Out of the Big Three WW2 bombers (B-17, B-24, Lancaster), was the Flying Fortress the most redundant?

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Some info on Bomber Command daylight attacks starting in 1944.


target location advances. accuracy increases by night translated
to day operations with G-H able to be used from Autumn 1944 as
ground stations could be set up on the continent.

Portal and Spaatz put oil as the primary target on 25th September 1944,
with rail and water transport next. Support for naval and land operations
came next with other targets to be attacked when conditions were
unsuitable for operations against the primary targets.

Bomber Command started daylight operations earlier on 27th August
against the Rheinpreussen synthetic oil factory with moderate results.

Flak was heavy but no bombers were lost and no attacks made by the
Luftwaffe as there were escorting squadrons of Spitfires which kept
them away.

3 September - 675 aircraft in daylight raids on 6 German airfields in
Holland. This and five further raids were rated as successful.

6 September - Emden - CBD and docks targetted with bombers flying
in at 2,000 feet to confuse the early warning system (German cities would
initiate a smoke screen covering targets but they had no time in this case).
Areas pinpointed were damaged and the submarine building yard was
severely hit.

11 September - attacks started on 3 oil facilities covered by 26 fighter
squadrons (don't know the type). Again no German aircraft could interfere
but 9 bombers were lost to flak. Results varied.

12 and 13 September more raids on oil facilities with the Nordstern facility severely
damaged.

Damage from flak increased in daylight attacks from the night average of 2.5
percent to 36.7 percent.

Opposition from Luftwaffe fighters in daylight was basically nil as escort fighters
were available and early warning radar systems were being lost in allied ground
advances by the day.

Attacks by larger forces increased from October. An example is Duisberg on 14th
October - 1,014 bombers in a daylight attack followed by 1,005 bombers that
night. Total bomber losses were 21 with heavy damage to docks, industrial facilities
and railway infrastructure.

Many other attacks were made with the night location finding experience being very
important.

Night attacks still had to contend with Luftwaffe night fighters.

Targets attacked from September 1944 to April 1945 - 153 daylight and 166 night.
 
The 151/20 was installed in the F4, the F2 had the 151/15
The F-0 (handful) and F-1 (just over 200) had the MG/FFM and perhaps the F-3 (15 built?) but how many may have been retro fitted with newer guns?
Some of the F-2s with 151/15s were refitted with 151/20s but since you could actually fit the barrel and changes to the feed to the existing gun that was simpler to do.

But if they could refit E-1s with 7.9mm guns in the wings to 20mm MF/FFMs in a different bay in the wing then swapping out the center fuselage gun doesn't seem out of the range of possibility.
 
Formation assembly alone took from one to two hours, depending on the number of aircraft, so that's one to two hours of flight time not available for cruising toward the target. Then there's the higher fuel usage of formation flying itself.

According to the Standard Aircraft Characteristics document for the B-17G, at a gross takeoff weight of 67,860 lbs (which includes 2,570 gallons of fuel, 148 gallons of oil, and 10,000 lbs of military load) and a cruising altitude of 25,000 feet, had a combat radius of 907 miles (788 nautical miles). The total mission time would be 8.88 hours with an average cruising speed of 209 mph (182 knots).

The calculation parameters from the document:
  1. Allowance for 10 minutes normal rated power, warm up and takeoff.
  2. Climb to 25,000 feet.
  3. Cruise at long-range speed until 15 minutes before bomb drop.
  4. Conduct a 15 minute normal power bomb-run.
  5. Drop bombs.
  6. Conduct 5 minute normal power evasive action (no distance gained).
  7. Plus, 10 minute normal rated power run-out from target area.
  8. Cruise back to base at long range speeds at 25,000 feet.
  9. Land with 5% initial fuel load as reserve.
Formation flying had its benefits and drawbacks.

