P-51 fuselage fuel tank (1 Viewer)

[MiTasol]

Congratulations. An excellent simple explanation.

I had been trying to write something that described the operation as simply and clearly and just could not do it.

 

[Engineman]

Congratulations. An excellent simple explanation.

I had been trying to write something that described the operation as simply and clearly and just could not do it.

Thanks. This is quite a complex subject, one that made aircraft designers bald, I think! The same concept positive G "balance weight" was fitted to all Bf 109 E/F/G/K to modify handling feel under G loads, only it was a much smaller weight, maybe 1/10th, just 1 or 2lb. It might have been in earlier 109's as well, and other aircraft. I showed the large glass one from a Ju 388 in my parts quiz, although that probably functioned more as a load limiter.

Eng

 

[MIflyer]

On the early Ercoupes they put a bungee cord attached so that you could turn a crank and add pull force to the elevator. So you were trimming the control linkage rather than the elevator. It eventually was replaced with a more conventional trim tab on the elevator.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Really? I would not have thought there would be enough room.

The US developed a new, UHF, much more sophisticated IFF, the BC-645, that had all kinds of features including the ability of aircraft to interrogate each other. But the British refused to change and you can't very well have two different IFF systems. As a result the BC-645 became a common surplus item offered to radio amateurs for about the next 40 years.

The British didn't refuse to adopt it there was debate about whether to adopt the British IFF or the US Navy's ABA aka the US Army's SCR -515 later known as IFF Mk IV.

From The CXAM Goes to War - Chapter 6 of Radar and the Fighter Directors

"Status of Identification Friend or Foe in the U.S. Navy, May 1942
Engineer Robert M. Page at the Naval Research Lab realized early in his radar research that the capability to identify friendly aircraft should be incorporated with radar, and he began work on radar recognition equipment in 1937. By early 1940 he had working prototypes of both aircraft-to-ship and ship-to-ship identification devices. At this time the General Electric Company was brought in to participate in production design as the prospective large scale producer. In mid 1940 navy and army representatives agreed that the new IFF sets would be used jointly by both services, and the designs were adapted to accommodate army requirements. By summer 1941 GE was producing engineering development models, with the the air/ship version being designated "IFF ABA" and the ship-ship version "IFF BI."

The Anglo-American cooperation in radar that started with the Tizard Mission soon cast a cloud over ABA and BI production. It had been agreed that both nations would use the same recognition devices to prevent misidentification of the other's ships and aircraft, and Page had argued strongly for the NRL system. The British were concerned, however, that the ABA/BI, which operated on a fixed frequency independent of radar frequency, had its frequency set too close to the operating frequency of the German Wurzburg radar. This could result in the Germans soon discovering the existence of Allied IFF and devising countermeasures. It was thus agreed that the British system, with modifications, would be used.

The British Mark II IFF did not use a single frequency, but rather scanned through the frequencies of all radars and responded on the frequency of the radar that had interrogated it. The Americans were concerned that as more radars with diverse frequencies were added to inventory, the Mark II could become overloaded, especially in the heat of battle. All agreed that the Mark II system would be modified to work at a fixed frequency, and would be designated IFF Mark III. It was also agreed that the American ABA/BI would be produced in limited quantities for testing so that it could be ready as a backup system if the Mark III were compromised. On 1 December 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations authorized American production of both the ABA/BI sets and the Mark II and Mark III with a priority second only to radar itself. More than 3000 of the ABA/BI sets were delivered for testing by the Army and Navy starting in early 1942. For both U.S. and U.K. use, the U.S. agreed to start large scale production of Mark II sets as a stopgap, pending development and test of the Mark III; then Mark III sets would be manufactured in the U.S. for both sides. Mark III sets started trickling into the fleet by May 1942. "

The USN used IFF MK II at Coral Sea and Midway. Even then only limited number of aircraft were so fitted. By October they were able to convert to IFF III.

