Panther and Tiger, designed by the Allies....

[Shortround6]

The US might have frittered away fewer tank crewmen if they had realized that, however good a tank may have been in 1942, it was going to be obsolete in 1945/45.

The US actually had the production capacity to use on at least one non-standard tank. Or at least was the country in the best position to build more than one type of tank. Granted M4A3E8 was a lot better than a 1942 Sherman M4 but then a 1945 T-34/85 was a lot better than a 1941 T-34 and the Soviets were working on the T-44.

The Americans built about 73% of the number of MK IVs produced in M3 Grants and Lees alone.
They also built (but perhaps wisely did not commit to combat in large numbers) about 25,000 M3/M5 Stuarts. add another 4700 M-24s made before August 1945.
Throw in a number of the US "oddballs" that never made it offshore like 250 M23 tanks

with electric transmissions that stayed in the US. Total production of M20 series tanks (including prototypes) up to the end of May 1944 was 301 ?

The Sherman was built in 9 different factories (although not all factories made large numbers) and with 4 major engine types, cast and welded hulls (and a Hybrid hull), different turrets on later models and two different suspension systems so as a "standard" tank it might leave a bit to be desired

 

[GrauGeist]

Don't forget the early M4A1 with riveted lower hull. When one of those took a hit, the rivets flew around the interior like schrapnel.

The one thing that many people overlook about the Sherman, is that U.S. docterine was to support infantry with the M4 and leave the enemy tank engagement to the tank destroyers.

However, it didn't end up like that. But in the end, the Shermans versus German heavy panzers was much like fireants overwhelming a rhinocerous beetle...

 

[parsifal]

Despite the shortcomings of the Sherman, it was still absolutely the right decision not to allow wholesale changes to be made to the basic design. The Allies suffered an overall exchange rate of 4.3 tank losses to each german loss. But the Allies were never seriously troubled by these losses whereas the Germans were gutted by the losses they suffered. It should not have been that way. Germany had a head start on AFV production, had superior designs and the productive capacity to absorb losses up to an exchange rate of about 2:1 but they couldn't even survive when the exchange rate blew out to 4:1. They were on the defensive, which gave them enormous inherent advantages, but they still lost, and badly. the reason for their gut wrenching losses lies in their inability, late war, to appreciate that basic numbers will win you battles (and in terms of favourable loss rates), but quality, if that comes at the price of numbers (which their incessant tampering with production lines certainly did, as did, equally, their mania for ever bigger tanks of greater and greater complexity) will not gain you anything substantial at all. The germans achieved the favourable exchange rates mostly because of the remaining experience in their crews and the vastly superior leadership and teamwork they could call upon. Dupuy has done some pretty exhaustive studies in this. they are experts at determining reasons for performance, and whilst raw ratio comparisons are notoriously rough, they still provide some illumination for discussions like this. At the time of Normandy, the heer enjoyed a qualitative (as in army superiority) advantage over the allies of 2.63, that is, in normal attacking situations, the allies needed 2.63 soldiers, or 2.63 tanks for every 1 heer soldier, or 2.63 tanks for every heer tank. they estimate that Tigers accounted for less than 5% of that advantage. If they did not have tigers, the German advantage would have dropped to 2.50. Dupuy doesn't look at what numbers might do, but Im willing to bet the farm that if these tigers were replaced by roughly 3x Mk IVs, the German advantage would have increased significantly.

Another factor affecting exchange rates (in men) was the effect of airpower. no direct losses really, but airpower has a multiplying effect on your fpf values that can really turn exchange rates around. EG, trapping an entire army on the Seine as it tries to escape....not directly the result of airpower, but airpower made it all possible.

 

[parsifal]

Duplicate, sorry guys.

 

[GrauGeist]

In regards to the PzKfw IV, I partially agree, but pound for pound, the StuG III was perhaps one of the best panzers of the war. Inexpensive, easy maintenance, reliable and proven effective many times over on the battlefield with an impressive success rate.

 

[Shortround6]

Despite the shortcomings of the Sherman, it was still absolutely the right decision not to allow wholesale changes to be made to the basic design.

