Polish AF: preparing for 1939

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Howard Hughes had used 100 octane in 1935 to set the speed record, but in 1935 100 octane fuel cost over 10 times per gallon what 87 octane did. Everybody KNEW 100 octane was coming, they just didn't know when at an affordable price. They also didn't know exactly what kind of 100 octane fuel. The Americans were the first to use 100 octane in military planes but their "aromatics shall not exceed 2%" fuel is not going to allow the same boost/power as the British ""aromatics shall not be less than 20%" 100 octane fuel.


Well, it seems the retracting gear would be no problem then. thank you.


If they could mount a 20mm Madsen cannon AND a mg in each wing (or cannon under?) then six mgs shouldn't be a real problem. And even if stuck with four that may not be quite as bad as it might seem. Nobody had armor or self sealing tanks. Germans had few (if any?) fighters with 20mm cannon. Most 109s used in Poland had 4 mgs.
 
we should really analyse the numbers of German fighters commited to the battle to determine the numbers of PAF fighters that should be fielded. tante mentioned only 200 Bf 109s, that would seem a bit low

This is a link to Dr Niehorsters Armed Forces OOB. The two principal formations committed to the battles were LF 1 and 4. On the assumption they were fully committed I count 370 Bf 109E and 94 Bf 109D. Therer were also about 100 Me 110s. that gives the Germans almost 570 fighters overall

Order of Battle 1.9.39
 
Very interesting discussion. The unavailability of 100 Octane fuel is a bit of a moot point as there were already issues with lower grade fuels. The Poles had tremendous logistical problems during the September campaign. Fuel was in high demand and short supply, the poor infrastructure and rapid relocation from one auxiliary field to the next made the job of supplying the squadrons next to impossible. By the time the soviets invaded most of the available reserves had been depleted, what was left could not get to the units.
 
probably the best thing the PAF could have done is pick several large farms and build barn looking buildings ( hangars) on them. when they felt that attack was getting close...take off at dusk and move all their ac to these hidden strips. they had to know they would not be able to defend their airdromes against the might of the LW so why not hide them. they could have had a couple strips for each group and rotate them in a "shell game" ( yes a logistical nightmare to some degree ) from field to field. it would not have changed the outcome but might have given their AF several more days to inflict damage on the advancing germans and surprise the LW. later in the war when us bombers and fighters were targeting their airdromes germany went to hiding ac on camoflauged bases.
 
remarkably, thats pretty much what they did do. When the german attack struck, they comprehensively pasted the known airfields of the PAF. Trouble is, the PAF had largely relocated to auxiliary fields. The PAF fought well above its weight, German losses for the campaign exceeded the frontline strength of the PAF and Polish pilots emerged as the best in Europe, bar none.

What the Poles could not do, was gain air superiorityor prevent the Germans from completing their mission . The LW was an integral part of the modern method, and it undertook that role efficiently and effectively. the Poles were better pilots, but they were too badlky outnumbered and as part of the overall polish war machine were not nearly so well integrated.
 
Bringing an old thread back to life...the Polish Air Force preparing for 1939. First off, one must put yourself in the Polish mindset during the time. I might be off a little, but I do believe the British offered immediate bombing of Germany if they attacked Poland. France, promised to attack Germany within something like two weeks. At this time in France I do believe they had something like 110 divisions vs. Germany's 36. So, you can see how Poland's defense plan was...a delaying defense. They only had to hold out for a short time until the French would be in artillery range of Berlin. Now, if I was to realistically prepare Poland's forces for 1939, I would buy RADIOS!!! Putting in the planes, tanks, everywhere. I would also have fuel dumps and spare parts in southern Poland. The planes originally were not supposed to retreat to the south, so when they did, they were ill-prepared. Radios were rare in the Polish military and I would say communication all-around was one of their military's biggest problems. Other thing I would do, is blow off France and Britain when they told me not to mobilize all the troops days before the invasion; having less than half your troops mobilized when you are invaded is not a good thing. Doing these things I mentioned; as well as, France and Britain sticking to their word, Germany would've been crushed.
 

The lack of radio's wasn't the only problem the Polish army faced. The best strategy Poland could have, was to fortify behind the Vistula and hope that Stalin doesn't declare. Also, look at the Saar 'Offensive', it was a disaster. You're not going to change the outcome in Poland unless the German's make large blunders and/or France gets it together which would take an earlier POD.
 
Well documented....????

