P-38 debate for ETO - Letter from Col Rau, CO 20th FG - March 1944-December 1944

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From the articles that I have read, it was "common knowledge" that running an engine with a lean mixture at low rpm with high boost would wreck it. Lindburgh was initially unable to get the pilots and ground crew to believe him. He had to personally fly with the group while using his settings and wait until his engines were torn down and inspected to convince them.

Unfortunately, it was the summer of 1944 when this happened instead of earlier in the war.

The British had been flying Merlins with low rpm and high boost since 1942 if not earlier but what did those Limies know :)

And both Allison and Lockheed service bulletins said to fly with low rpm and high boost but the front line mechanics and pilots know more than the factory guys too. :)
 
Aviation journalist and videographer, Jeff Ethel, a man who had more flight hours probably than ANY combat pilot in World War II, but only about 6 hours in a P-38, died in a crash of a P-38. A probable cause was listed as improper fuel management.

Failure of the pilot to maintain minimum control speed (VMC), after loss of power in one engine, which resulted in a loss of aircraft control and collision with terrain. Related factors were: the pilot's improper fuel management and failure to change the fuel selector position before a fuel tank had emptied, which led to fuel starvation and loss of power in one engine; and the pilot's lack of familiarity with the aircraft, relative to single-engine minimum airspeeds.
You can read the whole report here.
 
Jeff's father Irv (Col. USAF-Ret'd) told me that he was watching Jeff make a too hard 'fighter pilot' break from base to final, stalled, and went in flat - with nose gear coming back into cockpit - killing Jeff...maybe Irv didn't read the report but that is what he explained to me.

I don't understand your comment that Jeff had more flight hours than any combat pilot in WWII. Are you including those that flew combat in WWII and Korea and Vietnam like say, Gabreski or Anderson or Blakeslee or Kasler or Whisner, Yeager, etc? or just matching up Jeff's total flight time versus only their combat hours?
 
Maybe I'm I'll-informed, but I've never quite developed the enthusiasm for the P-38 many others seem to have. It was great in the PTO, almost tailor made for fighting the Oscars and Zeros where it could dictate the terms of combat. But in the ETO it always seemed to struggle to achieve parity with comtempory 109s and 190s, at least a until the L model, by which time the P-51 was doing pretty much everything better for less cost. Yes, I know the Lightnings were hamstrung by a 'stick with the bombers' mentality in their escort role, but most interviews I have read or heard from both sides of the conflict suggest that throughout 1943 it struggled against the LW fighters. It was a technological marvel, and at the outset of the war it was the only US fighter within miles of the European aircraft, but in terms of proving the concept of the twin engine fighter it was only ever a qualified success.
 
Just read the 'report' and admit skepticism. Reports no flap deployment and gear up 'while turning on base' while Irv reported base to Final hard break with gear and flaps down.

As to lack of T/E familiarity, Jeff had King Aire and twin Beech time as well as B-25 and B-26 time. Lack of familiarityin the P-38 I can buy, but wouldn't buy (easily) running out of fuel on downwind to base or base to final - or not lowering gear and flaps somewhere on downwind leg prior to base. As a low time guy in an airframe I would want to have everything set while keeping my eye out for other a/c as well as the threshold - PARTICULARLY if I was low time on the airframe.. minimize head down 'distractions' in the office like lowering gear, gear warning lights, flap settings, etc
 
Maybe I'm I'll-informed, but I've never quite developed the enthusiasm for the P-38 many others seem to have. It was great in the PTO, almost tailor made for fighting the Oscars and Zeros where it could dictate the terms of combat. But in the ETO it always seemed to struggle to achieve parity with comtempory 109s and 190s, at least a until the L model, by which time the P-51 was doing pretty much everything better for less cost. Yes, I know the Lightnings were hamstrung by a 'stick with the bombers' mentality in their escort role, but most interviews I have read or heard from both sides of the conflict suggest that throughout 1943 it struggled against the LW fighters. It was a technological marvel, and at the outset of the war it was the only US fighter within miles of the European aircraft, but in terms of proving the concept of the twin engine fighter it was only ever a qualified success.

Cobber - the Late J model had all the basic L model 'stuff' and was in theatre operationally in May and of course the escort was unleashed in February, 1944 so the ETO performance version was in place for half its life in 8th AF. The 479th FG under Zemke had the best air to air ratio in the 8th but have to take into consideration that half their credits were in September, 1944 so hard to know - leadership or a/c?

I have been of the long standing opinion that the P-38 was so big and distinguishable that on average the LW could see and react to fight or flee and seek a better tactical solution (like altitude out of the sun) to bounce them... or depart. The Mustang OTOH was hard to see or differentiate from 109s until NMF was common.
 
With a lot of planes they develop in fits and starts, not always a smooth curve.
For a part of the P-38s service it was the P-38 OR the P-40 and P-39. It may have struggled with the LW fighters in 1942/43 in North Africa but what would the P-40 and P-39 have done? It was also able to cover the Sicilian landings from bases in North Africa (and to cover the landings a plane had to remain on station for a period of time, not just make it there and back). The P-38 didn't start escorting bombers over Europe in any numbers until late 1943.
 
From the articles that I have read, it was "common knowledge" that running an engine with a lean mixture at low rpm with high boost would wreck it. Lindburgh was initially unable to get the pilots and ground crew to believe him. He had to personally fly with the group while using his settings and wait until his engines were torn down and inspected to convince them.