Actually this is not quite accurate. By the time 1945 rolled around the Shermans had different engines, different turret, different suspension and a different front hull shape. This disregards different armament. Basic hull shape, layout and transmission stayed the same.

It was pretty much an obsession with numbers that kept the Sherman in production with the above changes, and a refusal to change doctrine/tactics that kept it under armed for so long. They built almost as many Sherman TANKS ( not including SP guns-tank destroyers etc) from 1941-45 as the Germans did tracked chassis from 1936-45 (includingSP guns-tank destroyers etc) from the MK I to the Tiger II.
The Sherman had been intended as an exploitation vehicle, Break through was not supposed to be it's job and tank to tank fighting (or AFV to AFV)was supposed to be handled by the tank destroyers and AT guns. The Germans didn't co-operate with US doctrine
The US built about 10,600 full tracked tank destroyers during the war.

The Allies suffered an overall exchange rate of 4.3 tank losses to each german loss. But the Allies were never seriously troubled by these losses whereas the Germans were gutted by the losses they suffered. It should not have been that way. Germany had a head start on AFV production, had superior designs and the productive capacity to absorb losses up to an exchange rate of about 2:1 but they couldn't even survive when the exchange rate blew out to 4:1.

If the Americans were not seriously troubled they would not have been operating tanks in NW Europe with 3-4 man crews instead of full 5 man crews and in some cases the even these reduced numbers were made up of drafted infantrymen and not trained tankers which lowered the effectiveness in combat. Please look at production numbers, the Germans could NOT afford even a 4-5 loss ratio as they did NOT have the production capacity to keep up. Throw in British (roughly 7,000 later Churchills and Cromwells) and Russian production with the American numbers.

They were on the defensive, which gave them enormous inherent advantages, but they still lost, and badly. the reason for their gut wrenching losses lies in their inability, late war, to appreciate that basic numbers will win you battles (and in terms of favourable loss rates), but quality, if that comes at the price of numbers (which their incessant tampering with production lines certainly did, as did, equally, their mania for ever bigger tanks of greater and greater complexity) will not gain you anything substantial at all.

I am not sure how much "tampering" went on. There was only one production line for the Tiger and most modifications were minor (until the Tiger II and that is a totally different story). Early Panthers needed tampering with and the 6500 or so Panthers sure did a lot more than the Tigers did in combat just due to numbers let alone any advantages. Early 'responses' ( need for new/modified tanks and AT guns) to the Panther lumped it in with the Tiger as a heavy tank and it wasn't until 1944 that the allies appreciated that it was a new "medium" tank. Panthers were produced in different factories than the MK IV tanks.

The Tiger II and the later monsters fly in the face of experience gained with the Tiger I and Panther. Not so much in actual combat ( but semi-mobile pill box/bunker is a very limited role) but in getting into combat and getting out (mobility both on road and off) and with the experience of being unable to recover broken down tanks due to inadequate numbers of recovery vehicles building even heavier tanks (and with the Tiger II using the same overloaded engine and transmission) certainly did not make sense.

they estimate that Tigers accounted for less than 5% of that advantage. If they did not have tigers, the German advantage would have dropped to 2.50. Dupuy doesn't look at what numbers might do, but Im willing to bet the farm that if these tigers were replaced by roughly 3x Mk IVs, the German advantage would have increased significantly.

This rather leaves out the Panthers? It also means you need 3X the crewmen and if not 3X the logistic support perhaps 2X? If many Tigers were abandoned due to lack of fuel will the MK IVs have enough more range (on roads) to reach the fuel dumps?
Tigers and Panthers sometimes allowed crews to survive when they might not in a MK IV and gain experience.

Another factor affecting exchange rates (in men) was the effect of airpower. no direct losses really, but airpower has a multiplying effect on your fpf values that can really turn exchange rates around. EG, trapping an entire army on the Seine as it tries to escape....not directly the result of airpower, but airpower made it all possible.