What Polish troops in Gdańsk were under mobilization ? I think the Polish Post Office and Railway members can be taken as the troops.

s. 24 March i. Poland makes a partial mobilization of troops in Danzig, contrary to the German-Polish Treaty. (1:494)

What Polish newspapers in West Prussia-Pomerania??

March i. Polish newspapers in West Prussia-Pomeralia call for a boycott of Germans: shops, market stalls, restaurants, hiring, etc. (1:555)

First of all the author should edit all spelling mistakes . "Zachód" ( West in English ) is written with "ó" in Polish but not with "u". Also the "Pomeralia" should be the Pomerania.
 




"Documented" refers to footnotes, not accuracy. I'm sure there are inaccuracies, omissions as well as questionable inferences. But Poland had been successful in the most recent military clashes and may well have been overconfident as to their military might. And, both at the beginning and at the end of the war, their expectations of help from the west were misplaced.
 
I see. However the Polish overconfidence was a kind of a propaganda mostly. In fact, the Polish Army H.Q knew well the level of the Nazi German military might and also was aware of the weakness of the own Army, etc... Therefore the attempts to the accelerated purchases of the military stuff for the Polish Armed Forces . But the most important thing was to find allies and signation of military treaties with them together. Why? Because it made an impact on the Polish military strategy for the inevitable war. The idea of including of the Soviets in a guarantee arrangement sounds let's say sounds a little bit funny. Poland would never agree for that because of "the national experience" and political differences between the two systems. One thing is true though... believing in the military treaties with the western countries led Poland to the defeat.
 


That's sort of the point. Poland exported its best fighter but couldn't afford it for its own forces. Why would Poland need much of an air force when France and Great Britain would be bring theirs to bear and draw off the LW?
 
Gloster's F.5/34 flies in 1937 all metal and while the RAF ended up not ordering it into production, shifts in foreign interest (for export or possible license) might make it more interesting, especially compared to suggestions of licensing the Gladiator or Avia B-534. If the Poles had gotten the Mercury VIII into production sooner it would be a good match for a license built Gloster monoplane. Other than that, a license built Gladiator with F.5/34 or Blenheim style cowling and variable-pitch prop might bump performance up too and possibly exchanging the underwing LMGs for Oerlikons. (the PZL P.24 seems to have already switched to variable pitch 3-blade props of a similar arrangement, as does the PZL.37)

Otherwise it seems the P.24 and Fokker D.XXI seem like the best options to pursue. (aside from new indigenous designs other than the routes they tried historically -like re-using the P.24 fusealage and mating it with a smaller area -probably somewhat thicker- low wing with retractable gear) And a D.XXI with retractable landing gear might perform similarly well to the Gloster fighter anyway if using a similar engine and propeller. (and probably be significantly cheaper)

The PZL.38 failure was mentioned early in this thread as well, and while it wasn't workable in its current form, a small twin engine heavy fighter/interceptor might have worked better if targeting more powerful engines, especially if some of the added weight was traded for optimizing around a single-seat configuration or at least a more streamlined two-seat one. (dedicated advanced radio operator like the Fw 187?) Designing around the existing mercury engines in production with possible plans to upgrade to the VIII might be useful. The Mercury VI was rated for 645 vs the variety of 420-490 air cooled V-8 and V-12 engines tested on the PZL.38. Granted those are larger, draggier engines, but the Fokker G.1 dealt with the same frontal area along with a much larger wing and more pod+boom area, so may have been significantly better performing when mated with the same 840 hp engines while more of a mystery with those 645 hp engines. If focused as a bomber destroyer, using a battery of Oerlikon FF cannons concentrated in the nose would make sense as well. (or possibly 23 mm Madsen cannons, slower firing but the belt feed and much heavier damage per round should be an advantage -lots of trade-offs depending which is easier to fit into the nose, including oerlikons with larger capacity drums)

Given the historical timing of the PZL.38's development, focusing on using the Mercury VIII from the start might make more sense. (focus on getting both the airframe and new engine into production by late 1938 )


Going with the Mercury VIII sooner seems the safe bet and fastest route while also significantly lighter than the 14N. The 14K might be useful if licensed early enough to develop further like the Italians and Romanians did. (which also seemed to be lighter than the 14N though not as powerful by 1939)

The Romanian P.24E used the 930 HP Gnome-Rhône 14Kfs or IAR K14-II C32, so those might be compelling alternate engines to consider over the Mercury VIII while similar enough in size and weight to probably be usable in most other designs targeting the 840 hp mercury. (would be relevant to both the D.XXI and alternate PZL.38 suggestions)