It would be interesting to know how the USAAF squadrons which did do nighttime bombing with the RAF fared in terms of bombing distance attained, since these would be free of the formation flying restrictions.
That is very unrealistic for 8th AF (or 15th) Ops. A Bomb group starts engines at the same time and devotes 5+ minutes checking the a/c. At the tower flare the bombers, lead first for first squadron, taxiis with two wingmen in trail toward active runway, as eac of the rest of the squadron takes trail position for a nine ship take off, one ata time. Repeat for each of the other other two sqaudrons (or 3 more is max effort). Repeat squadron order take offs as the lead squadron circles while climbing slowly ~350fpm) to allow the trailing squadrons to catch up and form the group. If weather a factor, the goup assembles to a Buncher, around which the assembling group flies in a racetrack pattern. Dito for the other 30+ Bomb Groups all across East Anglia. Then the assembled groups in a Wing assumed the planned Wing position in trail - usually around a Buncher - before setting course to a Waypoint/RV for their position into the Task Force - usually just off the English Coast. This describes ONE Bomb Division procedure and climb to altitude usually not complete for 1st and 3rd BD until crossing Axis coastline. Steps 1. and 2. above in Clear weather usually around 45 minutes from Start Engines.

Bomb run at same speed as cruise - that speed dictated by the slowest (undamged) bombers - usually 150mph IAS at 25K. The 'natural cruise speed increased after unloading 8-10,000 pound load, but lead ships maintained cruise speed at Rally point as the formation was collected and then urn for home. Cruise nomal until point designated for decent when engines were throttled back. Cruise at reduced settings for Buncher/Spasher beacon for home field. In fomation the ead ship and squadron land in trail.

Land with whatever you have left.

Night bombing by the 8thAF would have been an unmitaigated goat fornication - and RAF would have been greatly hampered during the transition with 2x heavy bombers in the goo, many totally untrained in night operations. Aditionally just about all armament on B-17/24 should be removed for night ops. Chin turret and all nose armament, radio gun and waist guns, for example. On deep missions up to 13,000 round of M2 ammo carried - probably reduce to 2-3K max which would enable 4K plus more bomb load at faster cruise (eliminate minumum 3 to four crew).
 
That is very unrealistic for 8th AF (or 15th) Ops. A Bomb group starts engines at the same time and devotes 5+ minutes checking the a/c. At the tower flare the bombers, lead first for first squadron, taxiis with two wingmen in trail toward active runway, as eac of the rest of the squadron takes trail position for a nine ship take off, one ata time. Repeat for each of the other other two sqaudrons (or 3 more is max effort). Repeat squadron order take offs as the lead squadron circles while climbing slowly ~350fpm) to allow the trailing squadrons to catch up and form the group. If weather a factor, the goup assembles to a Buncher, around which the assembling group flies in a racetrack pattern. Dito for the other 30+ Bomb Groups all across East Anglia. Then the assembled groups in a Wing assumed the planned Wing position in trail - usually around a Buncher - before setting course to a Waypoint/RV for their position into the Task Force - usually just off the English Coast. This describes ONE Bomb Division procedure and climb to altitude usually not complete for 1st and 3rd BD until crossing Axis coastline. Steps 1. and 2. above in Clear weather usually around 45 minutes from Start Engines.

Bomb run at same speed as cruise - that speed dictated by the slowest (undamged) bombers - usually 150mph IAS at 25K. The 'natural cruise speed increased after unloading 8-10,000 pound load, but lead ships maintained cruise speed at Rally point as the formation was collected and then urn for home. Cruise nomal until point designated for decent when engines were throttled back. Cruise at reduced settings for Buncher/Spasher beacon for home field. In fomation the ead ship and squadron land in trail.

Land with whatever you have left.

Night bombing by the 8thAF would have been an unmitaigated goat fornication - and RAF would have been greatly hampered during the transition with 2x heavy bombers in the goo, many totally untrained in night operations. Aditionally just about all armament on B-17/24 should be removed for night ops. Chin turret and all nose armament, radio gun and waist guns, for example. On deep missions up to 13,000 round of M2 ammo carried - probably reduce to 2-3K max which would enable 4K plus more bomb load at faster cruise (eliminate minumum 3 to four crew).

This is the best document I have found on the structure of formation flying:

Eighth Air Force tactical development, August 1942 – May 1945.


See also,

Previously covered here:


Jim
 
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The USAAF raids in the ETO were designed to destroy German industry.

It was not until early 1944 that the goal was changed to destroy the Luftwaffe.

