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From the articles that I have read, it was "common knowledge" that running an engine with a lean mixture at low rpm with high boost would wreck it. Lindburgh was initially unable to get the pilots and ground crew to believe him. He had to personally fly with the group while using his settings and wait until his engines were torn down and inspected to convince them.
Unfortunately, it was the summer of 1944 when this happened instead of earlier in the war.
You can read the whole report here.Failure of the pilot to maintain minimum control speed (VMC), after loss of power in one engine, which resulted in a loss of aircraft control and collision with terrain. Related factors were: the pilot's improper fuel management and failure to change the fuel selector position before a fuel tank had emptied, which led to fuel starvation and loss of power in one engine; and the pilot's lack of familiarity with the aircraft, relative to single-engine minimum airspeeds.
Maybe I'm I'll-informed, but I've never quite developed the enthusiasm for the P-38 many others seem to have. It was great in the PTO, almost tailor made for fighting the Oscars and Zeros where it could dictate the terms of combat. But in the ETO it always seemed to struggle to achieve parity with comtempory 109s and 190s, at least a until the L model, by which time the P-51 was doing pretty much everything better for less cost. Yes, I know the Lightnings were hamstrung by a 'stick with the bombers' mentality in their escort role, but most interviews I have read or heard from both sides of the conflict suggest that throughout 1943 it struggled against the LW fighters. It was a technological marvel, and at the outset of the war it was the only US fighter within miles of the European aircraft, but in terms of proving the concept of the twin engine fighter it was only ever a qualified success.
From the articles that I have read, it was "common knowledge" that running an engine with a lean mixture at low rpm with high boost would wreck it. Lindburgh was initially unable to get the pilots and ground crew to believe him. He had to personally fly with the group while using his settings and wait until his engines were torn down and inspected to convince them.
Unfortunately, it was the summer of 1944 when this happened instead of earlier in the war.
The British had been flying Merlins with low rpm and high boost since 1942 if not earlier but what did those Limies know
And both Allison and Lockheed service bulletins said to fly with low rpm and high boost but the front line mechanics and pilots know more than the factory guys too.
Some didn't have the 'uneasy feeling' when they dropped tanks. Robin Olds was too busy shooting down an Fw 190 to remember to swithch to internals, lost power, switched tanks and continued to shoot down the 190.
Yes but the business of killing pilots is something that is still considered unpleasant and is still not much talked of, I would think that the strategists had it in mind as part of the plan but never shared it.(USAF) Fighter pilots destroying also the 'part' of the LW fighter that Germans have had ever greater difficulties to 'produce' - the pilots?
To your point, my father had the feeling that the airplane he was shooting down was a clay target - until he met one of the 'Clay targets' in 1976
Cobber - the Late J model had all the basic L model 'stuff' and was in theatre operationally in May and of course the escort was unleashed in February, 1944 so the ETO performance version was in place for half its life in 8th AF. The 479th FG under Zemke had the best air to air ratio in the 8th but have to take into consideration that half their credits were in September, 1944 so hard to know - leadership or a/c?
I have been of the long standing opinion that the P-38 was so big and distinguishable that on average the LW could see and react to fight or flee and seek a better tactical solution (like altitude out of the sun) to bounce them... or depart. The Mustang OTOH was hard to see or differentiate from 109s until NMF was common.