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I was fortunate enough to have flown the P-51, P-47, and P-38 in combat and have led fighter groups with all three.
P-38 - Though this aircraft had virtues, for me it was the poorest of the three US Army fighters in the European Theater. The fact that the extreme cold at altitude affected it's performance hardly endears the machine. The turbosuperchargers were controlled by an oil regulator. At altitude the oil had a tendency to congeal, which caused serious problems. On two occasions I recall, when entering combat with enemy single seaters it was a case of life and death to get away and survive, though I had started with the advantage.
On both occasions the engines either cut out completely or overran rpm limitations as throttles were cut or advanced. It was enough just to regulate the engines and control the aircraft without entering combat.
The second serious limiting factor that detracted from the P-38's combat capability was its steep diving restriction -- estimated at about 375 mph. A common tactic of the Luftwaffe single seaters was to split-S for the clouds or the deck. Ofentimes their head-on attacks on the bomber formations saw them roll over and dive for the deck to confuse and outdistance the flexible machine gunners. P-38s had little chance to pursue. When on defensive, it can be easily understood that a dive to safety was the best maneuver for longevity.
Another factor to degrade the P-38's combat capability was its identification factor. The eyes of a pilot often picked up the specks in the distance that could not be immediately identified as friend or foe. These were reported as "bogies." Appropriate tactical maneuvers were taken to prevent bogies from having an advantage of a subsequent attack. In the case of the P-38, the twin booms and slab elevator gave this aircraft's identity away -- as far as the eye could see.
It was also necessary for the P-38 pilot to do much more weaving to look down over the two engines that lay on each side of the cockpit. A better cockpit heating system could have been provided as my feet always froze at altitude.
Taken alone, the above statements would conclude that the P-38 had no oustanding features... it did! As a gun platform it was steady as a shooting stand. With two engines, there was no torque. With a little trim for buildup of speed (in a dive), a pilot could ride directly into a target.
As to the armament installation, I have seen no better. Four machine guns and one cannon in a tight pocket directly in front of the pilot. This armament being so closely aligned to the sight of plane of the gunsight required no convergence of fire as necessitated in fighters having their guns placed in the wings.
Though the P-38 had a wheel instead of the proverbial stick, this was no handicap -- control were light and reponse was excellent.
Relative to load carrying capacity, the aircraft could take off with just about anything. I've taken off with a thousand pound bomb under each wing and cruised with ease. On fusel consumption, the P-38 enabled us to cruise out to combat areas deep in Germany without the anguish of not having enough "petrol" to return home.
A tricycle landing gear made it much easier for a junior pilot to "spike the kite" on the runway and chalk up another landing. This was also an advantage in taxiing -- a large engine and cowling did not deter from forward vision.
Returning to England with considerable undercast always presented a severe problem of location. We had only four channels of VHF which were always crowded. Once over England we could only let down straight ahead until you could see the ground. The other P-38 groups were operating with the same problem as the 55th. But one thing we liked about the P-38 was its instrument flying ability.
Flying around 30,000 feet resulted in extreme fouling of the plugs in the Allison engine as well as a great number of thrown rods and swallowed valves. Needless to say, a P-38 on a single engine was in an unenviable condition. Our record during this period was very poor, about 1.5 Germans shot down to each American lost to all causes.
This was the world's coldest airplane and we tried every combination of suit, glove and heater imaginable, including some that would short out and give you a hot foot. We were so cold sometimes, we did not even want to fight.
The twin tails provided positive recognition for the Germans at distances greater than we could see them. Therefore, our initial engagements were always at a disadvantage. We were forced to go to very high altitudes, 30,000 feet to 35,000 feet. Even so, the Germans flew way above us. The Germans would escape by a split-S maneuver from these altitudes and the P-38 could not follow due to compressibility.
The maintenance on the P-38 was something to behold. The engines were extremely closely-cowled with much piping and no space. The mechanics did a magnificent job with extremly long hours of trying tediously to fix coolant leaks, rough engines, etc. It was truly a crew chief's nightmare. The plane employed oleo socks on all three landing gear struts. These had a habit of leaking as soon as it got cold and required considerable maintenance to reinflate. The turbo supercharger regulator had a delightful habit of freezing at high altitude, resulting in only two throttle settings... 10 inches of mercury, which would not sustain flight, or 80 inches which would blow up a supercharger. I recall one very cold day over the Ruhr Valley [in Germany] where both the pilots and the regulators were so frozen that, in spite of heavy flak in that vicinity, we let down to 3,000 feet to warm up both us and the airplanes.
