Oil campaign chronology of World War II

[syscom3]

An interetsing choronologic list of the missions of the Allied air force against the Nazi oil industry.

I know its wiki, but this being a chronology, it's pretty accurate.

Oil campaign chronology of World War II - Wikipedia

 

[Milosh]

 

[Browning303]

Thanks for sharing! An interesting article.

On the topic of the availability of oil and its impact on Germany in WW2, I thought this video was excellent:

 

[Koopernic]

An interetsing choronologic list of the missions of the Allied air force against the Nazi oil industry.

I know its wiki, but this being a chronology, it's pretty accurate.

Oil campaign chronology of World War II - Wikipedia

One of the best sources of information is the fischer-tropsch.org archive.

 

[Koopernic]

One of the reasons Italy was limited in military might was that despite an industrious, skilled and talented people it lacked not only oil but even coal. However Italy probably could grown its own food. Interestingly in 1942 or so Italian geologists discovered natural gas using a force balance gravitometer obtained from Germany. It was too late to exploit it.

The state of coal to oil technology was not enough at the time. Newer techniques, fluidised bed reactors, newer catalysts seemed to promise about a 50% increase in output of coal to oil plants and a several fold reduction in the amount of steel required. These were coming in at the end of the war. I don't know even if that would be enough. Coal is a awful thing to handle compared to oil. (Conveyors instead of pipes). Expensive to get out of the ground and transport and you loose around 50% in the conversion process. The amount of steel needed is probably 10 times more.

We can see from TIK's analysis or rather his books that the German army was often unable to manoeuvre for days or weeks at a time and this lost the initiative in a type of warfare they otherwise excelled at.

The elimination of what amounted to any German bomber production 2 months after D-day was mostly driven by fuel shortages as well as the need to concentrate on fighter production.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

A good graph of the strategic bombing campaign on German fuel is reproduced in my book, from which I have made certain graphs available online to
aid readability.

The Secret Horsepower Race: Image Archive - Calum Douglas

 

[Milosh]

 

[Koopernic]

What is amazing is the huge amounts of stocks of oil the Germans accumulated just prior to June 1944 and then how rapidly those stocks declined as production reduced due to bombing.
How did they achieve this accumulation? One could argue that the UK/US oil Offensive secured a Soviet victory.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

What is amazing is the huge amounts of stocks of oil the Germans accumulated just prior to June 1944 and then how rapidly those stocks declined as production reduced due to bombing.
How did they achieve this accumulation? One could argue that the UK/US oil Offensive secured a Soviet victory.

It could be argued (and has been) that the Transportation Plan was more important than the Oil Campaign, however I think the Red Army secured the Soviet victory.

 

[Koopernic]

It could be argued (and has been) that the Transportation Plan was more important than the Oil Campaign, however I think the Red Army secured the Soviet victory.

The Red Army would not have advanced at a fraction of the rate it did if the German armies Armour had of had the fuel to conduct advances and manoeuvres. The Wehrmacht was often so deficient in fuel unable to move its panzers for weeks at a time or conduct offensives or advances. It would need to wait weeks to accumulate the fuel required. During the Soviet invasion of East Prussia Each German Tank had only 2.5 loads of fuel. That's not even enough to retreat let alone exploit any opportunities or Soviet Weaknesses.

I would go so far as to say that without the allied oil (and transport campaign) the Soviets would have been contained another year. To that we might add that maybe half of the 20,000 8.8cm FLAK 37 guns in Germany as part of air defences could have been on the eastern front dug in to stop the Soviet Armour.

