- Thread starter
-
- #281
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
The figures are damaged suffered and losses per sortie encountering AA. So it should basically correct for mission profile differences. It wouldn't include pure air to air sorties, nor total milk run ground attack sorties. And 1945 carrier sorties only, so cuts out a lot USMC operations on Okinawa (which I doubt was heaviest AA loss environment anyway, that would probably have been going after airfields in Japan, as it had similarly been in ETO). And as mentioned already stats are given for both a/c damaged and lost, and rate of damage was similar, undercutting any assumption of a hidden difference in average mission profile or tactics between the two types on 'sorties encountering AA'. The main difference was % of a/c hit by AA which didn't make it back, which was much higher for the F4U, and that's actually the succinct point made in the notes to the NASC table, as quoted above.Ditto the F4U vs F6F. I suppose the USN may have had some sense of the mission profiles but it would be interesting for example to look at losses at Okinawa where the AA was heavy and the fighters were at very low level. Were more F6F's flying CAP for the fleet while the Corsairs were getting singed on the deck?
First statement is true*, but at risk of endless repetition, the statistical disparity can be boiled down to % of a/c hit by AA which were then lost, noticeably higher for F4U's than F6F's (64% more), in side by side carrier operations in 1945. The rate at which F4U's and F6F's were hit by AA, on sorties encountering AA, was about the same (only 4% more for F4U's). So we can state as fact that whatever organization differences existed between F6F and F4U units (many of which were USN anyway) on carriers in 1945, they did not have a significant effect on how often each type got hit by AA when they faced AA. And I see no plausible organizational explanation for a big differences in % of hit a/c which were lost. That pretty much had to be caused by differences in the planes themselves.Marine pilots are Marines first. They tend to get in much closer for air supprt, and stick around much longer then their counterparts, due to really wanting to protect the grunts. This may have a small factor in the numbers as well.
Yes sir. I enjoyed the book everytime I read it.
QUOTE]
Bud just passed away in late 2005. He was a very good friend of my father and was very complimentary of dad in the book.
Bud got his only score in a P-47 in the last mission he flew in a P-47 on March 6.. all the rest were in 51's.
Bud also was one of several pilots in the 355th that 'wrung out a D-9 in rat races with 51's while at Gablingen at the end of his tour. He and dad came home together
Sorry If I have missed it before, your fathers name? I didn't realize he was in the book. Sorry to hear Fortier has passed. I thought the story he told of his brother's B-17 mission was also incredible. Bud seemed to really like the security of the P-47, but it is obvious from the book he loved the Mustang. It is the first hand accounts like in this book, that despite tables and graphs, show the Mustang was THE fighter. Have you ever had a chance to visit thier base (or where it was) in England?
Same info, I was just dividing one loss rate on sorties encountering AA by the other 2.3 per 100 /1.4 per 100=1.64 rather than ratio of % lost of those hit 41/26=1.58. Let's call it 'around 60%'JoeB, Where does the 64% figure come from?
I thought the disparity was 58%. The 41% vs. 26%
Sorry If I have missed it before, your fathers name? I didn't realize he was in the book. Sorry to hear Fortier has passed. I thought the story he told of his brother's B-17 mission was also incredible. Bud seemed to really like the security of the P-47, but it is obvious from the book he loved the Mustang. It is the first hand accounts like in this book, that despite tables and graphs, show the Mustang was THE fighter. Have you ever had a chance to visit thier base (or where it was) in England?
Bert Marshall, Jr.
He was the fastest ace in the group, went from wingman to flight leader in one week, and Squadron exec in four weeks, squadron CO in 7 weeks, Group Exec in 4 months and was Gropu CO at end of war.
And my best man when I got married.
I miss him.
Bert Marshall, Jr.
He was the fastest ace in the group, went from wingman to flight leader in one week, and Squadron exec in four weeks, squadron CO in 7 weeks, Group Exec in 4 months and was Gropu CO at end of war.
And my best man when I got married.
I miss him.