From
HyperWar: The Capabilities and Limitations of Shipborne Radar [Chapter 9]
"A different system of IFF has been developed for use if the Mark III system becomes extensively compromised. Components of the Mark IV system have already been produced, but an extensive program of operational and maintenance training will be required to put this system into effective operation. The greater complexity of the Mark IV will probably cause more maintenance difficulty than is being encountered with the Mark III equipment."

The ABA IFF was judged to require more maintenance

"The Mark IV IFF system has certain advantages over the Mark III because of the higher operating frequency. But, since all the interrogators operate on the same fixed frequency and all the transpondors on a slightly different fixed frequency, keeping all the units tuned properly will pose a considerable maintenance problem if this system is put in use. However, if adequate test equipment is made available to the Fleet, there should be little difficulty in keeping the Mark IV system operative after the operational experience gained in the use of the Mark III IFF system."

From US Army TS Signals 2 The Test: Chapter 3: The Call for Equipment (January–May 1942)

"Another important project involved airplane identification. It had been obvious since radar's inception that the ability to detect aircraft at distances far beyond the range of vision would be of slight value unless some means could be devised to distinguish friendly craft. That accomplished, unidentified airplanes would be presumed hostile. To this end the U.S. Army and Navy had already begun work on airborne radar equipment which they called RR, for radio recognition. The British called their somewhat similar development IFF, Identification, Friend or Foe. After the Americans and the British compared notes on radar, the Americans adopted the British terminology, and by 1942 were adopting their equipment also, despite the fact that in some respects the American RR was better. In January, while continuing work on the airborne component of RR, the SCR-515, the ARL also went about converting a considerable number of British IFF Mark II sets to SCR-535's. By March, the Radar Unit was working also on American versions of a newer IFF, the Mark III and III-G, copied as SCR-595 and 695, respectively."

IFF Mark III was based on IFF Mark II which had a proven operational record. The pragmatic decision was made to select the system that had been shown to work in real life.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

If you could have sent Dowding and Park back from 1941 to 1935 they would have changed many things. By that time in 1941 they knew the war started in 1939 and France fell in 1940.

Actually I don't think there is much that Dowding should change. Of all the prewar thinkers in any field he foresaw the future better than any of them. In fact he didn't just foresee the future, he created it!

 

[pbehn]

Actually I don't think there is much that Dowding should change. Of all the prewar thinkers in any field he foresaw the future better than any of them. In fact he didn't just foresee the future, he created it!

I agree, but if you apply 20/20 hindsight and give Dowding Park and those concerned 5 years notice they would obviously have done better. Forget the Defiant, get the Beaufighter (or similar) in service for mid 1940. Have all factories concerned breaking ground 2 years earlier so Castle Bromwich is in full production at start 1940 making Mk IIs then Mk IIIs. Increase all production AND pilot training so that even losses in France leave you with 1000 S/E fighters. Pour more resources into Chain Home and GCI so they are all operational at start 1940. Put proper funding into Whittles jet engine and have a squadron operational in 1940, however rudimentary. If you are allowed such hindsight, the Battle of Britain probably wouldnt have started and if it did would have been over very quickly, same for any night time "Blitz". The story of when things arrived in service was in many/ most cases dependent on when work started and how many reesources they were given.

 

[SaparotRob]

You don't know what you need until you do but Chain Home was prescient.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I agree, but if you apply 20/20 hindsight and give Dowding Park and those concerned 5 years notice they would obviously have done better. Forget the Defiant, get the Beaufighter (or similar) in service for mid 1940. Have all factories concerned breaking ground 2 years earlier so Castle Bromwich is in full production at start 1940 making Mk IIs then Mk IIIs. Increase all production AND pilot training so that even losses in France leave you with 1000 S/E fighters. Pour more resources into Chain Home and GCI so they are all operational at start 1940. Put proper funding into Whittles jet engine and have a squadron operational in 1940, however rudimentary. If you are allowed such hindsight, the Battle of Britain probably wouldnt have started and if it did would have been over very quickly, same for any night time "Blitz". The story of when things arrived in service was in many/ most cases dependent on when work started and how many reesources they were given.