3 June 1944
Subject: P-38 Airplane in Combat.
To: Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command, APO 637, U.S. Army.
1. The following observations are being put in writing by the undersigned at the request of the Commanding General, VII FC. They are intended purely as constructive criticism and are intended in any way to "low rate" our present equipment.
2. After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred hours on combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands now, is too complicated for the 'average' pilot. I want to put strong emphasis on the word 'average, taking full consideration just how little combat training our pilots have before going on as operational status.
3. As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-five hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising along with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced", what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several things wrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure.
4. In my limited experience with a P-38 group, we have lost as least four (4) pilots, who when bounced, took no immediate evasive action. The logical assumption is that they were so busy in the cockpit, trying to get organized that they were shot down before they could get going.
5. The question that arises is, what are you going to do about it? It is standard procedure for the group leader to call, five minutes before R/V and tell all the pilots to "prepare for trouble". This is the signal for everyone to get into auto rich, turn drop tank switches on, gun heaters on, combat and sight switches on and to increase RPM and manifold pressure to maximum cruise. This procedure, however, does not help the pilot who is bounced on the way in and who is trying to conserve his gasoline and equipment for the escort job ahead.
6. What is the answer to these difficulties? During the past several weeks we have been visited at this station time and time again by Lockheed representatives, Allison representatives and high ranking Army personnel connected with these two companies. They all ask about our troubles and then proceed to tell us about the marvelous mechanisms that they have devised to overcome these troubles that the Air Force has turned down as "unnecessary". Chief among these is a unit power control, incorporating an automatic manifold pressure regulator, which will control power, RPM and mixture by use of a single lever. It is obvious that there is a crying need for a device like that in combat.
7. It is easy to understand why test pilots, who have never been in combat, cannot readily appreciate what each split second means when a "bounce" occurs. Every last motion when you get bounced is just another nail in your coffin. Any device which would eliminate any of the enumerated above, are obviously very necessary to make the P-38 a really effective combat airplane.
8. It is also felt that that much could done to simplify the gas switching system in this airplane. The switches {valve selector handles} are all in awkward positions and extremely hard to turn. The toggle switches for outboard tanks are almost impossible to operate with gloves on.
9. My personal feeling about this airplane is that it is a fine piece of equipment, and if properly handled, takes a back seat for nothing that the enemy can produce. But it does need simplifying to bring it within the capabilities of the 'average' pilot. I believe that pilots like Colonel Ben Kelsey and Colonel Cass Huff are among the finest pilots in the world today. But I also believe that it is difficult for men like them to place their thinking and ability on the level of a youngster with a bare 25 hours in the airplane, going into his first combat. That is the sort of thinking that will have to be done, in my opinion, to make the P-38 a first-class all around fighting airplane.
HAROLD J. RAU
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.
It's my understanding that the mach problem with the P-38 originated with the original "interceptor" design spec that required a very high RoC. To meet this spec the wing was designed to be rather thick. This led to a transonic aero phenomenon as the slipstream accelerated over the thick wing. Specifically, the CoP moved back on the wing causing the aircraft to pitch on its back resulting in breakup. Two or three test pilots were killed before the plane was released to service uncorrected.
True on movement of CoP, but it had the effect of causing a Nose down CMac - another callenge when trying to pull stck back to get the nose up and pull out.
The "dive brakes" fix actually functioned to shift the CoP forward into a stable position. After a tough teething period the P-38 matured into a rather good if expensive plane.
The Dive Brake primarily kept the P-38 from immediately entering into drag Divergence regime leading to transonix Mcr - (which had the effect of moving CoP aft as the shock wave formed at 25% chord and moved aft.. in other words it didn't move anything, it kept 'anything' from moving aft.
I have saved some discussions on the P-38 performance in Europe over the years. These reports point out at some of the problems. I would also like to emphasize that Luftwaffe was a stronger enemy in 1943/early 1944 than later on i.e. when P-51B/C/D arrived. Also, some of the P-38 advantages when compared to P-47/51 are not the case when compared to German models (climb rate).
Let's talk P38's for a bit.
Why did the P38 have so many problems flying bomber escort in Western Europe in late 1943, early 1944? Blown engines and such.
I have read about the cold temps at 30000ft. causing issues with the early models.
I have not read that other aircraft where having so many problems at high altitudes.
A second problems was the European fuels.