Any P.11 and (preferably) P.24 derivatives would be better as interim designs but likely necessary for to supplement overall numbers and worth investing in over some of the alternate military spending Parsifal noted. (including the Polish Naval build-up)

You also have the 940 hp license-built Pegasus XII engines used on the PZL.37. The 970 hp Pegasus XX is also referenced, but I'm not sure if those were license built or imported. The added drag of the Pegasus might exclude it from being interesting compared to the Mercury or 14K dervatives. In any case, it might be best to concentrate on a single engine design rather than being spread between the Mercury, Pegasus, and 14K, even if the three have a fair degree of similarity.

Finally, you've got the potential to import the Hispano 12Y but tooling up for licensed production of that would indeed seem more costly and more likely for delays than any of those radials. (it would seem the best bet drag-wise for the PZL.38 though, and perhaps offer a speed boost to the PZL.37 as well, at least without bombs -might be a 'quick' option for boosting P.24 speed too) The 12Y would have made more sense if they'd switched production over in the 1935 timeframe rather than focusing on Bristol engines.



Why not go with 2 Oerlikons in the wings and one in the engine while possibly omitting the LMGs?

Taking the existing 4x LMGs in the wings and adding 2 synchronized ones in the nose of the D.XXI seems pretty reasonable without requiring any wing modifications. (unless modifications to the wings to allow retractable gear coincided with ones making more/heavier wing guns practical -it could be the opposite though, retractable gear making it more troublesome to add/change guns)



Radios and radar would both be very useful if they had the resources to purchase such. More extensive adoption of radios seems more likely and in leu of radar, use of patrol/observation aircraft with better radios and coordinated network on the ground might be one of the more feasible options. (or possibly coupled with a limited number of radar stations ... I don't know what sort of access to RADAR technology the Poles would have had, if any though)

The PZL.37 might be good to adapt to the recon role.
 
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Not to drag up the more personal argument (or miscommunication) between you and Parsifal, but this paragraph seems to be the more relevant (and interesting) factual/historical part of that side discussion.

Humoring Germany's aspirations for an alliance against the Looming Communist Threat might have been interesting, but certainly not something to take likely let alone actually trust the Nazi government to be honor consistently ... or respectfully. (or sanely/rationally) It would involve a good deal of complicated political games to play to the Polish benefit and having any real interest in getting that close to Germany would likely require a stronger perception of real threats of invasion from Germany or the USSR.

Broadly opposing Communism would make alliances with France more complicated (possibly the UK as well) though opposing the Soviet Union and espansion more exclusively than a vague all encompassing 'Communist' threat might be more feasible. (Hitler probably wouldn't like it, but satisfying him would be impossible ... and generally insane or stupid anyway: the goal would be staying on reasonably favorable terms for as long as possible while not becoming too vulnerable)

Situations like allowing German troops and military equipment to march through Poland and line up on the Soviet boarder would be complicated at best and suicidal at worst. Being very selective about what routes were taken to minimize potential takeovers from within and maximizing potential seizure of German resources if/when any betrayal resulted seems like the ideal situation, but managing that without rousing too much German suspicion would be unlikely.

The more realistic, safe route seems like relying mostly on supplemental German resources more like the Finns did in Opposing Russia. A Poland-Finnish-Baltic alliance might be more useful and universal and one with potential to stand up against Soviet and Nazi betrayal. (while possibly retaining more Neutral support from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands, possibly France and Brittain, and other countries) And alliance along the Baltic coast could potentially starve out Russian shipping trade as well. I'm not sure if Romania or the Slavic States would be more likely to actively support an alliance in Soviet opposition or more neutral economic/material support. (given Romania Allied with Germany, the former seems likely there at least) Romania's shared boarder with Poland would also be significant, as would the immediate Soviet threat posed by the Russian boarder. (cooperation with Romania would also make the 14K derived engines the more attractive designs to focus on along with license producing the IAR.80/81)

So you delay/prevent the 1939 Invasion of Poland and have more concentrated support to Finland during the Winter War, possibly with conflicts in the Baltic states to push back the Soviets there as well.