Quite true but then it matters little if the accompanying tanks are Tigers or MK IVs if air power is blocking/restricting the roads/bridges needed to escape.

 

[Shortround6]

Trouble is it won't do some of the jobs a MK IV will do.

It may be 30% (or some such number) cheaper but it carries much less ammo. Lack of rotating turret limits it in some tactical situations. It's ability to support infantry with MG fire is extremely limited meaning it has to use the main gun with it's limited ammo supply more often. A Stug that is being resupplied (re armed) is NOT in combat.

A Stug is NOT a 1 for 1 replacement for MK IV so if you need 25-30% more Stugs to equal the MK IV in actual combat and not just fill out TOA/TOE what have you gained?

 

[GrauGeist]

However, the Stug filled the gap remarkably well, produced some of the highest kills of any panzer type and remained an extremely dangerous threat to Allied units right up to the final minutes of the war.

 

[tomo pauk]

IMHO, one of the German problems, from mid-war or, is that they don't have a real medium tank. The Pz-IV can be killed by many of Allied guns, on decent combat distances. It reached it's upgrade potential some time in 1942. The Panther, let alone Tiger, cannot be produced in quantities suitable for a country that is in a war with 3 major powers and their allies; Germany must also supply it's allies with tanks.

StuG-III was a fine vehicle IMO, maybe not capable to replace the Pz-IV on 1:1 basis, but way more useful than a heavy ATG with a dedicated prime mover. It is also a far better thing to have than any Pz-III for most of combat situations?

 

[Shortround6]

The MK IV was still quite useful but is a little slow, a bit short ranged, a bit thin in protection on sides and rear (once you get more than 45 degrees to the side 37 and 2pdr APCBC ammo will penetrate out to around 2000 meters or more). It's gun was quite useful up until the end of the war although it left something to be desired against the bigger Russian tanks. The co-ax MG with with 3000+ rounds of ammo is a big plus over the Stug, so is the 87 rounds of main gun ammo vs the 44-54 rounds in the Stug.
However the later versions were getting a bit less spritely in performance and the suspension may have been approaching it's limit.
It's Usefulness in 1944/45 was extended or helped by the failure of the British and Americans to develop better tanks and introduce them in 1944/45 in any real numbers. Perhaps the Russians wouldn't have bothered with the T-34/85 without the the Tiger and Panther being built but the T-34/85 sure shows the MK IV was falling behind.
Maybe the Germans didn't really need a 45 ton Panther but they needed something that was better than the MK IV.
The Tiger is a bit of a red herring, at 25 tanks a month at the start of production would 75 more MK IVs a month in the Fall and Winter of 1942 really have changed the German position?
Germany should have ramped up production of a lot of weapons in 1941-43 while they still had the opportunity.
I am not sure I quite but the 3 MK IV vs 1 Tiger cost equation either. I know that there are contract costs that show that or claims.
However can you really build 75 twelve liter 12 cylinder engines for the price of 25 twenty-three liter 12 cylinder engines?
Can you really build 75 7.5cm Kwk 40 guns for the price of 25 8.8cm Kwk 36 guns?
Maybe the Transmission do equal out?
you need 3 times the number of machine guns, 3 times the number of radios, 3 times the number of gun sights and vision devices.
You are not using quite 3 times the steel.
The Tiger may have been much more labor intensive to build but something seems a bit out of whack. Small scale production is never as cheap as large scale production.

 

[redcoat]

The Allies suffered an overall exchange rate of 4.3 tank losses to each german loss.

Do you have a source for that figure.
Thank you.

 

[parsifal]

Actually this is not quite accurate. By the time 1945 rolled around the Shermans had different engines, different turret, different suspension and a different front hull shape. This disregards different armament. Basic hull shape, layout and transmission stayed the same.

They did the same with hardware like the Spitfire, the B-17, even ships of various classes. It is still far cheaper and more efficient to modify an existing design than finalise a whole new design, set up your mouldings, stamping machines, forges and the like from scratch. the m4, despite its numerous changes, was still using many parts common to the original design at the end of its production run.