 

[Snautzer01]

Target Complex Location Type Plant Note Attacked Attacked Attacked Attacked Attacked Attacked Attacked Attacked Attacked Attacked
Oil Ammoniawerke Merseburg Leuna Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 600.000 tons capability. Also nitrogen and other chemicals 12-mrt-44 28-mrt-44 7-jul-44 20-jul-44 28-jul-44 29-jul-44 24-aug-44 11-sep-44 13-sep-44 27-sep-44
Oil S,D. Treibstobwerke Brüx Most Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 750.000 tons capability 12-mrt-44 21-jul-44 24-aug-44 11-sep-44 23-sep-44
Oil Hydrierwerke Politz Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 600.000 tons capability. 29-mei-44 20-jun-44 25-aug-44
Oil Braunkohle Benzin Bohlen Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 350.000 tons capability. 12-mrt-44 7-jul-44 16-aug-44
Oil Braunkohle Benzin Zeitz Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 460.000 tons capability. 12-mei-44 28-mei-44 16-aug-44
Oil Braunkohle Benzin Rothensee, Magdeburg Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 250.000 tons capability. 28-aug-44 20-jun-44 16-aug-44 11-sep-44 12-sep-44
Oil Gelsenkirchen Bergwerks Gelsenkirchen Nordstern, Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 400.000 tons capability. 12-jun-44 RAF 11-sep-44 RAF 13-sep-44 RAF 27-sep-44 RAF
Oil Hydrier Werke Scholven Gelsenkirchen Buer, Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 400.000 tons capability. 18-jul-44 RAF 26-aug-44 12-sep-44 RAF
Oil I.G. Farben Sławięcice Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 350.000 tons capability. Sub camp Auschwitz 7-aug-44 27-aug-44 13-sep-44
Oil I.G. Farben Sławięcice Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 125.000 tons capability. Sub camp Auschwitz 7-jul-44 7-aug-44 22-aug-44 27-aug-44 13-sep-44
Oil I.G. Farben Oswiecim Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 200.000 tons capability. 20-aug-44 13-sep-44
Oil Chemische Union Wesseling Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 200.000 tons capability. 18-aug-44 RAF
Oil Krupp Wanne eickel Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 130.000 tons capability. 29-sep-43 RAF 25-jul-44 5-aug-44 RAF 12-sep-44 RAF
Oil Winterschall Wettin Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 120.000 tons capability. 7-jul-44 13-sep-44
Oil Ruhrol Botrop, Welheim Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 100.000 tons capability. 20-jul-44 RAF
Oil I.G. Farben Ludwighafen Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Bergius) 90.000 tons capability. 3-sep-44 5-sep-44 9-sep-44
Oil Braunkohle Benzin Ruhland, Schwartzheide Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Fischer Topsch) 350.000 tons capability 28-aug-44
Oil Winterschall, Lützkendorf Wettin Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Fischer Topsch) 140.000 tons capability 12-mei-44 28-mei-44
Oil Hoesch Benzin Dortmund Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Fischer Topsch) 300.000 tons capability 24-mei-43 RAF 12-sep-44 RAF
Oil Gewerkschaft Rheinpreusen Meerbeck Homberg Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Fischer Topsch) 190.000 tons capability 1-jul-44 RAF 11-jul-44 RAF 20-jul-44 RAF 27-aug-44 RAF
Oil Ruhr Benzin Sterkrade Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Fischer Topsch) 125.000 tons capability 16-jun-44 RAF 18-aug-44 RAF 30-sep-44 RAF
Oil Schaffgotsch Benzin Odertal Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Fischer Topsch) 110.000 tons capability 7-jul-44 22-aug-44 13-sep-44
Oil Essener Steinkohle Kamen Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Fischer Topsch) 100.000 tons capability 11-sep-44 RAF
Oil Klockner Winterschall Castrop Rauxel Synthetic oil Oil Synthetic oil (Fischer Topsch) 100.000 tons capability 11-sep-44 RAF
Refineries Astra Romana Ploiești Oil Refinery Oil 1750000 ton per year 24-apr-44 5-mei-44 18-mei-44 31-mei-44 11-jun-44 28-jul-44 17-aug-44 18-aug-44
