P-47 in the ETO

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The P-39Q would just about be the diametric opposite of any P-47. It was pretty quick down below 10,000ft, and just about useless over 15,000ft. How do you get "the same altitude performance" bit?
I was comparing P-39Q to P-40N - not P-47 - with respect to both internal fuel, and FTH performamce of their respective Allisons.
 
Mathematically speaking, if you take the good points of a given aircraft and subtract them from it's numeric designator you are left with an also ran type of aircraft.

For instance - the P-47 has eight major advantages including tough, dive etc. Subtract these eight and you haven't got a lot left;

The equation then becomes 47 - 8 = 39. Thus proving that a P-47 would then be an also ran.

Simple really.
 
This is why a systematic mathematical approach always wins.
 
The P-47 didn't have the range to escort bombers to Berlin when European air superiority was still in question. It was soon relegated to ground attack. But it was a huge success.
 
The P-47 didn't have the range to escort bombers to Berlin when European air superiority was still in question. It was soon relegated to ground attack. But it was a huge success.
It wasn't "relegated", it was the best U.S. aircraft for that role.
The P-51 took over the P-47's role as escort, allowing the P-47 to perform fighter-bomber missions.
 
The P-47 didn't have the range to escort bombers to Berlin when European air superiority was still in question. It was soon relegated to ground attack. But it was a huge success.

Attacking Berlin in strength was far beyond the 8th AF bomber capability in 1943, and I doubt which model of fighter flying would have changed that, given the numbers involved.

There's also the tactical change that happened when Doolittle took over which factors into it. It's not nearly so simple as your post implies.
 
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The P-47 didn't have the range to escort bombers to Berlin when European air superiority was still in question. It was soon relegated to ground attack. But it was a huge success.
True that P-47 did not have the range to provide target escort to Berlin before Overlord. That said, the 8th AF operated P-47 as escort through VE Day and somehow destroyed another 1200 German aircraft after D-Day - versus approx 250 by P-38. Would you say that it was 'ineffective' as escort fighter? How curious.
 
As I read it the claim numbers posted are the wartime awards, not post war investigation.

In the Battle of Britain it looks like the Luftwaffe Bombers, Do17, Do215, He111, Ju87, and Ju88 shot down around 1 fighter for every 3 bombers lost to fighters. The 1,012 Eighth Air Force heavy bombers reported lost to Luftwaffe fighters January to May 1944 probably shot down around 500 fighters in return. All up January to May 1944 the USAAF in the ETO thinks it lost 1,587 aircraft to enemy aircraft attack out of 2,714 lost on operations, for the first 6 months of 1944, 1,871 lost to enemy aircraft, 3,618 on operations.
Q1 44 LF Reich 1296 total (1088 S/E), LF 3 364 total (364S/E);
Q2 44 LF Reich 908 total (608 S/E), LF 3 total 1300 (1300 S/E)
Is the second line LF 3 total correct?
Losses Q1 1944 for LF Reich 1094, (incl 789 S/E). Q1 losses for LF 3 159 (all S/E).
Losses Q2 1944 for LF Reich 1,165 (975 S/E). Q2 Losses for LF 3 113 (all S/E)
Which totals 2,531. What do the Luftwaffe loss figures cover? All losses on all combat operations? Or just any missing plus losses to enemy aircraft? The RAF German losses files has Luftflotte Reich losing 459 Bf109 and 175 Fw190 to enemy action in Q1/44, total 634, including destroyed on ground, plus another 98 Bf109 and 28 Fw190 on operations but not due to enemy action, grand total 760, for Q2/44 the figures are 587 Bf109, 268 Fw190 to enemy action, 74 Bf109, 44 Fw190 on operations but not due to enemy action, grand total 973. While Luftflotte 3 reported single engine fighter losses Q1/44 as 260 to enemy action (36 destroyed on ground) and in Q2/44 672 (138 on ground), with June 1944 losses to enemy action put at 495.