Unfortunately, it was the summer of 1944 when this happened instead of earlier in the war.
The British had been flying Merlins with low rpm and high boost since 1942 if not earlier but what did those Limies know :)

And both Allison and Lockheed service bulletins said to fly with low rpm and high boost but the front line mechanics and pilots know more than the factory guys too. :)

It isn't so much the mechanics but the pilots once they are alone in the cockpit at cruise, they tend to get "gauge fixciation," especially when numbers run high on acceptable limits and "double especially" with anything involving temperature. Even in today's world I've seen in more than one occasion pilots not wanting to lean for one reason or another. It wasn't a matter of flying "lean" it was a matter of staying lean of peak, and I think many pilots then and now don't fully understand this.

https://www.flyplatinum.com/blog/?p=577

https://bonanza.org/forums/index.php?topic=201.0
 
Through watching the TV and reading I have noticed that some historians measure the success of American fighter escorts through the number of enemy aircraft that they destroyed while either on the ground and in the air while others measure success by the number of friendly bombers shot down. My own opinion is that success can only really be measured by using a balance between the two. If I am correct in my belief that fighter escorts were mainly there to protect the bombers by gaining control of the air then it must be the case that fighter escorts were there to ensure the safety of bombers so they could return for future raids and that destroying enemy planes was just part of this strategy. My logic tells me that the escorts were basically just destroying the enemy fighters that the bombers didn't stop being produced.
 
(USAF) Fighter pilots destroying also the 'part' of the LW fighter that Germans have had ever greater difficulties to 'produce' - the pilots?
 
Some didn't have the 'uneasy feeling' when they dropped tanks. Robin Olds was too busy shooting down an Fw 190 to remember to swithch to internals, lost power, switched tanks and continued to shoot down the 190.

i didnt mean when they dropped their tanks....but if/when the engine crapped out. i imagine its different if when it happened you had an EA in your sites and was closing in as opposed to flying formation and watching your lead. i met up with one of the guys at an airshow years back and when the 51 was buzzing the runway i made a comment about there is nothing like the sound of a merlin engine. he looked at me and said something to the effect that it was a little unnerving when that sound suddenly stops at 20,000. when he said he "never got used to it" that lead me to believe draining the drop tanks ( when possible ) was a standard practice. i never pursued to question it further...
 
(USAF) Fighter pilots destroying also the 'part' of the LW fighter that Germans have had ever greater difficulties to 'produce' - the pilots?
Yes but the business of killing pilots is something that is still considered unpleasant and is still not much talked of, I would think that the strategists had it in mind as part of the plan but never shared it.
 
Every fighter pilot I know lived under the Mantra "Attack".

To your point, my father had the feeling that the airplane he was shooting down was a clay target - until he met one of the 'Clay targets' in 1976
 
God bless your father for how he was able to deal with what he was called to do drgondog. Please sir, I can't wait to hear the answer to parsifal's question.
 
He was a VP at LTV on business trip to Italy to 'sell A-7D and then on to the Paris Air Show ~1975. While in first class on a Lufthansa flight from Rome to Paris he struck up a conversation with a dead heading Lufthansa pilot next to him, noticing that a significant scar on his right bicep was showing under his right sleeve.

The German pilot remarked " One of your God*^$#ed American fighter pilots did this" to which my father remarked - "I was one of those, where did it happen" to which the German pilot mused "September 11 near Giessen, I led a flight of Bf 109s on an attack on B-24s and saw that a flight of White nosed Mustangs were chasing us and we dove for the deck. The leader shot down my #3, then my #2 and started shooting at me as I was low, trying to escape. He put 50 caliber into my engine, my arm and my thigh - missing bone but terribly painful.. I searched for an opening near some railroad tracks and bellied my 109 in, expecting to be strafed - nothing happened and a few soldiers got me out of the aircraft - I spent the rest of the war rehabilitating from my wounds".

My father interrupted him in the narrative by suggesting it was NE of Giessen on a track to Hannover about noon? That there were three Mustangs?

Short end to a longer story is that one of the pilots my father shot down had just been married that week, the other had three kids, the pilot telling the story recalled that most of his squadron had been KIA in that fight. Dad told him, when asked why he didn't 'finish him off' that he was driven off by heavy flak as he was closing and did not see him crash, assuming he got away.

I do not remember who the gentleman was but he became a friend that my father visited twice before passing away in 1979.

It was this encounter that was a motivating factor for me to research 'the other side' when writing about the 355th FG in my latest book.

EDIT - it was the White Nose Mustang remark that got my father's attention - signature spinner/cowl band for the 355th FG until November 1944 when the Cowl bands were Red(354), Blue(357) Yellow(358) along with rudder to match cowl - retaining white Spinner. This also was the only mission my father lost a wingman (Rafferty) KIA by the same flak barrage that caused my father to reflect on how much he really wanted #8?
 
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Cobber - the Late J model had all the basic L model 'stuff' and was in theatre operationally in May and of course the escort was unleashed in February, 1944 so the ETO performance version was in place for half its life in 8th AF. The 479th FG under Zemke had the best air to air ratio in the 8th but have to take into consideration that half their credits were in September, 1944 so hard to know - leadership or a/c?

I have been of the long standing opinion that the P-38 was so big and distinguishable that on average the LW could see and react to fight or flee and seek a better tactical solution (like altitude out of the sun) to bounce them... or depart. The Mustang OTOH was hard to see or differentiate from 109s until NMF was common.

Hello Drgondog
Intresting info. Off the topic but do You have any idea why Zemke, who seems to have been an exeptionally good combat leader never advanced beyond the rank of colonel even if he stayed in USAF till mid 1966?
 

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