Dowding never wanted the Defiant in the first place. He wasn't responsible for building factories or pilot training. He wasn't in charge of The Ministry of Aircraft Production. You're giving him responsibilities he never had. He did fund chain home. I don't what more you could expect one man to do.

 

[pbehn]

Dowding never wanted the Defiant in the first place. He wasn't responsible for building factories or pilot training. He wasn't in charge of The Ministry of Aircraft Production. You're giving him responsibilities he never had. He did fund chain home. I don't what more you could expect one man to do.

It is purely a hind sight discussion, if you can give Dowding 20/20 hindsight and transport him to 1935 you can do it with everyone else. Dowding didnt make a RADAR system or a teleprinter or a telephone line or anything else in what is known as the "Dowding System" he did turn off the Hurricane tap though, and that wasnt in his remit.

 

[pbehn]

You don't know what you need until you do but Chain Home was prescient.

Wanting "early warning" is as old as military conflict, castles were built on hills and observation towers put on top. Dowding, from what I have read, was not your normal genius if he was a genius at all Chain Home RADAR (RDF) wasnt state of the art even at the time, nothing in the Dowding system was unknown AFAIK. Maybe the use of colour to represent time was a clever innovation. BUT he realised he needed a system for a pi$$ing competition. He didnt want titanium and gold pots, he didnt want complicated pots, he wanted lots of pots and thousands of people trained in the correct way to pee so they could do it 24/7, with all information handled in such a way they the section commander could have the correct people peeing in the correct place at the correct altitude.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

It is purely a hind sight discussion, if you can give Dowding 20/20 hindsight and transport him to 1935 you can do it with everyone else. Dowding didnt make a RADAR system or a teleprinter or a telephone line or anything else in what is known as the "Dowding System" he did turn off the Hurricane tap though, and that wasnt in his remit.

The discussion is about what Dowding should have done differently not how Britain should have rearmed. I can't think of anything he should have done differently. Also, please explain the Hurricane tap comment.

 

[pbehn]

The discussion is about what Dowding should have done differently not how Britain should have rearmed. I can't think of anything he should have done differently. Also, please explain the Hurricane tap comment.

His letter halting the sending more Hurricanes to be lost in France often referred to as "the Hurricane Tap", this left Dowding with 500 Hurricanes and Spitfires when France fell . The discussion started about what we can think up in 2024 with 20/20 hindsight about how things were done wrong or could have been done better 90 years ago. If you give Dowding any 100% certain 20/20 hindsight knowledge he would certainly have shared it with those above him. Yes, I agree it is a nonsense discussion, as is criticising people long gone, not here to defend themselves, when we know much more about what the enemy was doing and how things panned out than they did or could. We still have clowns and their number increases by the year lambasting Chamberlain for his "peace in our time" speech and piece of paper when everything Churchill used in 1940 was ordered by Chamberlain as either Prime Minister (from 1937) or Chancellor (from 1931).

 

[Shortround6]

I agree, but if you apply 20/20 hindsight and give Dowding Park and those concerned 5 years notice they would obviously have done better. Forget the Defiant, get the Beaufighter (or similar) in service for mid 1940. Have all factories concerned breaking ground 2 years earlier so Castle Bromwich is in full production at start 1940 making Mk IIs then Mk IIIs. Increase all production AND pilot training so that even losses in France leave you with 1000 S/E fighters. Pour more resources into Chain Home and GCI so they are all operational at start 1940. Put proper funding into Whittles jet engine and have a squadron operational in 1940, however rudimentary. If you are allowed such hindsight, the Battle of Britain probably wouldnt have started and if it did would have been over very quickly, same for any night time "Blitz". The story of when things arrived in service was in many/ most cases dependent on when work started and how many reesources they were given.