It was pretty much an obsession with numbers that kept the Sherman in production with the above changes, and a refusal to change doctrine/tactics that kept it under armed for so long. They built almost as many Sherman TANKS ( not including SP guns-tank destroyers etc) from 1941-45 as the Germans did tracked chassis from 1936-45 (includingSP guns-tank destroyers etc) from the MK I to the Tiger II.

And that says volumes about the german failure. Germany is estimates to have possessed about 37% the productive capacity of the USin 1938, yet in all categories, produced a fraction of that percentage, in all categories

The Sherman had been intended as an exploitation vehicle, Break through was not supposed to be it's job and tank to tank fighting (or AFV to AFV)was supposed to be handled by the tank destroyers and AT guns. The Germans didn't co-operate with US doctrine.The US built about 10,600 full tracked tank destroyers during the war.

The whole concept of using Tanks as "breakthrough tanks, or "assault tanks" smacks of a disturbing misunderstanding of the proper usage of tanks in 1944-5. Tanks were not being used successfully in either of those capacities on the western front. Even on the eastern front, there was much more reliance on combined arms, tank infantry teams, in which the lead assault elements were the Infantry, not the tanks. the tanks were providing support, and in this role the 75mm was more than adequate.

Russians were still using crash through assault tactics, but at great cost in the east, and in these battles, the Tiger excelled when used defensively

Please look at production numbers, the Germans could NOT afford even a 4-5 loss ratio as they did NOT have the production capacity to keep up. Throw in British (roughly 7,000 later Churchills and Cromwells) and Russian production with the American numbers.

The US commanded about 40% of the world industrial potential in 1938, the Germans about 18%, the British about 10%, and the Russians about the same. occupied Europe and Italy accounted for about 12% of world Industrial potential, and japan about 6%.... the rest of the world made up the remainder. 1/3 of US industrial potential was diverted to the pacific, and there was virtually no tanks diverted to this TO except obsolete types, or the very end of the war. The US had a clear lead in automotive construction, however the Germans had a five year head start in setting up dedicated war industries.. by my calculation the allies enjoyed a potential advantage over Germany of 48:28....or less than 2:1. and yet, in the field of tank production, they enjoyed advantages of around 5 or 6:1. Some of that disparity arose because of the Germans resistance to standardisation and their fixation on building so called heavy tanks.

Not finished, but ill have to come back to this later.....

 

[parsifal]

Continuing on....

The Tiger II and the later monsters fly in the face of experience gained with the Tiger I and Panther. Not so much in actual combat ( but semi-mobile pill box/bunker is a very limited role) but in getting into combat and getting out (mobility both on road and off) and with the experience of being unable to recover broken down tanks due to inadequate numbers of recovery vehicles building even heavier tanks (and with the Tiger II using the same overloaded engine and transmission) certainly did not make sense

.

Tiger II in the attack were never very successful. I think it was during the Ardennes that 45 in an independent Abt crossed the front lines and within a week all 45 had been lost, mostly due to fuel issues and break downs. 45 lost is 105 of the production run, equivalent to 4000 T-34s!

This rather leaves out the Panthers? It also means you need 3X the crewmen and if not 3X the logistic support perhaps 2X? If many Tigers were abandoned due to lack of fuel will the MK IVs have enough more range (on roads) to reach the fuel dumps?

With a tiger component you may have 100 tanks in a divisional establishment. There were typically 2500 other vehicles attached to the division. If you had more lighter tanks in the division, you may have 250 or so tanks attached. The extra 150 tanks is insignificant to the overall logistic demands of the division.

But it is far more significant that the tanks made logistic support at the front lines easier, not harder. By far the biggest problem for logistics was that last 5-8km from the front lines. Getting supply or other support from the forward depots to the teeth in the front line was an enormous issue. If you have enemy tanks roaming around in that area, it becomes virtually impossible to do. And having a divisional establishment with only 100 tanks attached, basically means you have 1/3 the chance of containing such enemy penetrations. The issue builds on itself. if you have insufficient tanks to secure your forward areas, your logisitc support decreases, and up goes your breakdown rates. Losses start to climb, this was precisely what the germans found incidentally as they placed all their faith in a limited number of high quality and frightfully expensive AFVs.

