Out of the Big Three WW2 bombers (B-17, B-24, Lancaster), was the Flying Fortress the most redundant?

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I've posted up this article before but it is worth repeating here.

The number of RAF Mustang squadrons used as escorts to these raids also steadily increased during the period from an initial 7 or so in Aug 1944 to about double that number by the end of the war in Europe.
 
If Bomber Command decided to switch to daylight raids primarily, I assume that a 2-stage Merlin installation in the Lancaster wouldn't have been difficult
 
GrauGeist said:
The Halifax didn't have a better range compared to the Lancaster and the Lanc, Halifax and B-24 all had a service ceiling within range of the 88.
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Totally agree. I mentioned the Halifax mainly because no one normally does mention it (including me) and from the Mk III onwards it was quite a decent bomber. Plus it was at least as good as the B24 and B17 on Payload / Range
 
Clayton Magnet said:
If Bomber Command decided to switch to daylight raids primarily, I assume that a 2-stage Merlin installation in the Lancaster wouldn't have been difficult
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They did convert a few Lancasters to the MK VI specification, which had 2 stage Merlins.

According to the Wiki Lancaster page the engines didn't run well, and the VI was quickly withdrawn from service.
 
With invasion support and V weapons strikes Bomber Command was doing quite a lot of daylight raids from 14 June 1944 onwards, then hit Germany in daylight for the first time in 3 years on 27 August. From October onwards almost all bombing sorties were to German targets, Bombing sorties,

Jun-44 Day, 2716 Night, 13270 %day, 16.99
Jul-44 Day, 6727 Night, 8896 %day, 43.06
Aug-44 Day, 10156 Night, 7637 %day, 57.08
Sep-44 Day, 10019 Night, 4524 %day, 68.89
Oct-44 Day, 6758 Night, 8671 %day, 43.80
Nov-44 Day, 5176 Night, 8079 %day, 39.05
Dec-44 Day, 3720 Night, 9864 %day, 27.39
Jan-45 Day, 1303 Night, 8326 %day, 13.53
Feb-45 Day, 3669 Night, 11396 %day, 24.35
Mar-45 Day, 9605 Night, 9247 %day, 50.95

More data is available in the article mentioned by Ewen but from the British official history, for raids on targets in the Rhur during September 1944 by Bomber Command, the day raids were against the synthetic fuel plants, Night 872 sorties, 11 lost, 1.3%, flak damaged 22, 2.5% , Day 1,464 sorties, 19 lost, 1.3%, flak damaged 530, 36.7%. One reason why Bomber Command could prefer night raids.

Other reasons could include

Cloud varies across the day and season, the most clouds are at around 1 PM, around the 8ths usual attack time. Over Europe in summer during the day there are 3 days with no clouds for every 2 nights free of cloud, in winter it is 1 day to 3 nights. This ignores things like fog and mist, which are more prevalent in winter. Then there is the day to day weather, being able to strike day and night gives you options.

The problems of air traffic control if both Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force are operating in daylight, the number of allied escort fighters available, even with the Spitfires with rear fuselage tanks, the German fighter force growth and concentration as the year went on, quality was going down but not numbers within range of the targets. Inexperienced fighter pilots could still do well against weakly escorted bombers with weak defensive armament flying in loose formations. The time of year, Bomber Command started daylight raids against targets in Germany in late summer, then think of the amount of daylight available in the coming winter.

Lancaster VI, a cross between regular Lancaster and Mosquito for pathfinder and master bomber sorties, about 30 mph faster than the regular Lancaster, and 60 mph with the front and mid upper turrets removed, used Merlin 85 engines which had problems, the RAAF using Merlin 60 etc. series as replacement engines for its Lincolns until locally built Merlin 102 became available. Merlin 85 production began in January 1944 and ended in June 1945, 1,420 built. 2 Lancaster VI prototypes serials DV170 and DV199, 7 others modified, JB675, JB713, ND418, ND479, ND558, ND673 and ND784.

DV170 to Rolls Royce 16 June 1943, struck off charge 16 December 1947.

DV199 to Rolls Royce 6 July 1943, RAF Wyton 23 December 1943 to 1 January 1944, back to Rolls Royce, struck off charge 8 June 1947.