On a more idealistic alternate history point: you also keep Poland as a more free haven for Jewish refugees from German-held territories, and a more accepting one than many other European countries were in 1939. (plus more potential time for migration before Hitler's Final Solution starts to come into full swing, particularly with the war on and boarders closed -which also might not happen if the Polish Invasion is avoided/delayed)


And one thought on Finland: the Fokker D.XXI also seems like one of the more attractive options to produce under license with that country's limited resources along with potential to develop it further. (a modified license built D.XXI might have also developed into something a good deal more useful than the VL Myrsky ended up being a good deal later)
 
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Balljoint said:
That's sort of the point. Poland exported its best fighter but couldn't afford it for its own forces. Why would Poland need much of an air force when France and Great Britain would be bring theirs to bear and draw off the LW?
Click to expand...

According to the military treaties with France and Great Britain , Poland was obliged to make the Nazi German Army busy at the East in order to give allies some of time for getting start of their own actions against Hitler's Third Reich. Would Poland need much of an air force? I don't think Poland would need that. Just the Polish AF needed to replace the worn out stuff with a new one. The economical abilities didn't allow Polish AF to have more than 600 or maybe 700 planes of all types. However the small number could be compensated by better training of pilots and the better quality of flying stuff. Unfortunately getting of both these things requires quite a lot of time and money, the Poland already didn't have. However the training of Polish pilots was excellent what the September Campaign showed.

As far as the export of the best Polish fighter is concerned.... the PZL P-24 was much better than the P-11 , that's true. However the plane was designed just for the export only. The reason for that was the income for the PZL factory. The Polish Airforce was going to replace the P-11c type with PZL.50 Jastrząb that was going to become the basic fighter plane in 40'. To be honest , the design works for a P-11 successor were in progress from 1936. Initailly it was going to be a two-engine plane PZL.38 Wilk. But the project was ginven up because of technical problems with engines and the high production costs. Unfortunately the works on the PZL.50 Jastrząb got delaying because of a couple of different reasons including too weak motor, too heavy fuselage structure and an incorrect airfoil of the wing. Additionally the design engineer of the Jastrząb, W. Jakimiuk , got involved in PZL.44 Wicher design and build. So the farther works on Jastrząb had to be postponed or slowed down for a year.
 
Poland made mistakes concerning its appraisals of german capabilities but its a big stretch to argue they were over-confident. The biggest mistake was under-estimating the effects of Blitzkrieg, and also under-estimating just how effective the LW ground strikes would be. Their own defences were mostly ouflanked and then the final straw was the attack by the Russians into areas they had intended to retreat to.

Poland was forced to adopt a forward defence strategy west of the Vistula, because most of its industries were located close to the German / Polish frontier. They also needed to try and keep the corridor to Danzig open in the forlorn hope that resupply could be made from the west through the port of Danzig. The Poles hoped to hold a line for three month, using their frontier fortifications to hold the assaulting German army and hook into their flanks with their excellent cavalry. They were caught off guard however, because they had not completed their mobilization by the time of the German attack. It was expected they could hold out for at least three months, and in that time the westerm allies would put enough pressure on the Germans to force them to the negotiating table. In the air the Poles thought they could exact enough attrition on the LW to make it unprofitable for the germans to attack them. They passed over the Pzl-24, an export version of slightly better performance to their own Pzl-11s because they miscalculated how quickly the Germans would move on them, and were hanging out for the service delivery of the Pzl-50 and some foreign imports. They needed to remain open to business with other countries to bolster their meagre cash reserves.
A cool short video on the protypes the Poles were working on in 1939

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BaqhlXhFuuw


and also some visual of the Polish AFVs being considered, or adopted post war.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QUxktG0q7wI
 
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Well said Michael. But just a small correction regarding the corridor to Gdańsk and the resupply that could be made from the west through the port. In fact Gdańsk wasn't Polish at that time. Practically it was a German city from 1938 and even earlier. The port that could be used for delivering western supplies was Gdynia that was a Polish port.
 

No Würger, Danzig was a "free city" but was a de facto Polish puppet.
 
Man, I have never heard a such nonsense. Initially it was so-called "free-city" where both the German and Polish residents lived together quite peacefully. Since Hitler and his NSDAP got power in the Germany , the fascism of the city started. In 1934 there were 408 000 city dwellers. Most of them were Gremans, Poles were a part of about , different sources say 3-15%. In 1938 Nazis took the full control over the city. The official joining to the Third Reich took place on the 1st September 1939 on the day of the Nazi attack on Poland.
 

Yes, the city was ethnically German, but was still controlled by Poland. There's a reason why the Nazi's demanded Danzig to be annexed by Germany and didn't just take it.
 
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