This requires a considerable change in RAF and Air Ministry thinking.
In an old thread on somewhat similar lines I once counted at the end of 1938(?) that the RAF had about 1000 fighters on order (including end of Gladiator production, this may be low as Spitfire orders may have been increased in 1938 to about 510) and about 4000 bombers on order. I did not count trainers or flying boats or transports. These are 1938 bombers.
We can see at that point in time, where the emphasis was. At different points in time the emphasis changed. Unfortunately some times the allocations of increased resources did NOT change the proportions of of the emphasis or not by much.
To further your last statement. There were two orders for the Stirling bomber (100 aircraft each) before the Munich agreement which were soon changed to 1500 aircraft total a short while later and expanded production to 3-4 additional factories. 1st Production Stirling flew about 1 1/2 years after Munich and the first operational mission was 2 1/2 years after Munich with three Aircraft.
The British were trying desperately to increase the size of the RAF. You need about 10 ground crew for every pilot.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Air Britain published a list of RAF contracts and since the standard notation is number/year it is possible to extract a good idea of what was ordered when, but with warnings, like the capacity of the different factories needs to be accounted for, the list does not cover all cancelled contracts, this extract misses non standard contracts, orders depend on what is available to order, no idea about how diversions from RAF orders are counted but some prototypes are. The Battle was classified as trainer when it came time to compile figures for public release.

The following has a minimum order of 100 and represents 19,812 out of 20,561 reported ordered 1936 to 1938 inclusive
Albacore 300 Naval
Albemarle 200 Bomb M
Anson 1319 Train
Battle 1952 Bomb L
Beaufort 442 GR
Blenheim 1530 Bomb L
Botha 486 GR
Defiant 450 Fighter
Don 250 Train
Fulmar 250 Naval
Gladiator 334 Fighter
Halifax 200 Bomb H
Hampden 675 Bomb M
Harvard 200 Train
Hector 100 Train
Henley 400 Train
Hereford 150 Bomb M
Hotspur 389 Fighter
Hudson 301 GR
Hurricane 1988 Fighter
Lysander 353 Army
Magister 935 Train
Manchester 200 Bomb H
Master 500 Train
Oxford 1265 Train
Roc 136 Naval
Sea Gladiator 60 Naval
Skua 190 Naval
Spitfire 500 Fighter
Stirling 1017 Bomb H
Swordfish 472 Naval
Tiger Moth 780 Train
Walrus 168 Naval
Wellington 570 Bomb M
Whitley 552 Bomb M

Army 353
Bomb H 1417
Bomb M 2147
Bomb L 3482
Fighter 3661
GR 1229
Naval 1576
Train 5947

Mentions to 70 Hind, 80 Bombay, 80 Wellesley, 89 Mentor and 95 Shark.

With the experience from Spain the Luftwaffe revised its force structure plan from 1 fighter to 3 bombers to 1 fighter to 2 bombers.

Many of the 1939 contracts were placed after war was declared and later extended to cover wartime production, things like Blenheim V, Beaufighter VI, Spitfire 21, there were a number of cancelled contracts (Fairey for 150 Manchesters for example) and non standard contract numbers "BPC" for example, the Air Britain list totals approach 50,000 aircraft. If you confine the list to serials ending in Z9999 the total drops to 23,617, minimum order of 100 covers 23,390 of these.

Albacore 350 Naval
Albemarle 1500 Bomb M
Anson 1500 Train
Battle 500 Train
Beaufighter 2200 Fighter
Blenheim 2050 Bomb L
Defiant 200 Fighter
Halifax 202 Bomb H
Hampden 150 Bomb M
Harvard I 200 Train
Hurricane 1400 Fighter
Lancaster 200 Bomb H
Lysander 1567 Army
Magister 300 Train
Manchester 401 Bomb H
Master 500 Train
Oxford 1400 Train
Queen Bee 174 Train
Queen Wasp 250 Train
Spitfire 2610 Fighter
Sunderland 122 GR
Swordfish 400 Naval
Tiger Moth 2400 Train
Tornado 715 Fighter
Vega Gull 222 Train
Walrus 377 Naval
Wellington 950 Bomb M
Whirlwind 400 Fighter
Whitley V 150 Bomb M

Army 1567
Bomb H 803
Bomb M 2750
Bomb L 2050
Fighter 7525
GR 122
Naval 1127
Train 7446