Refineries Steau Romana Campina Oil Refinery Oil 1500000 ton per year 1-aug-43 5-mei-44 6-mei-44 11-jun-44 10-aug-44
Refineries Concordia Vega Ploiești Oil Refinery Oil 1450000 ton per year 1-aug-43 24-apr-44 5-mrt-44 24-apr-44 11-jun-44 9-jul-44
Refineries Romano Americana Refinery Ploiești Oil Refinery Oil 170000 ton per year 31-mrt-44 10-jun-44 15-jul-44 22-jul-44 26-jul-44 RAF 10-aug-44 18-aug-44
Refineries Phoenix Orion Ploiești Oil Refinery Oil 730000 ton per year 1-aug-43 24-apr-44 5-mei-44
Refineries Standard Ploiești Oil Refinery Oil 550000 ton per year 5-mei-44 28-jul-44 17-aug-44
Refineries Creditul Minier Brazi Oil Refinery Oil 535000 ton per year 1-aug-43 15-jul-44 31-jul-44
Refineries Colombia Aquila Ploiești Oil Refinery Oil 535000 ton per year 1-aug-43 5-mei-44 11-jun-44
Refineries Phoenix Unirea Ploiești Oil Refinery Oil 440000 ton per year 31-mei-44 15-jul-44 28-jul-44 17-aug-44
Refineries Xenia Ploiești Oil Refinery Oil 290000 ton per year 5-mei-44 9-jul-44
Refineries Petrolmina (Lumina) Ploiești Oil Refinery Oil 150000 ton per year 5-mei-44
Refineries Redeventa Ploiești Oil Refinery Oil 100000 ton per year 15-jul-44
Refineries Prahove Bucharest Oil Refinery Oil 200000 ton per year 4-apr-44 3-jul-44
Refineries Vacuum (Phpotogen) Brasov Oil Refinery Oil 35000 ton per year 16-apr-44 4-jul-44
Refineries Shell Koolaz Budapest Czepel Oil Refinery Oil 175000 ton per year 14-jun-44 2-jul-44 14-jul-44 17-sep-44
Refineries Magyr Budapest Oil Refinery Oil 60000 ton per year 3-apr-44 14-jul-44 17-sep-44
Refineries Fanto Budapest Oil Refinery Oil 60000 ton per year 14-jun-44 14-jul-44
Refineries Apollo Bratislava Oil Refinery Oil 150000 ton per year 16-jun-44
Refineries Socony Vacuum Almasfuzito Oil Refinery Oil 125000 ton per year 14-jun-44 9-aug-44
Refineries Hydrobenzen Petfurdo Oil Refinery Oil 100000 ton per year 14-jun-44 13-jul-44 14-jul-44
Refineries Magyar Szony Oil Refinery Oil 100000 ton per year 14-jun-44 21-aug-44 28-aug-44
Refineries Shell -Caprag Sisak Oil Refinery Oil 100000 ton per year 14-jun-44
Refineries Stadard Vacuum Brod Oil Refinery Oil 100000 ton per year 10-jun-44 RAF 1-jul-44 8-jul-44 RAF 14-jul-44 RAF 9-aug-44
Refineries Sumasisk Smederovo Oil Refinery Oil 40000 ton per year 11-jul-44 16-jul-44 17-jul-44
Refineries Ip Oil Osijek Oil Refinery Oil 20000 ton per year 14-jun-44
Refineries Lispe Budafapuszta Gas plant Gas 30-jul-44
Refineries Winterschall Vienna Lobau Oil Refinery Oil 200000 ton per year 1-jun-44 26-jun-44 22-aug-44 10-sep-44
Refineries Shell Vienna Floridsdorf Oil Refinery Oil 100000 ton per year 16-jun-44 26-jun-44
Refineries Socony Vacuum Vienna Kagran Oil Refinery Oil 60000 ton per year 15-jun-44
Refineries Nova Oel Vienna Schwechat Oil Refinery Oil 50000 ton per year 16-jun-44 26-jun-44 10-sep-44
Refineries Fanto Vienna Vosendorf Oil Refinery Oil 40000 ton per year 8-aug-44 23-aug-44
Refineries Creditul Minier Vienna Korneuburg Oil Refinery Oil 50000 ton per year 8-jul-44 22-aug-44
Refineries Skoda Werke Wetzler Vienna Moesibierbaum Petro industry Oil 26-jun-44 28-aug-44
Refineries Refiney Drohobycz Drohobycz Oil Refinery Oil 190000 ton per year 26-jun-44
Refineries Polski Trzebinia Oil Refinery Oil 300000 ton per year 8-aug-44
Refineries Fanto Pardubice Oil Refinery Oil 200000 ton per year 24-aug-44
Refineries Goverment Refinery Dubova Oil Refinery Oil 90000 ton per year 20-aug-44
Refineries Vacuum Kolin Oil Refinery Oil 90000 ton per year 24-aug-44
Refineries Vacuum Czechowice Oil Refinery Oil 75000 ton per year 20-aug-44
Refineries Fanto Werk Bohumin Oil Refinery Oil 75000 ton per year 29-aug-44
Refineries AGIP Fiumo Oil Refinery Oil 150 ton per year, Plant active not needed by Germany 22-feb-44
Refineries Romsa Fiumo Oil Refinery Oil 130000 ton per year 19-jul-44 20-jul-44