The allies did not follow that maxim. they went for the numbers. In open combat they paid a price for that. But because they had numbers in their formations, there never was that situation of the germans running amok in their rear areas.....it happened once or twice in 1942, but not in 1944. If the heavy tank concept had any credibility one would expect these heavy tanks being ablke to effect breakthroughs (that was their role after all) and then the allied logistic network being rolled up as german tanks destroyed the soft skinned support. Never happened, but it happened repeatedly to the germans as the so called "inferior" shermans cut their front lines to pieces

Tigers and Panthers sometimes allowed crews to survive when they might not in a MK IV and gain experience.

So too did the mk IIs, IIIs and IVs. During Barbarossa, in the dark days in front of Moscow, confronted with large numbers of T-34s at last, the tank formations suffered casualty rates up to 90% of the force structure. But 90% of the crews escaped, whats more, despite the attrocious weather, the Germans got most of the U/S tanks out and back to the workshops for repair. Soviets lacked the skills to put into effect full breakthroughs so the Germans got away with this on that occasion. later, during operations like Kursk, where the Soviets had learnt the skills needed for deep penetrations, the heavy tanks that had broken down and were far more difficult to recover were generally lost outright. Not sure about the crews, but a crew without a tank is as useful as a tank without a crew.....

Quite true but then it matters little if the accompanying tanks are Tigers or MK IVs if air power is blocking/restricting the roads/bridges needed to escape./QUOTE]

Falaise arose for a number of reasons. If there had been more tanks in the german formations, they may have been abale to circumvent the encirclement of the pocket, or effect a breakout. Maybe, maybe not, but virtually anything would have been better than having a few broken down heavy tanks no linger able to contain or parry Allied encirclement operations

 

[parsifal]

Do you have a source for that figure.
Thank you.

no. there are German records for tigers, and then you have some Soviet figures for exchange rates. Somewhere, a long time ago I saw loss rates for Normandy. ive also seen some figures along those lines at the Dupuy website, but I wasn't trying to be super accurate....

 

[Shortround6]

I believe the majority of the Tigers were in independent battalions under army command and assigned as needed. Only 4 divisions had Tiger companies permanently attached.

I think this is where we are disagreeing. The Tiger was not intended as a general issue tank. It was conceived and initially built (and 25 per month is a laughably low number) for a special role. This role may have been a bit misguided but it was certainly not out of line with the thinking in American, British, French and Soviet armies at the beginning of the war. All of whom built prototypes of such tanks and in fact ONLY the Americans (due to trans Atlantic shipping problems) failed to field them.

NONE of these armies were depending on the "assault" tanks to crash through heavy defenses by themselves but they were part of a tank/infantry/artillery team which would open a hole for the modern version of the cavalry (light and medium/cruiser tanks and motor infantry (trucks) to rush through and attack the soft areas.
In Practice it didn't work much better than the WW I idea of knocking a hole in the line with infantry/artillery to allow the horse cavalry to get into the enemies rear/soft areas.

There may have been a bit of fuzzy thinking going on in a number of armies.

The US tank destroyer doctrine was that the very fast tank destroyers (held at corp or army level) would be able to rush to threatened point/s in the line and get there in time to stop breakthroughs. For some reason they didn't seem to think the enemy would use much the same tactic/method only with somewhat slower standard tanks.

The British decided to use a lot of little "assault" tanks and call them "infantry" tanks instead of a few big ones. British couldn't move big tanks by rail and the British went for cheap all too often when it came to tanks. AN infantry tank was a shell proof mobile mg nest that could accompany the infantry as it assaulted. Sticking an AT gun in it was a bonus. Cruisers were the modern cavalry to exploit the the Breakthrough.

French went both ways ( or three ways?) with little/slow two man tanks to accompany the infantry in the assault but armored against 37mm AT guns and small HE shells AND larger Assault tanks with thick armor and a larger HE firing gun. The Cavalry got the third type of tanks (again both small and large) with more speed to exploit the breakthrough and do the actual breakout.