 

[MikeMeech]

This requires a considerable change in RAF and Air Ministry thinking.
In an old thread on somewhat similar lines I once counted at the end of 1938(?) that the RAF had about 1000 fighters on order (including end of Gladiator production, this may be low as Spitfire orders may have been increased in 1938 to about 510) and about 4000 bombers on order. I did not count trainers or flying boats or transports. These are 1938 bombers.
We can see at that point in time, where the emphasis was. At different points in time the emphasis changed. Unfortunately some times the allocations of increased resources did NOT change the proportions of of the emphasis or not by much.
To further your last statement. There were two orders for the Stirling bomber (100 aircraft each) before the Munich agreement which were soon changed to 1500 aircraft total a short while later and expanded production to 3-4 additional factories. 1st Production Stirling flew about 1 1/2 years after Munich and the first operational mission was 2 1/2 years after Munich with three Aircraft.
The British were trying desperately to increase the size of the RAF. You need about 10 ground crew for every pilot.

Hi
The following might be useful as it gives figures for what was delivered by or during 1940 (Source: 'Aircraft for the Few' by M J F Bowyer):

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you.

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you.

Army 353
Bomb H 1417
Bomb M 2147
Bomb L 3482
Fighter 3661
GR 1229
Naval 1576
Train 5947

So the FAA (Naval) was getting a bit under the attention that FC (fighter defense of GB and the empire) but total FAA fighters of any sort were 566 and orders to not mean delivery as noted later and in fact do not even mean in service at the same time. The Fulmar was supposed to replace the Skua and the Sea Gladiators were only ordered because the Skua, Roc and Fulmar were all running late. Out of the 566 FAA 'fighters' ordered in the 1936-38 period only around 50-60% were intended to be in service at the same time?

As far as the balance between FC and BC goes, I again thank you for the numbers.
BC had 7006 planes ordered vs the 3661 fighters but at this time all the FC aircraft were single engine, even the Blenheim fighter is post 1938

Granted 1952 of the BC aircraft were single engine (not counting the Hinds and Wellesley) but with over 1400 four engine (big twin) bombers on order by the end of 1938 we can really see where the RAF was putting it's effort (money).

There was also a bit of disingenuous about some of the numbers of BC. BC may have had plans to take over some of the GR aircraft for light bombing missions. Of course the Botha (about 40% of the total GR aircraft) turned into a total flop in both roles and the Beaufort (39%) was running late, and didn't perform as anticipated and would have been little better than the Blenheim in the light bomber role.

Also shows the lack of support for the "army". The 400 Hawker Henley dive bomber/tactical bomber order was cut in 1/2 but even before the cut in numbers it had been transferred over to Training Command leaving the "army" without a whole lot for tactical/battle field support aircraft. The increase in orders for Lysanders is just to accommodate the increased number of British army divisions, not to increase the air support per division.

The changes in numbers for the 1939 contracts do show increase support for FC but also they haven't come close to building the heavy bombers of the 1936-38 programs so increases in orders are not going to be service for several more years.

 

[EwenS]

FAA aircraft procurement was meant to cover
1. Initial equipment of units
2. Immediate reserve for units (100% of the above)
3. A war reserve until such time as production rates could be built up enough to cover the additional wastage rates caused by war. Detailed as follows in June 1939:-
"On the first line strength an all round war wastage rate of 20 per cent a month was assumed, and calculations made of the numbers of the several classes of aircraft that would be required to bridge the gap until peace production had risen to equal the wastage rate. Additional aircraft would also be needed for war training requirements. The total constituted our war reserve."

On 4 Sept 1939, the war reserve was estimated to be 50%, over and above the 100% immediate reserve.

FAA orders break down as (with rough delivery schedule):-

22 Sea Gladiator (Interim) - reallocated from an RAF contract. Initially for 38 but reduced to 22. Delivered Dec 1938 / Jan 1939
60 Sea Gladiator - deliveries Feb-April 1939
190 Skua - deliveries Sept 1938 - March 1940 (the Admiralty thought this had completed in Aug 1939)
136 Rocs - delivered April 1939- Aug 1940
250 Fulmar - series production from May 1940.