Refineries SIAP Trieste Oil Refinery Oil 150000 ton per year 6-jul-44 15-jul-44
Refineries Aquila Trieste Oil Refinery Oil 350000 ton per year 9-jun-44 RAF 10-jul-44
Refineries AGIP Porto Marghera Oil Refinery Oil 450000 ton per year 19-mei-44 25-mei-44 9-jun-44 10-jun-44
Refineries Shell Spezia Oil Refinery Oil 450000 ton per year 19-mei-44 22-mei-44
Refineries Petrolifera Fornova di taro Oil Refinery Oil 50000 ton per year 22-jun-44
Refineries SIAP Leghorn Oil Refinery Oil ? 28-mei-43
Refineries Oil Refinery Berat Oil Refinery Oil 10000 ton per year 23-jul-44
Refineries Pechelbronn Merkwiller Oil Refinery Oil 120000 ton per year 3-aug-44
Refineries Compagnie Indust. Des Petroles Sete Frontignan Oil Refinery Oil 300000 ton per year 25-jun-44
Refineries Etang de Thau Sete Étang de Thau, Sète Oil Refinery Oil Unknown, not in operation 25-jun-44
Refineries Pechelbronn Donges Oil Refinery Oil 250000 ton per year 19-jul-44 RAF
Refineries SGHP Douai Courchelettes Oil Refinery Oil 300000 ton per year 3-aug-44
Refineries Texas Bec dÁmbes Oil Refinery Oil 350000 ton per year 4-aug-44 RAF
Refineries Shell Pauillac Oil Refinery Oil 500000 ton per year 4-aug-44 RAF
Refineries Rhenia Assag Harburg Oil Refinery Oil 550000 ton per year 2-aug-43 RAF 20-jun-44 6-aug-44
Refineries Ebano Harburg Oil Refinery Oil 400000 ton per year 20-jun-44
Refineries Europaische Tanklager Hamburg Oil Refinery Oil 400000 ton per year 18-jun-44 20-jun-44
Refineries Rhenania Ossag Hamburg Oil Refinery Oil 130000 ton per year 18-jun-44 20-jun-44
Refineries Julius Schindler Hamburg Oil Refinery Oil 40000 ton per year 20-jun-44
Refineries Deutsche Vacuum Hamburg Schulau Oil Refinery Oil 18000 ton per year 1-mrt-43 RAF
Refineries Albrecht Slieman Hamburg Oil Refinery Storage Storage 2-aug-43 RAF 20-jun-44 24-aug-44 11-sep-44 12-sep-44
Refineries Olex Deutsche Benzin Hamburg Oil Refinery Oil Unknown 2-aug-43
Refineries Deutsche Erdol (Durag) Hanover Misburg Oil Refinery Oil 300000 ton per year 20-jun-44
Refineries Hemmingstedt Hemmingstedt Oil Refinery Oil 190000 ton per year 18-jul-44 6-aug-44 24-aug-44 12-sep-44
Refineries Ma Wag Ostermoor Oil Refinery Oil 150000 ton per year 20-jun-44
Refineries Deutsche Gazolin Emmerich Oil Refinery Oil 60000 ton per year 14-jun-44
Refineries Deutsche Vacuum Bremen Oslebenhausen Oil Refinery Oil 80000 ton per year 1-dec-43 4-aug-44
Refineries Deutsche Gazolin Dollbergen Oil Refinery Oil 40000 ton per year 5-aug-44
Refineries Erdol Salzbergen Oil Refinery Oil 30000 ton per year 26-aug-44
Refineries Deutsche Oil Rositz Oil Refinery Oil 120000 ton per year 16-aug-44
Refineries Westfallische Mineral Dortmund Oil Refinery Lubricating oil 4-mei-43
Refineries Reinsch Milan Oil Refinery Lubricating oil 7-aug-43 RAF
Oil Miscellaneous Fried. Krupp Essen Oil Miscellaneous Coke by products 7-jan-43 RAF 27-mei-43 RAF
Oil Miscellaneous Bergwerk Dahlbusch Essen Oil Miscellaneous Coke by products 3-apr-43 RAF
Oil Miscellaneous Gelsen Bergwerk Bochum Oil Miscellaneous Tar distillates 13-mei-43 RAF
Oil Miscellaneous Teerverwertung Duisburg Oil Miscellaneous Tar distillates 29-mrt-43 RAF 12-mei-43 RAF
Oil Miscellaneous Molbis Leipzig Oil Miscellaneous Low Temp Carbonisation, Coal tar treatement 28-mei-44
Oil Miscellaneous Beer Sohne Dortmund Oil Miscellaneous Tar distillation 22-mei-44 RAF
Oil Miscellaneous Gelsenkirchen Bergwerks Duisburg Oil Miscellaneous Coke and tar distillation 12-mei-43 RAF 21-mei-44 RAF
Oil Miscellaneous Grossgaserei Magedenburg Rothensee Oil Miscellaneous Gas and tar disstilation 12-sep-44
Oil Miscellaneous Nobles und Thorl Hamburg Oil Miscellaneous Vegetable oil refinery & Hydrogenstion 26000 ton per year 1-dec-43 RAF 20-jun-44
Oil Miscellaneous Rhenania Ossag Dresden Freital Oil Miscellaneous Vegetable oil refinery 6000 ton per year 24-aug-44
Oil Miscellaneous Oelfabriken Gross Gerau Bremen Oil Miscellaneous Vegetable oils 18-aug-44