Russians were in transition but the KV was intended for attacking prepared positions. Not for romping around the enemy rear areas.

The American M2 medium/heavy was the ultimate mobile MG nest (at least 6 MG operated from inside the tank) but sanity prevailed ( and the ability to learn at least a bit from others war experience) it became the basis for the Grant and SHerman while being replaced by the M6.

US built 40 of these things and I would note that had the Germans built even half that number they would have seen combat somewhere. The Americans had the advantage/disadvantage of a 3000-6000mile supply line in keeping 'salesmen's samples' out of the front lines.
The US did try to revive the thing with a new turret and gun

for attacking the Siegfried line but that idea came to nothing. Or should I say that the idea persisted but with other vehicles taking the place of the modified M6s.

Perhaps the concept of the assault tank was faulty but it took until after the war for that view to become widespread.

The independent Tiger Battalions were used most often as fire brigades to stop Breakthroughs or to perform counter attacks to restore the situation and since there were never enough of them ( or indeed enough regular tanks) they suffered from high mileage/utilization and the associated losses in a fluid situation or retreat. This was nothing new and had been noted by both sides in North Africa. Who ever got contol of the battlefield got to recover the bulk of the knocked out tanks and return them to service.
IF the Germans had succeeded in pushing the Allies out of Normandy we would be reading about the highly reliable Tigers and MK IVs and large numbers of Shermans, Cromwells and Churchills that ran out of gas or broke down in a matter of days.
Seriously, most WW II tanks had pretty lousy reliability, even some post war tanks had some problems, early M-48s suffered a major or minor breakdown every 68 miles if I recall right. Somebody once claimed that one reason the Russians built so many T-54/55/62s was that with their lousy transmission/clutch/steering system they would suffer 50-60% losses just driving across Europe in 4-5 days without any interference from NATO from blown clutches ( main engine and steering). The steering clutches in the Maltida had a book life of about 600 miles before needing to be relined. Some British tankers were astounded when a few Valentines managed 1500 miles on a single set of tracks in North Africa.

The question was how fast they could be repaired and catch up with their units. If due to the tactical situation the tanks have to be abandoned before repair many countries could suffer major losses.

Yes the Tiger was probably well below the average but the Germans certainly abandoned quite a few other types.

 

[parsifal]

Even though the tigers were mostly independent battalions, as were the US TDs, they were almost always attached to a division for a particular operation(s). They would rely on that divisions other services, particularly supply and recovery for support during the operation.

US TDs were used in the same way. not always, but often, such attachments could last for months at a time. effectively they were a part of that Division. Ive got the numbers of TD battalions at home, in Stantons book on the US army. They raised rather too many, as a considerable number of formations were broken up and the manpower yielded sent mostly to fight as infantry, but a few were sent to replace losses in the Tank formations, which as the 1944-5 campaign wore on were seen as more important. The US was never able to provide enough fillers to even replace light losses. it was their achilles heel really. And the arm in most need of replacements were the frontline infantry formations. Average casualty rates (killed/wounded/captured, but not returned) was about 1-4000 for the 70 or so divs that saw action in NW ETO. by far the majority of these losses were in the Infantry. Something is nagging the back of my mind that the US was receiving about 20000 fillers per month at that time. If the average loss rate was 3000 per div, for 10 months of fighting, that's roughly 21000 losses per month, or a net loss of about 1000 for the active army each month. its a lot worse than that, most losses were coming out of the 20 or so front line divs doing most of the fighting The arm that lost the most manpower were the numerous AA and CA units that had been raised.