While RAF raids did not directly lead to the destruction of the Luftwaffe, they did cause significant diversion of resources. Such as the strengthening of teh defences of cities by flak guns.
You need to be a little bit careful with separating out the RAF there. Many of the oil raids which really did totally stop Luftwaffe operations were RAF raids too.
 
I was more thinking about destroying aircraft in the air on the ground, rather than factories.
The production of German fighters skyrocketed in 1944, admittedly the full set of "reasons" for the Luftwaffe`s defeat includes things like airfields being attacked
and so on, but its definetly not the pivotal aspect of it.
 
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The production of German fighters skyrocketed in 1944, admittedly the full set of "reasons" for the Luftwaffe`s defeat includes things like airfields being attacked
and so on, but its definetly not the pivotal aspect of it.

According to Speer's armaments industry indexes, aircraft production soared in the first half of 1944, peaked in July, then fell off rapidly after that. The value in December was below what it had been in January.
 
The production of German fighters skyrocketed in 1944, admittedly the full set of "reasons" for the Luftwaffe`s defeat includes things like airfields being attacked
and so on, but its definetly not the pivotal aspect of it.

In the SWPA, from almost day one, General Kenney concentrated on destroying Japanese airfields and aircraft on the ground. If they cant take off they are useless and you always have air superiority.
 
No but if they have no airfield to go to there is not much point in building them and even if you do build them they have nowhere to operate from.

And Kenney did not just strafe them - he bombed the **** out of them so that the runway and other critical structure were destroyed as this photo from alamy shows. I have some photos from some 20 years ago that show the bomb craters at Wewak airport that have never been filled in. Unfortunately I would have to go through thousands of negatives to find them.
1678580239892.png


THis photo is from https://external-content.duckduckgo...8cdb4acb1530ee2cc520bf3926e5d66635&ipo=images
1678580643230.png
 
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That's interesting. And suspicious to me. Nonetheless, the information is sourced from "Bomber Command Headquarters, 'An Examination of the emergency escape arrangements from Bomber Command operational aircraft,' 19 May 1945. DHist 181.003 (D4598). There must be some substance to the information.

Why am I suspicious? Because the rear turret escape procedure for Halifax and Lancaster should be nearly the same in both types, but from this table, the survival of the rear gunner on the Halifax is 3 times that of the Lancaster. That's a head scratcher and not logical, in my opinion.

One answer to this might be that differences in targets and the relative contribution of those aircraft to those targets may have a significant weight or influence on the summary statistics.

I can't argue with the differences of the bomb aimer, navigator as they were closely located to the escape hatch in the Halifax. Dad always talked about how difficult it was for a pilot to escape from a Lancaster. Not certain about the WOp and flight engineer.

Important to look at the original source material for this to understand what is going on.

Jim

The post-war manuscript by Bomber Commands Operational Research Section put the blame for the low survival rate on the Lancaster to the following:

The low rate for Lancasters was thought to be due to the fact that it was more difficult to escape from that aircraft owing to the greater difficulty in moving about in the narrow fuselage, to the small forward compartment, and the poor rear escape hatch. It was also thought possible that the Lancaster was more liable to break up in the air and that the higher flight conditions might increase the difficulties of escape after the removal of the oxygen mask (...) Attention was later specially drawn to the series difficulties which frequently occurred owing to the jamming of the front escape hatch as when it was being thrown out it tended to twist itself perpendicular to the airstream and jam.

***This is from page 372 & 373 of "Operational Research in Bomber Command", you can find a copy on either the Laurier Military History website or the RAF's Air Historical Branch website.

In regards to the difference for the rear gunners on Halifaxes and Lancasters, my suspicion would be the possibility the Lancaster was more liable to break up in the air to be at fault. The ORS noted (according to Randall Wakelam's "The Science of Bombing" book page 151) that in ~68% of cases where a Lancaster was lost, note one member of the crew survived, which is what led to the suspicion the aircraft was breaking up. Since the crews didn't actually wear their parachutes in the aircraft, instead having to clip it on to their harness before jumping, if the Lancaster was more prone to breaking up then it was likely the crew were either tossed out the aircraft (without their parachutes) when the Lancaster broke up, or the cyntrifical force of the wreckage plummetting to the ground would prevent them from bailing out. The Halifax crews could have had an easier time clipping their chutes to their harness and bailing out if their aircraft tended to go down in a more controllable manner.
 