JB675 converted November 1943, RAF Wyton 14 March 1944, 7 squadron 14 April, 405 squadron on 1 May, 635 squadron 24 July, 7 Squadron 23 August, flying accident category AC 16 November, 76 squadron 2 December, RAE 17 December, Rolls Royce 20 January 1945, used as an engine test bed, SOC 7 September 1948.

JB713 converted December 1943, RAF Wyton 5 February 1944, 7 squadron then 405 squadron on 21 March, 635 squadron 25 July, lost on operations 18 August 1944.

ND418 converted January 1944 RAF Wyton 16 March 1944, 83 squadron 20 March, 7 squadron 14 April, 635 squadron 24 July, 82 squadron 15 November, RAE 17 December, bomb ballistics unit 28 February 1946, dumped October 1947

ND479 converted January 1944, used by Avro and AAEE, wrecked 26 April 1944.

ND558 converted January 1944, A&AEE 21 May, 635 squadron 26 August, Rolls Royce 11 September, RAF Wyton 16 September, Rolls Royce 28 February 1946, bomb ballistics unit 12 November 1946, still around end December 1949 (reported with Rolls Royce 1944 to 1946.)

ND673 converted March 1944, RAF Wyton 21 June, 7 squadron 25 June, 635 squadron 24 July, completed 23 operations as part of 635 squadron, RAE 11 December 1944, SOC Cat E 31 January 1947.

ND784 converted March 1944 was used as an engine test bed by Armstrong Whitworth and Power Jets, scrapped 1952

The Halifax III had an improved ceiling versus the mark II and V, the Halifax VI (480 production versions built July 1944 to November 1945), is reported to have had a better ceiling than the Lancaster I and III.

Bomber Command fuel loads were calculated according to track miles plus a fixed reserve, after that came what was available for a bomb load plus any weight safety margin for things like take off and altitude performance. Given the weather forecasting and the logistics of landing large numbers of aircraft when the weather turned bad there does not seem to be much fine tuning of fuel loads, just the basic rules.

In gallons the Lancaster fuel load was track miles divided by 0.95 plus a 200 gallon reserve. The Halifax II track miles divided by 0.83 plus a 200 gallon reserve. The Halifax III was track miles divided by 0.8 plus a 200 gallon reserve. The Stirling track miles divided by 0.75 plus a 300 gallon reserve.

So at 800 miles track range the Lancaster fuel load, including reserves, was 1,040 gallons, the Halifax II 1,164, the Halifax III 1,200 and the Stirling 1,367. At 1,400 track miles the figures were 1,675, 1,882, 1,950 and 2,168 gallons respectively. It meant at 800 miles the Lancaster could carry around 4,000 pounds more load than its nearest competitor, the Halifax III, but at 17,200 pounds it was more than the internal bomb bay capacity.

At 1,200 track miles the Lancaster had about 14,150 pounds available for bomb etc. loads, the Halifax III 9,260, the Halifax II 8,320, the Stirling 6,625.

At 1,400 miles the Lancaster is credited with having 12,620 pounds available, versus 7,480 for the Halifax III, 6,600 for the Halifax II and 4,695 pounds for the Stirling.

The early B-17F using standard 8th Air Force tactics would use 1,635 US Gallons to hit a target about 320 miles away, landing with 125 gallons remaining. The major penalty for flying high in large, tight formations from almost start to finish.
 
Clayton Magnet said:
If Bomber Command decided to switch to daylight raids primarily, I assume that a 2-stage Merlin installation in the Lancaster wouldn't have been difficult
Click to expand...
wuzak said:
They did convert a few Lancasters to the MK VI specification, which had 2 stage Merlins.

According to the Wiki Lancaster page the engines didn't run well, and the VI was quickly withdrawn from service.
Click to expand...
The Mk VI was tested by a few squadrons, 405 being one of them. Of the top of my head, Reg Lane OC of 405 did 3 ops in one. There's an anecdotal report he was "approached" by a JU.88 during one of these and he cranked up the jets to 300 mph and easily out-distances it. Lane's logbook is available to download from the International Bomber Command Digital Archives.

Bomber Command didn't repower Lancasters during their service. They remained with the same engine types until lost, written off or til the end of their period of service. I'm unaware of any change in power plants.