 

[Milosh]

I would submit that targeting the electrical power grid would have had more effect and been more crippling.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

I would submit that targeting the electrical power grid would have had more effect and been more crippling.

If you bomb any "intermediate" systems like electrical generation, it obviously causes severe problems. However, serious engineering sites usually have backup fuel generators, and repairs can be made very quickly. If however, you destroy oil infrastructure, you cannot even run vehicles, you cant transport anything, generators cant run, planes cant fly, tractors cant drive, bulldozers cant run - so you disable the means of running the repair organizations themselves. In addition, the attacks are being made in the air, they can ONLY be repulsed in the air, if you destroy fuel, you also disable the means of preventing subsequent attacks. Once you`ve got rid of fuel refining capability, the enemy air force quickly grinds to a halt, and you can then wipe out each industrial sector at your leisure.

 

[Milosh]

The German electric power situation was in fact in a precarious condition from the beginning of the war and became more precarious as the war progressed; this fact is confirmed by statements of a large number of German officials, by confidential memoranda of the National Load Dispatcher, and secret minutes of the Central Planning Committee. Fears that their extreme vulnerability would be discovered were fully discussed in these minutes.

The destruction of five large generating stations in Germany would have caused a capacity loss of 1.8 million kw. or 8 percent of the total capacity, both public and private. The destruction of 45 plants of 100,000 kw. or larger would have caused a loss of about 8,000,000 kw. or almost 40 percent, and the destruction of a total of 95 plants of 50,000 kw. or larger would have eliminated over one-half of the entire generating capacity of the country.

The shortage was sufficiently critical so that any considerable loss of output would have directly affected essential war production, and the destruction of any substantial amount would have had serious results.
Major Strategical Flaw of World War 2: Failure to Target Germany's Electrical Power Grid | History Forum (historum.com)

 

[Deleted member 68059]

The German electric power situation was in fact in a precarious condition from the beginning of the war and became more precarious as the war progressed; this fact is confirmed by statements of a large number of German officials, by confidential memoranda of the National Load Dispatcher, and secret minutes of the Central Planning Committee. Fears that their extreme vulnerability would be discovered were fully discussed in these minutes.

