P-38 debate for ETO - Letter from Col Rau, CO 20th FG - March 1944-December 1944

One of the things that occurred to me, ETO vs PTO, is that there were far fewer bounces from above in the PTO. Everything Rau talked about was in a panic situation taking the P-38 from fully loaded cruise to fully active WEP in what appears to be several seconds. Candidly, sitting here comfortably, it seems that first thing should be a.) turn into the fight while working RPM and throttle, b.) activate guns, c.) select internal fuel and d.) drop tanks.

With a 51 the throttle and prop control is on the left and manageable with one hand, and fuel selector switch lower center, toggle trigger on stick - 2 seconds to rev up, turn and dump externals.

A very interesting report!
The author shows remarkable insight into the pitfalls facing a new pilot / average pilot when faced with a situation requiring immediate action - but which one first! The idea that some of the switches were hard to operate is ludicrous!

Good point about flying a Lancaster - or any 4 engined bomber, FlyboyJ.
Flying over enemy territory at night in freezing conditions whilst being fired at by AA, and expecting a night fighter to appear at any moment - would be a serious challenge to any pilot.

RE: P38 issues.
Why don't these sorts of things (at least some of them) show up and get ironed out during development-QA/QC?

For example, the cockpit heating issue.
You mean to tell me that if the aircraft were flown at high bomber-escort alitude in the Continental US the issue would not have surfaced?
Same with the mach limits/compressibility.

During development, they never simulated being bounced?

Ugg.

What was the best way to jump out of a P38? It looks to me as though the P38's twin boom design would have made it more difficult for the pilot to leave the his aircraft safely but I have never read any complaints of this.

gjs238 said:

RE: P38 issues.
Why don't these sorts of things (at least some of them) show up and get ironed out during development-QA/QC?

For example, the cockpit heating issue.
You mean to tell me that if the aircraft were flown at high bomber-escort alitude in the Continental US the issue would not have surfaced?
Same with the mach limits/compressibility.

During development, they never simulated being bounced?

Ugg.

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Don't confuse QA/QC issues with engineering issues.

If an item is built to spec with no workmanship issues but it's designed poorly, that's an engineering issue.

If an item has workmanship issues or there was unauthorized deviations to the original design that effects operation, that's a quality issue.

To answers at least some of your questions - the P-38 was designed and built in Burbank, I think the average temperature through out the year is about 75F (I lived there for a while) little thought into cockpit heating, again the AAC initially accepted this with either giving no design specs to Lockheed on this and allowing the contractor to put in what they wanted or gave a minimal spec for cockpit heating. In 1937, when the design spec was developed by the USAAC, ask yourself how many fighters of that day had cockpit heating?

As far as being bounced? The P-38 was designed to be a high altitude interceptor; no one knew in 1937 what types of combat situations the aircraft was going to be placed in by 1943.

As far as compressibility - this was "new science." The P-47 had the similar issues...

Compressible Recovery Flaps

Late P-47 models have incorporated flaps for the purpose of aiding in recovery from dives of compressibility speeds.
Design Analysis of the P-47 Thunderbolt

pattle said:

What was the best way to jump out of a P38? It looks to me as though the P38's twin boom design would have made it more difficult for the pilot to leave the his aircraft safely but I have never read any complaints of this.

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There were plenty of comments made about this...

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g7jTdzfPUGA

"mach limits/compressibility" was very new in 1937/38/39/40.

Very few planes could actually dive fast enough to get into trouble at that time( and few, if any wind tunnels operated fast enough) so actual cause and effect were something of a mystery. P-38 actually suffered from several aerodynamic problems which gave the same symptom (tail shake) but required different cures. Some planes avoided the "mach limits/compressibility" issue as much by luck as by design in the late 30s.

Ergonomics was in its infancy, some air forces were doing good when they could standardize where to put 6-7 primary flight instruments in the instrument panel rather than leaving it up to each individual company's whim let alone where things like flap, landing gear, fuel tank selectors and the like went.

The P-38 was supposed to do the bouncing, not be bounced. Please remember that even one high placed British officer thought that Spitfires didn't need rear armor for the pilot as no enemy plane would be fast enough to catch it. Actual combat in 1942/43 was much different from what many of the pre-war theorists said, just as Flyboy has written.

FLYBOYJ said:

Don't confuse QA/QC issues with engineering issues.

In 1937, when the design spec was developed by the USAAC, ask yourself how many fighters of that day had cockpit heating?