Jim
 
Geoffrey Sinclair said:
The early B-17F using standard 8th Air Force tactics would use 1,635 US Gallons to hit a target about 320 miles away, landing with 125 gallons remaining. The major penalty for flying high in large, tight formations from almost start to finish.
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Formation assembly alone took from one to two hours, depending on the number of aircraft, so that's one to two hours of flight time not available for cruising toward the target. Then there's the higher fuel usage of formation flying itself.

According to the Standard Aircraft Characteristics document for the B-17G, at a gross takeoff weight of 67,860 lbs (which includes 2,570 gallons of fuel, 148 gallons of oil, and 10,000 lbs of military load) and a cruising altitude of 25,000 feet, had a combat radius of 907 miles (788 nautical miles). The total mission time would be 8.88 hours with an average cruising speed of 209 mph (182 knots).

The calculation parameters from the document:
  1. Allowance for 10 minutes normal rated power, warm up and takeoff.
  2. Climb to 25,000 feet.
  3. Cruise at long-range speed until 15 minutes before bomb drop.
  4. Conduct a 15 minute normal power bomb-run.
  5. Drop bombs.
  6. Conduct 5 minute normal power evasive action (no distance gained).
  7. Plus, 10 minute normal rated power run-out from target area.
  8. Cruise back to base at long range speeds at 25,000 feet.
  9. Land with 5% initial fuel load as reserve.
Formation flying had its benefits and drawbacks.

It would be interesting to know how the USAAF squadrons which did do nighttime bombing with the RAF fared in terms of bombing distance attained, since these would be free of the formation flying restrictions.
 
USAAF Bombers in the ETO Only. Unsure of Lancaster but it stands to reason most, if not all, the Lancaster data was from the ETO.
  • B-17: 291,508 sorties; 4,688 combat losses. Loss per combat sortie: .0151.
  • B-24: 226,775 sorties; 3,626 combat losses. Loss per combat sortie: .0176.
  • Lancaster: 156,192 sorties; 3,832 combat losses. Loss per combat sortie: .0245.

  • The B-24 has 16.8% higher loss per sortie than the B-17.
  • The Lancaster has 62.5% higher loss rate than the B-17.

Loss rate per sortie depends heavily on what the assigned missions were. The Lancaster didn't see service until 1942, so it's combat service history is close to the same as the B-17.

B-17 / B-24 data from American Combat Planes by Ray Wagner. Lancaster data from Osprey Combat Aircraft Lancaster Squadrons 1942 – 43 by John Lake.

Doesn't tell us much other than average loss rate per sortie. The Lancaster was a very good airplane that was hard to bail out of. On average, only about 15% of the crew got out of a Lancaster when abandoning one of them. It was largely due to teh size of the entry/exit hatch. The rate for the B-17 was around 50%. I don't have a decent B-24 number.

For ruggedness and reliability (read that as better withstanding battle damage and fewer mechanics needed), I'd take a B-17 or Lancaster any day, but there's little to choose about them from a "bomb the enemy" standpoint ... all 3 would do it quite efficiently.
 
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Bomber Command War Room Manual, Lancaster sorties and casualties were

day bomber 40,139 despatched, 35,022 attacking, 263 missing, 28 category E enemy action, 42 Category E not enemy action.
night bomber 108,264 despatched, 100,422 attacking, 2,992 missing, 107 category E enemy action, 294 Category E not enemy action.
minelaying 2,929 despatched, 2,511 attacking, 87 missing, 3 category E enemy action, 7 Category E not enemy action.
other sorties 4,860 (including 2,835 food drop and 469 PoW evacuation sorties), 3 missing, 4 category E enemy action, 2 Category E not enemy action. (In 1944 additional "other sorties" were 21 reconnaissance, 40 bomber support, 202 diversion and 40 dummy parachute dropping and it looks like the remaining other sorties were mostly diversions in 1945.)

Total 156,192 with Bomber Command, plus another 116 anti submarine sorties with Coastal Command. Total missing is 3,345 plus another 4 when with Coastal Command, total lost on operations 3,852+4.

For a comparison the W.R. Chorley losses series has 239 missing, 75 write offs day bombing, 2,996 missing and 472 write offs night bombing, 84 missing and 13 write offs minelaying. All up Chorley notes the losses taken by combat units plus the training units on operations comes to 4,152 Lancasters, including a few after the end of hostilities.

In 1945 Lancaster day bombing, 13,325 despatched, 11,568 attacking (86.7%), 69 missing (0.6% of attacking), night 20,051 despatched, 19,071 attacking (95.1%), 311 missing (1.6% of attacking), the day raids were shallow penetration but still had to be able to fly in formation and were usually after a specific target.