If the germans had been able to increase this leakage of manpower even a little, the US Army would have been in a world of hurt before VE day was reached. what the germans needed to do was be able to stabilise their front and reduce the fighting to a static form of warfare. Tank engagements were irrelevant to that issue. What prevented them from achieving that is complex, but at least part of the issue was that the US was able to stick a lot of pointy nasty things in the direction of the retreating germans and never give their unmotorised formations the opportunity to stabilise until it was way too late. In that context, having bucket loads of adequate, but not outstanding tanks was the right thing to do. the germans should have sat up and taken notice of that, and the people in the position to know certainly advocated such an approach....guderian for one was never a fan of the panther or the tiger, neither was speer, and most thinking german generals were disdainful of their value, given the sacrifices made to secure them. In 1942 when they first appeared, the average cost per unit was simply staggering...about 750000 RM per copy, a Mk IV cost just under 100000 at the same time. by wars end, this unit cost had dropped to just under 330000 but still....what a waste.

 

[redcoat]

no. there are German records for tigers, and then you have some Soviet figures for exchange rates. Somewhere, a long time ago I saw loss rates for Normandy. ive also seen some figures along those lines at the Dupuy website, but I wasn't trying to be super accurate....

During the Tunisian Campaign Tiger tanks were credited with more Allied tanks kills than the total number lost from all causes by the Allies during the period in question.
German army intelligence, when trying to get a realistic figure of enemy tanks destroyed, always cut the figure of claimed tank kills by 50 percent.

As for Normandy the only tank loss figures we can rely on to some extent is the number of tanks totally lost by both sides, around 3,000 for the Allies and just over 1,500 for the German's.

 

[Shortround6]

Just like aircraft, changes in tank production can take one to two years to totally change over or bring a new tank into large scale production.

Germans main problem was a massive failure to mobilize industry in 1941-42-43. The Germans built about 20-21% more AFV chassis in 1945 (in 4-5 months) than they did in all of 1941 and about 80% in 1945 of their 1942 production. This despite the disruption of the bombing.

1943 production was 11,600 chassis with Tiger Is making up 649 chassis. swapping the Tigers for 3 times the number of MK IVs means another 1300 MK IV tanks in 1943. And another 1300 or so in 1944. 1944 chassis production was just under 19,000.

See: German armored fighting vehicle production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Would these 2600 additional tanks have really changed the war much?
And
Germans built 2958 MK IIIs in 1942, 3379 in 43 and 4752 in 44.
Germans built 994 MK IVs in 1942, 3822 in 43 and 6625 in 44.
These are chassis of all types but Germany could have picked up 2600 MK IVs easy by getting large scale production going sooner.

First contract for the Tiger tank called for 285 tanks to be built from July/Aug of 1942 till May 12th 1943 for the Summer of 1943 offensive?

Again, hardly a general issue tank.

 

[Shortround6]

During the Tunisian Campaign Tiger tanks were credited with more Allied tanks kills than the total number lost from all causes by the Allies during the period in question.
German army intelligence, when trying to get a realistic figure of enemy tanks destroyed, always cut the figure of claimed tank kills by 50 percent.

As for Normandy the only tank loss figures we can rely on to some extent is the number of tanks totally lost by both sides, around 3,000 for the Allies and just over 1,500 for the German's.

and here we get into the same can of worms as with aircraft. Claims vs actual kills and losses from ALL causes vs combat losses.

what is even worse for tanks is just what was considered a "loss". The US in NW Europe didn't consider a tank a "loss" unless it suffered catastrophic damage or burned. A large fire ruined the heat treatment of the armor making it rather questionable. Many a "knocked out" tank had the crew's bodies removed, the inside cleaned, equipment repaired and shot holes plugged and welded and returned to service. Some tanks were back in service in just a few days.
Now if the allies suffered 3,000 "total" losses and yet held the battlefield/s and were able to recover/repair a fair number of tanks and the Germans "lost" 1500 tanks but a fair number of lightly damaged/broken down tanks are included in this it rather skews the actual day to day combat results.

 

[parsifal]

Yes, I agree, you need to get to write offs, or lost/captured to get meaningful understanding of numbers. when i say 4.3:1, thats still just an estimate. We know that the germans in battle could usually get a better exchange rate, but overall, their losses were evened out by the attrition they were suffering. it really is hard to know the precise loss rates to be honest, but most objective assessments follow the line that the germans had the advantage in battle, but the allies won in the wider dimensions of the battle....