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All of them. They had a huge heat generating engine set right in front of the cockpit! The P-38 did not have this advantage. I do not think operator warmth was an issue when it first came out. After all, I don't think any of the high altitude bombers had much of a heating system either. I think warmth was suppose to be handled with clothing (I think the bombers had heated suits?). Anyway I think the primary problem with the P-38 was that it was the first out of the chute with an advanced design. Like the Comet airliner, it uncovered problems that took a while to fix, and when it did, it had been beaten by a step by competing designs. There it no doubt that it was in high demand at the beginning of the war and that this hurt its capability to upgrade to more competitive designs. Throw in expensive to build and maintain, and maybe mission reliability, and the choice became clear after the advent of the P-51. With more breathing room, I think it could have been developed to be very effective in its roles in ETO, but it would always be expensive. Also, AAF training was not up to the task for new aircraft.

Maybe I'm too OCD, but I would think that once test personnel, whether OEM or customer, had an actual plane to put through its paces, they would fly it high, fly it low, fly it for long distances, dive it hard, etc etc etc.

Things like how to manage the engine settings for long endurance flight could have/should have been ironed out.
Even if some of the issues could not have been ironed out, at least there would have been less "surpises".

davparlr said:

All of them. They had a huge heat generating engine set right in front of the cockpit! The P-38 did not have this advantage. I do not think operator warmth was an issue when it first came out. After all, I don't think any of the high altitude bombers had much of a heating system either. I think warmth was suppose to be handled with clothing (I think the bombers had heated suits?). Anyway I think the primary problem with the P-38 was that it was the first out of the chute with an advanced design. Like the Comet airliner, it uncovered problems that took a while to fix, and when it did, it had been beaten by a step by competing designs. There it no doubt that it was in high demand at the beginning of the war and that this hurt its capability to upgrade to more competitive designs. Throw in expensive to build and maintain, and maybe mission reliability, and the choice became clear after the advent of the P-51. With more breathing room, I think it could have been developed to be very effective in its roles in ETO, but it would always be expensive. Also, AAF training was not up to the task for new aircraft.

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Valid points! I think you had a customer who was asking for something while not only not giving it full thought, but did not see or understand what was on the horizon.

gjs238 said:

Maybe I'm too OCD, but I would think that once test personnel, whether OEM or customer, had an actual plane to put through its paces, they would fly it high, fly it low, fly it for long distances, dive it hard, etc etc etc.

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They did...

http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_fighters/p38_1.html

Air Corps Record Set with Lockheed Plane, 1939 – CECOM Historical Office

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/p-38/p-38.html

gjs238 said:

Things like how to manage the engine settings for long endurance flight could have/should have been ironed out.
Even if some of the issues could not have been ironed out, at least there would have been less "surpises".

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Remember - you had some pretty "green" pilots flying the P-38 in Europe, some of them didn't fully understand engine operations and leaning procedures. This guy helped a bit, at least in the PTO...

"In addition, Lindbergh commented that he thought P-38 combat radius could be increased from 570 miles to 700-750 miles and still leave a one hour reserve of fuel. He felt our pilots could cruise at lower RPM and higher manifold settings, saving fuel without danger of harming the engines. This caught Gen. Kenney's attention and it was quickly decided that Lindbergh could continue flying as an observer providing he did not fire his guns, but if he did strafe a little no one would know…and if he could get the "Spirit of St. Louis" all the way to Paris maybe he really could help increase the combat radius of the P-38 and other fighters. Returning to the 475th, Lindbergh resumed flying June 20 and flew eight more missions through August 12, operating from Wakde, Owi and Biak. These missions, mostly to the Ceram and Halmahera areas, included both bomber escort and strafing flights. Between missions Lindbergh talked with many fighter units, explaining his fuel conservation methods."


"By then, however at lease partly because of Lindbergh's help, P-38 and P-47 maximum combat radius had increased to at least 700 miles."

http://www.charleslindbergh.com/history/b24.asp

all interesting reports and great finds. makes you wonder how many other planes...allied and LW had the same issues. sometimes we look at only the performance stats as we rate to the effectiveness of an aircaft....which is flown by test pilots ( who dont get bounced ). all this shows there is more to the picture. the plane could look great on paper and should have been a heavy weight contender...but was too complicated for the the "average" to use to its full potential. thanks all for those submissions....

gjs238 said:

Maybe I'm too OCD, but I would think that once test personnel, whether OEM or customer, had an actual plane to put through its paces, they would fly it high, fly it low, fly it for long distances, dive it hard, etc etc etc.

Things like how to manage the engine settings for long endurance flight could have/should have been ironed out.
Even if some of the issues could not have been ironed out, at least there would have been less "surpises".

Click to expand...

As far as the long distance things went the Air Corp was flying the P-38 against the recommendations of BOTH Allison and Lockheed. IF the customer WILL NOT follow the recommendations of the engine maker and airframe maker who's fault it it?