Total 658.

Roc peak production by Boulton Paul was estimated to be 15 per month from Nov 1939. The Air Ministry had advised the Admiralty that the peak peacetime production rate for the Fulmar would be about 20 aircraft per month (later 25 per month from Sept 1940) a figure that could probably be increased to 40 in wartime. The pre-war estimate was that this would end in April 1941.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

So the FAA (Naval) was getting a bit under the attention that FC (fighter defense of GB and the empire)

If you look at the various expansion plans the fighter force and the FAA remain comparable size wise.

but total FAA fighters of any sort were 566

As the FAA was a sort of mini RAF, a mixture of fighters and bombers, the RN determining the preferred force mix, production reality determining what they had.

The Fulmar was supposed to replace the Skua and the Sea Gladiators were only ordered because the Skua, Roc and Fulmar were all running late. Out of the 566 FAA 'fighters' ordered in the 1936-38 period only around 50-60% were intended to be in service at the same time?

The Gladiator orders were in part due to anticipated or actual delays in Hurricane and Spitfire production, orders were 23+186 in 1935, 16+78 in 1937 and 240 in 1938, then add the 60 Sea Gladiators in 1938. Everyone was working off WWI experience, the cycle of the need for the new drawing board design, the design in prototype trials, the design coming into production, the design in mass production, the design being phased out of production. They knew the cycle would take longer than WWI but were over confident about how much shorter it would be in wartime versus what it was in the late 1930's.

Granted 1952 of the BC aircraft were single engine (not counting the Hinds and Wellesley) but with over 1400 four engine (big twin) bombers on order by the end of 1938 we can really see where the RAF was putting it's effort (money).

Yet it could be said the RAF was doing what the RN was doing, building the more complex and harder to produce items in peace time knowing expansion of "lighter" forces was easier. The bigger the aircraft and the larger the crew the longer it took to create the force. At the same time heavy bombers tend to be more efficient in terms of the effort required per ton of bombs dropped. The British Bombing Survey Unit simply took the bombs dropped and divided that by the number of sorties sent (NOT attacked) and came up with the Bomber Command average bomb load in pounds, the second figure is per attacking sortie from the Bomber Command War Room 1945 report.
Blenheim 506, n/a
Hampden 1,556, 1,968
Mosquito 2,101, 2,383
Whitley 2,441, 3,003
Wellington 2,502, 2,957
Stirling 5,626, 6,622
Halifax 6,834, 7,539
Lancaster 9,186, 10,065

Bomb load wise around 2.5 Wellington to a Halifax, 25% more engines, twice the crew and probably between 150 and 200% the fuel. AVIA 15/950 Britain June 1941 expected unit costs for proposed orders, in pounds, 44,250 Lancaster, 43,752 Halifax, 52,300 Stirling, 27,700 Wellington, inital cost wise around 1.6 Wellingon to the Halifax.. Yes this is a peace time calculation when budgets matter more.

The Blenheim suffers a lot in the BBSU comparison thanks to many day sorties were anti shipping with no targets found and cloud cover raids that lacked clouds.

There was also a bit of disingenuous about some of the numbers of BC. BC may have had plans to take over some of the GR aircraft for light bombing missions.

I have not seen any indications of pre war ideas of GR aircraft in standard bombing raids. Coastal Command certainly did quite a lot of bombing of maritime related targets as well as bombing ships, wartime total of 4,778 tons of bombs, which is ahead of Fighter Command at 3,141 tons. Then again minelaying duties started with Coastal Command, then shared with Bomber Command until 1943 when Bomber Command took over. Coastal Command units did take part in the thousand bomber raids in 1942 but it was not considered viable given things like the extra navigation training they had. It is the trade off, the more specialised the unit is the better it is at a specific task, but what happens if the task ceases to exist? How long to retrain the specialist crew and what about the equipment?