100+ Octane fuel in the U.S.A. had 2% aromatics in it. European fuels had up to 20% aromatics, so the carburetors were jetted wrong right from the factory, but ran just fine on US fuel.
As you may know, the U.S. authorities recently decided without further reference to us, that all supplies of 130 grade would, as from August 10th, be leaded up to 5.5 cc. per Imperial gallon as compared with 4.8 cc. previously. So rapidly has this decision been implemented that there are at present two cargoes of the new base material (to be leaded in this country) on the high seas and a further three loadings for this country are anticipated very shortly.
It now transpires that the increase in lead content is likely to cause serious disturbances on a variety of American engines fitted to British machines, or American machines taken over by R.A.F. This is particularly true of heavy engines used by Costal Command and Allison engines for Fighter Command. The details are given on the attached minute by M.A.P. which was considered at a meeting today of all concerned, including the Americans.
It was assumed by the meeting that the American decision cannot have left out of account the difficulties now feared in the U.K. and that therefore the results of tests are available in U.S.A. which will point the way to the steps to be taken to overcome these obstacles. M.A.P. and Colonel Johnson are immediately telegraphing to Washington to renew requests for such information, and it has been agreed that we will defer asking the U.S. authorities to discontinue shipping the new material, until the results in particular of Colonel Johnson's telegram are received. It has been necessary to protect his position to some extent as he was a strong protagonist of the new fuel during his visit to Washington and, indeed, largely helped to push the decision through on the basis that the British agreed and that the increase in potential production was indispensable.
As regards the two cargoes which will arrive very shortly in the U.K. with the new material, it has been decided that Petroleum Board should
(a) as far as possible segregate the material
or
(b) will blend it in with old specification material I.
subject to the stipulation that the resulting lead content will not exceed 5 cc.
The carrying through of the above decision may, I fear, result in the delaying of one or other of the two tankers as they may need to be moved to a different port of discharge. It is the prime purpose of this minute to advise you of this, and I am also sending a copy to Mr. Wackcrill at Ministry of War Transport so that he should be fully informed.
The troubles are feared as much or more in the Overseas
Commands such as the ME and North Africa.
1. All British engines are cleared for this fuel;
The following table summarises the petition with American engine types :-
Wright and P W:
British Plugs - Probably OK
US Ceramic Plugs - No definite information
US Mica - No information
Allison:
British plugs - Severe fouling after 20 hours
US Ceramic - No information
US Mica - Not approved for combat ratings on 4.8
It cannot yet be said that British plugs will make all Wright Pratt Whitney engines satisfactory on 5.5 co fuel although the evidence obtained to date is encouraging. Tests are continuing,
We have no evidence to show suitability of America ceramic type plugs on 5.5 cc fuel. Tests are in progress on Double Cyclones and Double Wasps, If these tests are satisfactory, it will be assumed those plugs arc equally suitable for Cyclones and Twin Wasps,
British plugs have failed in the Allison engine in Mustang aircraft; no information is available as to the suitability of American ceramic plugs on this engine except that on 4,8 cc fuel the British plugs were not inferior to American plugs.
The position regarding the utilisation of 5,5 cc fuel by the RAF, is therefore,
a. British engines O.K.
b. Allison engines cannot use it and tests so far conducted indicate that the engine itself cannot digest 5.5 cc fuel. Considerable further test data is therefore required both on engine and plugs,
c. Wright and Pratt Whitney engines - no decision can be taken until flight tests under 3 and 4 above are completed. In view of the encouraging preliminary results on British plugs, adequate production of these types should be provided.
Charles Lindberg spent time in the Pacific as a civilian observer, I did not know this until about a month ago.
P-38 (35). P-47 (316), P-51B (318.5) where most of the P-51 credits were against LuftFlotte Reich which had been steadily building up with veteran Gruppe's transferring into Germany November 1943 - February 1944. In other words the Reich composition was not 'rookies' -
It is not "unlikely" the P-38 had issues with aromatics, it is a fact.
According to Pete, if you jet for the low aromatic gasoline and then run with the high aromatic gasoline, you will be considerably mis-jetted. Since the later American gas was aromatic adjusted up, the factory carburation settings were ALSO adjusted and they left the factory with correctly-jetted carbs.
By 1943 Luftwaffe losses had risen to alarming levels, see graph below.
By the time the Big Week was launched the Luftwaffe had already been weakened, and Allied tactics were much more effective. This led to massive losses (funeral of the Luftwaffe according to some).