In the day battles defending the Reich in early 1944 the Luftwaffe very easily won in terms of personnel losses, easily won in terms of material/airframe weight lost, the final question is how well did it do in terms of the numbers of aircraft lost on both sides. Then comes the note the Luftwaffe comprehensively lost in terms of maintaining pilot quality.
The entire flight school process was fatally flawed in 1942 and never recovered to produce quality replacements in late 1943/1944.
From what I can tell it took until sometime in 1943 before the Luftwaffe was graduating fighter pilots at a rate that would sustain the Battle of Britain loss rates. On top of that the Luftwaffe had been relying on winter lulls, but the USAAF stepped up its operations end 1943 and early 1944.
No. the short/medium range targeting was more for training as 8th AF was rebuilding from Summer/Fall losses. Additionally, weather/cloud cover precluded any attempt at 'precicion' strikes.
According to the Richard Davis raid spreadsheets, Eighth Air Force November 1943, 6,416.8 tons of bombs dropped of which 3,517.1 were dropped visually, December 11,734.5 and 5,545,8, January 1944 11,679.2 and 5,444.8, if you want just the bombs dropped on Germany for the 3 months it was 5,383.5 and 1,483.8, 8,893.7 and 2,705 finally 8,287.8 and 2,053.4, so most of the effort was on targets in Germany. Interesting when you consider the bombs dropped to end September 1943, maximum in any month was 2,050.9. H2S aimed strikes began in September, H2X in November 1943. In the end 52% of the Eighth Air Force bombs were aimed visually, dropping to 42% for targets in Germany.
Actually it is where you imagine we differ when it comes to the importance of well trained aircrew. Try and provide some evidence.
 
It couldn't go far enough. Yes it was involved in the war and yes naturally it shot down some planes. It could not provide escort all the way to Berlin and back. And there were more P-47s in the 8thAF than P-38s, so naturally they would shoot down more planes.

P-47 was probably a better weapon than the P-38 with fewer faults and somewhat better survivability, but the P-38 had the range and the P-47 did not.
 
If your yardstick for 'suitable/unsuitable' is range - and the P-47 was a.) far better fighter from 40,000 down and b.) had much greater range than P-39 - how could you advocate the P-39 for anything other than short range convoy escort, short range CAS or close range low to mdium altitude interceptor?
 
Some of the criticism for the P-47 seems to be unwarranted.
Please remember that the P-47 was ordered into production in Sept 1940, when the BoB was still being fought. Because it was a large and complex machine to took while to get into service. Please note that the P-40E was only ordered a few months earlier (and wasn't deliver until nearly a year later) and the P-40F wasn't flown until the summer of 1941 (after the XP-47) the first production P-40Fs weren't until the summer of 1942 (after the P-47Bs in trickling out).

In the summer of 1942 the US had plans for 3 high altitude possible fighters. With the 4th somewhat further away. (and others even further way)

They had the P-38 (and with only 300 gallons of internal fuel it had problems too, although the external tanks would help.
The P-40F with Merlin engine was available but didn't have either the performance or range needed.
The P-40Allison engine versions and the P-39 just won't the provided the needed performance for the bombers at any distance (even escorting over the English channel)

That leaves the P-47 and a P-47 with internal fuel has more range ( not a lot more but bit more) than the P-40F even with a 52 gallon drop tank.
Please remember that the P-47 was being introduced on 3 different production lines and they were building about 60 P-47s a month the summer of 1942.
They were cutting sheet metal on the P-51s with 2 stage Merlin prototypes when P-47s went over 100 planes a month.

P-40Fs were sent to North Africa and the P-38s were also sent to North Africa so there were darn few ways for the 8th AF to try to figure out how to use any type of escort fighters in the ETO in late and 1942 or early 1943.
The P-47 was a general purpose fighter for most it's early planned in career in 1941/42. Heck, even the Fisher XP-75 was planned as a fast climbing interceptor in 1942/early 1943 and not an escort fighter.

Blaming the P-47 for not being an escort that could fly 500-600 radius missions in late 1943 or early 1944 seems to be leaning on the retrospectroscope rather heavily.
 

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