Also shows the lack of support for the "army". The 400 Hawker Henley dive bomber/tactical bomber order was cut in 1/2 but even before the cut in numbers it had been transferred over to Training Command leaving the "army" without a whole lot for tactical/battle field support aircraft. The increase in orders for Lysanders is just to accommodate the increased number of British army divisions, not to increase the air support per division.

Now we run into things like being right for the wrong/not quite right reasons and the pre war situation of little hard evidence therefore all sides could dig in behind their preferred predictions of what was to come.

As of early 1938 the army was against sending forces to Europe, as of mid 1938 it was 2 divisions, in 1939 that became an army heading towards an army group, conscription of 20 to 22 year olds was approved in May 1939, until that stage the army did not have a lot of troops to send and lacked a lot of the heavy weapons needed to form divisions and larger. Lots of battalions out there equipped for local security duties, great for basic field craft and combat experience (North west Frontier anyone?) bad at training to fight as a division let alone anything bigger or getting the budget allocations for the equipment needed for such, even before talking about armoured forces.

To turn it around, since AA guns were an army responsibility, the army showed a lack of support for the RAF as it failed to provide the AA guns and troops necessary to provide security for the airfields required to provide what the army wanted, airpower spread fairly evenly across the front able to provide an air umbrella to hinder/prevent enemy air attacks and enable rapid, continuous air support around front line positions, with the army having a big say up to control of the aircraft. Going the other way the RAF was failing to support the army as it was only building a strategic defence fighter force, not a tactical one, and having squadrons able to move rapidly and keep fighting as airfields changed hands.

Experience showed to provide timely and continuous front line air support required a large fighter force to suppress enemy fighters and even then it required the strike aircraft to be survivable enough if attacked when low, slow and heavily laden. Fighter bombers can switch between air superiority and air support and can put up a better defence than dedicated strike aircraft which usually require escorts, making them much better suited to pre planned attacks, not as a form of quick response to enemy actions, do interdiction if the front is static and battlefield support if an attack is being done, while heavy bombers are quite capable of attacking "tactical" targets. Experience also showed having lots of bombs in the first wave of a day strike was good, as the smoke and dust from the the bombs obscure the target, try and attack with big individual loads. Also combined arms matters, an air strike or artillery barrage that is followed up by an attack is much better than just the strike/barrage.

In 1940 the RAF provided a similar in per division terms bomber and reconnaissance force as it did in 1944, what the 1940 force lacked was the fighters,, the RAF was right about best use of bombers, the reconnaissance and spotting requirements. Experience showed the Army was right about the benefits of air umbrellas and rapid battlefield support as the situation required. Wonder what the system would have done if the actual costs (money/manpower) of 2nd Tactical Air Force had been presented pre war, remembering the fighters at least would be in addition to Fighter Command.

It did help the Germans that the opposing armies usually took a lot longer to react and make decisions, which gave their airstrikes more time.

The changes in numbers for the 1939 contracts do show increase support for FC

One fundamental point when looking at specific time periods is a big order could have been placed earlier, or an order delayed until later for various reasons. Hence "no order found" is possible depending on the time period chosen.

Roc peak monthly production was 15 in October 1939, average for first 6 months of 1940 was 8.5, the Fulmar peak 33 in July 1941, average during 1941 was 26.25.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I did make the argument about the rear tank being used to balance the heavier engine as the MkIX did have lead ballast in the tail, the MkV had the rear 29 gallon tank fitted so it was viable and George Buerling fitted his MkV he had in Malta with twin side by side drop tanks so if mods needed to be done they were. If you go back the the original question about the P51 it had all sorts of problems that presented themselves as the airframe changed, going to the bubble canopy caused fishtailing but did they say no good and stop using it, hell no, they fitted a fillet down the spine and problem solved.

There are pictures of the side by side installation in Morgan and Shacklady. It looks like an old bedframe with two tanks suspended beneath. The drag must have been tremendous.
You claim that Buerling was personally involved. Did he (or anyone) actually take it into combat? I cant imagine fighting with that frame hanging in the slipstream.