Losses as a percentage of effective sorties, remembering the bias was to assume missing aircraft attacked before being lost. Overall loss rates bombing and mining only, 2.42% MIA, 0.35% category E, total 2.77%.
LancasterSortiesEffectiveMIACAT E%MIA%CAT E%loss
Day Bomb
40,139​
35,022​
263​
70​
0.75​
0.20​
0.95​
Night Bomb
108,264​
100,423​
2,992​
401​
2.98​
0.40​
3.38​
Sea Mining
2,929​
2,511​
87​
10​
3.46​
0.40​
3.86​
Other
4,860​
n/a
3​
6​
A/Sub
116​
n/a
4​

Cumulative totals from 8th Air Force April 1945 monthly report.
AircraftSortiesEffectiveMIACAT E%MIA%CAT E%loss
B-17
226,332​
185,704​
3,210​
1,018​
1.73​
0.55​
2.28​
B-24
102,258​
78,914​
1,086​
544​
1.38​
0.69​
2.07​
The USAAF Statistical Digest has 332,904 airborne and 274,921 effective heavy bomber sorties in the ETO, 187,410 airborne and over 147,111 effective in the MTO. The 15th Air force, so November 1943 onwards, reports 52,136 B-17 and 113,218 B-24 sorties, loss rates (assuming destroyed/combat loss = MIA and Category E) of 1.5% of effective sorties for B-17 and 2.02% for B-2.

8th Air Force, from a near complete list of B-17 combat losses but missing some B-24, usually category E which would reduce the overall personnel casualty rates. For the B-17 about 37% of an average 9.74 man crew were KIA when lost to fighters, 32.1% of an average 9.2 man crew were KIA when lost to flak. For the B-24, after taking out the low level mission flak losses, something like 49.4% of an average 9.4 man crew were KIA when lost to fighters. 37.1% of an average 8.9 man crew when lost to flak.

Bomber Command War Diaries has a sample only of 126 Lancaster, 74 Halifax and 13 Stirling losses, survival rates were 13.2%, 21.9% and 24% respectively.
 
It has seemed to me that the only advantage of the Lanc was its superior lift capability. What would its performance have been like had it hauled the power turrets, .50 cal Brownings, and ammo carried by B-17's or B-24's? What would their reputation have been had they flown daylight precision missions starting at the same time as the 17's (no fighter escort)? It seems to me that 3 turrets with .303 Brownings would not have been much protection (and no fixed mount guns). I think I've read that Lancs did do daytime missions, but I believe that was late in the war, with little Luftwaffe opposition. The other very obvious advantage is that the British manufactured them -- without them, it's not like they were going to make 17's or 24's under license.
 
Geoffrey Sinclair said:
Bomber Command War Diaries has a sample only of 126 Lancaster, 74 Halifax and 13 Stirling losses, survival rates were 13.2%, 21.9% and 24% respectively.
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The Crucible of War 1939–1945 — The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume III by Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnston, and William G.P. Rawlings (University of Toronto Press, 1994) has this to say about crew survivability (Table 7 on page 755). It cites Bomber Command Headquarters. 'An Examination of the emergency escape arrangements from Bomber Command operational aircraft.' 19 May 1945, DHist 181.003 (D4598) as the source.
Code: 
Crew Position and Survivability in Bomber Command Aircraft
January–June 1943

Position           Lancaster   Halifax  Wellington

Pilot                 9.6%      20.8%     14.6%
Navigator            13.8%      36.2%     21.0%
Wireless Operator    11.9%      32.5%     18.5%
Flight engineer      12.4%      34.0%        —
Bomber-aimer         13.2%      31.4%     18.5%
Mid-upper gunner      8.5%      27.3%        —
Rear gunner           8.0%      23.4%     14.6%

Overall              10.9%      29.0%     17.5%
 
Pretty much the same as the B-17 until 1944. The Lancaster always had 3 powered turrets.
 
Pretty much the same as the B-17 until 1944. The Lancaster always had 3 powered turrets.
With, I believe, a grand total of 8 x .303's. Less than one Spitfire firing all at once. And against a target with a pretty high closing speed. Compared to 10 x .50's... (G).
Click to expand...
 
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