Thank you for that information. Yes indeed, Fortier did speak well of your father. Your dad was quite busy to say the least. He sounded like a great man, pilot, and leader. I just re-read the story about his piggy-back ride home in a Mustang....wow!
Thank you for that information. Yes indeed, Fortier did speak well of your father. Your dad was quite busy to say the least. He sounded like a great man, pilot, and leader. I just re-read the story about his piggy-back ride home in a Mustang....wow!
Do you have the story handy behind the piggy back ride home? Sounds like a very good story!
He went back to 51s in during the Korean War.
We'd have to guess almost completely about effect of vulnerability on air-air results, in sharp contrast to the cut and dried figures on AA vulnerability. Maybe buried somewhere, or constructed from individual combat reports, we could find stats on what % of F4U and F6F hit by enemy *aircraft* fire returned, and at what rate each was hit on sorties encountering enemy a/c. But even if we had those stats, air-air has the whole other dimension of offensive effectiveness. To take an easier case, there seems little doubt (except among Thunderbolt true believers) that the P-51D was better at shooting down enemy a/c than the P-47D was, but surely less able to absorb their counter fire. It's still very difficult to quantify those two offsetting factors, though.JoeB,
I think the problem with comparing Hellcat vs. Corsair vulnerability/survivability in the air to air context is that the performance differences in the two planes is quite significant while the performance differences between the two planes in the air to ground realm really isn't.
I know that most fighters that were shot down never saw it coming but once the rounds start whizzing by, the Corsair probably had a good edge in evasive manuevering that exceeded the Hellcat with its markedly superior roll and dive performance.
Assuming the very large differential in survivability between the Corsair and Hellcat from AA was the result of the oil cooling design, do you think that design also presented a significant source of vulnerability for the Corsair in the air to air context which was not shared by the Hellcat? It would seem that a plane attacking from behind and above could reach the oil cooling aparatus with strikes at the leading edges of the wings where a cooling arrangement at the bottom of the cowling could not be reached at all. With the system spread from the leading edges of the wings to the engine, it would also seem to present at least a bigger kill zone to a plane attacking from behind and below too.
Do you have any thoughts on this?
I like the P-47 for several reasons:
1. The oil cooler on the F4U was vulnerable to ground fire and caused several casualties from fire as light as .30 caliber machine guns.
Documented sources? I would believe that any aircraft can be brought down with .30 caliber fire but my difficulty in this statement is visualizing USN damage assessment team behind enemy lines at Okinawa and saying 'yep it was a .30 cal to the cooler"
2. The P-47 was much much easier to land and had good ground handling characteristics. The F4U was the original ensign eliminator.
Would have been interesting to see the Jug land at the same speed, same angle of attack, over the flight deck of a carrier - and be able to make that judgment? That was the issue causing the Ensign Eliminator discussions
3. The P-47 had a turbocharger and it had great all-altitude performance with smooth boost from the ground to 40k feet.
And the F4U was just superb to 25K and still pretty good above that - so what? The Jug was designed for high altitude and the F4U was designed to USN doctrine. The F4U was more agile, could carry the same load or more, had longer range until the N and carried an extra 600-1000 pounds of carrier related weight which the Jug didn't have to match.
4. The extra two guns gave the P-47 a firepower advantage that many of its pilots thought was significant. It's a shame that they never armed them with cannon but neither was the Corsair until the end of the war.
And that made a difference how? The Mustang carried 2 to 4 less .50's than the Jug and destroyed nearly 50% more German fighters in 8 months less operations time.
5. Better downward visibility with the bubble cockpit compared to the F4U, which had very uncomfortable visibility characteristics.
Documented sources? I would believe that any aircraft can be brought down with .30 caliber fire but my difficulty in this statement is visualizing USN damage assessment team behind enemy lines at Okinawa and saying 'yep it was a .30 cal to the cooler"
And that made a difference how? The Mustang carried 2 to 4 less .50's than the Jug and destroyed nearly 50% more German fighters in 8 months less operations time.