And once again things were changing very fast. In the 1930s the US Navy had a requirement that ALL combat aircraft they purchased had to pass a "terminal velocity" dive test. This test was a vertical dive from a certain height with the dive held until the plane just would NOT go any faster. Good test of a high drag biplane. Lousy test for a low drag monoplane. Biplane couldn't go fast enough to require lots of pull out room (altitude) and even a "power dive" it's drag was such that the engine was in little danger of over speeding and local airflows were far from going trans-sonic. With the coming of monoplanes things changed in a hurry. Thousands of feet more altitude for pull out were needed, Engines could overspeed, and local airflows could do strange things.
Navy also had a requirement that it's aircraft had to be able to spin 10 complete turns both to the left and right and recover (not in the same test). Not a big problem for a biplane but for a faster monoplane that lost more altitude per turn? or need more altitude to recover from a spin/stall?

The Army and Navy did fly the planes high, low, long distance, dive hard, etc, etc. It's just that in the late 1930s they were entering parts of a flight envelope that NO aircraft had gone into before. Or only specialized research aircraft.

The genius (or group of geniuses) that told the P-38 pilots the way to cruise was at high rpm and low boost have never been named in popular aviation books. It does have a certain logic to it (wrong as it happens). If the engine is already at high rpm then if you are bounced or need to go to combat power the engine won't take as long to wind up to full rpm. It neglects both the fuel consumption problem and wear and tear on the engines AND the fact that the turbo is idling and it needs time to spool up. If flying at low rpm and high boost the turbo is running faster to begin with and it needs less time to hit peak rpm. It also seems to ignore the advantages of a constant speed prop although real pilots may correct me on that.

The Navy had gone from 260mph Bi-planes to 400mph F4Us in about 5 years (in fact several squadrons still had Grumman F3Fs on board carriers in 1941.)

FLYBOYJ said:

They did...

This guy helped a bit, at least in the PTO...

"In addition, Lindbergh commented that he thought P-38 combat radius could be increased from 570 miles to 700-750 miles and still leave a one hour reserve of fuel. He felt our pilots could cruise at lower RPM and higher manifold settings, saving fuel without danger of harming the engines. This caught Gen. Kenney's attention and it was quickly decided that Lindbergh could continue flying as an observer providing he did not fire his guns, but if he did strafe a little no one would know…and if he could get the "Spirit of St. Louis" all the way to Paris maybe he really could help increase the combat radius of the P-38 and other fighters. Returning to the 475th, Lindbergh resumed flying June 20 and flew eight more missions through August 12, operating from Wakde, Owi and Biak. These missions, mostly to the Ceram and Halmahera areas, included both bomber escort and strafing flights. Between missions Lindbergh talked with many fighter units, explaining his fuel conservation methods."


"By then, however at lease partly because of Lindbergh's help, P-38 and P-47 maximum combat radius had increased to at least 700 miles."

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Somehow Tony Levier always seems to get left out when the discussion of the Lighting's range comes up. He may not have flown combat but probably did as much or more than anyone else to counter act the problems the P-38 was having in Europe.

Shortround6 said:

Somehow Tony Levier always seems to get left out when the discussion of the Lighting's range comes up. He may not have flown combat but probably did as much or more than anyone else to counter act the problems the P-38 was having in Europe.

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He did - I met Tony several times while at Lockheed, he was a delight to talk to and recalled the past with vivid detail.

The ANTHONY WILLIAM (TONY) LeVIER Page of the Davis-Monthan Airfield Register Website

FLYBOYJ said:

There were plenty of comments made about this...

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g7jTdzfPUGA

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Thanks very much for that, very interesting.

Going back to the load on the pilot when switching from cruise to combat mode, here is a video about Robin Olds making a mistake when attacking a group of Me-109's. He dropped his external tanks but forgot to switch to his internal fuel tanks.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITRLk9b9AcY

that happened more often than you thought. when there wasnt any combat they would sometimes fly the drop tanks to the point of completely empting them. i have heard more than one vet recount the extremely uneasy feeling it was to have the engine quit and concern that it would start up again. they would lose a couple thousand feet of alt while restarting.

Some didn't have the 'uneasy feeling' when they dropped tanks. Robin Olds was too busy shooting down an Fw 190 to remember to swithch to internals, lost power, switched tanks and continued to shoot down the 190.

Shortround6 said:

The genius (or group of geniuses) that told the P-38 pilots the way to cruise was at high rpm and low boost have never been named in popular aviation books.

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From the articles that I have read, it was "common knowledge" that running an engine with a lean mixture at low rpm with high boost would wreck it. Lindburgh was initially unable to get the pilots and ground crew to believe him. He had to personally fly with the group while using his settings and wait until his engines were torn down and inspected to convince them.

Unfortunately, it was the summer of 1944 when this happened instead of earlier in the war.

It is difficult to change "common knowledge" when it is incorrect. It makes me chuckle to remember that in the 1970's it was "common knowledge" that those little four-cylinder engines in the the Hondas, Datsuns, and Toyotas could not last long since they "worked too hard" on the US highways. Every mechanic I knew told me that those engines would burn up in no time. Our 1979 Subaru had 240,000 miles on it and was still running when we sold it.