Well, it was a bit of a dog's breakfast...

I can't add much to the B-17 versus the B-24 argument as there are far more knowledgeable people here for that, but between the Lanc, which has had surprisingly little mention here, versus the Halifax, generally speaking, I can chip in.

There is a saying that goes that you were more likely to survive being shot down in a Halifax than in a Lancaster, conversely there was a saying that you were more likely to be shot down in a Halifax than you were in a Lancaster...

And if I had to choose, it'd be the Lanc II over the Halifax III. Makes conversion onto the Lanc III easier :D
The Halifax was given easier position in bomber stream and less bombload to even up the crews' chance.
 
How would they do that exactly and were the results viable?

I believe the B-24 had the same size crew as the B-17, but your point is well taken. I was thinking of the crew of the B-36. I blame Jimmy Stewart for his performance in the movie "Strategic Air Command", which I recently watched. It is a must watch for the exquisite photography of the B-36 in the air and for the shots of its interior. Jimmy Stewart was a real life Air Force General who at the time of the filming was fully qualified to fly the B-36 and the B-47. While John Wayne was protecting Hollywood from Japanese attacks, Jimmy was flying combat missions over Germany in a B-24. Before that he was a B-17 instructor.
Getting back to the subject, yes the B-29 was a half baked cake being force fed into service. Most of its issues seem to be related to the engines propensity to catch fire, not the aircraft itself.
Back to original point the numbers clearly show the B-24 was much more dangerous to its crew than the B-17. As an aside the numbers also show the B-26 in an extremely bad light compared to the B-25
Wasn't it bottom 2 cylinders of back row of R3350 that needed over regular replacement by ground crews that solved the problems?
 
According to one B-24 crewman I spoke to in the 70s the B-24 had a low loss rate on missions that were purely B-24s but a much higher loss rate on missions where they flew with B-17s as that required flying 30mph slower at B-17 speeds which were too close to the B-24s flaps up stall speed. I have never checked the numbers to see if he was correct.
 
According to one B-24 crewman I spoke to in the 70s the B-24 had a low loss rate on missions that were purely B-24s but a much higher loss rate on missions where they flew with B-17s as that required flying 30mph slower at B-17 speeds which were too close to the B-24s flaps up stall speed. I have never checked the numbers to see if he was correct.
That practice ceased in late 1943. 2nd BD were rarely tasked in same Task Force, and even more rarely 'forced' to slow down to wait for B-17 Bomb divisions. When you look at Mission briefing maps, 2BD often branching to different targets.
 
According to one B-24 crewman I spoke to in the 70s the B-24 had a low loss rate on missions that were purely B-24s but a much higher loss rate on missions where they flew with B-17s as that required flying 30mph slower at B-17 speeds which were too close to the B-24s flaps up stall speed. I have never checked the numbers to see if he was correct.

I've read anecdotes, probably apocryphal, of B-17 crewmen remarking that with -24s around escorts weren't needed.
 
I've read anecdotes, probably apocryphal, of B-17 crewmen remarking that with -24s around escorts weren't needed.
Sadly somewhat true. Before there enough B-24 BG in 8th AF, the early ones (44th and 93rd fall 1942) had to fly formation with B-17 BG. The best envelope for B-24 is 180 IAS at 18000-22000 feet, behind B-17s at 150 IAS at 25,000 feet. The Davis airfoil on B-24 was low drag but also lower max CL, making it more difficult to both fly and Manuever (stay in tight formation) at 25K.

Result, fly low and behind the B-17s in combat box formations. Right in strike zone of Fw 190/Bf 109 and 88mm flak. 8th AF didn't get enough BG equipped with B-24s until after Big Week to operate as independent Task Force. Kepner's favorite Fighter Wing, the 65th FW, was largely tasked for 2nd BD after D-Day. It was comprised of the 4th, 56th, 355th, 361st and 479th. Like the other two FW's it had P-38, P-47 and P-51 FG's able to perform Penetration, Target and Withdrawal escort via natural (range based) Relay system some what self contained.

My first Chief Desgn in airframe biz was a former 24 driver in 44th BG. He had noticable big forearms to which he attributed 'flying formation at 25K in the early days'
 

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