The destruction of five large generating stations in Germany would have caused a capacity loss of 1.8 million kw. or 8 percent of the total capacity, both public and private. The destruction of 45 plants of 100,000 kw. or larger would have caused a loss of about 8,000,000 kw. or almost 40 percent, and the destruction of a total of 95 plants of 50,000 kw. or larger would have eliminated over one-half of the entire generating capacity of the country.

The shortage was sufficiently critical so that any considerable loss of output would have directly affected essential war production, and the destruction of any substantial amount would have had serious results.
Major Strategical Flaw of World War 2: Failure to Target Germany's Electrical Power Grid | History Forum (historum.com)

I dont doubt it, but you only need to wipe out about 10 oil plants to eliminate the entire fuel and oil supply of the German fighter forces, (just a handful were able to make aviation fuel) whereas, as you`ve laid out above, if you wipe out 95 generation plants, you have done for only 50% of the electricity generation capacity. The following basically forms the bulk of all aviation fuel which could be used by the Luftwaffe for fighters. In fact, if you wipe out just Brux, Pölitz and Leuna you will probably cripple the Luftwaffe.

Brux
Pölitz
Leuna
Boehlen
Magdeburg
Zeitz
Scholven
Gensenberg
Blechhammer
Welheim

This was a serious strategic error in how they laid out their Hydrogenation facilities. For ease of supply, they were almost all stationed right next to the coal supply, therefore they were in a few (very predictable) locations, clustered around coal deposits. This lends itself to sucessful strategic bombing, and this is exactly what happened.

 

[nuuumannn]

I would go so far as to say that without the allied oil (and transport campaign) the Soviets would have been contained another year.

I wouldn't. Not with the change of season combined with a few tactical missteps along the way to really stifle the German advance. Given the delay imposed by winter, the Soviets are given time to build up their resources, something the Germans are powerless to stop, and once that happens, the unstoppable bulldozer starts moving and isn't going to stop until the Fuhrerbunker in Berlin is breached. The Germans have too few resources since they are fighting a multi-fronted war, even if they have more oil than traditionally. The Soviets can devote ALL their (and a large number of British and American) resources to defeating Germany.

 

[Milosh]

The Attack on Oil was more than on just aviation fuel. It also didn't start in earnest til '44.

"Generating and distributing facilities were relatively vulnerable and their recuperation was difficult and time consuming. Had electric generating plants and substations been made primary targets as soon as they could have been brought within range of Allied attacks, the evidence indicates that their destruction would have had serious effects on Germany's war production."

 

[syscom3]

The Attack on Oil was more than on just aviation fuel. It also didn't start in earnest til '44.

"Generating and distributing facilities were relatively vulnerable and their recuperation was difficult and time consuming. Had electric generating plants and substations been made primary targets as soon as they could have been brought within range of Allied attacks, the evidence indicates that their destruction would have had serious effects on Germany's war production."

I had read that the generating plants were small and difficult to hit even under the most ideal of circumstances and the bombardiers were spot on.

 

[Koopernic]

I suspect the coal to liquids plants generated their own electricity, probably using byproducts as did steel works.

i was involved at the periphery of a HVDC High Voltage Direct Current project called BASSLINK that connected the island of Tasmania via submarine cable and a HVDC cable to the Australian mainland. I became fascinated with this technology which can transmit electricity thousands of kilometers with 1/3rd the conductors. It has a practical history in WW2 Germany where underground transmission lines (I think Siemens) were built or started for supplying Berlin as this would be secure from air raid and stabalise the network by isolating faulty sections of the network from each other.

So there was a German effort to make their systems more robust.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

This is probably the most important single report (the "Final Report") on this theme, you can sometimes find early versions of it online (I think Fisher Tropsch has a pdf somewhere ?)

If nobody has a copy they can share, or knows the FT link, I`ll have a think if I can upload it to my website, it has 152 pages.