case of planes destroyed on ground by carrier-based aircraft, the final evaluations of the carrier task force commanders were used in lieu of the claims advanced in squadron
action reports. Squadron claims have been used, however, for grounded planes destroyed by our land-based aircraft, in view of the small n!xibers involved, and the general lack of final evaluations . (Squadron claims have been used consistently for enemy aircraft destroyed in air combat, since in few instances have higher commands reduced these claims).
Enemy aircraft destroyed in combat:
Airborne enemy aircraft claimed destroyed by naval aircraft, In aerial combat only. Planes destroyed by own anti-aircraft fire or in suicide crashes are not included. Enemy aircraft reported as "probably destroyed" are not included. Squadron claims, as made in ACA-1 or other action reports, are the basis for these figures. They thus represent the evaluations only of the squadron intelligence officer, squadron commander, and in some cases the air group commander. However, rarely was there any further evaluation by higher authority
of squadron claims with respect to airborne enemy aircraft.
There's more, but it is a longer read.
It is worth remembering that most Naval air actions involved 2 to 8 of our aircraft against 2 to 8 enemy aircraft since both sets were from carriers. That makes it WAY easier to keep track of victories and losses since there is no giant, swirling dogfight. Yes, there were a few, but not very many relative to the ETO or MTO.
By way of example. the very important mission to shoot down Yamamoto involved only eighteen P-38s (2 of which malfunctioned) versus two Betty Bombers and an escort of six A6M fighters. Seems like, with the value of Yamamoto to Japan, he would have had a more impressive escort, but nobody thought there was much danger. So, keeping track of things was WAY easier than 100 fighters escorting 200 bombers over Europe.
Despite that, they still fought about who exactly got Yamamoto! The questions is still debated! That may mean nobody is very sure of anything or one pilot or the other simply craved the credit.
I bet they didn't tell anyone else WHO was on a target aircraft from that mission forward!
Last edited: