P-47 in the ETO

[WARSPITER]

I am not as up on P-47 operations as in the ETO as a might be.

However the vaunted P-47 firepower/combat duration might need a bit of examination.

Yep, the P-47 had twice the firepower of a P-51B (eight guns to four)

My question is what what happened when they started hanging drop tanks of the wings of the P-47s??
Did the ammo capacity at 425 rounds.......or did they drop the ammo capacity to around 267 rounds per gun.

And didn't the P-51B have 350 rph for the inner guns and 250 guns for outer guns?
Didn't the P-51D 400rpg for the inner guns and the 270 rpg for the outer two guns in each wing?

If the P-47s use reduced ammo for either bombs or large drop tanks then the P-47s just have the extra "firepower" of the 7th and extra machine guns. They have no extra margin of firing time compared to the P-51D.

Perhaps somebody can post some notes on when or how the P-47s began reducing the ammo load?
And it may have varied in distance from target?

Good thing to consider with that one.

As to the slight disagreement re bomber escort capability et al it would seem the main contributions of the P47 were in early learning before the Mustang was available
and ground attack.

This is the best thing about this forum - actual data and experience to clear up misconceptions.

 

[pbehn]

Good thing to consider with that one.

As to the slight disagreement re bomber escort capability et al it would seem the main contributions of the P47 were in early learning before the Mustang was available
and ground attack.

This is the best thing about this forum - actual data and experience to clear up misconceptions.

And a massive pair of shoulders for the P-38 and P-51 to stand on. Big Week started with around 100 P-38s and 100 P-51s. If you wipe out the P-47 from history and no action is taken to compensate, you can't make a strategy to take on the LW over Germany with 200 fighters. If they have to escort from form up to landing the range would be just inside Germany at the start, massed long distance raids would have to wait until around or possibly after D-Day. Easy to forget in the comparison of qualities that they were both on the same side, the LW would always prefer a clear sky.

 

[DarrenW]

I love this dude clicking "Optimistic" as a reaction. Cool.. No arguments and no knowledge - but needs to feel cool. Yeah, really impressive. You are pretty sad.

HEY! You talkin' to me?!?!?

 

[pbehn]

HEY! You talkin' to me?!?!?

Dude, if the cap fits wear it.

 

[WARSPITER]

And a massive pair of shoulders for the P-38 and P-51 to stand on. Big Week started with around 100 P-38s and 100 P-51s. If you wipe out the P-47 from history and no action is taken to compensate, you can't make a strategy to take on the LW over Germany with 200 fighters. If they have to escort from form up to landing the range would be just inside Germany at the start, massed long distance raids would have to wait until around or possibly after D-Day. Easy to forget in the comparison of qualities that they were both on the same side, the LW would always prefer a clear sky.

Yes, that is what I meant by early learning. Without the jug there would have been a big gap and the process / requirements / logistics of long range
escort would have been way behind schedule. With that I am assuming that tactics such as the box formation may have been worked on at the time
the P47 was shepherding as that sort of thing took a bit of training to get right.

Horses for courses with the P51 as well. You go with the best you have at the time so there is no argument to be made against the way
things panned out.

 

[Peter Gunn]

HEY! You talkin' to me?!?!?

And me "dude", I gave him an opto on another post of drivel.

I'm guessing our dude won't be back anytime soon.

 

[Peter Gunn]

"It was the most numerous fighter"
- correct by a cople of hundred total vs 15,000 for both the P-47 and the Mustang.
"with top notch performance during the toughest time that the Luftwaffe was worn down.. As others have already shown. It was THE fighter that did the hard work!"
- incorrect. And for the period 1943, the dominant P-47 model were P-47C and P-47D pre Water Injection and Paddle pros. It was easily out manuevered under 20,000 feet by both the Fw 190 and Bf 109. It (P-47C/D was straight line faster from approx. 5K to above 22K and had available HP over HP required to out turn both above 28-30K. It was a dog in climb versus both 190 and 109 until 20K for Fw 190 but easily out rolled by Fw 190 for most of the combat envelope. It had two advantages -1.) It could out dive all LW opponents, and 2.) it was faster above 22 K.

"It was the most numerous fighter with top notch performance during the toughest time that the Luftwaffe was worn down.. As others have already shown. It was THE fighter that did the hard work!"
- incorrect. The LW nearly defeated the VIII BC in 1943 because the P-47 was incapable of target escort in mid to east Germany. The LW could easily avoid combat by using tactics of assembly and attack with mixed T/E and S/E fighters out of P-47 range. The P-47D was performing zero "Hard Work" past Holland until November when it could go to Bremen with 108gal C/L tank. By contrast, the Combat Radius of the P-51B with just 184 gal internal wng fuel and 2x75 gal could go 200 miles further to Stuttgart. The P-47D couldn't get that far until late April 1944 with 2x150 gal exernal wing tanks.

The P-38H and J put pressure on LW deeper into Germany in 1943 but like the Mustang, were too few in numbers to practically affect LW strength in late 1943.

"It was not the P-51 and especially not the P-51Ds..! Though they sure did their part later on."
- incorrect. In the crucial pre-Overlord five months, the very few P-51B/C equipped FG (compared to P-47D equipped FG) destroyed 1,148 compared to 752 for P47D. The P-38FG (VIII and IX FC combined) destroyed 141.

The Single most important factor is that P-51B range and capability as air superiority fighter left no place for LW to assemble unmolested beyond Berlin when the P-47s were turning back at Kassel and Stuttgart in February through May.

The second factor is that the Mustang was equal or superior to the Bf 109 and Fw 190 from SL to 29K with a few small blocks of transition for Merli two stage/two speed supercharger.



For the moment, lets stick with ETO- neither the P-47M or N had much impact in ETO. So, Durability and Firepower are 'advantage P-47'. Durability important when strafing an airfield, or someone is shooting your ass off. That said firepower not much use unless you can get to the fight? You seem to take 'range wih internal fuel' lightly? That is the difference between P-47 drivers holding their peckers in their hands back around Brunswick and Stuttgart when the air battles were Berlin, Magdeburg, Merseburg, Regensburg, Posnan, Ruhland, Munich.

The P-47C/D air to air ratio for 8th AF was ~7.3:1, The Mustang air to air ratio was 10.3:1. Sources, USAF Study 85, 8th AF Victory Credits Board June 1945, and massive (personal) research into 8th/9th AF MACRs.

Despite the durability question, the Mustang destroyed more LW aircraft strafing airfields per loss (~5.6:1) while strafing compared to P-47 (3.7:1) and P-38 (1.5:1).

As to advantages of P-51/C over P-47D: At Combat Weight at takeoff. Full internal fuel and ammoand oil for longest range:
P-47D-11 and greater through -16 with P&W R2800-63 with WI at 56"MP

P-51B with 1650-3 engine at 67"MP/3000 Hp was faster at ALL altitudes from zero through 30K.
P-51B with 1650-3 engine ROC greatly exceeded P-47D from zero through 38K. (only P-38J with fully functional engines outclimbed P-51B)
The P-51B out rolled the P-47D
The P-51B dived as fast as the P-47D
The P-51B required much shorter runway to take off.
The P-51B was deemed having best flying qualities by AAF
The P-51B was 1/2 less expensive to operate, including fuel and maintenance.
The P-51B cost 70% P-47D with far less labor cost.
The P-47D P&W R-2800 engine was slightly more reliable and had longer time between overhauls.

One or two of those will work for you in combat operations to defeat the LW prior to D-Day.

Sources: AAF Flight Test Data as acquired at Eglin Field and Wright Field May 1943 through June 1944. Spitfireperformance.com has many for you to look at.



Moot? The A-36 and P-51A were equipped with wing tanks and yes they did escort in CBI - but the discussion is ETO. The point is that when the P-51B arrived in ETO, the P-47D did NOT have wing racks or internal plumbing to move fuel from combat tanks to engine - which is why they sat on the sideline 'wishing and hoping' while the Mustang was getting the publicity. Ya gotta get to the fight, to fight.

OH please point me in the right direction Sensai.

You have wandered into a Twilight Zone where just about everybody you try to match knowledge with, has you in their hip pocket. Bring your medic kit.

Probably wasted electrons my friend, this dude won't be back anytime soon is my guess, but the info you post is always welcome.

Unless you start on about Cda/PYz coefficientschmaallzalalapalloza stuff, then my eyes tend to glaze over.

 

[drgondog]

I am not as up on P-47 operations as in the ETO as a might be.

However the vaunted P-47 firepower/combat duration might need a bit of examination.

Yep, the P-47 had twice the firepower of a P-51B (eight guns to four)

My question is what what happened when they started hanging drop tanks of the wings of the P-47s??
Did the ammo capacity at 425 rounds.......or did they drop the ammo capacity to around 267 rounds per gun.

And didn't the P-51B have 350 rph for the inner guns and 250 guns for outer guns?
Didn't the P-51D 400rpg for the inner guns and the 270 rpg for the outer two guns in each wing?

If the P-47s use reduced ammo for either bombs or large drop tanks then the P-47s just have the extra "firepower" of the 7th and extra machine guns. They have no extra margin of firing time compared to the P-51D.

Perhaps somebody can post some notes on when or how the P-47s began reducing the ammo load?
And it may have varied in distance from target?

SR - adding racks and externals didn't force reduction in either AN/M2 battery or ammo. The Jug had more 'useful weight' capability from P-51B/C/D/K.

Often missing in the conversation is that while many P-47 FGs in VIII and IX Fighter Commands than P-51B/C, there were many more 3,4 and 5 victory credit' days for a P-51B pilot than P-47D pilot - and against Bf 109 and FW 190s. That was a function of target rich envionment more than firepower and ammo, in which the 'half battery' P-51B was able to close and stick four 50 cal from short range.

 

[drgondog]

Probably wasted electrons my friend, this dude won't be back anytime soon is my guess, but the info you post is always welcome.

Unless you start on about Cda/PYz coefficientschmaallzalalapalloza stuff, then my eyes tend to glaze over.

Sorry 'dude'.

 

[tomo pauk]

The P-47D required extensive mid-fuselage modification to put the 70 gal auxilery tank under the cockpit, then modify the wings first for plumbing and wing pylons (D-15) and then P-47N mod to add even more fuel with wing tanks.

Bill - the modification was done on the main tank (205 gals initially), the auxiliary tank remained the same from the -C to -N; there was no additional fuel tank in fuselage*. The main tank was replaced by a taller one, fuel tankage in it was increased vs. old by 65 gals, thus it was 270 (main) + 100 (aux) = 370 gals in fuselage, from the bubbletop -D to -N.
Plumbing for wing tanks was done in August of 1943 for trans-Atlantic flight that included stops. Missed opportunity was to double-down on the wing tanks' modification on fighters that were in the UK in 1943early 1944.

*As far as factory changes are discussed about. Short-lived field mods that were tried at Pacific theatre are something else, the additional tank held 30-45 gals, depending on the mod.

 

[drgondog]

Bill - the modification was done on the main tank (205 gals initially), the auxiliary tank remained the same from the -C to -N; there was no additional fuel tank in fuselage*. The main tank was replaced by a taller one, fuel tankage in it was increased vs. old by 65 gals, thus it was 270 (main) + 100 (aux) = 370 gals in fuselage, from the bubbletop -D to -N.
Plumbing for wing tanks was done in August of 1943 for trans-Atlantic flight that included stops. Missed opportunity was to double-down on the wing tanks' modification on fighters that were in the UK in 1943early 1944.

*As far as factory changes are discussed about. Short-lived field mods that were tried at Pacific theatre are something else, the additional tank held 30-45 gals, depending on the mod.

You are correct Tomo re: internal tank arrangement and mods to extend from 305 to370. Brain fart on my end.

Plumbing modifications (not production insert) were made to several P-47D-6 to accomodate the trans-Atlantic ferry. That said, the modifications required for production insert of shipped wing with pylons and fuel feed system, including pressurization for combat tank feed - did not occur until the P-47D-15. The 'New' Internal tank drawings for the -25 (with new main tank) were not even completed until December 1943. The -15s emerged from BAD1 in late March

BAD1 launched Depot mod changes to existing P-47C/D in November 1943 to make the wing changes for -15 configuration - but a very slow process and squadron level operations for the Depot did not occur until March, 1944.

The wing changes for M and N were even more extensive and not possible at Depot - hence not released until fall 1944.

 

[Shortround6]

SR - adding racks and externals didn't force reduction in either AN/M2 battery or ammo. The Jug had more 'useful weight' capability from P-51B/C/D/K.

Often missing in the conversation is that while many P-47 FGs in VIII and IX Fighter Commands than P-51B/C, there were many more 3,4 and 5 victory credit' days for a P-51B pilot than P-47D pilot - and against Bf 109 and FW 190s. That was a function of target rich envionment more than firepower and ammo, in which the 'half battery' P-51B was able to close and stick four 50 cal from short range.

I wouldn't think that the racks caused any reduction in the load.
But extreme external loads (or field conditions) might have caused reductions in payload?

I have seen any number of "sources" say that P-47s production planes could carry either 6 guns or 8 guns but I have never seen a pictures that only show six guns (they may be a bunch of them?).

Strangely enough the only photos for 6 guns I have seen are for the XP-47J and the XP-72 and both planes are reported to have had 267-300rpg

A P-47 carrying 300rpg can save 300 lbs of ammo vs the 425 rpg load.
A 300rpg load will last about 22 seconds of firing time.
P-38s were supposed to hold 500 rounds but the weight charts show 300rpg as normal load and the 500rpg as overload. What charts show and what the operational units used may be different?

Or........................

Reducing the weight of the ammo in each wing by 150-180lbs improved the roll response???

Just thinking out loud here as to why so many old books talk about the 267rpg limit. Or was it was because of the extreme ordnance loads of the late planes?
Like the rockets, plus bombs plus one or more drop tanks?

 

[tomo pauk]

Plumbing modifications (not production insert) were made to several P-47D-6 to accomodate the trans-Atlantic ferry. That said, the modifications required for production insert of shipped wing with pylons and fuel feed system, including pressurization for combat tank feed - did not occur until the P-47D-15. The 'New' Internal tank drawings for the -25 (with new main tank) were not even completed until December 1943. The -15s emerged from BAD1 in late March

BAD1 launched Depot mod changes to existing P-47C/D in November 1943 to make the wing changes for -15 configuration - but a very slow process and squadron level operations for the Depot did not occur until March, 1944.

Thanks for the feedback.
In hindsight, the lack of the wings' drop tank facility on the P-47 already by early 1943 was a big, big mistake.

The wing changes for M and N were even more extensive and not possible at Depot - hence not released until fall 1944.

The -M was probably identical to the late -D, bar powerplant?
Wing change on the -N was indeed probably the factory-level change (minus the removal of the 'big' wing tip and installtion of a 'small' one - not unlike it was the case with FAA Corsairs, as well as Spitfires?).

IMO, after all this back and forth, the sheer amount of potential in the basic P-47 design was amazing, and unfortunately most of it was not put in the effect until winter of 1943/44.

 

[Snautzer01]

I wouldn't think that the racks caused any reduction in the load.
But extreme external loads (or field conditions) might have caused reductions in payload?

I have seen any number of "sources" say that P-47s production planes could carry either 6 guns or 8 guns but I have never seen a pictures that only show six guns (they may be a bunch of them?).

Strangely enough the only photos for 6 guns I have seen are for the XP-47J and the XP-72 and both planes are reported to have had 267-300rpg

A P-47 carrying 300rpg can save 300 lbs of ammo vs the 425 rpg load.
A 300rpg load will last about 22 seconds of firing time.
P-38s were supposed to hold 500 rounds but the weight charts show 300rpg as normal load and the 500rpg as overload. What charts show and what the operational units used may be different?

Or........................
View attachment 651250
Reducing the weight of the ammo in each wing by 150-180lbs improved the roll response???

Just thinking out loud here as to why so many old books talk about the 267rpg limit. Or was it was because of the extreme ordnance loads of the late planes?
Like the rockets, plus bombs plus one or more drop tanks?

How about 4 guns? Republic P-47 Thunderbolt

 

[pbehn]

And me "dude", I gave him an opto on another post of drivel.

I'm guessing our dude won't be back anytime soon.

Paramedic is one of the strangest dudes of all, set up his account in 2013 and these are the only two posts made.

 

[Snautzer01]

Paramedic is one of the strangest dudes of all, set up his account in 2013 and these are the only two posts made.

He does plan ahead doesnt he ?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The LW wasn't 'worn down' in 1943, but was crushed in Jan-May 1944 timeframe by P-51B,

So how many bombers, night fighters, ground attack etc. aircraft did the P-51B destroy in the first 5 months of 1944? Given it is the Luftwaffe being crushed.

Williamson Murray notes the Luftwaffe lost 13,483 aircraft in 1943, and another 9,867 in the first half of 1944. You report the US P-51 units operating out of Britain claiming 1,148 kills January to May 1944, with the P-38 and P-47 adding another 893. The USAAF fighter units in the Mediterranean, including P-51 from 16 April, claimed over 1,000 kills in the air in the first 6 months of 1944 (285 in June), while the ETO fighters claimed another 470 kills in June 1944 according to the USAAF Statistical Digest.

The Luftwaffe quartermaster noted on 31 December 1943 the single engined fighter force held 1,561 aircraft. The average strength for the 15 reporting periods roughly 10 days apart in the first 5 months of 1944 was 1,700.

Numerically the force held up, pilot quality wise it suffered a major loss. Strangely enough there was a drop from 1,683 single engined fighters in units on 31 May 1944 to 1,483 on 10 June but the numbers recovered.

The LW nearly defeated the VIII BC in 1943 because the P-47 was incapable of target escort in mid to east Germany.

So even escorted strikes to closer targets were not working? One of the criticisms of the 8th Air Force Commanders in 1943 is they were well aware of the much lower bomber loss rates for escorted strikes. The Luftwaffe defeated the USAAF unescorted bomber raids strategy in 1943. In 1944 the western allies had an operation that would force the Luftwaffe to fight, Overlord. The Luftwaffe needed to protect its bases and Heer supply lines.

Or is the idea unless the allies threatened eastern Germany the Luftwaffe day fighter force would largely remain passive?

In the crucial pre-Overlord five months, the very few P-51B/C equipped FG (compared to P-47D equipped FG) destroyed 1,148 compared to 752 for P47D. The P-38FG (VIII and IX FC combined) destroyed 141.

Putting aside the P-38 units. At the start of January 1944 the 8th AF had 9 operational P-47 groups, peaked at 10 in late January, then swapped a P-47 for a P-51 group. So 1 operational P-51 group in mid February to 9 P-47, by the end of the month 2 to 8, end March 3 to 7, end April 5.5 to 5.5, end May 7 to 4. Over at the 9th Air Force it had 1 P-51 group at the start of 1944, by end February 2 P-51 to 3 P-47, end March 2 to 5, end April 2 to 8, end May 2 to 13. So in the ETO from 1 P-51 and 9 P-47 at the start of the year to 9 to 17 end May. That is the definition of "very few".

The P-51 made the task of inflicting a major defeat on the Luftwaffe day fighter force easier and more efficient, with the bonus it made any target in Germany available for the day bombers.

 

[pbehn]

Numerically the force held up, pilot quality wise it suffered a major loss. Strangely enough there was a drop from 1,683 single engined fighters in units on 31 May 1944 to 1,483 on 10 June but the numbers recovered.

This is where we differ, numerically only pilot quality and the numbers of good pilots matter. You cannot issue fighter planes to keen aggressive young men and expect anything except defeat. Giving fighter planes to such young men was tried by the LW and failed. The numbers of good pilots is what the fight is all about, not the number of planes.

 

[drgondog]

So how many bombers, night fighters, ground attack etc. aircraft did the P-51B destroy in the first 5 months of 1944? Given it is the Luftwaffe being crushed.

8th/9th AF (9th 354 and 363FG TDY to 8th AF planners for LR escort) Mustangs Destroyed 1,148 (Claims much higher) in air, Approx 355 on Ground.
8th/9th AF P-47D Destroyed 752 (Claims much higher) in air, approximately 181 Ground.
8th/9th AF P-38J Destroyed 141 (" " ") in air, approximately 78 Ground.

Note: All VCs against Defense of Reich, I have noted 15th AF below but its record against LuftFlotte Reich is blurred by victory credits in MTO that were against Luft Sud units also.

Williamson Murray notes the Luftwaffe lost 13,483 aircraft in 1943, and another 9,867 in the first half of 1944. You report the US P-51 units operating out of Britain claiming 1,148 kills January to May 1944, with the P-38 and P-47 adding another 893. The USAAF fighter units in the Mediterranean, including P-51 from 16 April, claimed over 1,000 kills in the air in the first 6 months of 1944 (285 in June), while the ETO fighters claimed another 470 kills in June 1944 according to the USAAF Statistical Digest.

The 15th AF Mustangs (31st, 52nd FG) destroyed 140 between Jan1 and May 31. Unknown ground credits. 15th AF P-47s (325th FG through April/early May) destroyed 155 in air, unknown ground credits. P-38 (1st, 14th, 82nd FG) Destroyed 310 in air, unknown ground credits. 15th AF Spitfire (31st, 52nd FG) destroyed 120 in air and unknown on the ground.

VCs against Defense of Reich, Sud and Ost Front USSTAF targets

The Luftwaffe quartermaster noted on 31 December 1943 the single engined fighter force held 1,561 aircraft. The average strength for the 15 reporting periods roughly 10 days apart in the first 5 months of 1944 was 1,700.

For all theatres. I have to look but using Price for statistical summary - May 1943 for all Operations - all theatres, 980 S/E and 114 T/E day fighters;
for May 1944 for all operations - all theatres, 1063 S/E and 103 T/E day fighters.From Caldwell (via quartermaster, Prien, et al) the TO&E for end of 1943 - LF Reich 1160 total, LF 3 388 total, Combined LF Reich and LF 3 =884+388 S/E.
Q1 44 LF Reich 1296 total (1088 S/E), LF 3 364 total (364S/E);
Q2 44 LF Reich 908 total (608 S/E), LF 3 total 1300 (1300 S/E)
Losses Q1 1944 for LF Reich 1094, (incl 789 S/E). Q1 losses for LF 3 159 (all S/E).
Losses Q2 1944 for LF Reich 1,165 (975 S/E). Q2 Losses for LF 3 113 (all S/E)

Numerically the force held up, pilot quality wise it suffered a major loss. Strangely enough there was a drop from 1,683 single engined fighters in units on 31 May 1944 to 1,483 on 10 June but the numbers recovered.

Significant losses by LW vs 2TAC/8th and 9th AF over Normandy during first week of invasion - as well as Ploesti for 15th AF.

Pilot losses were far more critical as the replacement strategy was flawed. The Luftwaffe backstopped ETO losses by stripping Ost and Sud fronts for intact and experienced fighter pilots, plus drafted bomber and transport pilots for replacements. The entire flight school process was fatally flawed in 1942 and never recovered to produce quality replacements in late 1943/1944.

So even escorted strikes to closer targets were not working? One of the criticisms of the 8th Air Force Commanders in 1943 is they were well aware of the much lower bomber loss rates for escorted strikes. The Luftwaffe defeated the USAAF unescorted bomber raids strategy in 1943. In 1944 the western allies had an operation that would force the Luftwaffe to fight, Overlord. The Luftwaffe needed to protect its bases and Heer supply lines.

No. the short/medium range targeting was more for training as 8th AF was rebuilding from Summer/Fall losses. Additionally, weather/cloud cover precluded any attempt at 'precicion' strikes. Extreme alarm in Q4 1943 regarding growing LW strength in West (Primarily from G. Kuter to Arnold) was a major stimulus to 'promote' Eaker to MTO and replace with Doolittle. The major change in tactics was to unleash VIII and IX FC to attack LW aircraft wherever encountered and to engage/pursue with judgment.

Or is the idea unless the allies threatened eastern Germany the Luftwaffe day fighter force would largely remain passive?

Yes, but 8th not ready to challenge LW at Regensburg, Schweinfurt, Brunswick, Munich with the escort fighter force as comprised in December 1943. Mustangs and P-38s performed early target escort on limited basis in December and January, but too few target escorts available until Big Week to support Individual Bomb Divisions to branch and strike separate targets located apart from the Primary.

Putting aside the P-38 units. At the start of January 1944 the 8th AF had 9 operational P-47 groups, peaked at 10 in late January, then swapped a P-47 for a P-51 group. So 1 operational P-51 group in mid February to 9 P-47, by the end of the month 2 to 8, end March 3 to 7, end April 5.5 to 5.5, end May 7 to 4. Over at the 9th Air Force it had 1 P-51 group at the start of 1944, by end February 2 P-51 to 3 P-47, end March 2 to 5, end April 2 to 8, end May 2 to 13. So in the ETO from 1 P-51 and 9 P-47 at the start of the year to 9 to 17 end May. That is the definition of "very few".

Two operational P-51B Fighter Groups by 11 February, One 8th/one 9th - all under operational control of 8th AF. By end of Big Week, one more P-51B group (363rd) . On February 28th (4th FG) making two for 8th AF and two for 9th AF. The 355th and 352nd joined the P-51B (second and third P-47 conversion) from early March through April.
Three more added from May 1 through mid May - making the final P-51B operational FGs for 8th and 9th and 15th AF prior to D-Day (4th, 31st, 52nd, 325th, 339th, 354th, 355th, 357th, 359th, 361st).

The 9th AF also added two P-38 FGs in May about the same time that 359th and 361st FG converted from P-47 to P-51B. So by Mid May, there were six P-38J FGs flying escort missions.

That said, the real story is the ratio of sorties and the effectiveness of the P-51B sorties versus P-47 and P-38.The P-47 sorties between Jan1 and March 31 were approximately 7:1 over Mustang - similar for ratio of P-47 over P-38 sorties in ETO.

In MTO the P-38 flew the most sorties between January 1 and May 31st, P-47s and Spits about equal and P-51B the least

The P-51 made the task of inflicting a major defeat on the Luftwaffe day fighter force easier and more efficient, with the bonus it made any target in Germany available for the day bombers.

 

[pbehn]

Two operational P-51B Fighter Groups by 11 February, One 8th/one 9th - all under operational control of 8th AF. By end of Big Week, one more P-51B group (363rd) . On February 28th (4th FG) making two for 8th AF and two for 9th AF. The 355th and 352nd joined the P-51B (second and third P-47 conversion) from early March through April.
Three more added from May 1 through mid May - making the final P-51B operational FGs for 8th and 9th and 15th AF prior to D-Day (4th, 31st, 52nd, 325th, 339th, 354th, 355th, 357th, 359th, 361st).

One thing often overlooked is it wasnt just a matter of getting US aircraft and pilots to UK, they needed airfields with staff to fly from. The airfield that Chuck Yeager flew from RAF Leiston, was handed over to the USAAF in October 1943, the 358 fighter group arrived from Goxhill on 29 Nov 1943 and began operations on 20 Dec. Goxhill then became a training airfield for US P-51 and P-38 pilots. There was a lot of logistics to think about.

RAF Leiston - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

RAF Goxhill - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org